Obama’s decision to replace the US commander in Afghanistan places political considerations ahead of military ones

June 24 2010

“By some accounts,” reports a profile in the current issue of Rolling Stone, “McChrystal’s career should have been over at least two times by now.” That same profile is the reason why General Stanley McChrystal, commander of Nato’s forces in Afghanistan, tendered his resignation to Barack Obama on Tuesday, and why, yesterday, the President accepted it. Third time unlucky.

With his well-publicised eight-mile runs, four hours’ sleep and special forces background, General McChrystal styles himself as an ascetic warrior monk, but also seems to have a vain eye for his own myth. The most damaging comments were all made by the general’s aides, not the man himself. But they did display an abrasive culture of disrespect for the Commander-in-Chief and his civilian Administration. General McChrystal’s inner circle would appear to have been dangerously close to forgetting for whom they fight, and why.

All of this is reason enough for the general to have offered his resignation. But President Obama should not have accepted it. In doing so, he appeared prepared to sacrifice military success on the altar of political expediency. General McChrystal is the author of the troop surge in Afghanistan, and the driving force behind recent efforts to avoid civilian casualties. This is not only the most coherent and enlightened battle plan that this messy war has yet produced. It is also America’s best hope of extracting itself in anything approaching the timetable that Mr Obama has set.

The general himself, it is true, does not emerge from this profile as a particularly enlightened figure. His gung-ho dedication to his work is such that he has spent fewer than 30 days with his wife in any year since the start of the Iraq war. His language is crude, and his assessment of others, even his superiors, is blunt. He has a habit of arriving, unannounced, in the bullet-ridden trenches of infantrymen. His men adore him.

The criticisms vented by the general and his aides are the criticisms that soldiers make of politicians. Joe Biden, the Vice-President, is derided as unrealistic; Karl Eikenberry, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, as overly concerned with his own reputation; President Obama himself as militarily inexperienced. Moreover, these and other criticisms are not without merit. General Jim Jones, a Cold War veteran, may indeed be “stuck in 1985”. It is not unreasonable to liken Richard Holbrooke, the Special Representative to Afghanistan, to “a wounded animal”, thrashing around because he fears for his position. Much as these remarks should not have been made in public, the President must listen to them.

Similarly, Mr Obama must consider the bigger picture, and ask himself whether the McChrystal plan, impressive as it is, is actually working. The fear must be that Washington is too concerned about the relationship between civilian and military authority, and not concerned enough about the challenges faced by troops on the ground.

The United Kingdom is not a disinterested onlooker in all this. Much British blood has been spilt in Afghanistan as a significant part of the Isaf coalition. Its deputy commander is the British Lieutenant-General Sir Nick Parker. Until yesterday he worked hand in glove with General McChrystal. This episode serves as an unhappy reminder of the extent to which our Forces are tied to the fortunes of a troubled US president.

The only silver lining to this sorry cloud is the appointment of General David Petraeus as General McChrystal’s replacement. This is a political masterstroke by Mr Obama (the general is tipped by some Republicans as a future presidential candidate himself) but also a sound military decision. General Petraeus was the architect of the 2007 troop surge that snatched triumph from stagnated disaster in Iraq. It is to be hoped that he can pull off the same trick again.

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