Turmoil in Middle East and Pakistan
By Izzud-Din Pal
Sunday 3 April ,2011

WINDS of change are blowing in the Arab West Asia and North Africa. Many commentators have been speculating that the unrest would remain confined to the region. Whether Pakistan would be spared from this kind of large scale popular revolt is an issue that calls for a separate examination, given its fragile social and political system and almost a stagnant economy. The relevant question now is that as the new Middle East evolves how this will affect the country`s relations with the region.

In recent years, Pakistan has been drifting away from its South Asian roots towards the Arab Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. It all started with Z.A. Bhutto, with his Islamic Summit and the Islamic bomb in search of a new strategy for improving security of the country. This was followed by General Ziaul Haq with his dream of establishing a commonwealth of Muslim states with him as its chief patron.

As a consequence, school textbooks were revised to emphasise the (Arab) Islamic connection. Pakistan`s history now began with Muhammad bin Qasim, not Mohenjo Daro and Harrapa. A stadium was named after Muammar Qadhafi as well as a big mosque named after Faisal in Islamabad to show the nation`s regard for this link. (Of course, there is a Persianised Shahra-e- Quaed-i-Azam in Lahore to test the vocal chords of the average Pakistani. No wonder that `The Mall` continues to be the popular name for the busy central link. Why not just Jinnah Road?) Also Pakistan has been a source of skilled and unskilled labour supply to many countries in the Middle East, and a policy of offering agricultural land to the Gulf princes has been pursued by all political parties in power.

The Middle East policy may be explained partly in the context of the India-centric strategy. But the cost of promoting this pseudo-weltanchauung is astronomical, as it ignores the reality of geography, of Muslim South Asian heritage in religion, culture, literature, philosophy and arts, linking all the centres from Aligarh, Nadva, Lucknow, Delhi to Lahore. And the contributions made by the well-known sbelowufis, for bringing to the subcontinent the message of Islam, is as much part of Pakistan as of Muslims of India, as their popular landmark mausoleums remind us.

During the so-called decade of democracy, Benazir Bhutto made use of Umra diplomacy to keep in touch with the Saudis. Newaz Sharif has not been far behind in his enthusiasm about the Arab link. Compulsory teaching of Arabic in the educational institutions, for example, to familiarise students with the Quranic Arabic is one thing; it is quite another to require Arabic as a modern language; the two do not necessarily connect with each other for religious transformation. No wonder, the attempt at Arabisation being made in Pakistan has been laughed at by many scholars in the Middle East.

The current situation in the Middle East should persuade the people at the helm of affairs to rethink about this false endeavour. Whatever pattern the current revolution will take, it is reasonable to argue that with the passage of time, the Middle East will never be the same again. To stem this tide the Saudi monarchy, for example, is beginning to sense the danger, but does not realise that offering stipends and subsidies will not meet the basic needs of the younger generation. Nor will the tokenism to introduce municipal self-government. Then, there are questions about human rights, not only for the Shia minority but for women as well. The country needs social and economic reconstruction.

The monarchy has strong grip on the country, and whether it will survive beyond the present aging king is a question mark. In the meantime, they use Wahabism to legitimise the regime and offer assistance and subsidies for oil exports to other Muslim countries including Pakistan to win friendships abroad. They have boosted their security by having US troops stationed in the country. In spite of these measures they do not seem to be quite sure how they will adjust to a new Middle East as it begins to take shape.

In the meantime, they will try to defend the status quo in Bahrain, where their troops are now stationed to support the Sunni al-Khalifa family ruling over Shia majority. If the Shias should win there, this would have repercussions in regard to their own Shia population, and will also boost Iran`s position. Similarly, inYemen, the president who has ruled the country for 32 years with an iron grip is getting support to resist change.

Egypt, not Saudi Arabia, holds a unique position in the Middle East and is destined to play an important role in the final outcome in the region. How the revolution will play out in that country is difficult to answer. The movement can be in danger of getting compromised if elections are either too early or too late. And then the part the Muslim Brotherhood would play would have a significant effect on the political structure which will replace the system developed by Hosnie Mubarak. At present the party is engaged in a vigorous internal debate about democracy and its place in the new political system in the country. It is important to note as well that with Mubarak removed from the scene, there will be no status quo ante for Israel.

Looking at the rest of the Middle East, Algeria has an authoritarian regime and at present is living through a post-civil war trauma, which was bloody and cost around 200,000 casualties. Last month the government lifted the state of emergency. Morocco seems to have escaped this windstorm, with an accommodating monarchy and a stable political system. Jordan is trying to contain its own unrest. The current main trouble spots then are Libya and Syria.

There are two notable regional players, Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have direct stake in the changes which are taking place in the Middle East. And in the international arena, what role the US (and Nato) as well as China plan to pursue will have an important impact on the situation. All four of them have over-lapping and conflicting objectives. Middle East has always been an arena for this kind of diplomatic game.

The US, for example, supports stability in Yemen and Bahrain from the point of view of its security. In Libya, however, it agreed to start the no-fly zone (euphemism to deny state of war) provided there was regional support for it. This was offered by the Arab League, where Saudi Arabia is an important member. In the Nato, Turkey is a reluctant ally and supports an early ceasefire. If this should come to pass, then Libya would become a divided country, with rebels holding on to the areas on which they have gained effective control. How would China view this development will depend on how it can save its interest in Libyan oil, though it must be worried about the tottering of Middle East dominoes, representing authoritarian doctrines.

Syria has been under a secular, single-party Ba`athist rule with Bashar al-Assad as president. His father, Hafez al-Assad established the regime with liberalised but state-dominated economy, broadly on Chinese model. Relatives of the Assad family pervade the government and dominate the economy. Ba`athist party has a strong grip on Syrian politics. Hafez al-Assad, for example, is known for having ruthlessly suppressed a revolt by Muslim Brotherhood when he bombed the city of Hama to kill about 35,000 people in 1982. Bashar inherited the notorious emergency laws from his father`s regime after his father`s death in 2000. The civilian campaign is focused on these emergency laws. Turkey`s Recep Tayyib Erdigan has advised Basha`ar al-Assad to implement the reforms without delay.

Stakes are high concerning stability of Syria for Iran, a strategic ally of the country. It is through Syrian conduit that the Shia groups in Beirut get support from Iran, and Hamas is also a direct beneficiary of this arrangement.

One could safely assume that Saudi Arabia is not going to escape the winds of change blowing across the entire Arab World. It would be in the interests of Pakistan, as a South Asian nation, to recognise and support the emerging progressive forces in the Middle East, and not endorse the reactionary status quo seekers loaded with petro-dollar diplomacy.

The writer is a retired professor.