The summer offensive
A coordination mechanism for Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Nato forces is imperative with a view to developing a joint strategy to push back the present Taliban offensive.
By Khadim Hussain
AS per its announce ment, the Taliban mili tia has launched its summer offensive from the western side of Barawal, Upper Dir, which borders the Afghanistan province of Kunar.
The onslaught of the Taliban militia started on June 1, targeting the local security check post and indis criminately killing several dozen people of Barawal on the Pakistan-Afghanistan bor der. Keeping in view the reports that Swat Taliban leader Fazlullah had crossed over to Kunar after his militia was contained in Swat, the Taliban offensive must be seen in a larger strategic con text. Five points are worth considering in the analysis of the present onslaught.
To begin with, the presence of the militia in three areas in Upper and Lower Dir in the west of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has already been reported: the Osherai pass that links Swat with Upper Dir, Barawal that borders with Afghanistan’s Kunar province and the Maidan area of Lower Dir that borders with Bajaur Agency of northern Fata. Fazlullah and his high-profile commanders are believed to have fled from Swat during the military’s offensive against the Taliban via the pass of Osherai and crossed over to Afghanistan through Barawal. Second, the local lashkar of Amandara in Upper Dir had pushed the Taliban to Barawal and beyond in a severe gun battle last year. Local people claim to have seen the militia moving on the hills of Osherai and Barawal since then.
Third, the Taliban’s present offensive seems to be indiscriminate, focused on creating fear among the people of the locality. Analysts have already pointed out that isolating a community through destroying state and communication infrastructure and the indiscriminate killing of common people are tactics the Taliban have usually employed over the years to gain social control of a particular community and to force people to give up resistance.
Fourth, several of the commanders of the militant militia active in Malakand division in recent years have a detailed knowledge and understanding of the mountainous tracks and local communities since the late 1980s and early 1990s. That was when several militant adventurers moved to the intractable areas of Malakand division and established networks with the local militia of the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-iMohammadi (TNSM). The TNSM had succeeded in bringing the entire state machinery in Malakand division to a standstill back in 1994, occupying the hills of Malakand, Karakar (Buner) and Swat (Matta and Mingora).
Fifth, the militant religious movement in Malakand division has created a circle of public support and sympathy among the local communities since 1989. A section of the youth in Malakand division has been militarily trained by the militia. Not all of them may have been either arrested or killed by the security agencies.
The above analytical framework allows one to assume that the present offensive in Barawal, Upper Dir, by the Taliban militia is a precursor of a continued battle between the security forces and the Taliban for the social and administrative control of Malakand division after high-profile targets were hit by drone predators in Fata. Moreover, the debate on a military operation in North Waziristan may have triggered the present offensive by the Taliban.
It seems unlikely that the alliance between the leadership of Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and militant organisations of other national and transnational groups might simply be waiting for the Pakistani artillery, infantry and air force to hit them in North Waziristan. Yet, the alliance might need some more time to dissipate into the Kurram, Orakzai and Khyber agencies.
The present offensive in Upper Dir might also be analysed along the lines that the alliance mentioned above may be looking for another familiar and well-trodden safe haven in the shape of Malakand division. If this proposition is in any way close to reality, it is likely that the militia might occupy the upper mountainous range of the Hindu Kush and take over social control of adjacent communities.
If they succeed in doing this, they may be able to hold back the security forces for a long time and allow the alliance’s leadership time in which to keep moving back and forth, carrying out formidable assaults on Nato and Pakistani security agencies.
The strategy to combat the Taliban’s present offensive for the social control of Malakand division should have certain constituents.
First, state intelligence agencies working under both the civilian and military leadership must develop a coordination mechanism for swapping information on a regular basis. The vulnerable infiltrating points from the north and the west, especially Barawal, Osherai and Maidan, must be properly and regularly monitored.
Second, local resistance to the Taliban must be owned and streamlined by state agencies so that ‘warlordism’ does not raise its head as another monster which the state must fight.
Third, an effective and timely strategic communication system must be developed as early as possible to defeat the Taliban propaganda. For this to happen, local civil society organisations, academia and media persons must be engaged as they understand the components of the Taliban propaganda and can easily render it ineffective.
Fourth, insurgency and terrorism must be dealt with. The security forces have to hit all the suspected infiltration points as well as suspected safe havens up in the hills of Malakand division. This must happen before the Taliban militia makes space for itself and dissipates among the local population. Time and the ease of movement shall play an important role in the success and failure of the present Taliban offensive.
The security forces’ counter-offensive may result in more attacks on the urban centres of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata, hence the importance of the state intelligence agencies. Crucially, it is now imperative to establish a coordination mechanism between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Nato forces in Afghanistan with a view to developing a joint strategy to push back the present Taliban offensive. ¦ The writer is a researcher and political analyst.
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Source: The summer offensive