Pakistan in peril
By
Javid Husain
Pakistan is steadily being sucked into a vortex of internal and external threats, which, if not handled properly, carry the possibility of dire consequences for the future of the country. Externally, the country faces a threatening situation on its western frontier because of the continued fighting in Afghanistan between the US-led forces and the Taliban with both Washington and the Afghan government alleging ISI’s support to the Taliban. The charge levelled by Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, on September 22 that the Haqqani group, which had carried out an attack on the US Embassy and other targets in Kabul about a week earlier, was a “veritable arm of ISI” was the latest example of the mistrust which persists between Pakistan and the US. The admiral also threatened action against the Haqqani group, if it continued killing the US troops. More recently, the Afghan authorities have alleged that the plot to assassinate former Afghan President, Burhanuddin Rabbani, was hatched in Quetta with the involvement of ISI.
Of course, Pakistan has denied these charges and declared its unequivocal support to the restoration of durable peace in Afghanistan through an Afghan-led process. The unexpectedly strong Pakistani reaction has forced the White House to moderate its stance. The White House spokesman refused to endorse the language used by Admiral Mullen while reiterating that the Haqqani network’s continuing safe havens on Pakistani soil and the links between the Pakistani military and the Haqqani network were troubling for the US. President Barack Obama himself pointed out on September 30 that the intelligence about the relationship between the network and ISI was not very clear. However, the US pressure on Pakistan to “do more” to deny safe havens to the Haqqani network continues, as do the efforts by both Islamabad and Washington to defuse the tensions, which had been created by Mullen’s charges. The question, which still remains unanswered, is how far the US is prepared to go to implement its threats against the Haqqani network.
Internally, Pakistan is mired in serious economic difficulties marked by economic stagnation, high rates of inflation and unemployment, and widespread poverty. The energy crisis keeps getting worse by the day. Rampant corruption and blatant violations of the law of the land on the part of the high and the mighty have generated feelings of despondency and helplessness among the masses. Terrorism shows no sign of abatement. The federal government has virtually abdicated its responsibilities of ensuring the security of the masses, promoting economic growth and looking after the welfare of people. The rich are getting richer, while the poor are being drowned in the rising tide of unemployment and inflation.
The challenges facing the nation internally and externally demand a carefully formulated strategy enjoying the support of the people of Pakistan and various stakeholders. The All Parties Conference (APC) held on September 29 was the first attempt to work out such a strategy. It demonstrated national unity in the rejection of the US allegations against Pakistan. Beyond that, the conference called for increased emphasis on peace and reconciliation, presumably both in our tribal areas and in Afghanistan. It urged the initiation of dialogue to negotiate peace with our own people in the tribal areas. Significantly, it also underlined the importance of the policy of self-reliance as well as the need to carry out economic reforms and curb corruption. While these recommendations were in the right direction, it is unclear whether the federal government has the resolve and the capacity to implement them.
The most vexing and urgent foreign policy issue facing us right now concerns Afghanistan. Unfortunately, since the days of Ziaul Haq and the Afghan jihad of 1980’s, this issue has become the exclusive preserve of the Pakistan Army and ISI. This remained the case even after the restoration of democracy in 1988. The overemphasis on the military, as against the diplomatic aspects of our Afghan policy, led to serious blunders whose price the nation is still paying both internally and externally.
One of these blunders was the blind support that Pakistan extended to the Taliban from 1995 to 9/11 in enabling them to consolidate their control over most of Afghanistan and the rejection of overtures from Iran, which was supporting the Northern Alliance in 1998 and early 2001 for a compromise solution of the armed conflict in Afghanistan. These decisions isolated Pakistan at regional and international levels, tarnished the image of Pakistan, severely damaged Pakistan-Iran relations, and intensified the tidal wave of extremism and terrorism sweeping the country. The responsibility for these decisions lay squarely with the army and ISI, which were in charge of our Afghanistan policy. However, the leadership of our Foreign Office during that period must share its own part of the blame for submitting tamely to the military’s diktat.
Afghanistan’s history since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 provides ample evidence, if any evidence was needed, that durable peace in the country requires a broadbased government in which the various ethnic communities, including the Pakhtuns, the Tajiks, the Hazaras and others have their due share in power. Thus, neither the Taliban, who are mostly Pakhtuns, alone nor the present political dispensation in Afghanistan from which the Pakhtuns feel alienated can restore durable peace in the country. The Americans, therefore, must initiate negotiations with the Taliban without any preconditions if they wish to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan gracefully leaving behind a peaceful and stable country. Pakistan must also impress upon the Taliban the imperative of a negotiated solution leading to the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of a broadbased government in the country. Pakistan should not repeat the mistakes of pre-9/11 period in Afghanistan and should disabuse the Taliban of the notion that they alone can rule the country.
The American attempt to bludgeon the Taliban into submission through military means is doomed to failure. The military effort in Afghanistan must be accompanied by political initiatives to open the doors for national reconciliation and a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. It also follows that Pakistan’s role must be limited to encouraging the Taliban to go to the negotiating table in the interest of durable peace in Afghanistan. Thereafter, the Afghans themselves must take charge of their destiny free from foreign interference. Further, it does not make any sense for us to launch military operations against the supporters of the Afghan Taliban in our tribal areas, while we are encouraging the Afghan parties to go to the negotiating table. We must, however, distinguish between the Afghan Taliban, who constitute a legitimate Afghan political group struggling for power in Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda which is, undoubtedly, a terrorist organisation with international agenda. Our cooperation with the US to root out Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist groups should be continued with greater vigour than before.
In short, our Afghan policy should be rooted in an objective analysis of the ground realities, continued diplomatic engagement with the US and abstinence from provocations. The policy of self-reliance is a prerequisite for such a policy. It remains to be seen whether our political leadership has the sagacity and courage to come to grips with the internal and external challenges confronting the nation. Their failure to do so, and rid the country of corruption and the economic ills from which it is suffering, will condemn it to irrelevance in the emerging global scenario.