Quaid’s Shift from Unity Stance to Separation (1)

By Muhammad Yasir Kayani

Maulana Muhammad Ali is reported to have said at the end of his life: "I learnt Islam from Abul Kalam Azad and Iqbal --- one pulls me in one direction, and the other points to the opposite way". Ultimately he gravitated towards the viewpoint of the poet, but the man who did most to give a concrete shape to the political vision of Iqbal was another Muhammad Ali, whose transformation, through a painful process, from being an accredited "Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity" to the most thorough going championship of Muslim separatism completely altered the course of Indian history.

One important role which Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah played in the politics of India was for the achievement of the Hindus and Muslims unity by bringing about some understanding between the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. In fact, for more than two decades Quaid-e-Azam was known for this role than for any other. It will be recalled that Gopal Krishna Gokhale expressed the view that Jinnah had true stuff in him and that freedom from all sectarian prejudices which would make him as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.

Mrs. Sarojini Naidu called him 'An Ambassador of Unity' and wrote that Jinnah stood approved and confirmed by his countrymen not merely as an ambassador but as an embodied symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity. Similarly, Jawahar Lal Nehru wrote in 1936 that Quaid had been largely responsible in the past for bringing the Muslim League close to the Congress.

Few Indians remember that People Jinnah Hall was built to honour the fearless leadership of Bombay's most inspiring ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. Jinnah continued to work for the unity with the Hindus and until he was convinced early in 1940 that the Hindu leaders were not at all ready for any kind of understanding.

Quaid-e-Azam went to England for law education at the early age of 16 and stayed there for about four years. At that time liberalism was very much in the air in England and Quaid-e-Azam, who frequently visited the British Parliament, showed particular interest in the speeches of liberal leader like W.E. Gladstone and John Morley. Amongst the prominent Indians with whom he developed close relations in the early years of his political career were Surrendranath Banerje, Dadabhai Naoroji and Gokhale. Jinnah described Banerje as his leader. Surely, his association with such liberal leaders could not have generated any communal feelings in him.

Quaid was first elected to Imperial Council from a constituency reserved for the Muslims of Bombay and he first established his reputation as a legislator by piloting the Muslim Wolf Validating Bill. But it should be noted that at that time he was a member of Congress and not of Muslim League.

In fact, as the Agha Khan pointed out, “when in 1906 the Muslim leaders asked the Governor General, Lord Minto, for separate voting registers, Jinnah was the only well-known Muslim who came out in bitter hostility towards all that me and my friends had done and were trying to do".

During the next few years, Quaid’s thinking did not undergo any change, for at the 1910 session of the Congress, he was the "Prime mover" of the resolution deprecating the application or extension of the principle of separate representation to local bodies. Quaid was also a member of the Congress delegation that was to wait upon the Governor General to place before him the Congress viewpoint about separate electorates.

Quaid’s association with the Muslim League began as late as December 1912 but he joined the League in 1913 on the condition that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interests would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated, i.e. freedom of India. Owing to his liberal views, Quaid thought that he was ideally suited to bring about unity between the Hindu and the Muslim. He worked to bring about an understanding between the Congress and the League at a conference of Hindu-Muslim leaders at Allahabad in January 1911. He is reported to be present as a sort of "cross bencher" at this conference. Unfortunately, nothing resulted from it. Muslim leaders, however, remained anxious for an understanding between the two communities.

When the partition of Bengal was undone, more and more Muslim leaders began to realise that an understanding with the Hindus was very much in the interest of the Muslims. He also believed that the union of the two communities in India is absolutely necessary for the purpose of India. Therefore, even after Quaid had joined the League in the autumn of 1913, his activities continued on the non-communal lines.

It is necessary to note that his contribution at the League session held in December 1913 was to move a resolution for the reconstitution of the Council of the Secretary of State of India and to intervene in the debate on the resolution for separate representation in the local bodies by urging that the consideration of the resolution should be postponed for a year. The Congress fully understood Quaid's position and in 1914 included him in the delegation which was sent to London to ask for the reconstitution of the Secretary of the State Council.

For bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity, he found this opportunity late in 1915, when it became known that the Congress would hold its annual session at Bombay in December. Quaid then played a leading role in persuading the League leaders to hold the annual session of the League also at Bombay at the same time. The League leaders agreed and largely at the initiative of Jinnah, a special effort was made to create an atmosphere of cordiality between the two communities by inviting several prominent Congress leaders to the League session.

Quaid's most valuable contribution to this session was his resolution that a committee be formed to finalise a scheme for reforms and that the said committee is authorised to confer with political and other organisations on committee if any, appointed by such organisations as they deemed fit. The resolution was approved by the session and the Congress reciprocated by naming a committee to confer with the League's committee.

In December 1916 the Muslim League and the Congress held their annual sessions simultaneously at Lucknow and approved of the joint scheme prepared by their committees which later became famous as “Lucknow Pact”. In Indian dismal constitutional history, it represents the only period when Hindus and Muslims came to agreed conclusions about their future.

Though the poet was not satisfied with the Muslim viewpoint yet Quaid felt satisfied with it because it had brought about the understanding for which he had been so anxious. Had his efforts to deal directly with Montagu not been sabotaged by the government of India and its Black Rowlatt Acts, the years of tragedy that were to ensure in the wake of the war need not have derailed the process of responsible transfer of power set so patiently in motion by Britain's two greatest liberal secretaries of state John Morley and Edwin Montagu.

In March 1919, Quaid resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council as a protest against the passing of Rowlatt Act. He, however, was not in sympathy with the methods advocated by Mahatma Gandhi to deal with the new situation and had his first public difference with him over the change of the constitution of the Home Rule League. He resigned from the League now renamed Swaraj Sabha.

Quaid was a member of the Congress and he had been working for Hindu-Muslim unity. But this dual membership ended in December 1920. On the occasion of its special session at Nagpur the Congress adopted a new creed which permitted the use of unconstitutional means and decided to resort to non-violent, non-cooperative for the attainment of self-rule.

He was not opposed to agitation or even putting more pressure on the government, but disturbed the destructive methods which did not take account of human nature and which might slip out of control at any time.

He was convinced and did not hesitate to tell Gandhi directly that your way is the wrong way: mine is the right way---The constitutional way is the right way. He warned them openly of the futility of their battle plan, told them honestly of the havoc he correctly anticipated would be unleashed by and against the suddenly politicised masses. But this voice of practical statesmanship was no heeded and Jinnah walked away not only out of the Congress session but from the Congress party as well. Safely removed from the fray, he watched as violence and stupidity stirred up dark clouds of public rage and official repression.

He however, continued his efforts to achieve some understanding between the Hindu and Muslim leaders. Early in 1922, he played a leading role in convening all parties' conference which asked for a roundtable meeting between the government and the Congress on Khilafat, self government and other issues. The revival of Hindu Mahasaba, however, forced him to make the League more active so that it could become a representative body of the Muslims. But his passion for Hindu-Muslim unity did not subside.

Speaking at the annual session of the League in May 1924, Jinnah repeated his usual argument, "---- we must not forget that one essential requisite condition to achieve Swaraj is political unity between the Hindus and the Mohamedans; for the advent of foreign rule and its continuance in India, is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and Mohamedans are not united and do not sufficiently trust each other. I am almost inclined to say that India will get Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus and Mohammadans are united. Sawaraj is an almost interchangeable term with Hindu-Muslim unity.”

In December 1924, at the Bombay session of the League, Quaid and other Muslim leaders tried to recreate the atmosphere of 1915. Prominent Hindu leaders were invited to this session. But the Hindu leaders did not make any move to win the confidence of the Muslims and in 1926, Quaid had to complain that the Congress position with regard to the Muslim demands was far from reassuring.

Even so, at the League session held in December, he moved a resolution which inter alia, provided for the appointment of a committee to formulate a scheme, so far as possible, in consultation with a committee or committees that may be appointed by other political organisations for the submission to the Royal Commission when it is appointed. In moving this resolution, he said:

"We desire nothing but justice and fairness and I assure you that if we, the two communities, can settle our differences, it will be more than half the battle for responsible government won.”

In March 1927, Quaid made a new move for bringing about an understanding between the Hindus and the Muslims. He then persuaded a number of Muslim leaders to be flexible on the issue of separate electorates. Meeting at Delhi, the Muslim leaders agreed to a formula which provided for joint electorates on certain conditions. This formula looked so reasonable to the Congress leaders that All India Congress Committee which met in May, approved it and later in the year the plenary session of the Congress ratified it.

Quaid's efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity had not received the response which they deserved but he preserved. Soon the appointment of the Simon Commission provided him an opportunity for making another bid for the success of his mission. He joined hands with Congress in boycotting the commission and tolerated a complete split within the Muslim League to be able to follow a common policy with the Indian National Congress.

But the constitution framed by the committee appointed by the non co-operating parties (known as the Nehru Report) was not satisfactory from Quaid's viewpoint. In a bid to make the report acceptable to the Muslims, Jinnah proposed certain amendments to it at the Convention of the parties which were held at Calcutta in December 1928.

Source: Quaid's Shift from Unity Stance to Separation (1)