Afghanistan — what will happen after the Americans leave?

By Najmuddin A Shaikh

At this time when all branches of government appear to be consumed by a contrived political crisis, it is perhaps a bit much for ordinary Pakistanis to expect that our politicians and our security establishment will pay the required degree of attention to developments in Afghanistan including notably the decision of the Taliban to open an office in Qatar and to be prepared to use that office for negotiations with the Americans. And yet, this development and the hope it offers of some measure of peace and stability being restored in Afghanistan is of greater significance for Pakistan’s own peace and stability than all the political shenanigans and manipulations in Islamabad — shenanigans that have made us the laughing stock of the world with both friends and adversaries not knowing what to make of our descent into virtual chaos.

Let us consider the following: The withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan by 2014 is a virtual certainty. It is possible that the Americans will abandon the plan to retain a military presence after 2014 because Afghan President Hamid Karzai is setting what the Americans regard as impossible conditions and more importantly, as the withdrawal from Iraq shows, there is no stomach in Washington for continued foreign entanglement. Counterterrorism will still remain a focus but the epicentre of this is now perceived to be in Pakistan’s tribal areas and in Yemen and Somalia and the preferred tool will be drones and other means that do not involve ‘boots on the ground’.

All the brave words at the Bonn Conference about sustained support for Afghanistan and the probable repetition of the pledges made there at the forthcoming meetings in Kabul, Chicago and Tokyo notwithstanding it is unlikely that the international community will provide the $10 billion annually for a decade or more which President Karzai believes his country will need to maintain the newly-created Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and to sustain an economy in which currently at least 60-70 per cent of economic activity is dependent on the foreign presence. Today, it is calculated that despite the inflow of foreign funds the unemployment or underemployment figure in Afghanistan hovers around 40 per cent. The economic downturn and foreign aid shortfall will mean that the ANSF will be reduced in size and unemployment will climb sharply at least in the short- and medium-term because it will take a decade or more before Afghanistan’s mineral wealth can be exploited sufficiently well to make a substantial difference to Afghanistan’s economic fortunes.

So we can expect that to the dangerous mix of warlords, drug traffickers, transport mafias and extortionists that exists in Afghanistan today will be added demobilised soldiers whose only qualification would be the ability to wield a gun. The security guards, similarly trained, who will become unemployed once the large number of security firms is wound up, will provide a further addition. In these circumstances, I calculate that even if there is reconciliation there will be some two million Afghans who will seek economic refuge in Pakistan adding to the five million who are here already. If there is no reconciliation then there will be an influx of some five million or more and they will come not only from the south and the east but also from the north and with them they will bring the ethnic differences that will be a fundamental element in preventing reconciliation.

Let us not believe that these economic refugees will be evenly divided between us and Afghanistan’s other neighbours. All other neighbours have well-defined and relatively well-guarded borders. We, as a ‘soft’ nation with undefined borders and ties of kinship, have always been regarded as the primary asylum providers. Iran may appear attractive to some refugees but the Iranians are putting up effective barriers and are even now working on reducing the number of refugees already on their soil. We, on the other hand, despite the political and economic cost have accepted the UNHCR fiat that the refugee camps dotted around our side of the border cannot be shifted to Afghanistan and not even the most brazen of our spokespersons will claim that we exercise any genuine control over the camps.

Such an influx will mean that the demographic imbalance in the dangerously divided province of Balochistan will be further exacerbated and our already tenuous hold on our tribal areas will be further attenuated. Almost certainly in search of employment these refugees will find their way to Karachi, Lahore and other major metropolitan centres, which are already finding it difficult to cope with the ethnic and sectarian strife that has become part of our social landscape.

If there is reconciliation it is possible that at least some measure of assistance will become available to cope with the two million refugees we should expect. There will also be the hope that as conditions improve in Afghanistan, these refugees will return to their homes and will take with them some of the five million who are already here. If there is no reconciliation and five million political and economic refugees attempt to cross the border into Pakistan, then not only Afghanistan but Pakistan too will descend into chaos.

This is the grim reality with which we have to contend. If we wish to survive as a stable united nation-state all our energies must be devoted over the next few months, working with the Karzai administration and other major parties involved, to change the current ground realities. We cannot insulate ourselves entirely from the turbulence and turmoil that lie ahead for Afghanistan but we can certainly take steps to mitigate the turbulence and to reduce its impact on us.

What can we do?

Source: Afghanistan after Americans