Ayesha Haroon
Wednesday, March 28, 2012

Pakistan does not trust America and Afghanistan, America does not trust Pakistan and Afghanistan, Afghanistan does not trust America and Pakistan. Given that all three have to work together to help US combat troops meet their 2014 exit deadline, support Afghanistan in forming a stable post-Isaf government, and allay Pakistan’s fears of a hostile government on its western borders, the coming months are going to be fraught with tense negotiations.

To make matters more intense, we have Pakistan and America going to elections this year while various Afghan political players are hoping to replace Karzai when the Americans leave. This means all governments will continue to make strident statements and take ‘tough’ stands even as they try to negotiate a better deal for themselves.

As it is an election year for the US, Republicans will have a field day if President Obama apologises to Pakistan for the Salala tragedy – so no apologies are expected. President Karzai knows the Taliban are likely to be recognised as a political party by the West, and, hence, cannot underestimate the fallout of the Quran burning and the American soldier’s shooting of civilians. But even while he tells them off, President Karzai is aware that his government is totally dependent on Washington for money, governance, and security.

In its deliberations, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security is likely to demand the US stop drone attacks immediately, a Reaganesque ISI-CIA relationship where there are no American boots on Pakistani soil and all local operations are conducted by the ISI, and compensation for providing passage to coalition trucks.

The above are largely military demands being made by a civilian government; of course, that is how it should be but in themselves these are not enough. And the demands should not be made of Washington only – the parliament has to make demands of itself and the army.

We have to ask ourselves why we are in this mess? The eighties were a decade of Kalashnikovs and heroin, the nineties of quick dismissals of democratically-elected governments, the new millennium brought bomb blasts and perpetual violence. All this while, we went from one economic crisis to another.

We had privatisation and liberalisation and downsizing and rightsizing because these sundry ‘-sations’ would pay off our national debt and give us economic peace. Today we have a huge national debt and every little dollar shock destroys plans of most businesses.

We were told getting IPPs and privatising electricity distribution would improve the energy sector. Today load-shedding, which sends the blood-pressure of domestic consumers shooting, has closed down countless industries and ruined livelihoods.

We were told selling off public transport companies will bring in competition and improve the transport sector. Today a daily wage-earner spends almost forty percent of her day’s wage on just getting to and from the job.

We were told privatising banks will increase efficiency, give small businesses access to money, and improve the banking sector. The now-private banks make money from their spreads and access remains limited to those who can afford the huge interest rates.

We were told ‘strategic depth’ was very important for our security needs vis a vis India and, hence, the US-Saudi-Pakistani decision to bring in hardline fighters from the Middle East was necessary. Today we have two large and insecure borders.

Let us see how we handled the war on terror. We decided to support the US else it was going to bomb us into ‘stone age’ – not the most trust-enhancing start to a relationship but the then-chief executive and COAS developed such a good relationship with George Bush that the US president even publicised General Musharraf’s book during the state visit to US.

Despite its close cooperation with the US, the army, admittedly coerced into the war, miscalculated how long the war was going to continue and did not negotiate well with Washington. The war on terror has cost Pakistan tens of billions of dollars, and yet we have to justify even the cost of services rendered. More importantly, the army horribly miscalculated how the jihadi elements will turn on Pakistan and shatter our everyday lives.

Obviously, we have problems and they go beyond the tactical; even the tactical can only be won if the right strategy is in place. Politicians have the ability to think through complex political and economic issues – and strategic defence is political issue.

We do not merely have to think who will be in power post-Isaf withdrawal. We have to decide what kind of nation we want to be. Do we want all of our people to have a decent life? Or only a few? Do we want militant groups to bully and kill others? Militant-ethnic groups to run wild?

Do we want to persecute the minorities? Did the demand for Pakistan arise because as a smaller group Muslims were having a hard time in the Indian Subcontinent or because they wanted a separate state to suppress other smaller goups?

What kind of economic system do we want to follow? Do we want to have social mobility in the country or do we want the poor to stay poor and the rich to become richer? Should we not hold those accountable who take bad and/or corrupt decisions that wreak havoc on the country?

And do we want to have a civilian government or a civilian-military government? How can there be a troika when the people’s representatives should be at the helm of affairs?

If parliament focuses its attention solely on short-term ‘military’ goals then we are going to continue lurching from one mess to another. Washington and Kabul, limited by their political compulsions will only concede what they can afford to give, not what we want or need. Only we can set and meet our demands.

The writer is a former editor of The News Lahore.
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