April 2, 2012
M. Zaidi

IDEOLOGY may have been the forte of Al Qaeda ideologues promoting global jihad, but it has also combined with a military tactical doctrine to make it look more pragmatic to millions of ‘jihobbyists’ around the world.

Since this becomes a conflict between good and bad, good has to necessarily triumph over bad, since without an alternative vision for the future, no ideology can hope to succeed.

The faithful are implored to shun inertia and spring into action, since only from action can that alternative vision for future be achieved. The vision that inspires Al Qaeda is the ouster of foreign occupiers in Muslim lands, the removal of all vestiges of cultural pollution that violate the laws of God and the application of laws that are informed solely by the Holy Quran.

The US is the main antagonist, one against whom Al Qaeda ideologues have laid out an ideological strategy. As a typical example, Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi has tended to argue in his works that the US is weakening, while the jihadi movement led by Al Qaeda is on the rise around the world.

For example, in a 2002 article A Lesson in War, he performs a nuanced distillation of Carl von Clausewitz, a pioneer of war studies and tactics. Qurashi postulates that Americans are too entrenched in Clausewitz’s ‘centre of gravity’ doctrine, which emphasises fighting a centralised hostile adversary with a unified command structure, which becomes redundant when fighting a fluid organisation like Al Qaeda. Qurashi argues that Americans are totally inept when it comes to understanding Al Qaeda’s tactics, and deconstructs Ray Cline’s arguments about power.

Qurashi interpolates variables that Cline argues are vital for any entity to acquire power, within which territoriality , economic capability, military ability, strategic purpose and a will to accomplish that purpose are essential elements. Qurashi argues Al Qaeda has significant potential power and territorial bases in the shape of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. It has
the will, and territory will be hugely helpful for acquiring economic capability.

Qurashi interpolates research by another American military strategist T.N. Dupuy, who identifies fighting power (P) as being constituted of the number of troops (N), multiplied by variable factors (V), multiplied by the quality (Q) of those troops: P, in fact, is equal to NVQ.

He says that even though the US may have a central pool of troops, the jihadis can recruit Muslims from all over the world, offsetting the numerical ratios of American troops. He also postulates that the qualities of Islamist warrior (jihadis) are undeniably higher, since they fight out of conviction, not monetary gains, and live hard lives and thus are inherently
conditioned for war.

Abu Musab al-Suri also stresses on Islam being under attack by the establishment of the ‘new world order’ comprising the Jews and ‘Crusaders’, spearheaded by America, with France, Britain and Nato, and the ‘apostate’ Arab regimes. Suri has also equated Islamic scholars who denounce jihadism with the enemy within, who lead Muslims astray under the guise of
Islamic injunctions.

The need for edifying action is also demonstrable in his Call for Islamic Global Resistance. Suri has laid out a ‘battle doctrine’ against primarily America, which stipulates that mere words will not save the ummah in the face of the enemy’s “machineguns, flogging, rape and defamation”. Suri’s emphasis at all times is on the fact that jihad against the US cannot be
waged through words and non-violent means, and only this philosophy is the way forward.

As regarding asymmetric warfare, for Qurashi the asymmetrical confabulation of jihadi vs US forces is not such a bad thing since the fluid nature of jihad makes it more flexible, creative and resilient, besides making good propaganda material. This has been effectively utilised particularly by Al Qaeda to project itself as a small but dedicated populist force
seeking to defend the freedom of the oppressed and downtrodden challenged by the American Goliath.

Qurashi points to various asymmetrical trajectories which he argues can be effectively utilised. America’s superiority in forces’ strength, he argues, has not defended it against the weaker side’s intelligence and will power. The superiority of American information technology has not defended the US against the economic aftermath of 9/11 since images of the
subsequent stock exchange crashes were transmitted by the enemy’s own media centres.

He then posits the largest fissure in the American armour — America is seeking to protect the narrow ideal of a state while Al Qaeda is fighting for the people; America is trying to uphold democracy while Al Qaeda espouses a higher divine cause which gives it the leverage to operate throughout the world, while the US is limited by its territorial imperatives.

Qurashi tries to show that America is still reliving the Cold War military doctrine when engaging Al Qaeda, which is ineffective against the entity’s cell-based, fluid and constantly morphing tactics. For Al Qaeda, the scatter of forces created by engaging in Iraq at the same time as in Afghanistan shows the lack of creativity of American thinking.

On the other hand, the jihadis gain their strength from the same troop diffusion process by opening up too many fronts for Americans to handle at one time. This ‘too much everywhere — too little effectiveness’ theme also resonates with another top Al Qaeda strategist and ideologue, Abu Bakr Naji, who argues that even though US has the capability to crush jihadism
and Al Qaeda, only hegemony will not be enough.

Remote countries will become graveyards for the Americans unless the US legitimises itself in the eyes of the people of those countries. This would mean a reversal of its foreign policy in some cases. Reliance on proxy regimes, Naji argues, will not work since they in turn lose legitimacy by allying with the Great Satan.

The writer is a security analyst.
-Dawn