Owing to a number of insurgents — religious extremist and sectarian groups — the security landscape of Balochistan has become very complex.


In recent history, the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 6, 2006, in a military operation, instigated the current phase of Baloch insurgency — fourth one, to be precise — and the Baloch insurgents have since continued attacks on state institutions, security forces, gas and power installations and also the non-Baloch.


On the other hand, the religiously-motivated militant and sectarian groups have also grown in number as well as strength and expanded their areas of operation across Balochistan. Quetta is becoming a hub of local and foreign religious militant groups and sectarian outfits. Media has reported many incidents of attacks on barber shops, music shops and other places where so-called “un-Islamic” activities were going on.


Meanwhile, the Hazara tribesmen in Balochistan, numbering around 300,000, are currently under direct threat, mainly from the sectarian militant groups. The incidents of terrorist attacks and target killings, mainly perpetrated by the Baloch insurgents and religious extremists, have increased gradually, particularly from 2006 onwards.


In 2011, Balochistan suffered the highest number of fatalities in sectarian attacks for any region — 106 people killed in 21 attacks — all concentrated in the cities of Quetta and Mastung. According to a Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) annual security report, the figure for Balochistan represented 33 per cent of the total sectarian-related fatalities in Pakistan in 2011.


Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda and local militant outfits like Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan, sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Imamia Student Organisation (ISO) and Sipah-e-Muhammad and an ethno-sectarian group Jundullah have their presence in the province in one way or the other. These organisations are pursuing their own parallel agendas while the Baloch movement continues to occupy the centre-stage in the broader Baloch conflict.


The PIPS report, titled ‘Conflict and Insecurity in Balochistan’, identifies four support factors for the possible presence of Afghan Taliban in Balochistan: first, a free cross-border movement along Durand line from the times of Soviet-Afghan war; secondly, the presence of Pakhtun community in the province; thirdly, widespread network of Deobandi madrassas particularly those belonging to Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, and fourthly, the Afghan refugee camps.


At present, Afghan Taliban and their local associates may be using Baloch territories as safe haven for retreat and focusing on their activities in Afghanistan but their long-term presence can trigger the process of Talibanisation in the province in the future. Armed jihadist groups are present in the province and can be mobilised by the Taliban leadership.


Jundullah has emerged as a new phenomenon in Pakistan blending religious sectarian agenda with nationalist separatist ideology. It is an anti-Shia and anti-Iran militant outfit which operates in the Iranian province of Sistan–Balochistan, bordering Pakistani districts of Chaghai, Kharan, Panjgur, Kech and Gwadar. The number of Jundullah activists is now estimated to be around 800. According to an ABC television report, the group is also getting fund from America’s Central Investigative Agency (CIA).


Jundullah’s activities are growing in Iran that have hurt the Pak-Iran relations. The group is also said to be aligned with the local anti-Shia outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan to target the Shia Hazara community.


Sectarian outfits have a significant presence in Balochistan. Target killings, especially of Hazara community, have become a common phenomenon. These outfits are pursuing their agendas with relative freedom and independence compared to insurgents and Afghan Taliban. The government does not deny the presence of sectarian groups in Balochistan, particularly in Quetta, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, Sipah-e-Muhammad, and Sunni Tehreek; the officials only link the Shia-Sunni clashes with their ‘donors’ Iran and Saudi Arabia. They believe the religious clerics of both the sects have a lot of funds to promote the agendas of their donors.


SSP has a big support base in Balochistan. It was banned twice by the government but in Balochistan it remains intact and provides the ground support for LeJ terrorists.


Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is another anti-Shia Sunni outfit which operates in and around Quetta. Two groups of LeJ, known as Usman Kurd group and Qari Hayi group are active in Balochistan. Whereas LeJ concentrated on Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan after its terrorist camps in Kabul and Kandahar were destroyed during the US forces attacks on Afghanistan in 2001, outlawed Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the mother organisation of LeJ, remains a silent supporter of LeJ.


It has become a wider group and attracts other jihadist organisations into its fold as well. Few factions of Jaish-e-Muhammad’s defunct group have established operational relationship with LeJ. A big number of Harkatul Mujahideen and Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (HUJI) have also joined the group.


Imamia Students Organisation (ISO) is a well structured group with a huge influence on the Shia youth as well as mainstream Shia politics. Its president Nasir Shirazi claims that ISO is not a sectarian organisation but it has always played an important role in sectarian-based violence. The Shia outlawed sectarian group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) has former ISO members in its fold. In Quetta, ISO has remained engaged in clashes with other sects.


Security experts believe sectarian violence will continue to be a long-term challenge because of the growing nexus among the various sectarian groups, Taliban and al Qaeda and the reorganisation of the violent Shia sectarian groups as a reaction, especially in the context where the law enforcement agencies have consistently failed to keep up with the emerging challenges.