Hafsa defiance: what is the regime waiting for?

By Dr Moonis Ahmar

“There were only six Taliban who enforced Shariah in Afghanistan and we are 10,000. Then how cannot we enforce Shariah at least in Islamabad?” ––Maulana Abdul Aziz, Incharge of Jamia Faridia and Jamia Hafsa

TWO fanatic brothers, Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi of Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa are at war with the state in the heart of Islamabad. They and their followers, about 10,000, are armed to the teeth, have enough ammunition and have many trained suicide bombers to meet the state power, if attacked. They have formed ‘Qazi courts’ consisting of ten Muftis and intend to enforce, at least in the capital, their brand of Shariah by force –– their original goal, of course, being to blackmail the state in the name of religion to continue to keep possession of the illegally grabbed mosque complex land.

The regime, committed to root out terrorism in the country, finds itself helpless, if not demoralised, to meet the unusual threat. Last week’s events showed an unusual rise in temperature in the war of nerves between the clerics’ brigade and the Islamabad administration, raising fears of a brutal showdown. A large contingent of the police force, about 7,000, was brought by the authorities from Punjab cities in what looked like a ‘shock and awe’ method to unnerve the militants. They took positions around the Lal Masjid, causing panic among the residents as the capital city was sealed off. The militants inside the mosque also took positions on the rooftops and outside the premises. A ‘jhad’ was declared by them on loudspeakers.

But the clerics had the last laugh as the local administration decided to put off the much-awaited assault on grounds that it would lead to desecration of the mosque and physical harm to female students inside it –– as it was revealed to it only after the police were called in. So, the regime, which has already seen its writ being badly shattered during the last five months, again failed to put its foot down to recover its lost face and bring the clerics’ revolt to an end. It was wrong in its calculations that a greater show of police force would make them see reason. It goes without saying that the clerics’ defiance bodes ill for the regime and the state and sets a dangerous precedent of resorting to blackmail of any kind by using religion.

The two seminaries, Jamia Hafsa and Jamia Faridia and the adjoining Lal Mosque are claimed to be owned by the Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi. Jamia Hafsa is believed to be the largest female seminary in the Muslim world, educating more than 6,500 students. Maulana Abdullah, father of the two brothers, was also a priest in the Lal Masjid and was one of Zia’s favourites because of his pro-Jihad leanings. The two brothers are also reported to have had links with Jaish-i-Mohammad and Harkatul Mujahiden, the banned militant outfits.

The current crisis began in February this year when the Hafsa students occupied the Islamabad’s children library to protest against demolition of the mosques by Capital Development Authority (CDA). Since then, the standoff between the two sides remains unresolved, notwithstanding the peace efforts by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. However, on May 11 he expressed the fear that the ‘deal’ which he had brokered with the clerics might ‘fail’ because of delaying tactics by the CDA. According to the deal, seven demolished mosques would be rebuilt at where they had been before. Besides, the two clerics had agreed to vacate the library as soon as a woman librarian was appointed and after that no male or female student would carry sticks.

According to the PML chief, the brothers had agreed that only genuine madrassah students would stay inside the compound, moral policing in markets would stop, all observation posts would be removed, provocative speeches would be stopped and all banners displayed around the two institutions would be removed. Ironically, despite all these assurances, the situation remains unchanged and, meantime, the two brothers have hardened their defiance and stepped up their insistence on enforcing the Shariah in Islamabad.

The clerics have been sending their ‘moral police’ to different parts of Islamabad to enforce Shariah by attacking music shops and threatening citizens. On May 11, after Friday prayers, the Lal Masjid administrators distributed among the worshippers pamphlets containing 50 guidelines for the enforcement of Shariah in all spheres of life including legislation, human rights, education, health, employment, taxation and banking. They asked the media to formulate a code of conduct to deal with obscenity. The government officials should undergo special training to fully understand their Islamic duties. They demanded Urdu be declared official language and that interest-based banking system be abolished to be replaced by an Islamic one.

Unfortunately, the Lal Masjid episode is the outcome of the establishment’s calculated policy to give free hand to some religious elements to pursue their political agenda outside the ambit of law. For the feudal-oriented ruling elites, the real threat does not stem from such fanatic religious groups, but from democratic forces which can, if they happen to come into power, disempower them.

In preventing the advent of democracy, extremist Islamic groups and the establishment are the natural allies. For long, the Musharraf regime had looked the other way when dozens of private Shariat courts were established in different parts of Pakistan. Currently, there are 54 private Shariat courts. Hafiz Saeed’s Jamaatal Dawa (JD) runs 24 and Siphah-i-Sahaba five in different parts of the country. In the Shakai agreement in 2004, in the tribal areas of Pakistan the government had allowed Baitullah Mehsud to enforce Shariat in the areas under his control. He not only established courts but also formed a Shariah police. Reports of attacking schools, video and barbershops in tribal areas and some parts of the NWFP in the name of enforcing Shariah indicate the mushrooming of such elements who in the name of Islam want to impose their way of life on the rest of society.

At least on two occasions, the government should have taken strong action against the mosque complex administration. First, when it issued last year a ‘fatwa’ that a funeral prayer and Muslim burial of a soldier killed fighting in Waziristan is not valid. The fatwa was signed by other 500 so-called scholars. Till 2005, Maulana Aziz was serving as the official ‘peshimam’ in Lal Masjid. It is still a government-run mosque and is controlled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Maulana was however dismissed from service after his issuance of the fatwa. But he was reinstated on the intervention of Ejazul Haq, the federal minister of religious affairs. Besides, he was declared a proclaimed offender in a murder case two years ago but has so far not been arrested by the state authorities. Such a timid behaviour of the state was backed by a section of the establishment.

Second, the occupation of children’s library that encouraged the two clerics to mobilize seminary students was not timely vacated.

It was primarily because of the severe warning by the elements belonging to Waziristan against any crackdown on the mosque militants that the government gave up the idea of taking any action against the seminaries. Around 5,000 armed men from Waziristan had come to Islamabad to express their solidarity with them.

As long as the ruling elites continue to pursue a non-democratic and exploitive approach on matters of national importance, religious and ethnic extremist groups will remain a threat. The problem is that the so-called secular elite of Pakistan is least concerned about addressing issues which cause social injustices, political instability and economic exploitation of the masses. People at the helm of affairs fail to realize the fact that the tendency to create a state within a state provides enough space to religious fanatic individuals and groups.

Instead of focusing on the areas of human development, improving the quality of life of people, establishing stable economic and political institutions and the rule of law, the state is more eager to maintain the status quo and prevent a positive political change in the country. Overcoming the steady rise of religious fanaticism in Pakistan is not easy because of the systematic policy of patronization pursued by a segment of ruling establishment. The Lal Masjid affair proves the bitter fact of state’s inability to ensure rule of law and provide basic security to its citizens.

The writer teaches at the department of international relations, University of Karachi.
amoonis@hotmail.com