Is pre-emption still the rule?

By Khalid Saleem

One would have thought that having burnt its fingers in the Iraq and Afghanistan adventures, the US would have found it expedient by now to fine-tune its strategic roadmap. In particular, President George W. Bush, his party having lost the majorities in both houses in the midterm elections, should by cold logic have been expected to make a slight detour, if not a U-turn, in so far as his pre-emption doctrine is concerned. This, it would now appear obvious, is not the way the cookie has crumbled, if that is the Americanism one is looking for. The Bush administration has belied hopes – if there were any – that anything in the way of second thoughts is in the offing. If anything, the administration has confirmed that its actions so far have been strictly in accordance with the announced National Security Strategy and that the world – already somewhat edgy on past experience – can lump it and look forward to more of the same.

What a wary world regards as the “Bush pre-emption doctrine” would bear recapitulation. It will be recalled that the National Security Strategy of the US sprung by the White House on an already jittery world was based on the premise that “America is at war”. The document had specifically emphasised the role of “pre-emption” in US National Security Strategy. To quote: “We do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur.” This was evidently meant to provide convenient cover for not only the adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to similar ventures that may be contemplated in the time to come.

Before one delves into the whys and wherefores of the National Security Strategy of the US, it may be helpful to go briefly over its various contours. So here goes:

* Pre-emption retains its position of va tage in the National Security Strategy. “We do not rule out the use of force ‘before’ attacks occur.”

* North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma and Zimbabwe are classed as ‘tyrannies’. “Tyrannies that seek weapons of mass destruction threaten our immediate security interests…We have no doubt that the world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMDs at their own peril.”

* “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.” Diplomatic efforts must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided, but “military action cannot be ruled out”.

* Washington supports creation of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel. Hamas (that had won a landslide election victory) “must renounce violence, accept Israel and disarm”.

* In South Asia, India and Pakistan must resolve their disputes. The US has noted “an improvement”. There is “a new spirit of cooperation in the dispute over Kashmir”. Strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan developed of late “gave us leverage to play a constructive role when tensions in the regions became acute”.

* Russia’s efforts to prevent democratic development at home and abroad will hamper its ties with neighbours, Europe and the US.

* “With Pakistan, our bilateral relations have been bolstered by Pakistan’s choice to join the war against terror.” Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have “launched effective efforts to capture or kill the leadership of the al Qaeda network”.

Two things need to be pointed out in this regard: 1) the US National Security Strategy paper is supposed to be issued every year (the lapse of the past few years notwithstanding), 2) it may not be entirely accurate to term the paper issued as a “doctrine” – it can be seen more in the nature of a defence of the administration’s post-9/11 policies intended basically for the domestic audience. The fact that it also serves to put the fear of God into a few errant states can be seen as an additional bonus.

Having said that, one would be justified in averring that the inferences to the regions nearer home would merit closer examination. The reference to Iran, for instance, was in some ways perfunctory, despite the belligerence of the tone. While singling out Iran as the one country from which the US (read Israel) faces the greatest challenge, the strategy paper – though holding out the threat of ‘military action’ – stopped short of foreclosing all options. In effect, it went out of its way to suggest what needed to be done in order to avoid a confrontation. This appeal was directed not only at Iran, but also at the other parties presently engaged in diplomatic efforts to sort out the wrangle. One is free to draw one’s conclusions.

On the issue of Palestine too, the strategy paper left things a bit vague. Starting on a somewhat positive note by reiterating US support for the creation of a “Palestinian state at peace with Israel”, it meandered off into uncharted waters. Having shouted support for establishment of democracy from housetops, the US must understandably have felt a bit shy of directly renouncing the verdict of Palestinian voters. So it opted for the “next best thing”: it slapped impossible pre-conditions for Hamas to fulfil in order to obtain the blessings of the US administration. Hamas was asked to a) renounce violence, b) accept Israel and c) disarm, in order for it to be acceptable at the negotiating table. In other words, Hamas had been asked to discard all its trump cards in advance as a precondition for being allowed to participate in the game! The intra-Palestinian conflict has, in the meantime, served to move the goalposts, much to the delight of the Israelis.

Nearer home, in South Asia, the strategy paper held out no hope for a gentle US nudge in order to keep the much-vaunted peace process on track. For the US to note, as it did, “an improvement” in the situation or “seeing a new spirit of cooperation in the dispute over Kashmir” is neither here nor there. The reference was evidently towards the myriad CBMs that passed through the mill, which are incidentally fast approaching their “use by” date. What was left unsaid was what happens when the sheen of the CBMs wears off and the common man sees them for what they are – feeble efforts at papering-over of cracks in the decaying edifice? Who, then, is going to be left holding the baby?

Direct reference to US relations with Pakistan has centred mainly on “Pakistan’s choice to join the war against terror”. There was also the rather chilling reference to the launching by Pakistan (and Saudi Arabia) of “effective efforts to capture or kill (sic) the leadership of the al Qaeda network”. Surely, there should be more substance to our (strategic?) relationship than just that. Or maybe we have surrendered our prerogative to choose!

The writer is a former ambassador and former Assistant Secretary General of the OIC.

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Time is like a river.
You cannot touch the same water twice,
because the flow that has passed will never pass again.
Enjoy every moment of life.

I have learnt silence from the talkative, toleration from the intolerant, and kindness from the unkind; yet strange, I am ungrateful to these teachers.