An enigmatic relationship
Shamshad Ahmad
Satureday, JUNE 09,2007
Despite the chequered history of their relationship, Pakistan and the US have been friends and allies for nearly sixty years now. For much of its history, however, this relationship has lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared vision beyond the "narrowly based and vaguely defined" issue-specific priorities.
From the early days of its independence, Pakistan had a direction clearly charted for its future relationship with the US by the value system that it cherished, and indeed by Quaid-e-Azam himself. Speaking to the first US ambassador to Pakistan on February 22, 1948, Quaid-e-Azam described Pakistan and the US as equal partners in defence of democracy and freedom.
Emerging from the trauma of sub-continental turmoil, the young state of Pakistan, imbued with Islamic values and a moderate and progressive outlook, gravitated naturally to the pole that stood for freedom and democracy in that intensely bi-polar world.
In making that deliberate choice, Pakistan was guided not only by the Quaid's vision but also by its over-riding security and economic interests. On its part, the US looked at Pakistan and its special geo-political importance as a strategic asset in its "containment" policy against Soviet expansionism.
It has been a curious relationship which never had any conflict of interest and yet experienced interruptions in its intensity as well integrity. The "hinge" was purely one of mutual expediency as both sides were always aiming at different goals and objectives to be derived from their relationship.
For Pakistan, the issues of security and survival in a turbulent and hostile regional environment and its problems with India were the overriding policy goals in its relations with Washington. The US policy interests in Pakistan, on the other hand, have traditionally encompassed a wide range of regional and global issues, especially nuclear and missile proliferation, India-Pakistan hostility, drugs trafficking, democracy, human rights, and economic reform.
Unpredictability has been another consistent feature of this relationship. The US would lose interest in remaining engaged in any cooperation once it achieved its objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistan was either consigned to benign neglect or hit with a succession of punitive sanctions that left in their trail resentment and a sense of betrayal.
In the early 50s, with growing concern about India's designs against our independence, we negotiated a "mutual defence agreement" with the US (1954) and by 1955; we had joined Western Alliances, SEATO and CENTO in the hope that they will provide strength to us in our quest for survival. This was a clear expression of our choice for freedom and for security. Our experience, however, did not match our expectations.
As a result of these alliances, we did receive nearly $2 billion in US assistance from 1953 to 1961, including $508 million in military aid. But when it came to defending ourselves against India in 1965 and then again in 1971, we were left all alone, and in the process lost half the country. This tragedy, indeed, was the worst that could happen to any independent country in contemporary history
In the mid-1970s, we were again disappointed when the US and other Western countries failed to appreciate our apprehensions from India's unchecked nuclear ambitions. The US pressurised France to cancel a deal for supply of a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Limited US aid as then resumed in 1975, but was suspended again in 1979 by the Carter administration in response to what was alleged as Pakistan's "covert construction of a uranium enrichment facility."
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, Pakistan again became a key ally of the US and also the front-line state in the last and decisive battle of the Cold War which hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union and its symbol the "Berlin Wall." In return, we were paid in 1981 a five-year $3.2 billion aid package.
As soon as the Soviets pulled out, the US just walked away leaving Afghanistan and its people at the mercy of their fate. Once the war was over, we were also left in the lurch with a painful legacy in terms of a massive refugee influx and a culture of drugs and guns, commonly known as the "Kalashnikov" culture, which has almost torn apart our social and political fabric.
In the years that followed, the US not only turned a blind eye on our strategic concerns vis-à-vis India but also started bringing us under greater scrutiny and pressure for our legitimate nuclear program. We faced an unfair punitive approach under its congressional laws on nuclear proliferation and human rights.
The 1985 Pressler Amendment the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 banned economic and military assistance to countries engaged in nuclear weapon programs. Similarly, two other amendments, the Symington Amendment and the Glenn Amendment also invoked sanctions against countries that tried to elude IAEA safeguards on nuclear materials and technology or against countries that conducted nuclear tests. Pakistan was the target of these laws.
During the 1980s, when we were fighting America's War against the Soviet Union, we were allowed waivers from these Amendments despite the fact that our nuclear program was a known reality and the US knew that Pakistan was enriching uranium. However, the Pressler Amendment sanctions were imposed on us in 1990 when the US saw Pakistan had no further role to play in its global strategies. In May 1998, the US imposed full restrictions on all non-humanitarian aid to both India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests.
Since then, the Pressler Amendment sanctions have found many exemptions and waivers, most notably under the Brown Amendment and especially the two Brownback Amendments, the latter of which give the US president permanent authority to waive the sanctions under the Symington and Pressler Amendments that banned all military and economic assistance to Pakistan since 1990.
Shortly after the 9/11, President Bush lifted completely the economic and military sanctions against both India and Pakistan, which had been imposed for their nuclear tests. Since then, Pakistan is again a close and pivotal ally of the US and has been extending full cooperation in the war on terror. Billions of dollars being pumped into Pakistan for the services it is rendering to the US in its "war on terror" have brought no change in the lives of the people of Pakistan. They remain mired in socio-economic vulnerabilities and politico-constitutional chaos.
In Pakistan, anti-Americanism has been growing largely because of the US support for a military dictatorship in the country. In fact, there is a general feeling all over the world that the US was never a "steadfast and reliable" friend and that over the decades, the US neglect and "self-serving" exploitation of its friends had contributed to most of the current problems in different parts of the world, including our own region.
Our people hope this perception will change with the change of incumbency in the White House next year. They welcome the recent bipartisan calls by US lawmakers for unfettered democracy in Pakistan through "free and fair" elections without which they fear there could be a void which would be filled by extremist parties that have otherwise traditionally fared poorly in Pakistan.
Howsoever enigmatic, US-Pakistan relationship is an important equation. Despite ups and downs, this relationship has remained fundamentally strong and enduring. It is time for both sides now to set a better bilateral perspective for this relationship on the basis of mutuality and sovereign equality.
US-Pakistan relations will stand or fall based on whether they benefit the people of Pakistan or any particular regime or ruler. US engagement with Pakistan must go beyond the war on terror. It must reach out to democratic and liberal forces and the business community in our country, and also the younger generation in Pakistan, which may resent US power but not its ideals. And in their success alone lies the very future of "enlightened" moderation in this country.
The US must also bear in mind that its flawed policies on Pakistan could lead to its total alienation from its 160 million people just as it alienated itself from the people of Iran in the late 70s. A people's trust once lost can never be regained. One historic lesson that the US must not "unlearn" is that its excessive reliance on authoritarian regimes and military dictators will not serve its long-term interests nor promote regional and global stability.
It must help Pakistan return to the path that meets its people's democratic aspirations and socio-economic needs. Only such a course will make Pakistan its strong, stable, moderate and reliable partner in pursuit of common goals and in defence of shared values.
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/jun-2007/9/columns1.php