Raza Khan


Finally after delay of almost a decade the National Assembly of Pakistan on March 8, passed the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) law bill setting up the much-needed framework to formulate counter-terrorism policy and see its implementation.

The bill which has already been passed by the Senate of Pakistan was moved by the Federal Law Minister Farooq H. Naek in the NA and was passed with some minor amendments from a couple of members. The passage of the bill is a milestone as far as the country's war against terrorism is concerned. Although NACTA as a body has existed for years but it could not play any role as it did not have any legal cover. Due to which other organizations have not been cooperating with NACTA due to which it had become a toothless body. This writer can recall a phone call from ex-head of NACTA, Tariq Pervez, after the former wrote a comprehensive article on the counterterrorism policy for Pakistan in a leading newspaper of the country. Pervez appreciated the article and wanted to have contact with Mr. Alex Schmidt, a former head of a UN anti-terrorism body and was interviewed for the article. It suggests the kind of help and resources available to NACTA.

A country which is struck by huge large-scale terrorist attacks for years must have a counterterrorism authority. The rationale for having a counterterrorism authority for the state is that only such a body could coordinate the activities and efforts of different law-enforcement agencies including intelligence agencies, and various relevant government departments. Without coordination among various departments and agencies countering the phenomenon of terrorism is simply impossible. In other words, without a counterterrorism authority efforts by different governmental institutions and bodies remain isolated and thus inconsequential. Pakistan's failure to effectively counter extremism and terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam has mainly been due to the absence of any counterterrorism policy. It is important to note that a state could have a viable counterterrorism policy if a counterterrorism body is in place. Although a parliament has existed in Pakistan, which reflects the collective wisdom of the people of the country, but keeping in view the complex nature of the phenomenon of terrorism and religious extremism in Pakistan it is really impossible for the parliamentarians to formulate a policy on their own. The track record of the outgoing government is enough to testify this incapacity of the parliament to formulate a counterterrorism policy. During this period no counterterrorism policy existed.

The outgoing government only declared strategy to negotiate the threat was based on the so-called Ps and Ds. Initially, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led coalition government declared a strategy of three Ds to effectively quarantine the rampaging militancy and insurgency by religious extremist groups. The three Ds were explained as Dialogue, Development and Deterrence. Afterwards the government came with another strategy of three Ps representing Prevent, Protect and Pursue. A closer look at the three Ds and Ps reveals that they were more or less the same things. However, these strategies to counter religious extremism and terrorism have largely failed and this can be gauged from the ever-increasing number of terrorist attacks as well as the wider area these attacks are covering and the strengthening of the extremist forces in the country.

The element of dialogue with extremist and terrorist groups has been given a lot of chance to have an effect but it proved totally ineffective. Talks with militants by Pakistani authorities over the years instead strengthened the former. As during the last five years there has not been any elaborate counterterrorism strategy in place therefore the government emphasis on dialogue had been under compulsion and threats from religious and conservative political parties as well as the insurgents. However, the government could not pursue a meaningful dialogue because the United States pressurized it not to do so. Although the government engaged in dialogue with insurgents on several occasions, like in Waziristan and Swat, but the aim was to isolate insurgents then to defeat them. Moreover, the government did so to buy time as the insurgents got too strong to be eliminated through police or military action. However, the time thus gained by the government was also utilized by the insurgents to reinforce themselves and replenish their ranks.

The second of the Ds i.e. development could be termed as the most important strand of the counterterrorism strategy. Keeping in view the nature of religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan which largely has its bases in the extremely remote and underdeveloped FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and southern Punjab, the government should have came up with huge and extensive development projects in these regions particularly FATA. Unfortunately any such project and, through it, the overall development of these regions remains a pipedream.

The element of the third 'D' of deterrence is inherently anticipatory in nature which the government could not employ effectively; otherwise, the terrorist attacks instead of increasing should have come down.

So now when the law to constitute the counterterrorism authority has been passed the would-be counterterrorism authority has to take into considerations the failure of the strategies of Ps and Ds and only then it would be able to come up with an effective counterterrorism policy.

It is really important to note that the proposed NACTA would be under the prime minister instead of the Interior Ministry, which the previous body had been. The placing of the original NACTA under the control of the Interior Ministry has been the great stumbling block in the growth and viability of the body as the bureaucracy of the ministry tried to control the authority. The NACTA bill 2013 envisages that the body would be independent and it makes the body really important; still to be effective the body must be independent literally. The importance of the NACTA Bill can be gauged from the fact that the board of the authority would be chaired by the prime minister whereas federal ministers of interior, finance, defence, law; chief ministers of all provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan and prime minister of AJK along with DG ISI, IB, MI and FIA would be the members of the board. In the context of extremism and terrorism, FATA is the most important territory of the country therefore, Governor KP, who is ex-officio, the administrative head of FATA, should also be on the board.

The passage of the NACTA Bill is quite late, but it is a good beginning and it is hoped that the next government would try its utmost to make the body a really independent and viable institution.

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