The politics of deal-making

By Imtiaz Alam
Preparations are underway for a crucial transition to a more democratic-looking regime as the Musharraf administration comes under greater internal and external pressures and braces to meet extended challenges to its survival. Against this backdrop former prime minister Benazir Bhutto captures the headlines while setting her terms for a well-managed transition to civilian rule. And with these developments the whole political scene is changed forcing various political actors to reposition themselves in a complex and treacherous power game. The issue of making a deal, as if a sinful act, has become the focal point of debate, regardless of its content. The real issue is what kind of a transition and what kind of a settlement, if not a 'deal' is necessary for a country that is at the crossroads of militant-driven destabilization and a transition to greater participatory democracy and effective rule of law.

Only those who are subjectively carried by their adventurous or romantic baggage, or those who are left out of historical opportunities, would take a rejectionist position. Therefore, accusing Ms Bhutto of betraying the cause of democracy by entering into a dialogue with the Musharraf government is not justified. The parliamentary parties are in contact with the treasury benches on a daily basis without which no parliament can function. Despite daily fights and public debates, both the government and the opposition have a modus operandi, which remains under stress at times and at ease most of the time in normal democracies.

Making of various deals among the political interlocutors has been a long tradition and no political element worth the name has ever been above it, except those who are locked into their self-created rigidities. Only infantile adventurists have been averse to compromises, regardless of figuring out their loss and benefit. There are of course good deals and bad deals; good compromises and bad compromises. And history is rampant with such compromises that benefited one party or the other or both sides. A few examples from recent history are worth mentioning: when Filed Martial Ayub Khan convened a round table conference, most parties participated and succeeded in getting almost all their demands accepted by the dictator. That was a good deal which was subverted by Z A Bhutto who wanted to embarrass his political opponents and take a political mileage out of the popular wave that had overtaken the whole country. But rejection by Bhutto of the deal reached between the opposition and Ayub Khan paved the way for General Yahya Khan's martial law. The constitutional accord that Z A Bhutto reached with the National Awami Party (NAP) and Jamiat Ulemai Islam (JUI) was a good compromise that allowed the passage of an agreed constitution in 1973. Those who subverted this accord or torpedoed the PNA-Bhutto agreement became instrumental in paving the way for another martial law in 1977, and perhaps both sides were responsible.

In the present times, we know three deals that had far reaching impact on our polity. First to enter into a deal was the deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif who sought asylum instead of fighting back the coup makers. It was a bad deal motivated by personal interests. The second deal was struck between the Mullahs of high clergy and the Musharraf regime that allowed the chief of Army Staff to become president in exchange for greater share for the MMA vide the most despicable 17th Amendment. The third deal was entered into between the army and the local militants in North Waziristan that did not go well with the war against terrorism and served the purpose of the extremists. Therefore the real issue is not of a deal or compromise. It is of what suits whom and whether it is in public interest or against it. However, the issue of timing and the way it is undertaken is also important.

The All Parties Conference in London could deliver only a much repeated resolution with two yet-to-take-place public meetings in the strongholds of JUI, which is still willing to cut a separate deal with the military establishment to revive an erstwhile mullah-military alliance. Despite a vast agreement on the issues of free elections, an interim neutral government, an independent election commission, unacceptability of a president in uniform and his re-election by the current assemblies, the opposition got divided. The differences over the tactical matter of resignations from the assemblies and their timing could be left for further deliberation when the occasion would have so demanded. But our too intelligent mullahs were keen at dividing the two mainstream leaders to pursue their own agenda and use the PML-N to confront international consensus on restraining Pakistan from falling into the ditch of extremism, isolation, anarchy and self-destruction.

Exploiting the difficulties the Musharraf regime is facing in terms of not doing enough on the terrorist front and well aware of the dangerous consequences of destabilization that will suit the extremists, Ms Bhutto has taken the course of diplomacy and dialogue. She understands better than any other politician the present imperatives of international consensus regarding the present and future of Pakistan. Maintaining her liberal and secular credentials, she has refused to join hands with the mullahs and did not even hesitate to make a common cause with the regime on the issues of women and minorities' rights. Without jeopardizing the war against terrorism and compromising on democratic principles, she accused the Musharraf regime of adopting a strategy that helped extremism grow. However, she did not attack the regime for whatever efforts it made to curb terrorism as most parties in the newly formed All Parties Democratic Movement (APDM) do religiously.

Ms Benazir has upheld the demands for free and fair elections, separation of the offices of COAS and president, rejection of the army's role in politics, independence of the judiciary and supremacy of parliament. As the US pressure on the Musharraf regime increases with the linkage of aid to the fulfilment of conditions regarding war against terrorism, revival of democracy and nuclear proliferation, her position is hardening in the negotiations. But what she should not forget is that the Musharraf regime is at its lowest ebb and it is increasingly becoming unpopular. A deal should not go against democratic principles and should be transparent. The best course to actualize it is through the vehicle of a round table conference so that no one remains excluded. Meanwhile, Shehbaz Sharif must rest assured that both Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif can together dispense with the authoritarian parts of the 17th Amendment in the next freely elected parliament. Let first thing come first, i.e. free and fair elections.



The writer is editor current affairs,

The News, and editor South Asian Journal. Email: imtiazalampak@yahoo.com

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