01.09.2013 Rethinking anti-terrorism strategy
The government is still struggling to come up with a coherent strategy that could define the approach that many different government agencies need to follow
By Helal Pasha
Amid certain hesitancy, numerous approaches, number of drafts, and advices from various defense analyst and public intellectuals, the Prime Minister Nawaz government is still struggling to come up with a coherent strategy that could define the approach that many different government agencies need to coordinate and follow in the field. The problem is that the government has embarked upon such a long spiel that it has lost the way. The policy does not need a long preamble explaining the causes of terrorism in Pakistan. Most Pakistanis already know them.
The purpose of the policy should be defining actionable plans to counter the domestic terrorism effectively. The domestic terrorism does not require a counter insurgency strategy; neither does it need the whole population to get ready to scarify its time and lives defending the motherland from terrorism. All it needs is creating awareness in the general populace and developing a system that people can understand and know whom to contact upon watching some suspicious activity. The army’s intervention is mostly not required. The civilian law enforcement agencies can be sufficiently trained to handle individual suicide bomber or a terrorist attack by a few individuals.
Over the years, successive Pakistan governments have looked at domestic terrorism as insurgency in a foreign land. The US was dealing with the insurgency in two foreign lands, while for Pakistan no terrorist is foreigner. They are all homegrown, and they should have always been treated as such.
The defense analysts, in their borrowed wisdom, also fall in the same trap. The analysts want to follow the US COIN model or other counter-insurgency programmes, where the US army takes the primary role. They completely ignore the US domestic counter-terrorism approach that has no role for the army. That should have been the model for Pakistan from day one.
Pakistan’s terrorism problem is three and half dimensional. The first dimension and the most prominent group is Pakistani Taliban from Fata. The second and half dimension is Punjab-based sectarian outfits and former Jihadi who took part in battles in Kashmir. The last dimension consists of various warring groups including the Taliban and sectarian militants based in Karachi. There might be some splinter groups, but all law enforcement agencies are aware of these groups. Knowing their background and ideological commitment is completely irrelevant from the law enforcement point of view. They are all involved in terrorism and should be treated as terrorists.
Now look at the approach the US took after the heinous attacks on September 11, 2001. The US first decided to beef up its internal security system. The US national anti-terrorism policy has two aspects: visible and invisible.
Visible features were not about creating roadblocks at every turn or stationing ill-equipped police officers to search the cars. The US instead created a highly visible airport security system under Transport Security Administration. To enhance the public awareness, the US government initiated a colour-coded alert system that was given prominence in the media. As the colour codes moved up, more people showed interest in their surrounding. The people, within a short period, were fully attuned with the government efforts in national security.
The airport security system was not catching many terrorists. The system instead alerted everyone including the would-be terrorists that the internal security is always on high alert and they have a little chance of getting away with anything evil. Any report of mistreatment of passengers at the airports that appeared poor public relations, also sent a message to bad guys that the security personnel at the airport are no-nonsense and discourteous bunch that do their job no matter what.
The visible aspect of security worked as significant psychological deterrence. The invisible part actually grabbed the suspects before they could even get close to doing anything.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was the lead agency aided by several other non-uniform agencies and the local police that took part in the invisible side of the counter domestic terrorism policy. The agencies first identified potential groups that could be, for various reasons, inclined towards terrorism. Once identified, the congregation places of these groups were first placed under surveillance. The second part was penetrating the groups.
Both the surveillance and penetration identified the individuals for careful monitoring. New York was the focal area of this programme, but over years the programme was implemented all over the country.
The US have many right wing groups involved in domestic terrorism; they were all brought under this programme. With this tight programme hardly any would-be terrorist got out of the civilian agencies’ sight. Some individuals managed to fall through the surveillance programme, but they were far and few. Overall the US has been successful in controlling domestic terrorism to almost zero in the last 12 years.
Pakistan clearly does not have the resources that the US can muster. Pakistan does have a civilian intelligence network. Pakistani police has deep reach in the communities. Given some confidence and resources, they can deliver suspects before they turn into hardened criminals. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is right in lifting the ban from hiring in Intelligence Bureau. These are the intelligence units that need patronage from the state.
The agencies in Pakistan have many advantages. They already know the groups, where they live, operate, the masterminds behind the terrorists, and their local patrons.
With nearly all Pakistan now covered with radio, television network, it is not difficult to set up a visible terrorism awareness programme to increase citizen’s participation.
Provinces have a greater role in law and order maintenance. They cannot be left alone to deal with terrorism. The federal government has to step in and ensure that they are actively pursuing and have the resources to catch the terrorists before any possible act. The Punjab government cannot sit silent while the Punjab-based sectarian groups create mayhem in Balochistan and Sindh. Punjab should tighten the noose around the areas where terrorists congregate and recruit. Those areas should be blanketed with intelligence, police and armed paramilitary forces.
Similarly, Sindh and Balochistan governments should take an identical approach. KPK has major problems. The federal government will have to make sure that all known or unknown crossing points from Fata are monitored adequately. Satellite monitoring and quick response units should be established for KPK and Fata.
Finally, please do not throw ill-equipped police officers at the mercy of terrorists at roadblocks. Have some experts design the roadblocks in such way that no vehicle comes in direct contact with police officers until all its occupants have stepped out and are at a safe distance from the police officers.