Support for IS
The fact that the self-styled Islamic State is drawing fulsome praise from across the militant spectrum is hardly surprising. After all, the terrorist group’s rapid rise and capture of territory in Iraq and Syria has granted it celebrity status within jihadi circles. So while there may be minor differences between various global militant groups — tactical, theological, level of ferocity — the general consensus seems to be that the IS model of waging ‘jihad’ is a successful one and worthy of replication. A few days ago, the banned TTP — while still accepting Afghan Taliban supremo Mullah Omar as its spiritual leader — praised all militants in Iraq and Syria, including IS, terming them “noble” and “our brothers”. Some time ago, pro-IS literature was also reportedly distributed in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Fata. Also, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a fanatical militant outfit responsible for a number of terrorist atrocities inside Pakistan, proclaimed it was “in the same ranks” as the so-called Islamic State. Nigerian extremist group Boko Haram has expressed warm wishes for IS ‘caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as have some militant outfits in Southeast Asia and North Africa.
While there’s little hard evidence that the above-mentioned statements signify that IS and other militant groups are forging some sort of grand global jihadi alliance, they do appear to be policy statements making the intentions of the militants clear. They should serve as warning shots, alerting governments the world over to the potential havoc such groups can unleash should they join forces operationally. In many ways, IS is the new Al Qaeda; but considering that it actually holds territory makes the Islamic State even more dangerous than the terrorist franchise. After all, Al Qaeda was successful because it was provided a safe haven by the erstwhile Taliban rulers of Afghanistan. Should IS consolidate its hold over areas it controls it will serve as a magnet for extremists from across the globe, with the potential to destabilise states across the Middle East and Central Asia, including Pakistan. While Al Qaeda is now being regarded by many as a spent force, especially after the elimination of Osama bin Laden, IS has many of the trappings of a state and its battlefield successes have made it the talk of the Islamist world. Hence it is essential that governments, especially those of Muslim states, coordinate their efforts to deny IS the chance to operationally link up with sympathetic groups elsewhere.
Eid shutdown
GIVE the majority of working Pakistanis half a chance, and they with alacrity will take off from their job early. Not for us the metaphor of busy beavers; no, we ensure that work must be avoided wherever possible. The casual onlooker could be forgiven for thinking that Pakistanis have done everything that needed to be done, solved all equations and balanced all the ledgers, to turn to a day off without the slightest feeling of guilt. Yet what is worse is that this characteristic is also reflected in the approach of the state. True, the number of gazetted holidays — when institutions such as banks cannot open for business even if they wanted to — has been reduced from what it used to be. Nevertheless, the state misses few chances to signal to the populace that there’s no need for the wheels of industry, banking, finance and so on to keep turning; that a cup of tea and rest can achieve the needful. Take, for example, the shutdown over Eid earlier this week. The government had announced a national holiday for the day of sacrifice itself, followed by two more holidays. But the slowdown started from Friday and the employees of several government offices are sure to include the coming weekend as well. Can the country afford lengthy shutdowns when it is not just losing revenue on account of work not done but is also delinked from the global banking and financial worlds? Consider just a couple of rough calculations: the daily turnover for the Karachi Stock Exchange varies from day to day, but the last figure recorded was Rs6bn. The maths for a three-day shutdown is simple. Retail and wholesale contribute Rs13bn a day to GDP, while manufacturing is Rs14bn. Revenue has been forgone from many other sectors as well. But tell that not to the state of Pakistan and its citizens, both of which evidently feel that this country is so rich that a few days’ income lost is no problem at all.
Civilians in the crossfire
THE escalating violence between Pakistan and India along the Line of Control and the Working Boundary in the disputed Kashmir region has, as ever, murky origins. India blames Pakistan, Pakistan blames India; meanwhile, the worst sufferer is the civilian population on either side of the divide. More lives have been lost and with the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reduced to urging India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes diplomatically and through dialogue, there is a very real fear that more violence could result in more lives lost in the days ahead. With the blame game continuing and with few independent sources to verify how violence broke out, there is though a sense that both sides are determined not to back down — though it is difficult to see why either side would want the conflict to spiral out of control. For Pakistan, conflict in Kashmir cannot militarily be a goal at this juncture with the North Waziristan operation ongoing and strains on military resources because of overall troop commitments in Fata. For India, with the Narendra Modi-led BJP government in Delhi eyeing gains in elections in India-held Jammu and Kashmir scheduled for November-December, prolonged conflict should not be part of a winning electoral strategy. Yet, logic often does not work as it should in this most disputed of regions and, occasionally, events in Kashmir are tied to wider struggles that Pakistan and India may be engaging in.
Consider that the Modi government has taken a decidedly tough line with Pakistan despite Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif wanting to pursue dialogue while simultaneously struggling with civil-military issues at home. The rapturous tone of the recent visit by Mr Modi to the US may have encouraged the Indian security establishment to pile further pressure on Pakistan. Meanwhile, on the Pakistan side, that very tone of Mr Modi’s visit and the successful inclusion of Pakistan-specific militancy concerns in the joint US-India statement may have rankled, and sections of the security establishment here may have decided that India, and the world at large, needs reminding that the Kashmir dispute is still very much alive and a flashpoint that should invite international attention. The path to military de-escalation at least remains well-known. Purposeful and result-orientated contact between the directors general of military operations of Pakistan and India can help dampen the violence along the LoC and the Working Boundary — but will the two countries decide to activate that option themselves, or will the international community have to put pressure behind the scenes? The approaching winter — while still distant in the present context — should also help dampen hostilities, though it remains to be seen if the elections will be held on time or postponed until the new year after an ongoing visit to Jammu and Kashmir by the Election Commission of India. As ever, little can be said with certainty on Kashmir.
Published in Dawn, October 9th, 2014