Music to the ears
AS the two-day annual All Pakistan Music Conference filled the night sky with music from the lawns of the National Academy of the Performing Arts in Karachi recently, many had reason to reflect on the great classical musicians and vocalists Pakistan has produced over the decades. That these musical traditions have continued to be passed down through the generations testifies exemplary commitment, especially in the face of scant support by the state. At Friday’s event, as bansuri-playing brothers Abid Ali and Sajid Ali were introduced, it was pointed out that while the former had played with the likes of Mehdi Hasan and Noorjehan, his sibling is contributing to Coke Studio collaborations. Hidden in this compliment — Coke Studio has not only produced music to critical acclaim but has also proved commercially successful — is a reality that has seemingly escaped the attention of policymakers. Since the audience for classical music is small (and this is true for many parts of the world), artists receive state support; failing that, and driven by the need to earn, they perforce turn to other work. As a result, the true classical traditions become neglected and eventually die out.
This unfortunate process has been under way in Pakistan as well. And yet at no administrative level has much concern been evident. That it was once on the radar is manifest, given that institutions such as the Pakistan National Council of the Arts and the Arts Councils in various cities were set up with mandates that included supporting (financially and through the provision of performance platforms) artists whose work would attract low commercial attention, such as classical music. In practice, though, efforts made by these organisations have come across as piecemeal and sporadic. Avenues such as Pakistan Television and Radio Pakistan, too, are no longer as hospitable to classical musicians as they once were. Surely, Pakistan’s classical music traditions ought not to be allowed to die out simply because of inattention. Is it too much to ask policymakers to intervene?
Ludicrous suggestion
THE water regulator, Irsa, has suggested to the federal government that all development programmes being carried out in the country be “frozen for at least five years and funds may be diverted” for building mega dams. This is an absurd proposal, and has been floated in the past as well to little avail. The secretary water and power would be well advised to ignore it. Nobody doubts that Pakistan needs more water storage, especially in response to the challenges posed by climate change. But suggesting that these should be built by diverting the entire PSDP funds for five years to the water bureaucracy shows a lack of seriousness on the part of Irsa. First of all, before making such an enormous request, which if agreed to would have deep ramifications for the economy, it is worth asking what other steps the regulator has recommended to meet the challenges of climate change.
What suggestions do they have regarding flood-control measures and the improvement of flood-forecasting techniques? What work have they done to promote more efficient utilisation of water on farms? Instead of advancing silly proposals of this sort, Irsa’s time would be better spent doing some actual work on the challenges that climate change presents to Pakistan, and on what sort of strategies can be adopted to meet them. Demanding money for giant construction schemes is something a lot of government departments excel at, but the water bureaucracy has left everybody behind in asking for the entirety of the development funds in the country to be placed at their disposable. The proposal is not even a new one. Officials from the water bureaucracy have been making suggestions of this sort for many years now. It reflects an extreme version of the thinking that infects much of our approach to water issues: that more physical infrastructure and more money are the answer to Pakistan’s water issues.
More than physical infrastructure, the water bureaucracy needs to do a better job of managing the resources at its disposal first, and doing more to advance policy reforms to raise efficiency and awareness of best practices and the reduction of water theft. The poor track record of the water bureaucracy in building large hydro projects, as evidenced by the repeated delays and poor management of the Neelum Jhelum hydropower project, do not inspire confidence that they can be trusted anymore with large construction projects.
Return of IDPs
THE pledge by the Pakistan Army to begin the return, in a phased manner, of an estimated 150,000 families displaced by the military operations in the North Waziristan and Khyber agencies is a welcome sign that the leadership has some understanding of the need to fight a people-centric counter-insurgency. To avoid a familiar cycle of violence peaking and subsiding over a period of time in most insurgency-hit areas, the local population needs to be on the side of the state. That is possible, but only through the careful management of the needs of the local population. To begin with, the affected population needs to be equipped with enough resources to make resettlement as painless a process as possible. The military and the Fata administration have accumulated a fair amount of experience in this regard and it appears that a reasonable amount of resources have been allocated to the task. But setting aside a quantum of resources and aid is one thing; ensuring that the families that it is intended for receive it in a manner that is dignified and as trouble-free as possible in the circumstances is another.
Far too often, the good intentions and the well-designed plans fail at the point of contact with the affected population: the lowest tiers of the military are not trained to deal with population and those of the administrative set-up rarely think of themselves as public servants. What is then designed thoughtfully and with care in Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad tends to not work as well on the ground in Fata. This has been a recurring theme over the years with IDP management and returning them to their homes in Fata. Then, there is the sense that after the IDPs have been returned and several months have passed, they are essentially left to their own devices, with the military dominant in the area but focused on protecting territory and the civil administration all but displaced and non-functional.
That turn of events over the medium term is a failing on the part of the military. If Fata is ever to be normalised – and not simply returned to the pre-insurgency state of affairs – it has to have a sustainable, responsive system of government running the gamut of civil administration to the administration of justice to law and order. Worryingly, the military leadership appears unwilling or unready to permit meaningful Fata reforms. Finally, there is the long term: what is the military’s exit strategy from Fata? One hundred and seventy five thousand troops cannot remain there forever, but militancy in Fata is intrinsically connected to the situation across the Durand Line, management of the border and broader foreign and national-security policies. The military leadership pledges to wipe out terrorism, but a militarised anti-terror strategy combined with a shield still seemingly provided to old militant favourites does not seem to be the right way ahead.
Published in Dawn, March 9th, 2015