Balochistan amnesty
IN theory, it is a significant concession by the state, addressing one of the principal demands of militants in Balochistan: along with the release of the so-called missing persons in the province, offering an amnesty to those involved in militancy has been seen as a major step towards the end of the long-running, low-level insurgency in the province. But the announcement by the Balochistan apex committee, a high-level provincial body consisting of government and military officials, of a general amnesty for militants who surrender and the creation of a rehabilitation programme for such militants is unlikely to immediately change the security environment in the province. Unconditional surrenders and handover of arms to the state followed by an attempt to reintegrate armed Baloch into society are not uncommon — indeed, in recent weeks there have been reports of several low-level tribal leaders turning in their weapons to the Balochistan government. The real challenge in Balochistan centres on the militants who, in the vernacular, are believed to have taken to the hills and the non-tribal leaders who are driving much of the insurgency through swathes of Baloch-dominated areas in the province.
Will anyone of those Baloch elements be tempted to opt for even a temporary ceasefire in the wake of the apex committee’s announcements? It seems unlikely. For one, the insurgency itself is believed to have fractured, and splinter groups are harder to induce with state-sponsored incentives as well as more likely to be determined to keep fighting to establish their credentials. More fundamentally, however, none of the rhetoric emanating from the state suggests that there is a rethink of the militarised strategy for dealing with Balochistan’s militancy problems. Consider just some of the heated rhetoric surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, with blunt vows by both government and military officials to do whatever is necessary to ensure the project comes to fruition. Given that the principal known opponent in Balochistan of mega development projects by the centre are the Baloch militants, how does the tough line taken on the construction of the CPEC chime with an attempt at a more conciliatory, softer approach towards the militants themselves?
Surely, as the recent Mastung carnage and various other attacks over the years have underscored, the Baloch militants’ violent approach tends to undermine the nationalist goal of a more autonomous and prosperous Balochistan. Surely also the state has a responsibility to, as was reiterated by the committee, to ensure security by taking on irreconcilable and unwaveringly militant elements. But over a decade of trying to pacify Balochistan by crushing armed dissent has yielded precious little: large parts of Balochistan are today as inaccessible and cut off from the rest of the country as they were a decade ago. Balochistan is a political problem that should be settled through political means — until that reality is accepted, Balochistan will continue to bleed.
Islamic State’s reach
FRIDAY’S deadly events illustrate the capacity of the selfstyled Islamic State to wreak havoc across regions beyond its direct control, as well as the need for a coordinated response from the international community in order to neutralise the extremist movement. At least two of the attacks — in Tunisia and Kuwait — have directly been claimed by IS, while it is unclear which group is responsible for the assault on a French gas factory. A fourth attack in Somalia was carried out by the Al Shabab outfit. The Tunisian and Kuwaiti attacks also illustrate the favoured targets of the so-called caliphate: Westerners and Shias, respectively. Nearly 40 tourists — reportedly mostly Europeans — were killed when a gunman opened fire in a Tunisian beach resort; the attack was confirmed to be the work of IS on Saturday, while this is the second major terrorist assault in the North African country this year. In Kuwait, a suicide bomber targeted a Shia mosque packed with worshippers during Friday prayers. Nearly 30 people were killed while over 200 were injured. This is said to be the oil-rich sheikhdom’s worst terrorist incident in many years while the atrocity mirrors two similar bombings of Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia that occurred over the past few weeks.
Clearly, the threat IS poses is not limited to the territory it occupies in Iraq and Syria. These attacks show it has the capability to inspire cells and lone-wolf attacks much further afield. Only a few days ago, an IS ‘spokesman’ called for attacks during the month of Ramazan. On Friday we witnessed the destructive response to this call. The need is for countries which have suspected IS cells or sympathisers to pool their efforts in order to prevent coordination between militants and the leadership. IS is a transnational threat, hence it requires a response that is not limited by frontiers. Along with a crackdown on the movement’s ability to communicate with supporters, including through the internet and the media, perhaps the most important requirement is to dislodge the ‘caliphate’ from the territory it has occupied in Iraq and Syria. For this, regional states will have to shed their divisions and work with both Baghdad and Damascus. This may be easier said than done, but unless the physical safe havens IS has occupied are taken away from the organisation and its leadership captured and neutralised, many more such atrocities can be expected.
Budget walkouts
FOUR budgets have been passed following a walkout by the opposition in the National Assembly as well as in the legislatures of three provinces — Sindh, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In fact, the walkouts themselves were motivated by factors that had nothing to do with the budget. This is not the first time that budget sessions have been marred by walkouts due to factors extraneous to economics. KP has a bit of a record in this, where every budget session for the past three years at least has seen a walkout. The state of the economic conversation amongst the political leadership is dire enough as it is, but walking out of the budget session in protest has taken matters to a new low altogether.
The budget session ought to be reserved only for budgetrelated discussions. Political scores can be settled later. The budget and the allocations contained within it are far too important to be held hostage to politicians’ outrage. The combined amount contained in these four budgets is close to Rs6.9 trillion, which is not a small sum of money whose allocations are being decided in such a casual manner. And although the Balochistan Assembly did not stage a walkout, the quality of discussion was very poor; the provincial government did not even release the detailed documents of the budget, so it is difficult to see how the legislators were even able to have a debate. Budget debates have historically been of very poor quality in Pakistan, with most members sticking only to rhetorical talking points. But this year has been a record as four of the five assemblies passed their budgets while the opposition walked out, and the fifth assembly carried on a debate without any budget details having been released. It shows a lack of interest in our political class that appears averse to tackling the real problems that plague the country. This is a deeply regrettable fact in the era of empowered provincial assemblies.
Published in Dawn, June 28th, 2015
http://www.dawn.com/newspaper/editorial