Brutal gun culture
THE recent incident involving cricket ace Wasim Akram and an unnamed trigger-happy individual serves as a reminder of the brutal gun culture that prevails in Pakistan, especially its largest city. The legendary fast bowler was reportedly involved in an accident with another vehicle while on his way to Karachi’s National Stadium on Thursday. According to Mr Akram, a vehicle deliberately rammed into his car. As an argument ensued, an individual from the other vehicle pulled out a gun and shot at Mr Akram’s car. It is a relief that the sporting great was unharmed. Police say a suspect is in custody while the investigation continues.
Some estimates suggest there are between 18 to 20 million firearms in the possession of civilians in Pakistan. This is a frightening figure, and it is evident that millions of gun owners are not shy about flaunting their deadly toys. In Karachi, from ‘influentials’ with an armada of guards in tow down to the common mugger — all are armed to the teeth, and a neighbourhood argument or burglary can result in tragedy. Over the past few days there has been a spate of shooting incidents in the metropolis, including a botched robbery in which a leading lady doctor was murdered. The issue of regulating firearms is a joke, as the state has initiated many de-weaponisation drives with great fanfare, only to eventually lose steam. Government officials have themselves admitted that many purported gun licenses are faked, while others have been issued without proper verification. This is the state of the official licensing mechanism; on top of that, there are the countless illegal guns floating around. What is needed is a thorough, countrywide de-weaponisation campaign; ideally, only police and military personnel should carry guns, and there too they must use deadly force as a last resort. Law-enforcement agencies have done a reasonable job in reducing Karachi’s violence in recent months. Street crime remains a problem, though. A similar effort is required to rid the city — and country — of guns.
Saudi suicide attack
WHILE the occupation of territory within Iraq and Syria by the self-styled Islamic State sent shockwaves across the Middle East — if not the world — should the extremist movement gain a foothold in Saudi Arabia, the consequences would be even grimmer. And over the past few months we have witnessed IS expand its footprint within the kingdom in a devastating manner. On Thursday, a suicide bomber targeted a mosque in the city of Abha frequented by security men; at least 15 people have been confirmed dead while the attack has been described as the deadliest aimed at Saudi security personnel in recent years. Though the attack took place in a province that borders Yemen — where the Saudis are fighting the Houthi militia — it has been claimed by IS in an online statement. It seems that after targeting the kingdom’s Shia minority, the group has turned its guns on the Saudi state. In May, IS suicide bombers attacked two Shia mosques in the Eastern Province in different incidents, while there have been a number of confrontations between the militants and security forces. That IS does not intend to stop here is evident; it has urged young Saudis to carry out attacks and has promised to continue targeting the Saudi state.
Riyadh has been taking action against militants on its soil. Last month over 400 individuals with suspected links to IS were picked up in swoops. Yet clearly, the IS support base and militant pool in the kingdom remains, indicating that more needs to be done. The Saudis should not underestimate their foe, especially when there is a radicalised segment of the population with sympathies for the ‘caliphate’. Though Riyadh has battled an Al Qaeda insurgency in the past, and emerged victorious, this time things are a little more complicated. For one, Saudi Arabia is involved in direct hostilities in Yemen, which has kept its security forces occupied, while its reported support to questionable militant groups in the Syrian civil war continues. Perhaps to address its internal militancy issue Saudi Arabia needs to disentangle itself from these regional conflicts and help the belligerents reach negotiated settlements. The fact is that IS seeks to bring down the Middle East’s regimes and remake the region in its own image, which makes the outfit a threat to Saudi as well as regional security. Therefore, all regional states need to coordinate efforts to halt the expansion of this ruthless concern.
Afghanistan: future uncertain
THE bloodiest 24 hours in Kabul in years suggest two things. One, the issue of who is to succeed Mullah Omar as leader of the Afghan Taliban is anything but settled. It could be that, as many observers have suggested, the weekend attacks in Kabul are the result of factionalism and a challenge to Mullah Akhtar Mansour. The Kabul attacks could also have been authorised by Mullah Mansour himself, possibly to demonstrate that he is not in the pocket of Pakistan or desperate to make peace with the Afghan state. Either way, the succession issue is far from settled. While it is still not clear quite who leaked news of Mullah Omar’s death and why, it does seem that hiding Omar’s death for two years has hurt Mullah Mansour’s credibility. A new leader who hoodwinked his fellow militants in an attempt to make sure he inherited the leadership mantle is hardly the kind of figure who compares well to Mullah Omar.
The question for the Afghan government and the outside world, in particular Pakistan, is what next? The facts suggest a gloomy picture. The possibility of a dialogue process resuming, or starting anew, soon seems low. There are also a couple of months at least left of the principal fighting season this year, suggesting more military gains for the Taliban ahead. Worryingly for the Afghan state, it has already lost record numbers of soldiers and policemen in Taliban attacks this year. The government of President Ashraf Ghani is also hampered in its ability to regroup and reassess its security strategy because of internal political divisions. Parliament has yet to approve a defence minister. It is difficult to know whether and if the Afghan Taliban will stay politically united or how long it will take for the present convulsions inside the insurgency to settle down.
For Pakistan, at least, the political goal should be to continue improving ties with the Afghan government, while the security goal should be to curb militant activity along the Durand Line. With the Afghan Taliban, the goal should be to reaffirm the state’s preference for a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government while simultaneously encouraging — and this will be a very fine balancing act — the Taliban to end internal rifts and unite behind the pro-peace faction without seeming to create a new Taliban leadership that is little more than a front for the Pakistani security establishment. Perhaps also the political leadership can try and contribute more to Afghan policy and take a more visible role. A visit to Kabul by the prime minister, for example, could send the right signal and would give the political leadership of both countries an opportunity to discuss how to move ahead. It should be obvious: security or foreign policy without major civilian input is hardly good for Pakistan or the region.
Published in Dawn, August 9th, 2015
Source: EDITORIAL