1990-2001: Post Cold War Era and Pakistan's
Dilemmas
Four major issues dominated Pakistan's foreign policy in the 1990s. These were a drift in Pakistan-U.S. relations, the Afghanistan problem, the Kashmir insurgency and its impact on Indo-Pakistan relations, and the nuclear explosions.
Another Drift in Pak-US Relations
Pakistan faced hard choices in the early 1990s. The U.S. was no longer willing to underwrite Pakistan's economic development and modernization of its military because Pakistan had lost its strategic relevance for the U.S. The decline of Pakistan's strategic relevance was caused by a host of factors like the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989), the revolt against the Soviet dominated authoritarian political systems in Eastern Europe (1989- 90), the end of the Cold War (1990), and the break up of the Soviet Union (1991). The absence of a competing superpower secured the primacy of the U.S. in global politics and a triumph of western values of liberal democracy and free economy. Afghanistan was no longer a high priority issue and the U.S. attention focused on consolidation of the incipient democratic trends in Eastern Europe and Russia and management of local and regional irritants elsewhere. This shifted U.S. priorities in South Asia from seeking Pakistan's cooperation to non-proliferation and repairing the damage caused to its relations with India due to its Pakistan-Afghanistan policies in the 1980s. The United States imposed four types of sanctions against Pakistan in this phase. First, it suspended military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan by invoking the Presser Amendment in October 1990 in pursuance of its nonproliferation policy. (See the above section). Second, additional economic sanctions were imposed on Pakistan after it exploded nuclear devices on May 28 and 30 1998 in response to similar explosions by India on May 11 and 13. Third, the US imposed more sanction after the military take over in Pakistan on October 12, 1999 under a U.S. law that called for discontinuation of economic relations with the regimes that come to power by displacing an elected and constitutional government. The military regime led by General Pervaiz Musharraf was placed under these sanctions. Fourth, limited sanctions were applied to some Pakistani institutions and organizations in 2000, 2001 and 2003 on the pretext that Pakistan received missile technology from China or Korea in violation of the international arrangements for checking proliferation of missile technology. The U.S. also toyed with the idea of declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state during the 1990s for allowing its territory to be used by militant Islamic groups, Afghan war veterans and others, for launching terrorist acts in Indian administered Kashmir and elsewhere. Pakistan's support to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001) was another issue of contention between Pakistan and the U.S. The U.S. tried to mollify Pakistan by releasing weapons and military equipment Pakistan had paid for before the imposition of the Pressler Amendment and returned the money in 1996-97 Pakistan had paid for the purchase of new F-16 aircraft under a special legislation (the Brown Amendment). It is interesting to note that the U.S. returned the paid amount for F-16 aircraft after adjusting a part of the due amount against the price of the gain it supplied to Pakistan in the past and storage charges for the F-16 aircraft manufactured for Pakistan but not delivered to it.
Continuation of the Afghanistan Problem
The Afghanistan problem continued to haunt Pakistan during these years. It had two aspects: the refugee problem and installation of a government in Kabul that could ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Though the UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched various programmes for encouraging Afghan refugees to return to their homes, a majority of them stayed back. Internal strife in Afghanistan dissuaded them to go back; a good number of them returned after spending some time in Afghanistan or periodically shuttled between the two countries. International assistance for the maintenance of refugees declined, increasing socio-economic pressures on Pakistan. Pakistan's effort to install a pro-Pakistan Mujahideen government in Kabul did not succeed. When the Taliban movement surfaced in the fall of 1994 in Khandhar, the managers of Pakistan's Afghanistan policy co-opted them and facilitated their strides for capturing Kabul, which they did in the last week of September 1996. Pakistan recognized the Taliban government in May 1997 and secured its recognition from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. No other country extended recognition to the Taliban government. It was not long that the Taliban government incurred the displeasure of the international community because of its socio-cultural and gender policies. They were also accused of harboring militant Islamic groups that engaged in violence in different countries. The Al-Qaeda established its base in Afghanistan and some of the militant and sectarian Pakistan Islamic groups used Afghanistan as a safe-haven and military training centre. Despite the growing criticism of the Taliban government at the international level, Pakistan continued to support them and advocated that they should be given Afghanistan's seat in the UN, a plea that did not evoke much support. Pakistan made unsuccessful attempts in 2000-2001 to moderate Taliban's socio-cultural policies. It also sought the Taliban's help to round up the Pakistanis who took refuge in Afghanistan after resorting to violence and sectarian killings in Pakistan. The Taliban government denied their presence in Afghanistan which somewhat irritated the Pakistan government but it continued to support the Taliban government. The continued commitment to the Taliban regime in Kabul adversely affected Pakistan's reputation at the international level and built strains in its relations with Iran. The civil strife in Afghanistan adversely affected Pakistan's efforts to cultivate meaningful economic and technological
interactions with the states of Central Asia that attained independence when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Some of these states complained about the efforts of the Taliban and Pakistan based militant Islamic groups to cultivate linkages with the Islamic dissident element in Central Asian states.
Insurgency in Kashmir
The outbreak of insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir in 1989 added a new dimension to the Kashmir problem. By 1990-91, a number of ex-Afghan Islamic militant groups identified the situation in Kashmir as a Muslim cause and decided to support the insurgency. Pakistan's Army and intelligence authorities cultivated these groups and encouraged their role in Indian administered Kashmir as a low cost strategy to build pressure on India for the
resolution of the Kashmir problem. As India was subjected to criticism at the international level for mismanaging the political affairs in Kashmir and there were complaints of human right violations by its security forces, India denied the domestic roots of insurgency in Kashmir and put the blame for the insurgency on the Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups. This built strains in India-Pakistan relations and the two countries traded charges and counter charges on the developments in Kashmir. India and Pakistan agreed on a framework for peaceful interaction when Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999. However, the spirit of this declaration was destroyed when Pakistan and India engaged in a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir during May-July 1999. The Indian government felt betrayed by this war after having signed an agreement for peaceful interaction in February. When, in October 1999, Pakistan's Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, assumed power in a coup, Indian government refused to interact with his government. India pursued the policy of no contact with the military government of General Pervez Musharraf until July 2001 when Pervez Musharraf was invited by Vajpayee to visit Agra for talks. The Agra summit conference proved inconclusive.
Going Nuclear
The last major development in this phase was the decision of India and Pakistan to become overt nuclear powers. Had India not exploded nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, Pakistan would not have gone for nuclear explosions on May 28 and 30. These explosions were described by Pakistani leaders as the rectification of the strategic imbalance in the region caused by India's nuclear explosions. Initially, there were signs that Pakistan might delay nuclear testing. The major factors that shaped Pakistan's decision to test nuclear devices included the reluctance of the Western powers to impose tough sanctions against India; non-availability of credible security guarantees to Pakistan; Pakistani perception that the U.S. administration would not be able to deliver an attractive package of economic assistance and military sales; the hawkish and anti-Pakistan statements of India's Union ministers and the senior members of the ruling party, creating the impression in Pakistan that India might use its nuclear status to extend its military reach beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir; and the growing domestic pressure for testing. The government of Pakistan did not make a realistic assessment of the implications of testing for Pakistan's troubled economy. Pakistan's economic crisis accentuated after nuclear testing. However, the government deflected the criticism by describing it as a guarantee against India's nuclear blackmail. Pakistan describes its nuclear weapons and missile programmes as a part of its policy of maintaining 'minimum credible deterrence' against security threat from India. Given the wide imbalance in conventional weaponry to the advantage of India, Pakistan attaches much importance to nuclear and missile programmes for ensuring security. Pakistan has offered India a restraint regime covering nuclear and conventional weapons. India does not want to be tagged with Pakistan on this issue and favors a global restraint regime that takes care of its security concerns visà- vis China and fits well with its ambition for being counted as a leading global actor. As long as India and Pakistan diverge on how best to ensure their security, Pakistan will assign importance to its nuclear and missile programmes for ensuring its security.

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