Articles related to Relations for CE 2014

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1. Pakistan Russia Relations.

Pakistan`s Moscow option
BY M U N I R A K R A M | 8/17/2014 (Published in DAWN Newspaper)

SINCE independence, Pakistan`s relations with Moscow have been mostly adversarial. Pakistan was America`s `most allied ally`. India aligned with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Moscow`s veto in the UN Security Council to block Kashmiri selfdetermination, the U2 flight from Peshawar, Soviet support in 1971 for India`s war to dismember Pakistan and Islamabad`s collaboration with the US in the antiSoviet war in Afghanistan punctuated the hostile relationship.

Although the hostility slowly dissipated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, friendship eluded Moscow and Islamabad, for several reasons: Russia`s continuing defence relationship with India, Pakistan`s support for the Afghan Taliban and by extension their Chechen and Uzbek associates Moscow`s alignment with the Northern Alliance and Pakistan`s post 9/11 alliance with the US.

However, the new `Cold War`in Europe, ignited by the Ukraine crisis, has profound strategic implications not only for Europe but also for other `theatres` where Russia`s interests and objectives intersect with those of the US and Europe. Sino-Russian relations have become dramatically closer. Moscow is reasserting its role in the Middle East. It is also likely to do so in East and South Asia.

Pakistan-Russia relations have been evolving in positive directions during recent months. Pakistan is acting against Central Asian terrorists. As India has moved closer to the US, Russia has warmed to Pakistan. The closer Sino-Russian relationship has reinforced this trend. There are clear recent signs that Moscow is now open to substantive security collaboration with Pakistan. Russia`s aims are: to secure Pakistan`s cooperation to stabilise Afghanistan, combat Chechen and Central Asian terrorist groups present in the region, compensate for India`s tilt towards America and thereby retain leverage in New Delhi.

There are a number of areas where mutually beneficial cooperation can be promoted between Islamabad and Moscow.

Afghanistan: Over the past year, quiet talks between Pakistan, China and Russia have been under way to consider ways to stabilise Afghanistan.

Russia`s old relationship with the Northern Alliance and influence with Iran; Pakistan`s influence withthe Pakhtuns and the Afghan Taliban; and China`s financial and economic capacity can be a powerful combination to promote reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan as the US disengages from that country.

Indo-Pakistan: As India`s major defence partner and a member of BRICS, Moscow continues to enjoy considerable, if reduced, influence in India despite New Delhi`s tilt towards the US. Russia desires IndoPakistan normalisation to prevent a disastrous conflict, limit American influence and develop new avenues for energy, trade and industrial cooperation with the South Asian region. Given the new global political alignments, Moscow`s mediation between India and Pakistan could be more even-handed and effective than the sl(ewed policies presently pursued by Washington.

Defence: Russia`s defence industry is still among the best in the world. Moscow may now be willing to lift its self-imposed embargo on defence supplies to Pakistan. The dimensions of such cooperation will depend considerably on Pakistan`s ability to pay for defence equipment and, to a lesser extent, on the vigour of New Delhi`s anticipated objections.

Oil and gas: Russia is the world`s largest producer of oil and gas. The expertise of Russia`s Rosneft and Gazprom can contribute significantly to developing Pakistan`s oil and gas potential, onshore and offshore.

Western sanctions have enhanced the incentive of these giant Russian companies to find new frontiers of cooperation.

Gas supplies: In the walce of the Western embargoes, Russia is looking for alternate markets for its abundant gas production. Its $400 billion gas deal with China has been the most prominent response.

Moscow is also interested in building gas supply routes to India and Pakistan. Russian gas could be added to supplies from the proposed TAPI pipeline.

New pipelines can be built to Pakistan and India through China. Russia`s Gazprom could also help in executing the projected Iranian gas pipeline to Pakistan (and India).

Nuclear reactors: So far, Russia has refused to supply nuclear power reactors to Pakistan due to the restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers` Group on non-members of the NPT with the significant exception of India. It is possible that in the new stra-tegic circumstances, and in exchange for appropriate safeguards, Russia, like China, may consider the sale of nuclear power plants to Pakistan, especially if India acquires its new plants from the US.

Trade: If Afghanistan can be stabilised, it would open the way for expanded trade between Pakistan, Central Asia and Russia. While Pakistan requires Russian oil, gas and industrial products, Pakist an can be a competitive source of agricultural and textile goods to Russia. Pakistan could also offer Russia trade access to India in exchange for its help in normalising Pakistan-India ties.

Industrialisation: Russia retains some of the industrial prowess of the Soviet Union. It can modernise the Soviet-supplied Pakistan Steel Mills. Similar cooperation can be pursued in a number of `hightech` sectors, such as biotechnology, aviation and space, where Russia possesses competitive capabilities.

In some areas such as Afghanistan, IndoPakistan normalisation and counterterrorism the objectives of the US and its allies are convergent with Russia`s. In other areas energy, defence, nuclear generation opposition can be expected from the West to Pakistan-Russian cooperation. India may also object, although its opposition may not be decisive.

While Pakistan no longer requires, nor is likely to receive, US arms supplies or nuclear power plants, its ability to resist Western objections to cooperation with Moscow could be constrained by its financial and trade dependence on the West. Pakistan`s financial stress may also restrict its ability to pay for Russian supplies of defence and other equipment.

Pakistan needs to identify realistic goals for its new relationship with Russia, evolve sustainable ways to minimise its financial vulnerability (including greater financial integration with China) and deploy adroit diplomacy to capitalise on the emerging global and regional strategic realities. Of course, while its politicians squabble on the streets, adding to the country`s turbulence, it is difficult for Pakistan to devise well-considered policies to exploit the Moscow option or other strategic opportunities.• The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

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Pakistan India Relations:

A disappointing move by India
Dawn Editorial Published on 8/20/2014

THE Pakistan-India foreign secretary-level talks to have been held next week were supposed to mark the first meaningful engagement in the normalisation process between the two countries since Indian
Prime
Minister Narendra Modi won power.

Now, the cancelled meeting has instantly become a symbol of the difficulty to even talk about talks when it comes to the two rivals. To be sure, this time the blame must lie firmly on the Indian side. The suggestion that the Pakistan high commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, committed a grave diplomatic error by meeting a Kashmir Hurriyat leader is simply preposterous. Leave aside that such meetings ahead of high-level talks between Pakistan and India have occurred in the past and are standard diplomatic fare, if Mr Modi`s government is really keen on starting over with Pakistan, then would it not make sense to bring on board as many stakeholders as possible when it comes to the Kashmir dispute? Bizarrely, there have even been claims in some Indian quarters that the meeting in India would be akin to Indian diplomats engaging Baloch separatists in Pakistan. Perhaps it is worth reiterating the basic facts here: Kashmir has been an internationally accepted disputed area from the very inception of Pakistan and India; there is absolutely no question about the legal status of Balochistan as part of the Pakistani federation. Unhappily, latest events have underlined an old truth when it comes to PakistanIndia relations: if the political leadership on both sides appears weak, hawks and hard-liners emerge to try and scuttle the very idea of normalisation between the two countries. Consider that on the Pakistani side,
Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif took the difficult decision of travelling to Mr Modi`s swearing-in ceremony despite no Indian prime minister having visited Pakistan in over a decade, even as hawks inside Pakistan openly questioned why Mr Sharif was giving Mr Modi a public relations boost without getting anything in return. Without that kind of singular commitment at the very highest levels of political power, Pakistan-India relations will never truly be able to move forward.

Of course, if forward movement is difficult, it does not mean that a tenuous quiet is a permanent condition. Going in reverse is all too easy. The Line of Control and the Working Boundary are tense and low-level violence in recent days could quickly escalate if the political environment also turns poisonous. Mr Modi himself made some hardhitting statements against Pakistan on a recent visit to Kashmir. The BJP has been in power at the centre in India before, but Mr Modi is for the first time directly in charge of the international dimension of India`s interests. It is all too easy to see how Mr Modi could use a hard-line stance on Pakistan to reap domestic dividends. But, while interconnected, international relations should not become hostage to domestic concerns.

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EU’s Russia policy
By Remi Piet Published in The News on August 19, 2014

Ten years ago, Robert Kagan famously compared the relationship between the EU and the US to the one between Venus and Mars. Brussels would be the amicable face of the couple wielding its normative influence and soft power potential, in contrast with Washington's aggressive foreign policy. Recent developments, however, have shown that the EU might be giving up its soft politics for a more bellicose stance, at least on Russia.

As Jean Claude Juncker, the new president-elect of the European Commission, struggles to form a cabinet of commissioners and balance the European member states' interests, one of the central points of scrutiny is the stance taken by potential candidates towards Russia. The Russo-sceptic voice within the EU, traditionally led by Poland and the Baltic States, is no longer ignored. These concerns now have been echoed by politicians in traditionally more pro-Russian EU members.

The squabble over the composition of the next European Commission has shown yet again that European member states continue to disagree about almost everything when it comes to further integration or reforming European economies. The German conservatives are criticising the candidate for the EU's economic portfolio, Pierre Moscovici, for being “unqualified” because of his Keynesian beliefs. Juncker himself is opposed by the UK for his perceived federalist agenda.

Maybe the only point of agreement during the intergovernmental negotiations in Brussels is that the future commission should be tough and intransigent on Russia. If Putin's record in reestablishing the stature of Russia after the post-Cold War slump can be considered quite impressive, it does not match the level of his other accomplishment: rekindling consensus in Brussels over his mismanagement of the Ukrainian conflict.

The new anti-Russian stance impacted discussions over the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose creation was one of the crucial advances of the Treaty of Lisbon. Establishing this portfolio was supposed to be a stepping stone towards the EU finally playing a relevant role in global diplomacy. Unfortunately, the appointment of a low-profile and inexperienced British politician, Catherine Ashton, in 2009 cooled enthusiasm about the EU's diplomatic future for some time.

But the change of tone in Brussels seems to be real this time. As Ashton leaves the post, everyone agrees that it is time for a new, more assertive figure. In fact, several early candidates for the position were rebuffed for their lack of sternness towards Moscow.

Federica Mogherini the Italian initial front-runner is almost out of the race for being complacent towards Russia throughout the conflict in Ukraine. Radoslaw Sikorski, Poland's foreign minister, lost all chances when he mocked his country's relationship with the US, calling it “worthless”.

Eventually, the position might very well be handed to Kristalina Georgieva from Bulgaria. Although Georgieva clearly possesses the needed competencies after four years as EU commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis response, she might owe her nomination to a behind-the-scenes deal. Bulgaria must have been promised compensation from European leaders who demanded it halt work on the Russia's South Stream pipeline, a costly sacrifice for the Bulgarian economy.

Yet there is no guarantee that Brussels’ harsh rhetoric towards Russia is going to transform into effective policies. If the EU is adamant in maintaining a firm position towards Putin, its posturing might be worthless unless individual states stop implementing separate policies, in the hope of protecting their selfish interest at the expense of a common European foreign policy strategy.

While they encourage Brussels to be bold, some European countries are far from taking decisive steps toward sanctioning Russia. France still intends to sell its Mistral warship to Russia; Germany has no intention of placing its energy security at risk, and the UK continues validating export licenses for weapon sales to Russia while pampering Russian billionaires.

Excerpted from: ‘EU's Russia foreign policy: From Venus to Mars?’. Courtesy: Aljazeera.com

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Originally Posted by engr sarakhan

Pakistan India Relations:

A disappointing move by India
Dawn Editorial Published on 8/20/2014

THE Pakistan-India foreign secretary-level talks to have been held next week were supposed to mark the first meaningful engagement in the normalisation process between the two countries since Indian
Prime
Minister Narendra Modi won power.

Now, the cancelled meeting has instantly become a symbol of the difficulty to even talk about talks when it comes to the two rivals. To be sure, this time the blame must lie firmly on the Indian side. The suggestion that the Pakistan high commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, committed a grave diplomatic error by meeting a Kashmir Hurriyat leader is simply preposterous. Leave aside that such meetings ahead of high-level talks between Pakistan and India have occurred in the past and are standard diplomatic fare, if Mr Modi`s government is really keen on starting over with Pakistan, then would it not make sense to bring on board as many stakeholders as possible when it comes to the Kashmir dispute? Bizarrely, there have even been claims in some Indian quarters that the meeting in India would be akin to Indian diplomats engaging Baloch separatists in Pakistan. Perhaps it is worth reiterating the basic facts here: Kashmir has been an internationally accepted disputed area from the very inception of Pakistan and India; there is absolutely no question about the legal status of Balochistan as part of the Pakistani federation. Unhappily, latest events have underlined an old truth when it comes to PakistanIndia relations: if the political leadership on both sides appears weak, hawks and hard-liners emerge to try and scuttle the very idea of normalisation between the two countries. Consider that on the Pakistani side,
Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif took the difficult decision of travelling to Mr Modi`s swearing-in ceremony despite no Indian prime minister having visited Pakistan in over a decade, even as hawks inside Pakistan openly questioned why Mr Sharif was giving Mr Modi a public relations boost without getting anything in return. Without that kind of singular commitment at the very highest levels of political power, Pakistan-India relations will never truly be able to move forward.

Of course, if forward movement is difficult, it does not mean that a tenuous quiet is a permanent condition. Going in reverse is all too easy. The Line of Control and the Working Boundary are tense and low-level violence in recent days could quickly escalate if the political environment also turns poisonous. Mr Modi himself made some hardhitting statements against Pakistan on a recent visit to Kashmir. The BJP has been in power at the centre in India before, but Mr Modi is for the first time directly in charge of the international dimension of India`s interests. It is all too easy to see how Mr Modi could use a hard-line stance on Pakistan to reap domestic dividends. But, while interconnected, international relations should not become hostage to domestic concerns.

Tenuous ties
BY A . G . N O O R A N I | 8/23/2014
EVEN by the record of the tortuous course of ties between India and Pakistan, the former`s decision to cancel the foreign secretaries` talks, scheduled for Aug 25, is a grave mistake of lasting consequences.

The summit at New York on Sept 25, for which the secretaries were to prepare, might not be held at all. If every promising moment is followed by another of despair, it is because each side is in thrall to its own public opinion but has scant regard for public opinion on the other side; seldom adopting a negotiable stand. These enduring constants bedevil ties.

Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif accepted
Prime
Minister Narendra Modi`s thoughtful invitation to his swearing-in on May 26 ignoring criticism at home; a fact which was widely noted in India as was his circumspection on Kashmir.

By every rule of sound diplomacy, the tempo should have been maintained as determinedly as it is on Sino-India relations.

Recurring reports of `incursions` on the border do not af feet the quest for better relations with China. At Leh on Aug 12, at a gathering of personnel from the armed forces, Narendra Modi fired a salvo at Pakistan for engaging in a `proxy war of terrorism`. The next day Pakistan`s Foreign Office criticised the `baseless rhetoric against Pakistan`. A few hours later the Indian external affairs ministry defended the prime minister`s remarks as an `articulation of India`s core concerns with Pakistan` The atmosphere was effectively spoilt on Aug 18. All hell broke loose over Pakistan`s high commissioner Abdul Basit`s meetings with Kashmir`s Hurriyat leaders. The talks were cancelled.

Three points are in order. First, such talks have been held for nearly two decades in Delhi since May 1995 when president Farooq Leghari attended a meeting of Saarc, the regional South Asian forum.

In July 2001, Gen Musharraf met `separatists` before the Agra summit and again in April 2005; in April 2007 prime minister Shaukat Aziz met them on a visit for a Saarc meeting. So did foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar in July 2011 and foreign affairs adviser Sartaj Aziz in 2013. None of the three prime ministers of the day P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh lost his sleep over it.

Secondly, it is a ritual, fatuous exercise.

Hurriyat has leaders who are barely on speaking terms with one another, and meet visitors separately. They have no constructive proposals to offer beyond demanding a place at the high table. Leghari and Musharraf were taken aback by Syed Ali Shah Geelani`s reproach at Pakist an`s lapses from the Islamic code. It is no secret that Musharraf advised them to talk to New Delhi.Thirdly, the meetings on Aug 19, a week before the foreign secretary talks, were illadvised nonetheless. The aim should be to promote dialogue, not to do anything which would be perceived as provocation by a new and consciously hard-line government. No gains were achievable and the risks were palpable.

The reaction was utterly disproportionate.

The talks were cancelled. Every Kashmiri leader across the board criticised it, as did some in New Delhi. What message does the Modi government intend to convey to other neighbours and to the big powers? Is it a portent of worse to follow? The omens were none too propitious. On July 8, the UN Military Observers Group was asl
The same month the visiting UN peace-keeping chief Hervé Ladsous made it plain that quitting India was ruled out. Only the Security Council can `undo the decision`.

Based on its resolution of April 21, 1948,Rosalyn Higgins, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, held the same view in her book.

One hopes that all this does not indicate a desire for a new format spawned by a new diplomatic culture, for the reasons for the cancellation makeno sense. The Shimla pact itself envisages `the final settlement of Jammu & Kashmir` Arun Jaitley, defence minister, was sent to Kashmir as an interlocutor on July 22, 2003.

L.K. Advani met the Kashmiri leaders in New Delhi in February 2004.

The record of pronouncements on unquestionably `internal` matters is unedifying.

Pakistan`s cabinet ministers spoke volubly in 1984 when Punjab in India was in turmoil. In 2006, India`s external affairs ministry attacked Pakistan on the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Are we doomed to a persistent deadlock? As for trust, Prof Yan Xuetong, dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, has pointed out that `mutual trust is a result rather than a premise of long-term cooperation. Instead of `mutual trust,` Beijing and Washington should drop the wishful thinking and spend more effort on building a realistic relationship based on their interests.` That applies to India and Pakistan as well. •