Rethinking Foreign Policy -- Can Pakistan and India Agree?

[Khuram]

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Rethinking Foreign Policy -- Can Pakistan and India Agree?
Dost Mittar
March 12, 2006

Pakistan has a robust economy, perhaps better than it has been since the time of Ayub Khan. The bitter macro-economic medicine administered by Shaukat Aziz when he was the Finance Minister has borne fruit but the critical factor has been the substantial support provided by the U.S as a compensation for Pakistan for fighting its “War on Terror”. As a consequence, the G.D.P is growing by almost 8 per cent. All sectors of the economy are growing, the government is collecting increased revenues, the foreign exchange reserves are high and rising and the Pakistani rupee is higher now than it was in 2001. There are now over 23 million mobile phone users in Pakistan, which makes it nearly double the penetration rate in the neighbouring India; 1.5 million subscribers were added in Pakistan in the month of January 2006 alone.

Despite this rosy economic picture, Pakistan can be said to be passing through one of the darkest periods of its history. It is facing crises both internally and externally. Internally, Pakistanis are increasingly unhappy with President Musharraf’s policy of cooperation with the U.S and military action in Waziristan. The population of Pakistan in general and the NWFP in particular is generally sympathetic to the militants waging war in Afghanistan. Dissidents in Balochistan are up in arms and the army has to use helicopter gunships to deal with the insurgency. The religious parties are angry also with the West’s insensitivity towards Muslim sentiments. The civil society is upset with Musharraf’s reluctance to give up his military uniform and hand over the rule to civilians.

Externally, Pakistan is being criticised for not doing enough against the “War on Terror”. The Indians are complaining that Pakistan is not destroying the jihadi infrastructure supporting militants in Kashmir. Afghanistan is complaining that it is not going after the Taleban leaders despite it providing intelligence regarding their whereabouts in Pakistan. The U.S wants it to crack down harder on the Al Qaeda elements in the border districts adjoining Afghanistan. Musharraf, on the other hand, claims that he is doing all that is possible in combating terrorism.

There is a real disconnect between the international and Pakistani views about what Pakistan is doing to combat terrorism. Generally speaking, foreigners view all jihadi activities as terrorist activity. This is not the case with Pakistanis and Musharraf. Musharraf seems to categorise Jihadis into at least four groups. The first group were the sectarians led by the likes of the SSP who were creating dissension within the country and had to be eliminated; Musharraf had started acting against them even before September 2001. The second group were the members of Al Qaeda, especially Arabs, Chechens and other non-afghan foreigners. These ex-darlings of the U.S, who came to Pakistan to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but later turned against the U.S, became a liability after the attack on the World Trade Centre in September 2001. When Musharraf responded to Colin Powell’s famous telephone call on Septemeber 12, 2001 by joining the U.S fight against Al Qaeda, these jihadis became unwelcome in Pakistan. Their only usefulness now is negative in that if they are totally defeated, Pakistan will lose much of its usefulness for the U.S in its War on Terror.

The remaining two categories of Jihadis are the Taleban who are waging war against the U.S led coalition in Afghanistan and those fighting a war against the Indian occupation of Kashmir. These two groups of Jihadis are the creation of Pakistan and have been supported by funds, manpower, logistics and training by both the civilian and state actors in Pakistan. Asking Pakistan to destroy them is like God asking Abraham to sacrifice his son. Pakistan agreed to curb their activities as the US pointed the gun to its head, but lacks the enthusiasm it has for destroying the other two categories of jihadis.

It is in this context that one has to view the increasing disenchantment of the U.S with Pakistan and the de-hyphening of its relationship with India. The recent Bush visit has crystallised what had been apparent for quite some time now; namely, that the U.S considers India to be a key partner in how it views the future shape of the world in general and Asia in particular. This partnership will endure even if the Indo-U.S nuclear deal fails to pass the Congress because the Americans increasingly view India as an anchor for their Asian strategy. The U.S has realised that being the sole super-power is not enough to manage international relations; they also realise that they may not remain the sole super-power for long, with China fast gaining the wherewithal to be a super-power in another decade or two. While India has no desire to be an American vassal in its attempts to contain China, it does not mind taking advantage of the situation to boost its own ambition to be a world power, a strong regional player and a pre-eminent South Asian power.

Pakistan, on the other hand, is viewed as a not-too-trustworthy-but-necessary ally in the War on Terror. It is also viewed as a potential nightmare if Musharraf is replaced by forces inimical to the U.S. Mark Shield on Jim Lehrer Hour Report on the PBS quoted inside U.S Administration sources as saying that the biggest nightmare of Bush is not Iraq or Iran but things potentially going wrong in Pakistan. In short, the U.S views Pakistan as a short-term solution but a long-term problem.

This shift in the U.S position towards the subcontinental siblings is neither new nor sudden. Pakistan is being viewed the same now as it was in the year 2000 when the last U.S President, Bill Clinton, made a pit-stop in Pakistan only to deliver a huge snub and a public admonition. At that time, Musharraf was being reprimanded for Kargil as well as for his coup d’etat against the civilian rule. In between came September 11, which made Pakistan indispensable for the U.S in its fight against Al Qaeda. The breathing space provided by that event is now coming to an end, partly because, unlike Hossani Mubarak of Egypt or even the Saudi royalty, the Pakistani state has been ambivalent in cracking down its homegrown Islamists.

On the Pakistani side, too, the disenchantment with the U.S is complete. The Pakistani news commentators are almost unanimous in proclaiming that the U.S is no longer a reliable ally, especially when it comes to dealing with helping Pakistan with its Kashmir agenda. There are rumours about some uneasiness within the army brass as well. The voices for a re-think of the Pakistani geopolitical alliance are getting louder.

The natural tendency in Pakistan, given the current circumstances, is to reduce the importance of its alliance with the U.S and move, instead, even closer to China. This makes sound political sense, as the Indo-US partnership is partly directed at China and that country has a natural interest in forming counter-alliance. It is no coincidence that Musharraf visited China just before the Bush visit and signed important deals with that country. If the U.S eventually implements its nuclear deal with India, which it is unwilling to extend to Pakistan, China can be counted upon to sign a deal with Pakistan to extend similar cooperation in the civilian nuclear field. If China wishes, it would also be in a position to shift some of its manufacturing facilities to Pakistan and give it some preference in bilateral trade.

If Pakistan follows that route, and indications are that it will, this would be a continuation of the international diplomacy that Pakistan has pursued since its inception. The thrust of this policy has been to checkmate India at each and every forum. This India and Kashmir-centric policy has so far not paid any dividends to Pakistan; it has led to the dismemberment of the country, rise of jehadism, dominance of military over every other institution and an emphasis of religious over other identities. What it has not done is provide Pakistan with political stability and a chance to fulfil its potential.

There is however another avenue open to Pakistan and that is to make a paradigm shift in its approach towards India. It can turn India from being a source of permanent hostility to one of economic and political strength. To do so would not require any real sacrifice on its part, merely to accept the reality of status quo and Pakistan’s inability to change it by force or by diplomacy. The task is easier now for Pakistan than it has ever been before: The increased people-to-people contact and other confidence building measures have created a climate of goodwill between the two countries, which however seems to be coming under stress as Pakistan gets blamed for increased terrorist activity in India and India is accused of fishing in the troubled waters of Balochistan. The bilateral trade between the two countries is also increasing. Pakistan finally seems to be discovering the potential of religious tourism from India as more Sikh and Hindu pilgrims are encouraged to visit places of religious interests to them. Pakistan has a better and less-utilized physical infrastructure, which can be attractive to Indian entrepreneurs struggling with a croaking infrastructure in their own country.

This is no easy task for any Pakistani leader, least of all for President Musharraf who is feeling less and less secure of his position with each passing day. If he has to undertake such a bold departure, he would need some support and sympathy from India in the form of a relaxation of its stand on Kashmir. Musharraf has presented numerous proposals on Kashmir without receiving any favourable response from the Indians. It is time for Indians to show a willingness to reveal their cards. The Indian leadership has frequently stated that they are willing to give greater autonomy to Kashmir without indicating the areas in which it is willing to cede authority. Musharraf needs to show some gain from the bilateral bonhomie and Indians should enable him to do that. At the very least, Pakistan should be seen to be a player in moving towards a settlement of the of Jammu and Kashmir problem.

One might ask what would India gain from making any concession? On the surface, it might appear that India does not need anything from Pakistan. India is currently in what the stock-market analysts call “The Sweet Spot”. Its economy is booming; the world leaders seem to be vying with each other to come to India and seek a piece of its economic action; the Multinational corporations are focussing on India as never before and the country is the favoured destination of institutional investors. Even the militancy in Kashmir is on the decline and the country is under no pressure from any quarters to make any compromise.

To think in the above way would be a shortsighted approach on India’s part. India is right now in a position when it can afford to be magnanimous. But it does not have to be merely altruistic, because ending the sibling rivalry, which started at the twin-birth of the two countries, is also in the interest of India for both domestic and international reasons. Domestically, the terrorism problem, which was earlier limited to Jammu and Kashmir and North-East, is now spreading all over the country. If left unchecked, it would make India an unsafe place for doing business and would be avoided by international investors in the same way that they now avoid Pakistan. Since many of the terrorist bombings are traced to Muslims, it is creating public opinion against them, especially among the educated middle class urban Hindus. A resolution of the Kashmir problem to the satisfaction of Kashmiris and Pakistanis will reduce support for the Jihadis who want to expand their activities outside Kashmir. While it is politically incorrect to relate the security of Indian Muslims to a rapprochement with Pakistan, the reality is that the end to hostility with Pakistan would remove a major cause of stigma of disloyalty from Indian Muslims.

India also has an external reason for ending hostility with Pakistan. India’s dreams of becoming a world power have never been closer to becoming reality than now. But to do so, India has to be acceptable as a leader in its own backyard. For that to happen, it needs to be perceived as a Big Brother and not as a Big Bully. It needs to be a force for stability and progress in the neighbourhood. Pakistan is passing through a difficult phase. It can help it maintain stability and prosperity by strengthening Musharraf’s hands against forces of instability, a stable Pakistan is good for a stable India.

If India and Pakistan can end their family feud, they would together be in a much better position to fight off the external forces that wish to dominate the region by playing one country against the other.

[Khuram]

India-Pakistan: Peace After the Earthquake?
Author: Esther Pan, Staff Writer


Updated on November 1, 2005

Could the October 8 earthquake help bring peace between India and Pakistan?
Has India offered Pakistan aid since the earthquake?
What is the basic conflict over Kashmir?
Has any progress been made in negotiations?
How did the earthquake impact Islamic militant groups in Kashmir?
Is there political will on both sides to reach an agreement?
Is there precedent for natural disasters affecting politics in Pakistan?

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Could the October 8 earthquake help bring peace between India and Pakistan?
India and Pakistan have clashed over the disputed region of Kashmir since 1947, when the two countries were partitioned into separate states following the end of British colonial rule. The devastating earthquake—which measured 7.6 on the Richter scale and struck the Pakistan-controlled region of Kashmir—killed tens of thousands of people and left millions homeless. It has also triggered international attention on the region’s peace process, which experts say could be accelerated in the wake of the Kashmir quake. There are some precedents: The 1999 earthquake in the Marmara region of Turkey prompted Greek expressions of sympathy that improved relations between the traditional rivals, and the Indonesian government and Aceh separatists agreed to a peace deal after the December 2004 tsunami ravaged the region. “As a general rule, these kinds of large-scale natural disasters do tend to have an impact, directly or indirectly,” says Stephen Cohen, senior fellow in foreign policy studies and a South Asia expert at the Brookings Institution.

Has India offered Pakistan aid since the earthquake?
Yes. Pakistan has accepted twenty-five tons of food, medicine, tents, blankets, and plastic sheets from India, but rejected India’s offer of helicopters to assist with relief efforts. Islamabad has also been cool to the possibility of conducting joint military-rescue operations. Experts say Pakistan has long been suspicious of its neighbor and will not allow Indian military helicopters to fly over its territory. “It’s very telling which one Pakistan accepted,” says Mahnaz Ispahani, adjunct senior fellow for South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

What is the basic conflict over Kashmir?
Each side claims the mountainous province, home to about 10 million people, as its own. At the time of partition, Kashmir’s maharaja chose to join India, a primarily Hindu state, though the majority of the prince’s subjects were Muslim. India claims this decision, as well as elections held since then in Kashmir, make the province an integral part of India. Islamabad argues that the people of the province would choose to join Pakistan if given the choice; in 1948, UN Security Council Resolution 47 called for a plebiscite to let Kashmiri citizens decide which country to join. This vote never took place, man experts say because India rejected the resolution’s plan for a truce.

Islamic militants have led an insurgency in the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir since 1989. India accuses Pakistan’s government of supporting the militants; Pakistan denies the charge. The two countries fought wars over Kashmir in 1947, 1965, and 1971. In 2002, escalating tensions—caused, at least partly, by an attack against India’s parliament building by Islamic militants—led each country to amass hundreds of thousands of troops along Kashmir’s de facto border, the Line of Control, which brought the nuclear-armed nations to the brink of war.

Has any progress been made in negotiations?
Not much, experts say. Since relations began warming between India and Pakistan in the spring of 2003, the steps forward have been small and slow. Negotiations on issues from trade to transportation links have yielded some symbolic successes—like the April 7, 2005, opening of a bus line that crosses the Line of Control—but few concrete gains have been made on the most important areas of conflict. “The Indians don’t want to make concessions and don’t think they have to; the Pakistanis feel that after investing fifty-five years trying to get a change in Kashmir, they should get some concessions,” Cohen says. Pakistan has suggested India withdraw some of the 350,000 troops it has stationed in Kashmir; India refuses. “The criteria for an agreement is that both sides can declare victory,” Cohen says; experts say the two sides are far from reaching such a point, but remain hopeful some sort of reconciliation can be reached.

Despite the October 29th bombings in New Delhi, which India blames on Pakistani militants who are against Indian rule in Kashmir, the two countries have made concerted and uncharacteristic efforts to maintain good relations. Just hours after the attack, which killed at least fifty-nine people, the two governments agreed to open five points along the Kashmiri Line of Control to help reunite families and transfer relief supplies to the devastated region. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who denies his country's involvement in the attacks, was quick to condemn the terrorist act and promised "unequivocal support for the investigation."

How did the earthquake impact Islamic militant groups in Kashmir?
The leader of the militant group Hezb-ul-Mujahadeen called for a ceasefire October 11 in the Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir affected by the earthquake. While ceasefires are “always relevant,” Ispahani says, she and other experts question if this one will have a lasting impact. It could be a political ploy, they say, because most of the militant bases are on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control and likely have been destroyed by the earthquake. While Pakistan has repeatedly denied Indian accusations that it supports and arms Kashmiri militants, experts say it could do more to stop them. “If Musharraf wanted to crack down on the militants, he should do it now,” Cohen says. “But [he won’t], because people in his government would then say, ‘What leverage do we have over India?’”

Is there political will on both sides to reach an agreement?
Experts agree that, in order to reach an agreement on such a longstanding and intractable problem as the status of Kashmir, both Indians and Pakistanis must have a change of heart about their neighbors. This hasn’t quite happened, experts say. Ispahani says Pakistani news announcers still denounce the “Indian occupiers” in Kashmir, and India seems equally unwilling to compromise. “It’s an important time for those concerned with pushing [negotiations forward] to think about how to make that a priority,” Ispahani says. “[The earthquake] should have an impact. Whether it will or not depends on the political will on both sides.”

Is there precedent for natural disasters affecting politics in Pakistan?
The 1970 Bhola cyclone, which killed more than half a million people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), and the 1974 earthquake that hit the northeastern Pakistani town of Patan, killing 5,000, hurt the credibility of the country’s leadership, under General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan and General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, respectively. In the current disaster, experts say the slow pace of relief efforts—which are increasingly being criticized by the earthquake’s victims—could hurt Musharraf. His critics and political rivals, including former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, could say, “It’s a military dictatorship, but where are the results?” Cohen says. That pressure, in turn, “might weaken Musharraf and make him less able to negotiate” with India, he says.

[Khuram]

The Great India Debate (US-India)

Bush and Singh have a hard fight on their hands (Photo: AP)
March 7, 2006
Prepared by: Esther Pan


With President Bush newly returned from the pomp and ceremony of his visit to India, the debate is focusing on a historic nuclear deal he announced with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh March 2. The deal, explained in this CFR Background Q&A, will ensure U.S. assistance for India's civilian nuclear energy program. But critics say there are no measures to restrain India's nuclear weapons program. Strobe Talbott, the main negotiator with India and Pakistan during the Clinton administration, tells cfr.org's Bernard Gwertzman the Clinton administration was unwilling to make such a deal with India for fear of the damage it would cause to international nonproliferation efforts.

The nuclear deal is part of a wide-ranging agreement that covers U.S.-Indian cooperation on issues from security to counterterrorism to trade. Many in India are celebrating both the agreement and the new relationship with the United States. Zafarul Islam-Khan writes in the Milli Gazette, an Indian Muslim newspaper, that with this deal, “the hurdles faced by Indian procuring nuclear technology and fuel have been removed for good.” But others are concerned that agreeing to the nuclear deal will make New Delhi a hostage of U.S. policy on other issues, including Iran’s nuclear activities (Power and Interest News Report).

Dr. Harsh V. Pant of King’s College, London, summarizes the debate over the nuclear deal in both India and the United States for the Power and Interest News Report. George Perkovich, a leading expert on India's nuclear program, tells cfr.org's Bernard Gwertzman the deal is good for U.S.-Indian relations but that the details in the draft accord were "very under-cooked and not well-considered." Carnegie nonproliferation expert Joseph Cirincione slams the deal, saying it “endorses and assists India’s nuclear weapons program” and was not properly reviewed by the State Department or Energy Department before being announced by Bush and Singh.

The U.S. Congress was not consulted on the details of the agreement, which will complicate efforts for congressional approval this month. A number of key legislators have already criticized the pact. Cirincione says Bush may have made a serious mistake by placing nuclear weapons at the heart of better U.S.-India relations. Six well-known nonproliferation experts agree, writing a letter to Congress detailing the deal’s shortcomings (PDF). “Building upon the already strong U.S.-Indian relationship is an important goal, and we remain convinced that it can be achieved without undermining U.S. leadership efforts to prevent the proliferation of the world’s most dangerous weapons,” the letter states.

But some experts defend the deal. Former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill called the deal "a major departure for American foreign policy" at a recent CFR meeting, and compared the transformation of U.S.-India relations to the opening of U.S. relations with China or the Soviet Union. Seema Gahlaut of the Center for International Trade and Security argues in this brief (PDF) that the deal will encourage India to continue its program of voluntary export controls and help strengthen global nonproliferation efforts. Gahlaut and her colleague Anupam Srivastav say India has instituted a strong system of nuclear export controls, comparable to that demanded by international treaties (PDF). And Teresita Schaffer of CSIS says much depends on the implementation of the deal, which will be difficult for both sides (PDF).