Britain's defence policy is straining its armed force

[Aarwaa]

Ticking time bomb

Dec 12th 2007
From The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Britain's defence policy is straining its armed forces

The unprecedented and ongoing criticism of the UK government by military experts including five former defence chiefs, has reinforced concerns that relations between the armed forces and the government may be close to breaking point. Since 1997 the armed forces have found themselves squeezed between increasing foreign commitments on the one hand, and insufficient funding on the other, resulting in large cuts to all three services. The strains may well worsen.

Since September 11th 2001 the UK’s armed forces have found themselves committed in large numbers for sustained deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, as part of former prime minister Tony Blair’s promise in 2002 that Britain would pay the “blood price” to maintain its special relationship with the US. However, the government has been consistently unwilling to pay the “cash price” for such an undertaking, with the percentage increases in the UK defence budget paltry compared with that of the US. Although direct comparisons are difficult, the disparity is clear: according to the US Defense Department, its budget increased by almost 50% between 2001 and 2007; in the same period, the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) saw average real annual increase of around 1%.

As a result, the MoD has found itself unable to afford its future equipment plans, forcing it to either cancel or delay a raft of projects in order to meet its present contracted procurement obligations, most notably the oft-criticised £20bn Eurofighter Typhoon programme. However, this has had severe operational consequences, especially in the case of the MoD’s decision to reduce its ten-year helicopter procurement budget by some £1.5bn—a decision that has left the armed forces saddled with some 70 Puma and Sea King helicopters that are unsuited to the “hot and high” conditions of Afghanistan. Cuts in equipment have been matched with reductions in personnel, with the then defence minister, Geoff Hoon, in 2004 announcing cuts across the army, navy and air force. Consequently, the overall impression has been that of the UK military being asked to do more, with less.

Overstretch

This impression has been exacerbated by the worsening security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and a raft of press reports highlighting the squalid state of some military barracks and alleged poor care for injured troops. The government has been quick to respond, pointing out that in addition to the defence budget some £5bn has been spent on the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, and blaming the previous Conservative government for the poor army accommodation. However, perhaps emboldened by the support of the press (criticism of inadequate funding for the armed forces has ranged from the centre-left Independent to the more right-wing Daily Telegraph), armed forces chiefs have spoken openly about the threat to the “military covenant” between the government and its armed forces. Tensions only increased when Gordon Brown, the new prime minister, handed Des Browne, his defence minister, the work of the Scottish ministry in addition to the defence portfolio, leaving the impression that running the former was viewed as a part-time job. The former chief of staff, Lord Boyce, called the move an “insult” to the armed forces.

As the UK forces prepare to withdraw from Iraq and switch increasingly to Afghanistan, the situation appears only set to worsen. Recruitment to the armed services is below target, and the hectic pace of deployments has seen an acceleration in the number of officers resigning. Where this leaves Britain’s commitment to its foreign policy aims in the Middle East and Afghanistan is uncertain, especially given widespread reports of further cuts ahead--this summer’s three-year Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) saw the MoD receive an annual increase of only 1.5%, which will have to cover not only further Typhoon purchases and the building of new aircraft carriers, but also the commencement of spending on the government’s replacement of the Trident nuclear weapon system. As such, all eyes are on the present defence chiefs, who have publicly stated their opposition to further reductions in frontline numbers. This may not be the end of their dissent.

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