A constitutional state

[arsa]

Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Since this is our third transition to democratic rule, and political parties have been tested several times, there is enough experience to draw a clear distinction between elected parliamentarians and genuine democratic forces

Politics and its related processes and issues have different standards and meanings around the world. Three factors determine these differences: quality of leadership; civic capacity of society; and the effectiveness of political institutions.

Pakistan is deficient in all areas that make politics rule-bound and moral — moral in the sense of serving the public interest, being responsible to the needs of society and honouring the mandate.

While talking about the unending struggle to establish good politics and democracy in Pakistan, it is pertinent to ask: why have we not been able to accomplish much in the way of developing democratic norms; and why is it that the democratic experience has always been short, controversial and confrontational?

Usually, the failure of the democratic experience is explained with reference to the nature of civil-military relations — political structures are weak, and the more organised and ambitious generals use the military as an instrument to gain power. Once in power, they stay for as long as they do not encounter effective opposition from society.

While civil-military relations can be a starting point in such a debate on democracy and authoritarian rule, there is also the need to explain why political structures are weak and who keeps them weak. The answer lies in the undemocratic mindset of traditional leaders who control the political parties and, through them, the electoral process.

One point that is debated often but never understood is why there is no democracy within political parties; and why and how families and oligarchs dominate them. In essence, these elements use political parties to maintain their dominance, using the party’s name, social support base and elite network to control access to electoral politics and power.

Unfortunately, these traditional leaders have a very low commitment to democratic ideals, and don’t share the dream of true democracy because they fear losing out to a new breed of public representatives. The experience of other countries shows that democracy within political parties roots them in society, and provides them with an unending supply of new ideas and leadership.

But that is exactly what our ruling classes fear.

We must, however, acknowledge the hard fact of politics: that politicians and political parties universally are interesting in getting power and keeping it. So why the fuss about the Pakistani ruling classes?

The reason is that in democracies, the political game is played within a legal-normative framework, which has evolved into a system of political beliefs and norms. Violation of these norms would impose unacceptable political costs on the players.

In our political system, we have a different rule: all is fair in politics. Thus the behaviour of political players is geared towards gaining and retaining power through any means, even if it requires rigging the laws, the constitution and the electoral process.

This erodes the faith of the common man in democracy and democratic forces for two reasons.

First, he sees the same crowd in the corridors of power. Second, political attitudes and policy behaviour do not change much beyond the rhetoric of doing better and the excuse that most problems have been inherited from the previous regime.

Since this is the third transition to democratic rule, and political parties have been tested several times, there is enough experience to draw a clear distinction between elected parliamentarians and genuine democratic forces. Of course, not all elected parliamentarians can be termed undemocratic, but very few in the past have worked in support of and have sacrificed their careers for building democracy in Pakistan. The rest, the overwhelming majority, has gravitated around military dictators or dynastic party bosses.

There is a disconnect between the new social forces of Pakistan and the traditional elite that dominates the political process. These new social forces — the middle class, the youth, mediapersons, and a blossoming civil society — would like to make the transition to democracy in its true sense.

The idea is not to replace the traditional elite, but make them rule-bound and responsive, and hold them accountable for their actions. The creation of government should not only be defined in terms of electoral legitimacy, which, of course, is a fundamental condition, but also in terms of establishing democratic rule.

Pakistan is a constitutional state, not a historical entity like many pre-colonial states. Being a constitutional state means the people must have a right to choose their government, and provinces must have autonomy and a share of sovereign power.

The constitutional character of the Pakistani state has been lost through the usurpation of power by four military regimes and their political allies. This loss of constitutional character helped the generals and their subordinate political class enjoy power, but destroyed our collective potential to create a democratic state and society.

There are two conditions to turn Pakistan into a constitutional state. First is the supremacy of the 1973 Constitution, which is based on national consensus and must be restored. Political parties have, time and again, demonstrated this consensus by passing the 13th Amendment, signing the Charter of Democracy, and now moving the 18th Constitutional Amendment Bill in parliament. This is the starting point.

The disfigured constitution makes the present political system neither parliamentary nor presidential. It was disfigured to give a constitutional veneer to General Pervez Musharraf’s rule. Those who might try to maintain the constitution in its disfigured form may have their own political ends in mind, but doing so would provoke political resistance, which is take shape even now and may grow stronger in the coming weeks and months.

The second condition to turn Pakistan into a constitutional state is the independence of the judiciary. No parliamentary system anywhere in the world can function without an independent judiciary. In the current system, the legislative check is non-existent because the majority party or coalition forms the executive. And then a parliament dominated by the traditional elite becomes a rubber stamp for the executive.

The real check on parliamentary power is the judiciary. It is not difficult to understand the reasons why generals and dynastic party bosses like to keep the judiciary subservient to the larger interests of the ruling elite. But if this continues, Pakistan will neither become constitutional nor will it complete a democratic transition.