Then’ and ‘Now’

[arsa]

Ejaz Haider
Friday, January 23, 2009
Militarily, India is free to do what it wants and acquire the capabilities that Thakur has written about. But to think that such a process can lead to the point where the strategy of coercion would kick into play must assume, of necessity, that Pakistan's capabilities will remain static. That assumption is a bit far-fetched

Ramesh Thakur’s Jan 19 YaleGlobal article (“The Dilemma of Dealing With Terror Central” —See A7), is remarkable for its internal contradictions. Consider.

Thakur begins with the “winter of 1971” and how India, if it had heeded world opinion then, would not have been able to resolve the crisis.

“Fascinating,” as Mr Spock would say, except that 2009 is not the winter of 1971. India’s policy of “offshoring its response” is grounded in the reality that now informs the region. And that reality is underpinned both by the presence of nuclear weapons as well as the interest of the rest of the world in a region riven with complexities.

Off-shoring the response is in fact India’s compulsion, not noblesse oblige.

What is most interesting is that Thakur, after listing the compulsions of the rest of the world, from the United States to China, thinks it fit to warn that this could lead to “a costly India-Pakistan war and the intensification of export-quality Islamist terrorism as Pakistan falls apart.”

The problem is, as he sets down himself later, that a military response is not possible currently because “India does not have such intelligence and military capacity today; [though] it must embark on a crash course to acquire it”.

From the 1971 unilateral venture (let’s not even get into how India had then managed the stage for its push) to today’s reality-check. So, for now, at least, by Thakur’s own admission, there is not going to be a costly war. But what about “export-quality Islamist terrorism as Pakistan falls apart”?

No need to worry, really, going by Thakur’s argument that “India may no longer have a vested interest in a strong and stable Pakistan” because “even as Pakistan has teetered on the brink of collapse and disintegration, reduced to a bit player, India has prospered and emerged as a big player in world affairs”.

Very good then. Pakistan can fall apart, teeter on the brink etcetera, while India prospers. Or would it?

Perhaps not. Because export-quality terrorism is just that, export quality. And geography and history both work against India if Pakistan falls apart. Just like geography makes eminent economic sense when it comes to trading together and bringing sub-regions close, in the same fashion geography (and history) is likely to help the more diabolical export business.

This is precisely why the world is interested in Pakistan or worried by it, take your pick. And this is why the kind of unilateral military response that lurks just below the surface of Thakur’s article is not possible.

The contradictions are obvious. Could he have structured it differently? Let’s try it.

He could have begun with 1971, not so much as an “ominous parallel” but as an event offering a contrast to now — i.e., India’s response to “now” as opposed to “then”. That would have required, of course, listing those factors that helped India do what it did in 1971 and which may not exist today.

This approach would have helped establish the point about India’s limited choices today, exactly what is needed to figure out what India can do now and how effectively.

Realpolitik is about reality, not the morality of a situation. Corollary: solutions must keep in mind limitations and seek compromises rather than taking a maximalist approach.

A good example is Kashmir. Best solution: Pakistan could get it militarily. Wrest it, and live happily ever after. Not possible, though and, therefore, the morality of the issue — past as well as continuing, through the killings of hapless Kashmiris — does not really matter beyond the normative and the moral. Pakistan has had to embark on a painfully long process of negotiating the issue, a process that has yielded some gains but not allowed Kashmiris their life and dignity yet.

Ditto for India. If it could kick Pakistan’s backside, it would have happily done that. It can’t, for several reasons.

The best response (and analysis) then is one which begins with limitations of what can and cannot be done. If Thakur had established that, he could have analysed without the contradictions that have crept into his piece. But he wavers between wish and reality, analysis and anger, unilateralism and the compulsions of multilateralism.

Let me now put it on the table straight.

Militarily, India is free to do what it wants and acquire the capabilities that Thakur has written about. But to think that such a process can lead to the point where the strategy of coercion would kick into play must assume, of necessity, that Pakistan’s capabilities will remain static. That assumption is a bit far-fetched.

The best option would be for the two countries to work together. But working together means not just taking a snapshot view of one incident, but looking at the trajectory of India-Pakistan relations to see whether the two sides can resolve outstanding issues and evolve cooperative strategies through such a process.

Of course, India can say no. It has, so far. In which case, Thakur would do better to move away from his emphasis on conventional fighting and “escalation dominance” and focus on the sub-conventional. The problem is, sub-conventional conflict plays havoc not just with societies that are being attacked but also those that are mounting such attacks.

It doesn’t seem likely that an economically upcoming and rising India can afford the burden of such contest. But that is an issue for India to decide, and India can say: the economy can go to hell; we are more interested in sinking Pakistan.

And herein resides the bigger contradiction.

If the issue is tied to the question of how to get rid of terrorism and have India live peacefully and prosper, how would any of these strategies help India do that?

A stable Pakistan is therefore in the interest of India; if Pakistan sinks, India cannot remain afloat for very long. Neither will sinking Pakistan take care of the problem of terrorism; if anything, it will exacerbate the problem.

At this point, let me sign off with Thakur’s biggest contradiction. Read his conclusion that takes a mix of neo-liberal and normative approaches. I agree with him there. That is what is required; a new approach. But does he really think his conclusion squares with what precedes it?

Short answer: no.
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