Between a rock and a hard place

[niazikhan2]

Arif Nizami

President Barack Obama's unveiling of the long-awaited Afghan exit strategy based upon sending 30,000 additional US troops by next summer and the announcement of the withdrawal of forces in July 2011 will be worrisome for policy-makers in Islamabad. Although it is widely acknowledged that Pakistan is the key to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the region its frantic demand for being consulted in framing of the strategy was not met.

Mr Obama's 40-minute address at the United States Military Academy at West Point was focused on Afghanistan but he made it clear that Pakistan's cooperation was pivotal for the US. Although Islamabad was assured by Mr Obama that the US would not cut and run leaving Pakistan vulnerable to the Taliban there was a clear warning that safe havens for Al Qaeda and the Taliban within its borders would not be tolerated.

The US is also worried about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of the jihadists and this concern was reflected in President Obama's speech. In this context President Zardari's handover of the command of the National Command Authority (NCA) to the prime minister on the eve of the address will be seen as an attempt to satisfy critics worried about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear assets.

President Zardari finally received a phone call from Mr Obama just hours before his West Point speech. Islamabad's concerns that the envisaged surge will exacerbate its already precarious position in its tribal belt by compromising its counterterrorism efforts were virtually ignored. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's demand for a dialogue on the issue just on the eve of the announcement was seemingly for public consumption rather than a serious plea for being taken on board. It is clear that Mr Obama means business so far as his allies, Mr Karzai and Mr Zardari, are concerned. On the one hand he is not willing to hand over any more blank cheques to the corrupt Karzai regime and on the other Mr Zardari, whom the US now considers politically weak and vulnerable, is being put on notice to 'do more'.

Understandably the new US strategy poses a serious dilemma for Islamabad. Washington no longer considers making a distinction between the good and the bad Taliban relevant. As is evident from the letter written by Mr Obama to President Zardari almost a fortnight ago and personally delivered by National Security Adviser James Jones, the US wants to browbeat Pakistan to fall in line or face the consequences.

This virtual ultimatum to Pakistan puts its civilian government, armed forces and intelligence apparatus on notice to go all-out for Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and the Taliban . Their job requirement is to dismantle the so-called Quetta Shura and at the same time withdraw support for, and apprehend, the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Pakistan army's successes in rooting out the Taliban in the Swat valley and more recently militants' rout in South Waziristan, although duly acknowledged by Washington, are not considered enough by the US administration.

Nothing short of a putsch by the Pakistan army against the bulk of Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban holed up in South Waziristan will mollify Washington. In the past Islamabad has been reluctant to oblige its US mentors. But now Washington has raised the ante by committing additional troops starting to be deployed as early as next month, mostly concentrated in Southern Afghanistan in the Pakhtun belt.

By putting a timeframe for the withdrawal by July 2011 just when the US presidential election campaign kicks off Mr Obama wants to demonstrate to his domestic audience that by then at least some of his goals in Afghanistan will be met. But it sends the wrong message to all other stakeholders in the conflict.

The Taliban could simply wait out this period and why would the Pakistan army stick its neck out to destroy the very force which would, in all probability, be the future rulers of Afghanistan? Certainly Mr Karzai should be a depressed person being asked to fend for his own within the next eighteen months. A feat he has not been able to achieve in the past eight years of US occupation.

Mr Obama has exhorted that Pakistan and the US share a common enemy in the form of Al Qaeda and the Taliban and that support for democracy and security of Pakistan will endure even after the guns are silent in the Pakistan-Afghan arena. But what is the guarantee that history will not repeat itself once the US forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan? Pakistan has been reluctant to shift its strategic paradigm despite pressures to the contrary. The Pakistan army still considers India as its principal foe and Afghanistan its strategic depth and that a precipitate withdrawal by the US will leave a vacuum that will be filled by New Delhi. In this context the Afghan Taliban are viewed as long-term strategic allies who cannot be alienated for short-term US goals.

As for Islamabad's strategic goals it is an open secret that the army and the civilian government are not on the same page. Mr Zardari is perceived to be too close to the US favouring a detente with India. This does not sit well with the army, which sees itself as the guardian of Pakistan's national and strategic interests. Also the leader of the main opposition party, Mian Nawaz Sharif, although not close to the US or anti-Taliban a la Zardari, prefers cordial relations with New Delhi.

It looks increasingly difficult for the present weak civilian dispensation to force its agenda on the most powerful institution of the country. However, the stage is not set yet for a military takeover. For Pakistan still trying to deal with the negative fallout of nine years of Musharraf, any extra-constitutional change is not a realistic option. In any case, the military has its hands fully embroiled in dealing with a full-scale domestic insurgency which did not even spare the GHQ.

The US, which is providing $1.5 billion per year assistance to Pakistan, is also backing its fragile economy through the ongoing IMF bailout. In addition to this the Pakistani military is being provided with assistance.

CENTCOM chief Gen David Petraeus, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mike Mullen and the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, are frequent visitors to the GHQ where they meet Pakistan army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Hence Washington has considerable leverage both with the civilians and the army in Pakistan.

In the evolving scenario Islamabad's biggest strategic dilemma is to stick to its present policy in the region without incurring the wrath of the US. President Obama has a lot at stake in Afghanistan and after announcing his new strategy it is no longer Bush's, but Obama's war. With the resurgence of the Taliban at its height and the heavy casualties being suffered by NATO forces his political future and that of the Democratic Party is at stake. The war costing $3.6 billion a month is also a huge drain on the US economy already in deep recession.

A desperate US administration could possibly authorise incursions, including boots on the ground, into Pakistan's war-torn tribal areas. According to US media reports, the CIA has been authorised to increase drone attacks over Balochistan. A majority of Pakistanis, despite being subjected to a constant and consistent wave of suicide terror attacks by the Taliban, views Pakistan's fight against the Taliban as America's war. Hence any overt incursion by the US will have disastrous consequences for the already fragile political and security situation within Pakistan. With options running out, Pakistan will be inexorably sucked into a war of attrition with Al Qaeda and the Taliban of all hue. Islamabad is between the rock and the hard place as it is becoming virtually impossible for its strategic stakeholders to resist the pressure to change.