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Nuclear Prolefration
INTRODUCTION*
Nuclear proliferation is one of the gravest threats to international security in the post-Cold War world. A nation acquiring nuclear weapons could menace neighbouring nations and - by acquiring suitable missile technology - could pose a far more widespread threat. During 1994, the dangers of nuclear proliferation have been vividly highlighted by three particular developments: North Korean nuclear activities and the crisis arising from North Korea's refusal to permit international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Evidence of "leakage" of nuclear-related materials from Russia and other former Soviet states. The assertion by Pakistan's former Prime Minister, Mr. Nava Sharif that his country had indeed created and deployed nuclear weapons. 2. Events of this kind have underlined the importance of dealing with nuclear proliferation and have focused even more attention on the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Renewal Conference which will take place in New York in April and May 1995. At the last NPT Review Conference in 1990, many differences emerged among the participants to the extent that the conference closed without producing an agreed text. Although several of the sources of disagreement in 1990 have subsided, renewal of the NPT is certainly not assured. And failure to renew the NPT would be a major blow to efforts to curb nuclear weapons proliferation. 3. The purpose of this Report is to survey recent regional developments in nuclear proliferation and to assess the challenges to the non-proliferation regime. The Report concludes with recommendations for improving the likelihood of NPT renewal and for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION The Middle East The Middle East has long been regarded as a key problem area for the non-proliferation regime. The region's volatile combination of tension, hostility and activity related to weapons of mass destruction poses many serious challenges. Israel Israel is thought to have begun developing nuclear weapons in the early 1970s, allegedly in co-operation with South Africa. According to some estimates, Israel could very rapidly make up to 100 nuclear warheads operational. Israel maintains that it will not be the first state in the region to introduce nuclear weapons. This is usually taken to mean that weapons are held one step short of final assembly. The military nuclear programme is centred on the Dimona nuclear research centre in the Negevdesert. Israel has not admitted that it has a military nuclear programme since this would no doubt lead to an adverse international political reaction. On the other hand, it has not sought to deny its existence too vigorously, thereby making any potential aggressor cautious about military confrontation. The Iraqi nuclear programme, uncovered by United Nations inspectors after the war to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation, showed the inadequacy of existing international measures to control nuclear proliferation. Iraq's progress towards building nuclear weapons surprised the international community and was one of the main reasons for reappraisals of proliferation controls. Despite acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, Iran is believed to have pursued a limited military nuclear programme since the 1970s, with only a brief lull after the 1979 Islamic revolution. There were reports in 1993 about Iranian efforts to recruit nuclear weapons scientists and purchase nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union but these allegations remain unsubstantiated. Syria has long been cited as posing a proliferation risk. It allegedly began a military nuclear programme in 1979 and has not provided the IAEA with full information on its nuclear activities. In 1991, China reported to the IAEA the potential sale of a 30 KW research reactor to Syria. The IAEA blocked the sale and Syria subsequently reduced its nuclear activities. Economic difficulties also seem to have played a part in the scaling down of Syria's nuclear programme. Libya operates a small Soviet-built research reactor at Tadzhura about 25 kilometres from Tripoli. Since 1980, Libyan nuclear activities have been under IAEA safeguards. Concern about Libya, however, does not centre on its small indigenous programme but rather on its alleged desire to obtain a complete nuclear weapon and to fund the development of an "Islamic bomb" by other nations. Over the years, Libya is rumoured to have approached China, Pakistan and India with offers to purchase nuclear weapons. More recently, there have been indications that Libya has been behind efforts to obtain nuclear weapons material from the former Soviet Union. India and Pakistan jointly pose one of the most serious and immediate proliferation threats. Their nuclear activities combined with political and territorial disputes give rise to grave concern. In testimony before the American Congress, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency James Woolsey said that the arms race between India and Pakistan represents "the most probable prospect for the future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons". Both India and Pakistan are believed to have the capacity to build nuclear weapons in a very short space of time. As with Israel, their denials of actual possession of nuclear weapons are probably based on the weapons being held just short of final assembly. Pakistan's military nuclear programme is believed to have begun in 1962 at the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. It is now thought able to assemble 5 to 10 nuclear devices, which would make it the third largest unofficial nuclear power after Israel and India. Pakistan claims that it has the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but it has made the political decision not to do so. Shortly after her election in 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto confirmed that Pakistan would continue with its nuclear programme but later issued a directive banning all public statements on nuclear power.In August 1994, Navaz Sharif, who was the Prime Minister of Pakistan for 30 months until July 1993, declared that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapons capability. He was quoted as saying "I confirm Pakistan possesses an atomic bomb" at a rally in the disputed area of Kashmir. He declared that any attack against Kashmir could trigger a nuclear holocaust. Pakistan's present Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, denounced this assertion as a "highly irresponsible statement" but declined to elaborate further.Other Pakistani officials then restated the position that Pakistan had acquired the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but had taken a policy decision not to do so and that the use of nuclear technology was confined to peaceful purposes.The end of the Cold War had a substantial effect on Pakistan's relations with nations outside South Asia. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan combined with heightened international concern about nuclear proliferation led to increased pressure on Pakistan to abandon its military nuclear programme and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. One important factor in this process was American legislation known as the Pressler amendment. This blocked American military and economic assistance unless the President certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons. In 1990, president Bush was unable to certify this so aid was cut off, the most significant effect being the freezing of a delivery of F-16 aircraft which Pakistan has partly paid for. This block is still in place.Regarding international agreements on non-proliferation such as acceding to the NPT or supporting prohibitions on the production of fissile material, Pakistan's position is that it will only support such moves if India does likewise. North Korea 12. On 12 March 1993, North Korea announced that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Having acceded to the NPT in 1985, North Korea cited Article X of the Treaty which allows a party to withdraw at three months notice if extraordinary events jeopardize a party's supreme national interests. That decision followed an IAEA demand to mount a special inspection at the Yongbyon nuclear complex that was suspected of - among other things - housing an undeclared reprocessing plant from which nuclear materials were being diverted for military uses. The Former Soviet Union The break-up of the Soviet Union posed several extremely important problems related to the fate of its nuclear arsenals and extensive nuclear infrastructure. Although only Russia among the new republics can sustain a military nuclear weapons programme, the transition to non-nuclear weapons status by the other republics is not straightforward. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, former Soviet nuclear weapons remained in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. In May 1992, these republics signed the Lisbon Protocol which was added to START I, the nuclear weapons reduction agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1991. Under the Lisbon Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to transfer all former Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia. These republics also agreed accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapons states "in the shortest possible time". The transfer of tactical nuclear weapons was completed by the middle of 1992 despite disagreements between Ukraine and Russia. It rapidly became evident that dealing with the former Soviet Union's nuclear legacy would severely strain the resources of the new republics, so several Western nations began to provide assistance. The most significant assistance is that provided by the United States which, under its "Nunn- Lugar" programme, allocates $400 million per year to assist with demilitarization of all kinds. So far, $1.2 billion has been allocated. In addition, the United States agreed to purchase the highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear warheads. The proceeds of this sale - possibly $12 billion over 20 years - are to be distributed among the former republics according to a formula agreed among themselves. Russia Russia, as the successor state to the former Soviet Union, is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear weapons state. Russia and the United States are implementing START I and START II which will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 each by the year 2003. While Russia has an impressive nuclear weapons infrastructure, it was never intended to cope with nuclear disarmament on the present scale. Storage facilities for nuclear warheads and fissile material are stretched and coping with plutonium will be especially difficult. A Russian-American joint venture is investigating a plutonium-burning nuclear reactor and Japan has offered to help in this area too but such projects will not come to fruition quickly enough to circumvent the need for large-scale plutonium storage. In deciding how to deal with Russia's plutonium stockpile, a central problem is that Russia tends to regard plutonium as an asset which has been expensive to develop and which should therefore be used in some way. The United States, on the other hand, tends to view it as a liability which should be rendered unusable and disposed of as soon and as safely as possible. In June 1994, Russia and the United States signed an agreement on plutonium production whereby Russia agreed to close its "dual-use" plutonium manufacturing reactors (located in Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26) by the year 2000. Both nations also agreed that their military reactors which have already been closed - this covers all American weapons reactors - will not resume operations at any time. The United States also agreed to help Russia develop alternatives for producing the heat and electricity now generated by its plutonium producing reactors. Nuclear Smuggling In recent months, nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union has caused great concern. For several years, there have been warnings that nuclear materials might be smuggled out of the former Soviet Union. Declining living standards combined with instances of lax security provided motives and opportunities for criminal sales of nuclear materials. In 1992, for instance, Mr. Gennadi Novikov, head of the nuclear safety service at the Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear plant, warned of the declining security standards. In addition, the Russian media have provided accounts of breaches in security at military and civil nuclear installations. For example, the Russian press reported in March 1993 that eleven kilograms of uranium 238 were stolen from the Arzamas-16 nuclear research and development centre and that local law enforcement authorities were investigating "dozens" of similar cases. Police in St.Petersburg reportedly recovered several kilograms of highly enriched uranium and several journalistic investigations left little doubt about the existence of a nuclear black market THE 1995 NPT RENEWAL CONFERENCE The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the foundation upon which all other efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are based. It was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and entered into force on 5 March 1970. So far, 164 nations have acceded to the Treaty and only 28 have not done so. The NPT is reinforced by a variety of regional arrangements such as Euratom, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. There are also bilateral agreements such as those between Argentina and Brazil, and India and Pakistan. There is also the Nuclear Suppliers Group - also known as the London Club - which has harmonized export controls on nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, there is the International Atomic Energy Agency which operates safeguards on the use of nuclear material and technology to which parties to the NPT are committed. IAEA safeguards include: an accounting system to reveal, within a conversion period (i.e. before the state concerned has had time to assemble a nuclear weapon), any diversion of "significant quantities" of nuclear materials; a containment system for sensitive materials to limit the possibility of access; and a monitoring system, comprising cameras, radiation detectors and closed-circuit television able to detect illegal traffic in materials, equipment or technologies. Safeguards can be applied in two ways. Non-nuclear weapons states who are party to the NPT have a "full-scope" or comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This means that all nuclear material in the nation concerned is monitored by the IAEA. Nations who are not party to the NPT can purchase materials and technologies from other nations who are party to the NPT, but these items must be placed under IAEA safeguards. Since the Gulf war, the IAEA has been given the freedom to act on information supplied by outside sources such as national intelligence agencies. It has also determined, after a legal reappraisal of its rules, that it can mount special inspections in nations which have signed full-scope (also known as comprehensive) safeguards agreements with the IAEA. These inspections can take place at locations chosen by the IAEA, whether or not the inspected state has declared them to the IAEA. Essentially, full-scope safeguards give the IAEA the right to verify all nuclear material in the relevant state and to apply safeguards to all nuclear activities within the state. The inspected state has the right to be consulted but, in the final analysis, it is obliged to permit an inspection to take place. If the objection is maintained or if inspections are frustrated, the IAEA can refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council, as happened with North Korea. Another development which should enhance non-proliferation efforts is that the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed in 1992 that all significant new transfers to non-nuclear weapons states would be conditional on the recipient having a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The only exceptions would be cases where the transfer is deemed essential for the safe operation of existing facilities and even then safeguards must be applied to the facilities in question. The NPT specifies that it must be reviewed every five years and that after 25 years, a Renewal Conference should be held to decide whether the NPT will remain in force "indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". Preparatory meetings have already taken place for this Renewal Conference and, so far, it appears that the indefinite renewal sought by many nations is by no means a foregone conclusion. Before looking further at the prospects for renewing the NPT, it is useful to summarize what are seen as the achievements and failures of the Treaty. NPT Achievements and Failures The NPT has been neither a complete success nor a complete failure. On the positive side, it has made nuclear weapons proliferation more difficult for would-be proliferators. In the late 1960s, it was feared that dozens of nuclear weapons states might emerge over the next few decades. In fact, there are now probably only three additional de facto nuclear weapons nations; Israel, India and Pakistan. Another nation - South Africa - actually did produce nuclear weapons but has now abandoned them and has committed itself to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In addition, the NPT has successfully promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy by allowing nations to develop nuclear energy under IAEA monitoring and with IAEA and other international assistance. It has also provided motivation for the nuclear weapons nations to work towards nuclear disarmament, as they are obliged to do under the NPT. Whether they have done enough has been a subject of acrimonious debate at previous review conferences, but the prospect of regular scrutiny at these conferences has provided some impetus for disarmament. Another NPT strength is that it provides the legal basis for dealing with nations conducting questionable nuclear activities. On the negative side, experience with Iraq showed that even a party to the NPT can make great progress towards building nuclear weapons with only modest scientific and industrial resources provided it has the will, the ingenuity and the resources. Another problem is that the Treaty is discriminatory in that it enshrines the nuclear weapons status quo and places different obligations on nuclear weapons nations and non-nuclear weapons nations. Its crisis management and enforcement provisions are open to criticism in that sanctions or actions to be taken against violations are not mandatory but instead are at the discretion of the United Nations Security Council. Some of Treaty's definitions are unclear. These include the definition of "manufacture" of a nuclear weapon, so that a nation could assemble all the key components of a nuclear weapon but would not be deemed to have manufactured a nuclear weapon unless these components were brought together. The definition of a "significant quantity" of fissile material is also open to question as are the allowable margins of error in accounting for fissile material. Towards Renewal There is general agreement that modifying the NPT is likely to be too cumbersome and attempts to do so are likely to result in deadlock and, perhaps, a failure to renew the Treaty. Similarly, replacing the NPT with a new treaty has been ruled out since a new treaty is unlikely to attract the nearly universal membership of the NPT. The broad goal of all the NATO nations, Russia and many other nations is therefore to seek indefinite, unconditional renewal and to enhance non-proliferation efforts. Not all participants are likely to support these goals. Mexico, for instance, has proposed a five-year extension followed by indefinite renewal only if an agreement has been reached on banning all nuclear weapons testing. Only Iran has declared its opposition to indefinite renewal, but other nations are known to feel that extension for fixed periods would be an effective way of applying pressure on the nuclear weapons states to disarm Regarding nuclear safeguards, there is clearly much scope for redirecting resources so that they reflect proliferation risk rather than simply the scale of national nuclear programmes. An extremely strong case can also be made for increasing the IAEA's safeguards budget. At the same time, inspection arrangements should be studied further to see if it is possible to provide the IAEA with the same sort of inspection rights that are associated with the Chemical Weapons ConventionThere should also be detailed consideration of the sanctions which should be imposed on nations which are not party to the NPT and which have nuclear programmes. At the very least, these should be excluded from international nuclear trade unless they submit to full- scope IAEA safeguards. For nations which violate the NPT, a clear decision to impose specific sanctions should be agreed. Nations who intend to violate the Treaty should be left in do doubt that their actions will have clear consequences. copied from some unknown web source, incovenent writing syle . |
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