The rise’and’fall of the csp 1958-1971

[Atif Supermacy]

THE RISE’AND’FALL OF THE CSP 1958-1971 by saeed shafqat

The military regime under General Ayub Khan provided a challenge and an
opportunity to the CSP. The challenge was that initially the military held the CSP as partly responsible for creating political chaos in the country: Therefore they applied pressure on the CSP cadre to mend its ways. In the first instance the military appointed about 272 armed forces officers to important administrative positions in the civil service. In the early 1959, it charged that 13 CSP officers had indulged in “corruption, misconduct, and inefficiency”. After a summary trial the regime forcibly retired the officers. This shook the confidence of the CSP cadre. [Burki (1969)]. The military regime demonstrated that it meant business and would purge the CSP, if they did not mend their ways. Thirdly, in August 1959, the regime appointed a Pay and Service Commission, which was headed by A. R. Cornellius, the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan, who was known for his anti-CSP views. By such measures the regime conveyed the impression that it aimed to reorganise and restructure the services which implied eroding the power and privileges of the CSP.
The CSP were able to resist the challenge that the military regime posed. The CSP showed pragmatism, flexibility and a certain degree of esprit de corps to reach an understanding and compromise with the military regime. Finally, in the same year an Economic Pool was created to manage the senior positions in the ?.linistry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Affairs. 40 percent of the pool’s positions were to be filled by non-CSP officers. The CSP perceived it as yet another effort to undermine their position, as previously these positions were totally reserved for the CSP.
According to the changing needs of the country, the Establishment Division, devised a policy that starting from 1959, all CSP officers will be provided training in tields pertaining to Economics, Public Administration, Community Development, Finance, Accounting etc. Resultantly, by 1968, about 79 CSP officers had obtained training in 17 American and British universities [Burki (1969)]. Braibanti records that the Ford Foundation and USAID played a major role in building training institutions and providing fellowships for the civil servants [Braibanti (1966)]. By changing the direction of training to new fields, the Establishment Division was able to not only strengthen the status of the CSP cadre, but also equipped a generation of civil servants who could lay claim on professional expertise in financial management, community development and good governance.
This new breed of civil servants, enthusiastically supported the two programmes of the military regime, the Basic Democracies and Rural Development Programme. Both these programmes, enormously increased the power, privilege, prestige of the CSP cadre officers, who served in the districts, It also increased their interaction with the local politicians. Consequently, although the district officer was able to promote some sort of community development and welfare, yet as a cadre the CSP ran into conflict with the politicians. In the rural setting of Pakistan, the politicians perceived them as ‘political manipulators’ and ‘instruments’ of the military regime.
Thus by conceding entry of the military offtccrs to the CSP cadre, reformulation of training programmes, and by enthusiastically supporting the policies of the military regime, the CSP were able to protect their elite status. The cadre was skillful in resisting and subverting the onslaught of Cornellius Commission report and its recommendations. But in the aftermath of Ayub’s fall the CSP could not retain their power and glory. Their reputation was tarnished and their confidence was shaken.