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US’s al Qaeda strategy in a mess —Jan Assakzai
Islamabad is more concerned with the local network of al Qaeda-linked militants, classed as the TTP, and not the ambitious al Qaeda itself

Talking of the US’s struggle to revive Pakistan’s cooperation against al Qaeda and the militants linked to the group, it is perhaps high time to write an obituary of the US policy of regionalising the fight against terrorism in the AfPak region. At the time of the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the overriding aim of this effort was to defeat terrorism that emanated from this region spearheaded by al Qaeda and its allies, the Taliban. But after the US’s entanglement in Iraq in 2003 and other global challenges, the US scaled back on the main objective of defeating terrorism and adopted a policy of containing the monster by further seeking regional help, i.e. enlisting Pakistan’s cooperation.

The regionalisation of the fight against terrorism, i.e. involving the cooperation of regional/host countries, has so far created positive results for the US in other parts of the world. There has been particularly remarkable progress in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Indonesia, while in Yemen the authorities are desperately trying to contain al Qaeda. In Somalia, given the resolve and effort of the US allies in the region, al Qaeda is on the backfoot if not completely out of business. The host governments in the above countries were committed to fight terrorism tooth and nail.

As far as the AfPak region is concerned, al Qaeda has been wiped out from Afghanistan. Today’s al Qaeda is not the same organisation that mounted the September 11 attacks in 2001; many of its top leaders, including Osama bin Laden, have been killed or captured; its transnational operational and tactical abilities have been reduced or weakened considerably.

However, in the case of Pakistan, it is markedly a different situation. Pakistan has seen al Qaeda reviving its fortunes, despite the latter’s global setbacks over the last decade. First, it has become well entrenched, particularly in the tribal areas. The strategic space it has in the form of FATA gives it an unprecedented sanctuary. It is the only piece of geography perhaps in the world that is off limit for journalists, researchers and independent observers but is open to militants from Central Asia to the Caucasus and from Somalia to Europe and the US.

Militants have training camps drawing recruits, mentoring other extremist outfits from as far afield as Punjab and Afghanistan. The operational ability of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) targeting different parts of Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the tactical reach of the Haqqani network into the heart of Afghanistan and beyond, and militants of the Turkestan movement striking targets in China’s Xinjiang and the north of Afghanistan is due to al Qaeda’s mentoring, its training skills and operational guidance. The militants’ favourite use of suicide bombing is a direct adoption of al Qaeda’s much-feared methodology. Al Qaeda’s top leadership led by Ayman al-Zawahiri is still alive and inspiring its followers around the world, though not being able to operationally guide them. They can kill US allies at will.

We are perhaps a breath away from possible al Qaeda attack(s) on Europe and eventually the US, with a potential for unforeseen consequences. Pakistan has vetoed in the past any operation in Waziristan under the name of what it believes as ‘national interest’.

What has crystallised al Qaeda’s revival is the conflicting objectives of Pakistan and the US in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan does not believe that the al Qaeda-led militancy is an existential threat. Ironically, al Qaeda has a global agenda, which means focusing against the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Their focus on Afghanistan helps Islamabad by default in its ‘strategic depth’ policy.

Diverging from the US imperatives, Pakistan also has to have a proxy militant landscape handy if it needs to not only enhance its influence in Afghanistan under its strategic depth policy, but also to project foreign policy objectives in India. Islamabad is more concerned with the local network of al Qaeda-linked militants, classed as the TTP, and not the ambitious al Qaeda itself.

Secondly, in order to extract more concessions on the negotiating table with Afghanistan and Washington, the militancy threat has become a strategic bargaining chip for Pakistan’s establishment, hence providing a reason for a nexus with the militants. Various policy makers, the right-wing pro-establishment media and political leaders would frequently question the concessions they extracted from the US for fighting extremism and militancy in the county, forcefully suggesting them being less than desirable, including nearly $ 20 billion over the last 10 years or so. Now Islamabad has gone further to reduce this cooperation, apparently as a reaction to the Mohmand attack, with various vibes coming out of the country calling for resetting of relations with the US against extremism on more favourable terms.

On the other hand, the US long ago scaled down its objective to defeat terrorism. It was the Obama administration that devised a strategy and committed more resources than the half-commitment of the Bush administration. Fast-forward to the eve of 2012. The US economy is in the worst recession since World War II. The Obama administration’s hands are full with multiple crises emanating from its relations with Iran, Syria, resurgent Russia and China. Domestically, the presidential elections are looming. Washington seems simply to have fatigued in pursuing even its limited objective: containing al Qaeda in Pakistan.

The US strategy of realigning with Pakistan’s establishment to fight against al Qaeda has led to its dependence on Islamabad’s duplicitous role. However, the more the US relied on the Pakistani establishment, the closer the nexus of Pakistan with militant networks developed. This is why events like Osama bin Laden’s hiding out in Abbottabad, the recent attack on the US Embassy in Kabul and the Mumbai attacks were all traced back to some sort of active or passive support of Pakistan’s establishment for the militants.

It is beyond any doubt now that regionalisation of the job of combating terrorism through the half-hearted cooperation of Pakistan has not enhanced the stability of the region and the security of the world, including the US.

While the US and its allies are set to leave Afghanistan by 2014, the nexus of terrorism — al Qaeda, elements of the Afghan Taliban, their Pakistani counterparts and with the establishment’s ‘admitted’ links — to say the least, is hardening by day. Only a naive person would believe that the militant landscape would simply diffuse itself and they would happily go home with the feeling that they have won and now it is time to rest. The fatigued resolve of the US and Pakistan’s divergent priorities in fighting terrorism in the region only promise, by default, that the region will be a constant threat to global security. If the US, in earnest, wants to put al Qaeda and the linked militant landscape out of business and see peace and stability in Afghanistan and the region, it needs only one political solution: persuading Pakistan, one way or the other, to break its nexus with militants of all shades.

The writer is a London-based analyst. He can be reached at janassakzai200@gmail.com