Afghanistan Issue (Important Articles)
 

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]An Afghan Led Reconciliation Process[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
February 27, 2012
By Dr Raja Muhammad Khan


In its primitive history, Europe has undergone a series of wars for centuries. However, the “Thirty years war” from 1618-1648 has a unique significance. This bloody war forced the European wisdom to reconcile. They sat together and found a way-out from the continued infightings. Their reconciliation gave Europe in particular and the world in general a new concept, “The Concept of Nation State”. Since it was a European problem, therefore, the notables met at Westphalia, Germany, and concluded a treaty, which in the history known as the “Treaty of Westphalia”. As of today, the borders of Westphalia are between rivers Rhine and Weser, located north and south of Ruhr River. Today, European very proudly claims that, they are the one who gave world, a system where they could live in an organized manner with claims and obligations. The concept revolves around the sovereignty of the nation state, how much small or big in size it may be with respect to its contemporaries.

Historically Afghanistan has been a region of great turbulence, where wars and infightings have been the order of the day. It has been a centre of global wars and factional and ethnic fights. Like thirty years war of Europe, this great civilizational country, indeed an Asian crossroads has faced a mix of foreign invasions and infightings for more than thirty years now, in its recent history. The days, months and years may be different, but, the sufferings are similar to ‘European Thirty Years’. Today, after 364 years of Westphalia, the world is more civilized and aware, thus why cannot we find another treaty specific to this nation state, which externally can guarantee Afghanistan its sovereignty and internally, peace and stability. Why cannot the war wagers of the same civilized Europe, who claims export of the concept of a sovereignty world over, ensure sovereignty of this country and end their occupation to let Afghan have their own will and wish within their own territorial borders.

After a decade of US invasion, today, there is warmth in the process of political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Two dimensions of this process seem more prominent. One, led by United States, which has encouraged opening of a Taliban’s talking point in Doha, Qatar, where there have been many rounds of covert and overt direct talks between US officials and the representatives of Taliban leadership. No official of Afghan Government or any other Afghan faction has participated in these US led talks, thus are non-indigenous in nature. This is purely a foreign led reconciliation process. The second, a domestic reconciliation process, headed by Afghan Government. President Karazai has personally took a lead role and desired to try the domestic option. Irrespective of the option finally materialized, the ultimate aim should be; peace, stability and harmony among all groups and factions of Afghanistan. Afghans are tired from infightings and international invasions and interferences in their motherland. They want an end to all and a guaranteed safety and security from external powers. At the same time they want that their traditional and religious values and Afghan customs and culture to be respected by all. After all why should they be deprived of their basic rights, enunciated in the UN Charter of this highly civilized world?

While inviting Taliban for a direct talks and political reconciliations, Afghan President Karazia, requested a help from Pakistan. On its part, Pakistan was very quick and responsive. Prime Minister Gillani after consultations with his aids and security establishment, appealed to all Afghan factions to be part of these talks for the greater cause of Afghan peace and stability. In his appeal he said, “I would like to appeal to the Taliban leadership as well as to all other Afghan groups, including Hizb-i-Islami, to participate in an intra-Afghan process for national reconciliation and peace. It is important to create conditions conducive for a grand intra-Afghan settlement, based on national reconciliation that involves the Afghan people without any distinction.” Together with Afghans, Pakistan wishes that all Afghan factions must unite themselves to conclude a treaty for the permanent solution of their domestic issues and block the routes for any future foreign interventions and invasions.
It is still uncertain as to what would be the formal response of the Taliban to the call of President Hamid Karazai for a direct talk and political reconciliation. Nevertheless, for the permanent peace and stability in Afghanistan, the reconciliation process must be supported by neighbours and international actors, especially United States. However, the durability of the reconciliation can only be ensured once these are led by Afghan nationals rather by foreign powers. In the same context, during an address by Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, at Chatham House, an international relations think tank in London, she said, “We will support any (peace efforts) that are Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-driven. This is our first and last pre-requisite. But we will not lead. We cannot lead … We will only follow what our Afghan brothers and sisters decide is the course of action they will adopt.”

On one hand, United States is negotiating with Taliban, outside the boundaries of Afghanistan (at Qatar), whereas, on the other, it is continuing with the military offensives, resulting into killing of innocent Afghans, humiliation of Afghan dead bodies and desecrating of Holy Quran within the boundaries of same Islamic Republic. The biggest question is that how come these acts of US and NATO go side by side with a reconciliation process. Some of the recent acts of US in Afghanistan may become a great setback to the reconciliation process led by US. Through these acts US indeed is adding difficulties for it and increasing its enemies too. Through these acts, particularly after the desecration of the Holy Quran, there have been wide spread demonstrations throughout in Afghanistan, killing dozens of Afghan protestors, besides two NATO soldiers.

Before Afghan public sentiments transformed into an Afghan National Resistance Movement, United States must bring a change in the attitudes of its troops deployed in that country. As tangible measures, night raids and military offensive must be stopped forthwith. There must be restoration of respect for the Afghan masses and their traditions. Apology from President Obama and ISAF Commander in Afghanistan over the desecration of Holy Quran may not be enough. Those responsible for this act must be publically punished and the conspiracy must be investigated for the satisfaction of Afghan people. Else it would be considered as if US desires instability in Afghanistan and this negotiation with Taliban is another strategy for creating acceptability for its long-term stay there.

For a stable Afghanistan, US must bring clarity in its approach and attitude towards Afghan future. In the first instance, this super power must have a precision whether to support or otherwise, the reconciliation process among the various groups in Afghanistan. If U.S wants peace and stability in Afghanistan, it must encourage an Afghan led political reconciliation process, rather itself engaging with few Taliban, thousands of miles away from Afghan soil. An indigenous Afghan led political reconciliation process taking on board all Afghan factions including Taliban would ensure durable peace in Afghanistan. Only in the subsequent phase, other stakeholders like; U.S, Pakistan and geographically contiguous regional countries, should be consulted for future guarantees to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. However, the entire process should be Afghan owned with Afghan people at its lead role without discriminating any group or faction.

The writer is an analyst of international relations.

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Awash with civilian blood[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 17, 2012
By Mohammad Jamil

During the last 10 years, thousands of civilians have been killed by air strikes supposedly targeting the Taliban, as if the Afghan life is cheap. It seems that the mounting toll is sapping the authority of the Western-backed Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, who has pleaded repeatedly with the US and Nato commanders to consult with the Afghan authorities before the operations are initiated and show more restraint. Despite this, unfortunately, the occupiers have always turned a deaf ear to his pleas and cries.

Against this backdrop, the unprecedented attack on families asleep in their homes came as anti-foreign sentiment was already running high after the Afghans discovered that the US troops had burned copies of the Holy Quran at a military base.

The latest incident took place when a US soldier shot dead 16 Afghan civilians, including nine children, in a village outside his base in southern Afghanistan, a rampage that the Afghan President said was unforgivable. The soldier, who was reported to be a staff sergeant and father of three, who has done three tours of duty in Iraq, was arrested after the assault.

It is not the first time that the US soldiers have intentionally killed Afghan civilians, but the toll is unprecedented for a single soldier. The commander of the American and Nato forces in Afghanistan, General John Allen, however, promised a thorough investigation of the tragic incident. “I am absolutely dedicated to making sure that anyone who is found to have committed wrongdoing is held fully accountable,” he said, but his response is unlikely to do much to dampen the fury of the Afghan officials or people.

In 2010, US soldiers had killed three Afghan civilians as a sport in the Kandahar province. They were sentenced in August 2011, but it did not deter other American soldiers from involving in such despicable acts.

In January 2012, a video surfaced showing US marines urinating on the corpses of three insurgents, and in February anger flared over the burning of the Holy Quran. The US President, Barack Obama, said he was deeply saddened. He said: “I offer my condolences to the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives, and to the people of Afghanistan, who have endured too much violence and suffering. This incident does not represent the exceptional character of our military and the respect that the United States has for the people of Afghanistan.” But this will not heal the Afghan wounds, because despite regrets by the President, military commanders even in the past did not avoid participating in such incidents.

When the Americans and the Europeans are killed in a terrorist attacks, like 9/11 or 7/7, the champions of the cause of human rights throughout the world mourn; they light candles and place bouquets at the venue or the graves of the victims. But when other people are killed in similar attacks, or by ruthless and callous bombings and air strikes, there is no mourning. One may ask: What different breed is the Taliban from their compatriots, who fought against the Red Army, and were regarded as freedom fighters or mujahideen by the West, especially the Americans, while the Soviets viewed them as bandits? It is up to the historians to write the true history, but, for the present, Afghanistan is awash with civilian blood. Unfortunately, weddings have also been bombed more than once during the last four years.

In 2010, for instance, at least 44 civilians were killed in what they called a mistaken Nato air strike, in the Gujran District of Daykundi province carved out of the Uruzgan province, on three mini buses in southern Afghanistan a marriage party. This added to the already existing hatred against the US and West. After the incident, the Nato officials said: “It hit a suspected insurgent convoy, but ground forces later found a number of individuals killed and wounded, including women and children.” In addition, a commander said that this was not a deliberate act, but sometimes they have to take snap decisions. The question, however, remains: How such incidents take place by mistake when the US and Nato forces have all the facilities to determine the identity of people on ground? Indeed, such callous acts belie the claims that the US and Nato forces are in Afghanistan to protect the people from the militants.

The Americans and the Europeans are yet harping on the same tune that they are fighting in Afghanistan to secure it and their countries as well against militancy. But the Afghans are paying the price for it with their innocent blood – the blood of their civilians, their children and their women.

Needless to say, the saddest part is that there are no eyes brimming with tears in the West and no fears on the massacre of Afghan civilians. Not a single human rights activist has so far made an issue of this civilian carnage in which 16 innocent people lost their lives, as if the Afghans are no human beings. Pathetically, Western hearts bleed on the deaths of their troops; if the Afghan war is becoming unpopular in the West, it is because of mounting casualties and injuries of their armies and not because they feel qualms about the killing of innocent people of Afghanistan.

The writer is a senior journalist and freelance columnist.

Email: [email]mjamil1938@hotmail.com[/email]

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Terror, Trauma and the Endless Afghan War[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 18, 2012
By Amy Goodman

We may never know what drove a U.S. Army staff sergeant to head out into the Afghan night and allegedly murder at least 16 civilians in their homes, among them nine children and three women. The massacre near Belambai, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, has shocked the world and intensified the calls for an end to the longest war in U.S. history. The attack has been called tragic, which it surely is. But when Afghans attack U.S. forces, they are called “terrorists.” That is, perhaps, the inconsistency at the core of U.S. policy, that democracy can be delivered through the barrel of a gun, that terrorism can be fought by terrorizing a nation.

“I did it,” the alleged mass murderer said as he returned to the forward operating base outside Kandahar, that southern city called the “heartland of the Taliban.” He is said to have left the base at 3 a.m. and walked to three nearby homes, methodically killing those inside. One farmer, Abdul Samad, was away at the time. His wife, four sons, and four daughters were killed. Some of the victims had been stabbed, some set on fire. Samad told The New York Times, “Our government told us to come back to the village, and then they let the Americans kill us.”

The massacre follows massive protests against the U.S. military’s burning of copies of the Quran, which followed the video showing U.S. Marines urinating on the corpses of Afghans. Two years earlier, the notorious “kill team” of U.S. soldiers that murdered Afghan civilians for sport, posing for gruesome photos with the corpses and cutting off fingers and other body parts as trophies, also was based near Kandahar.

In response, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta rolled out a string of cliches, reminding us that “war is hell.” Panetta visited Camp Leatherneck in Helmand province, near Kandahar, this week on a previously scheduled trip that coincidentally fell days after the massacre. The 200 Marines invited to hear him speak were forced to leave their weapons outside the tent. NBC News reported that such instructions were “highly unusual,” as Marines are said to always have weapons on hand in a war zone. Earlier, upon his arrival, a stolen truck raced across the landing strip toward his plane, and the driver leapt out of the cab, on fire, in an apparent attack.

The violence doesn’t just happen in the war zone. Back in the U.S., the wounds of war are manifesting in increasingly cruel ways.

The 38-year-old staff sergeant who allegedly committed the massacre was from Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), a sprawling military facility near Tacoma, Wash., that has been described by Stars and Stripes newspaper as “the most troubled base in the military” and, more recently, as “on the brink.” 2011 marked a record for soldier suicides there. The base also was the home for the “kill team.”

The Seattle Times reported earlier this month that 285 patients at JBLM’s Madigan Army Medical Center had their post-traumatic stress disorder diagnoses inexplicably reversed by a forensic psychiatric screening team. The reversals are now under investigation due to concerns they were partly motivated by a desire to avoid paying those who qualify for medical benefits.

Kevin Baker was also a staff sergeant in the U.S. Army, stationed at Fort Lewis. After two deployments to Iraq, he refused a third after being denied a PTSD diagnosis. He began organizing to bring the troops home. He told me: “If a soldier is wounded on a battlefield in combat, and they’re bleeding to death, and an officer orders that person to not receive medical attention, costing that servicemember their life, that officer would be found guilty of dereliction of duty and possibly murder. But when that happens in the U.S., when that happens for soldiers that are going to seek help, and officers are ordering not a clear diagnosis for PTSD and essentially denying them that metaphoric tourniquet, real psychological help, and the soldier ends up suffering internally to the point of taking their own life or somebody else’s life, then these officers and this military and the Pentagon has to be held responsible for these atrocities.”

While too late to save Abdul Samad’s family, Baker’s group, March Forward!—along with Iraq Veterans Against the War’s “Operation Recovery,” which seeks to ban the deployment of troops already suffering from PTSD—may well help end the disastrous, terrorizing occupation of Afghanistan.

Denis Moynihan contributed research to this column.

Amy Goodman is the host of “Democracy Now!,” a daily international TV/radio news hour airing on more than 1,000 stations in North America. She is the author of “Breaking the Sound Barrier,” recently released in paperback and now a New York Times best-seller.

© 2012 Amy Goodman
Source: Truthdig

[B][CENTER][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghanistan shooting shows U.S. should stop treading water[/SIZE][/FONT][/CENTER][/B]
March 18, 2012
By MALOU INNOCENT and ROBERT NAIMAN

The rogue U.S. soldier’s massacre Sunday of 16 Afghan villagers — nine of them children — follows the violent anti-American protests unleashed in Afghanistan over the burning of Qurans by American soldiers.

This continued violence reveals the latent animosity that persists between foreign and indigenous forces. Accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. military forces would most likely save us from a costly strategic defeat in the future.

By October, the roughly 90,000 U.S. troops now in Afghanistan are due to shrink to 68,000, with a complete exit by 2014. Though these moves are steps in the right direction, officials are still grasping for a protracted presence.

Washington seeks a bilateral arrangement that allows indefinite outposts (“joint bases”) with their Afghan counterparts. Indeed, plans for an extended presence, which would embed civilian and military advisers at bases and Afghan government ministries, call for even closer contact between Americans and Afghans. But a long-term strategic partnership between Washington and Kabul is a mission doomed to fail.

The recent spiraling violence, accompanied by heightened mutual distrust and a dearth of local cultural knowledge, does not instill confidence in our victory. Each new crisis triggers yet another violent outburst fueled by public outrage.

More troops, more money, more time and more resources are unlikely to change these underlying realities and could exacerbate them. Foreign-led efforts to resuscitate Afghan institutions have made only limited progress toward enabling that country to function logistically without the continued assistance of the international community.

Kabul’s dependence on foreign patronage not only undercuts its domestic legitimacy, but its tightly centralized system of government undermines local ownership of the development process by the country’s distinct and insular regions.

An indefinite U.S. military presence in this landlocked country could also be challenged by the tenuous supply lines. After Pakistan closed two border crossings into Afghanistan, the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been using the Northern Distribution Network, a patchwork of roads, ports and railways connecting the Baltic and Caspian regions to Afghanistan, via Russia and Central Asia.

This patchwork road system means far higher transit costs — $104 million a month compared with the Pakistani alternative of $17 million a month, according to one Pentagon official. As Indiana Sen. Dick Lugar, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said after the killing of Osama bin Laden, Afghanistan no longer holds the strategic importance to match America’s exorbitant investment.

Indeed, in addition to fears of insurgents ambushing vulnerable supply lines, commercial sources familiar with the NDN claim that the Uzbekistan government is “continuously uncooperative” when it comes to shipping goods into Afghanistan. One can only hope that Washington can retain the consent of relevant governments until U.S. forces withdraw by discouraging neighboring states from following Pakistan’s lead in closing their supply routes as well.

Rather than continue to tread water in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama should announce an accelerated drawdown of U.S. troops. Sharing intelligence with allies and partners, scrutinizing people trying to enter the United States who may be linked to terrorist groups and relying on targeted raids against Al Qaeda leaders — as opposed to local insurgents who aren’t trying to attack the U.S. — are the most efficient means of reducing the threat from terrorism.

Compared to drawn-out nation-building campaigns, targeted operations are the lesser of two evils. They don’t require tens of thousands of U.S. troops to occupy Afghanistan or any foreign country.

These operations are far less costly in terms of lives, money, time and effort than attempts to cultivate a foreign people’s allegiance to a rapacious and unpopular central government backed by foreign forces. Without a drastic change in strategy, the war in Afghanistan will continue to be a slow bleed.

Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute. Robert Naiman is the policy director at Just Foreign Policy.

Source: Politico

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Putting an end to a degenerating war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 19, 2012
By Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Despite religious injunctions, international laws and exhaustive military manuals regulating belligerents’ conduct in war, protracted wars seem to degenerate inevitably. There is a progressive erosion of ethics; even the best armies encounter indiscipline, unauthorised vengeance, crimes against women and children and disregard of human rights.

The 11-year-old war in Afghanistan is beginning to be a case history of this deterioration. Perhaps nothing like what happened to the hundreds of inhabitants of My Lai in Vietnam on March 16, 1968 has taken place in Afghanistan but civilian casualties are on the rise, as, indeed, are the instances of wanton disregard for human dignity. It is not just the indiscriminate cruelty in the night raids of the Special Forces or the ‘mistaken’ bombing of Afghan wedding parties; rogue elements — individuals or small groups — from the Nato-Isaf (International Security Assistance Force) troops behave disgracefully.

This may indicate stress in a hostile environment, sheer fatigue, frustration at the lack of success and racist and religious bias in the lower rungs of command but, apart from tarnishing the image of the United States and its allies, it complicates the implementation of the existing plans to disengage from the conflict.

The situation since the beginning of 2012 has been egregious. Pictures of marines urinating on the bodies of slain Taliban fighters have gone round the world; so has the news of the bloody sequel to the ‘accidental’ burning of the copies of the Quran and of an American soldier, reportedly either deranged or drunk, shooting 16 Afghans, including nine children dead. Retaliation has come not just from the Taliban but also from members of President Karzai’s security forces.

Internal settlement

As the Afghan conflict degenerates, the danger of eventual disengagement leaving behind an unmanageable anarchy increases. That the movement towards disengagement is irreversible can be seen from President Barack Obama’s latest pronouncements about winding down the war ‘responsibly’ and from what we know of his recent consultations with UK Prime Minister David Cameron. Regardless of the compulsions of the American presidential election, the forthcoming Nato summit in Chicago must rise to the challenge of making qualitatively different policy adjustments to achieve this objective.

The guiding principle will have to be a higher priority for an internal Afghan settlement than for the strategic gains of outside powers. The basic elements of a settlement may include the following: farewell to arms; inclusion of the Taliban in a national government; consensus on constitutional reforms including greater devolution of power to provinces within the framework of a viable united state; size and composition of the Afghan National Army and security forces; and the disbanding of militias maintained by the warlords or their absorption into the agencies and forces of the state.

Short-sighted social, ethnic and sectarian engineering by any outside power will only perpetuate tensions as it, indeed, has done since 2001. Diversity in Afghanistan is no different from diversity in other regional states.

The US-led interventionist powers must honour the sovereignty of Afghanistan and respect the prerogative of its government to negotiate the grant of such facilities to them. The Chicago summit ought to substantially scale down plans for a huge Afghan National Army to align them closer with national needs and means. Raising an army that can only be fractionally financed by Kabul and that is primarily designed to fulfil Nato’s own ambitions in a contested region will only make Afghanistan controversial and prone to instability. A policy of positive neutrality will give the resurrected Afghan state time to establish itself strongly.

Regional countries must be drawn into a UN-sponsored arrangement of non-interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. Without prejudice to such treaties as Kabul may enter into with neighbouring states, the UN Security Council should be the guarantor of non-interference. Regional associations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Economic Cooperation Organisation, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should be encouraged to network to assist Afghanistan re-build its economy and realise its potential as a natural hub of regional and international trade. A greater role for the GCC states in the economic field should be seen as a natural extension of the Qatar process for peace.

In the short run, the powers that militarily intervened to overthrow the Taliban regime will be seen to have been forced to substantially curtail their war aims. But in a long-term projection, this would be the best way of salvaging the nobler elements in their decade-long military campaign in this Asian land. Above all, they would have extricated themselves from a dilemma that could only get worse with time.

Tanvir Ahmad Khan is a former ambassador and foreign secretary of Pakistan.
Source: Gulf News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]For a stable Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 20, 2012
By Javid Husain

As if the US did not enough troubles already in Afghanistan because of its flawed Afghan strategy, the gross misconduct on the part of its soldiers keeps aggravating its problems. The latest tragic incident was the massacre of 16 Afghan villagers, including women and children, by a lone American soldier in Panjwayi District near Kandahar on March 11. This tragedy took place in the wake of the disgusting videos showing American soldiers urinating on Afghan corpses and the desecration of the Holy Quran, which led to widespread demonstrations in Afghanistan and the killing of Isaf soldiers by the Afghans. The Americans are, thus, not only losing the political battle in Afghanistan, but they have also lost the moral high ground to the opposition.

These incidents reflect the hatred between the Afghans and foreign soldiers, as well as the failings of US strategy in Afghanistan, particularly the alienation of Pashtuns, the imposition of a government of its choice on the independent-minded Afghans and the unsuccessful attempts to impose a liberal order on a deeply conservative society. There is little doubt, therefore, that the US is bogged down in Afghanistan, despite the high price it has paid in terms of blood and treasure. The American people are increasingly turning against the war in Afghanistan that, in their view, appears to lack any clear aim or purpose, especially after the killing of Osama bin Laden. America’s current economic problems make it difficult for the administration to justify the high cost of the war. Little wonder, therefore, that Washington is now in desperate search of a graceful way out of the predicament in which it finds itself in Afghanistan. The situation calls for a thorough review and modification of America’s Afghanistan policy. This, in turn, would require course correction of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy, since any changes in the US strategy would have direct implications for our security and well being.

It is not enough that every time a disgusting or repulsive incident involving American soldiers takes place in Afghanistan, the US government and military commanders should apologise to the Afghan government and people. What Washington needs to do, in addition, is to set for itself realistic goals in that country and formulate a well considered strategy for their achievement. The realistic US goal would be a peaceful and stable Afghanistan from where Al-Qaeda cannot pose a threat to other countries.

The starting point of the strategy for the achievement of this goal should be an intra-Afghan dialogue involving the Taliban/Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and other significant Afghan political groups/parties. The aim of this dialogue should be national reconciliation and power-sharing arrangements leading to the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. The challenge facing the Americans is to work out the modalities for bringing the Taliban into the mainstream of Afghan politics and persuade them and other Afghan parties to join the intra-Afghan dialogue.

The negotiations for national reconciliation in Afghanistan would be difficult. In view of the tendency of the Afghans to take a quick recourse to guns rather than dialogue, the success of the intra-Afghan dialogue is hardly guaranteed. Hopefully, however, both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance have learnt by now that neither of them alone can rule over and establish durable peace and stability in Afghanistan. If this indeed is the case, a generally acceptable political settlement in the country would become a possibility.

Needless to say, the US should encourage and facilitate such intra-Afghan dialogue without laying down impossible preconditions for its initiation. In view of the current animosity between the Taliban and the US, both sides should consider adoption of confidence building measures (CBM’s) to set in motion the process of talks. These CBM’s could include swap of prisoners and even a temporary halt in fighting by both sides. Hopefully, the suspension of talks with the Americans announced by the Taliban a few days ago would be temporary, allowing the two sides to resume their contacts soon.

In view of the hatred that many Afghans have towards foreign soldiers, total withdrawal of the US/Isaf troops from Afghanistan would have to be an essential element of any deal that is worked out among the Afghan parties, and between them and the Americans. The US target of withdrawal of the Isaf troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 seems realistic, if other pieces of the Afghan puzzle fall in place and a broad-based Afghan government takes over the reins of power by that time.

In view of the experience of the 1990s, when various Afghan parties and regional countries made a mess of the situation in Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah government, the US would be well advised to refrain from a precipitate military withdrawal to avoid the renewal of hostilities among the parties into which the regional countries may also be sucked in. It would be preferable instead to condition the total military withdrawal of the US/Isaf troops from Afghanistan on the conclusion of a political settlement and the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan and cutting off all links with Al-Qaeda by the Afghan parties. However, even after total military withdrawal, the US should remain engaged in the country to provide support to developmental activities there.

The proposed arrangement would have a reasonable chance of success, only if it enjoys the support of the regional countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and major powers like China and Russia. It is important, therefore, that these countries are taken into confidence, while the intra-Afghan dialogue is continuing. But as the government of Pakistan has pointed out from time to time, the peace process in Afghanistan must be Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. Pakistan and other countries should simply act as facilitators for the intra-Afghan dialogue in way without trying to predetermine its end result. Several recommendations worth the consideration of the Pakistan government flow from the foregoing analysis.

Firstly, Pakistan should do all that is in its power to encourage the Afghan Taliban and other Afghan parties to initiate intra-Afghan dialogue. This should, however, be done delicately without in any way interfering in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. We and other countries must allow the Afghans to take their destiny in their own hands.

Secondly, since the intra-Afghan dialogue must involve the Afghan Taliban, it would not make any sense for us to take military action against them, even if some of them happen to be on our soil as long as they avoid terrorist activities against Pakistani targets. It would be ideal, if all the Afghan parties and the foreign troops in Afghanistan can be persuaded to halt hostilities temporarily pending negotiations for the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, in handling the situation in Afghanistan, we must not repeat our strategic blunders of the 1990s when we alienated the non-Pashtuns in Afghanistan, while supporting the Taliban. A determined effort must be made by us to build up bridges of understanding and friendship with the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, etc.

Fourthly, in view of the disastrous experience of our support to an exclusively Taliban government in the 1990s, we must clearly understand that such a government is neither in our interest, nor feasible if the restoration of durable peace and stability in Afghanistan is desired. The situation in Afghanistan calls for a coalition government of the Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.

Finally, our ultimate goal should be to have close friendly relations and cooperation with an independent and sovereign Afghanistan. Our real strategic depth lies in a friendly Afghanistan that is capable of taking decisions about its own destiny, rather than an Afghanistan that is under our thumb.

- The writer is a retired ambassador.

Email: [email]javid.husain@gamil.com[/email]
-The Nation

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Self-interest in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 21, 2012
Mahir Ali

“I been knocking on the door/ That holds the throne/ I been looking for the map/ That leads me home/ I been stumbling on good hearts/ Turned to stone/ The road of good intentions/ Has gone dry as a bone/ We take care of our own…/ Wherever this flag’s flown/ We take care of our own.”

Bruce Springsteen is no stranger to wilful misinterpretation; the tendency for his protest songs to be miscast as patriotic hymns stretches back more than a quarter of a century to Born in the USA, which was misappropriated by the Reagan re-election campaign in the mid-1980s.

The opening track on his latest album — arguably his most potent series of commentaries on the state of the union — is, as Springsteen recognises, liable to being misunderstood.

Who would have thought, though, that it could be deployed as a theme song for the rapid evacuation of Robert Bales from Afghanistan after he strolled into a village near Kandahar and slaughtered 16 innocents, many of them children?

He was rapidly airlifted to Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. The question of facing charges in Afghanistan obviously did not arise.
And even before he had set foot in Kansas, a civilian lawyer had been hired to assist him. That’s all well and good.

Every accused person deserves a lawyer, and perhaps it’s just as well that the one representing Bales has appropriate experience. John Henry Browne has represented, among others, Ted Bundy, an American serial killer, rapist and necrophile who was executed some 15 years after being charged.

Browne is likely to have better luck with Bales. After all, a couple of months ago Sergeant Frank Wuterich was effectively exonerated for charges relating to the massacre of 24 Iraqi civilians in Haditha, when he and seven other marines went on a rampage. Charges against six of the others were dropped or dismissed, while the seventh was acquitted.

Many years earlier, Lt William Calley was the only soldier convicted after details of the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam became public, despite concerted efforts at a cover-up. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at the same Fort Leavenworth.
President Richard Nixon immediately decreed that he should serve his time under house arrest. Less than four years later, he was a free man.

We take care of our own.

One of the supposedly mitigating factors in Calley’s case was the popular impression that he had been scapegoated. That was certainly true to the extent that many other officers and troops were involved in the gratuitous massacre of hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. It’s not that he wasn’t guilty, just that he obviously wasn’t the only one.

The corollary, in Calley’s case as much as in Wuterich’s, ought to have been several more trials rather than effective exoneration. Unlike Calley, however, Bales wasn’t ostensibly following orders. Unlike Wuterich, he was apparently alone. And deranged?

As Robert Fisk commented last week, “Surely, if he was entirely deranged, our staff sergeant would have killed 16 of his fellow Americans. He would have slaughtered his mates and then set fire to their bodies. But, no, he didn’t kill Americans. He chose to kill Afghans. There was a choice involved.”

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been cited all too frequently by the American press. Bales had served tours of duty in Iraq — where, according to a brother in arms by the name of Capt Chris Alexander, he did not betray a negative attitude towards his adversaries: “He said there was no need to be a jerk. Be polite, be professional and have a plan to kill everyone you meet if you need to.”

That makes the entire enterprise of imperialist wars sound much like the longstanding parody of a US military recruitment drive: “Travel the world. Meet interesting people. Then kill them.”

In the case of My Lai, the American perpetrators of war crimes essentially got off with a defence that was deemed inadequate for Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. It’s useful to remember, though, that quite a few of those who deserved to stand trial for their complicity in Nazi crimes were recruited to the American cause as immigrants.

The mitigating circumstances cited by the American press in the case of Bales, even before he has been charged, range from his war experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to the fact that his family back home was in dire economic straits. At least some of the reports concede, however, that he was by no means the only American soldier in that position.

Could it possibly be the case that war brings out the worst in those who participate in it, particularly — as in invariably the case — the enemy is ill-defined and dehumanised? If so, is that not a sufficient cause for avoiding war rather than holding out the false hope that the conflict presages some sort of a solution?

It has become less fashionable to refer to the Nato-led military operations in Afghanistan as ‘the good war’. The majority in Afghanistan never did support it. Now even the majority in the US does not, which has led some of Barack Obama’s would-be Republican challengers to suggest it ought to be halted before the 2014 schedule. Obama has apologised profusely for the latest massacre, telling Hamid Karzai that the mass atrocity felt as vile as if it had been perpetrated against American kids.

Karzai, meanwhile, has been putting on his periodic puppet-without-a-string act, demanding that Nato forces get out of Afghan villages — but not yet, mind you, out of the country, a move that would render his regime untenable.

What the future holds for Afghanistan is indeterminate and probably unpleasant. No one can accurately predict the extent to which the Taliban — initially sponsored by two of America’s closest allies in the anti-Soviet ‘jihad’, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and quite conceivably still the beneficiaries of assistance from the ISI — will run rampant again. But if the blighted land if ever to be Taliban-free, the impetus must come from Afghans themselves.

Those who execute toddlers, urinate on the corpses of their adversaries and demonstrate their cultural ignorance by trying to incinerate copies of the Quran deserve no say in the matter.

[email]mahir.dawn@gmail.com[/email]
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Telepathic analysis of the Afghan war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 22, 2012
Musa Khan Jalalzai

While I sleep, my soul and brain waves start visiting hundreds of people, offices, files, archives; picking out messages, reports, information, analysis and the records of negotiations behind closed doors. In a meditative state, I sit in the skies looking at Earth to uncover some important things without using material and physical things — e-mail or telephones. No doubt, these are important, but having discovered telepathic knowledge, I studied many books, reports and stories with considerable attention for three years.

Before going into the details of my irksome journey into the war zones in Pakistan and Afghanistan, I just want to elucidate the philosophy of mind control knowledge in a few words. As I have already studied and experienced the power of mind control techniques, simply speaking, telepathy is communication between minds, thoughts and visions. This is the knowledge of the transmission of feeling, emotions and images. In our world, this is considered to be the knowledge of mind control, the knowledge of intelligence abilities or the knowledge of mental discipline. Telepathy is a direct transference of thoughts and minds from one person to another without using the usual sensory channels of communication. It is called extra-sensory perception. Interestingly, animals communicate regularly through telepathy.

Yes, I was talking about the overnight journey of my soul and brain waves to many inaccessible places, specifically in Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the last two months, some unexpected events enraged the entire population in Afghanistan. From the desecration of the Holy Quran to the desecration of the graveyard of Britain’s heroes in Libya, from the killing of American and British soldiers in Kabul and Kandahar to the killing of 16 innocent civilians in a Kandahar village — all these unwanted incidents created misunderstandings between the guardians and the guarded in Afghanistan.

Last week, the Afghan army chief claimed that innocent people were killed in Kandahar by a group of Americans; it was not the act of a single soldier. According to him, the killings were premeditated. In the light of this statement, I decided to send my brainwaves to Afghanistan to find out the recently developed thoughts in the minds of civilian and government officials of the country. From the top of the mountain, my mind waves told me that the situation was going out of control as the Afghans became enraged over the recent incidents. The killing of six young British soldiers created a climate of despair in the UK. In the presence of my brainwaves, Afghan defence officials secretly conveyed their annoyance and exasperation to the presidential palace. My brainwave secretly entered into the Interior Ministry from the back door, where two American military men were killed by an Afghan intelligence man two weeks ago. Records of whisperings showed that Afghan police officials did not want any more close cooperation with the foreign forces. My brainwave revealed to me that they didn’t like any watchdog system in their offices to check their corruption. From a short visit to the NATO headquarters, my brainwaves told me that within the NATO and US military command, there was reluctance to directly confront the problems of corruption, powerbrokers, criminal elements and Taliban influence in the command structure of the Afghan National Army (ANA). My brain recorded many messages including power of the warlords, their private military networks and their private security firms that present the biggest challenge to the country. A woman in the Interior Ministry told my brainwave that Bismillah Khan’s position was going down and he might lose his seat in the near future as his performance as the interior minister had been very controversial. In a new message from the Kabul-based journalist community, my brainwave told me that these misunderstandings, frustrations and the climate of fear might jeopardise the US-led coalition strategy of training ANA soldiers. My brain retrieved a heartbreaking message from an American journalist saying that US forces faced a new threat despite the more than a trillion dollars the Americans spent in Afghanistan.

Three days ago, in Islamabad, my brainwaves entered GHQ and met some military officers who were talking about the failure of the Americans in Afghanistan. They were enjoying doodh-patee (milk tea). In the ISI circles, there was a hot debate that American military strategy to save Afghanistan from their wrath had failed. As the tiresome night elapsed, my soul and brainwaves finished their long journey and returned to London with numerous messages.

The next day early in the morning after tackling some breakfast, I physically visited one of my politician friends from Pakistan in London. Chaudhry Allahwali told me that some elements in Islamabad were trying to convince Afghan tribal elders to fight against the Americans and kill them. In Chaudhry’s understanding, the US soldiers urinating on Taliban dead bodies, cursing them and unnecessary killings of innocent people endangered the lives of the US soldiers in Afghanistan. Chaudhry Allahwali warned that factors that created animosity included American military convoys creating a climate of fear, returning fire on Taliban in an apparently discriminate way, using weak intelligence sources and conducting night raids on private homes. What does the killing of Afghan civilians say about the US embarrassment across the world and what repercussions will these killings have on the US-Afghan partnership? They lost the war but they are looking for a safe exit. The occupation is coming to an end and the morale of foreign forces is going down. He told me that the mood in Europe was changing while London was weeping for the death of its soldiers. In the end, he said angrily, “The war in Afghanistan will never be won because there is no war and no army to fight it with.”

The writer is author of Policing in Multicultural Britain and Civil war in Afghanistan. He can be reached at [email]zai.musakhan222@gmail.com[/email]
-Daily Times

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Dangerous narratives[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 24, 2012
By Hasan Khan

IF anything drags down the current peace process in Afghanistan it will be the prevalence of religious, ethno-historical and politico-strategic narratives that encourage Afghans to continue fighting till the finish.

The Afghan psychology is one of ‘raw bravery’ boosted by romanticising past victories against global powers. Serious measures are needed to counter these narratives.

Following Obama’s exit policy in Afghanistan, different forums have started debating possible solutions to the future of the war-battered country. The Taliban’s readiness to open a political shop in Qatar and its recent contacts with the US had given impetus to these debating sessions.

However, workable ideas have been scant; most donor-sponsored forums waste time on tracing the factors that led to the war, counting the actors and coming up with ‘conspiracies’ that were hatched by the world against the Afghans.

Reading the history of the Afghan wars through rose-tinted glasses, a batch of retired generals and first-generation Pakhtun intellectuals have been busy romanticising Afghan heroism and love for religion as well as trying to frighten the world by presenting superhuman Afghan qualities. Calling for the humiliation of the Americans at the hands of the Afghans, these ‘experts’ continue to beat the drums of war, as they remind the Afghans of their ‘glorious’ past.

The Afghan conflict is seen predominantly through the prism of religion and the perception among ordinary Afghans is that their ragtag nation is repeating history by defeating the US just as they triumphed over the Soviet Union and the British Empire.

This discourse is very dangerous as it continues to fan the idea of ‘holy jihad’ in a religious sense and ‘the global war on terror’ at a politico-strategic level.

No efforts at coming up with a permanent solution to the Afghan crisis can be successful until such narratives, whether based in religion, history or politics, are eliminated. Space is needed for an alternative discourse before various Afghan factions and
ethnic groups can effectively be made part of a future dispensation.

Since the invasion by the Soviet Union in 1979, the Afghan conflict is being showcased as a holy war. This prefix continues as Afghan lands serve as hunting grounds for both Arab sheikhdoms and western democracies — some are sending their bad boys
there, others are searching for the bad boys.

Another equally dangerous narrative is propagated mostly by military commentators and religious elites who call the Afghans ‘invincible’ and their land a graveyard for the superpowers, in which history is now repeating itself.

The fact is that the British Empire remained master of Afghan foreign policy from 1879 to 1919 — 40 years — unchallenged.

Besides, taking full control of Afghan foreign policy, the British also seized the Kurram and Pishin valleys, Sibi and Khyber Pass and forced the Afghan monarch to sign the humiliating treaty of Gandamak.

In the late 19th century, the Afghan monarch signed the Durand Line Treaty surrendering Afghanistan’s legal claims over what became the North West Frontier Province and the tribal areas (now Fata) to the British Crown. And who defeated the Soviets?

No doubt the Afghans put up a historic resistance but the war was, for all purposes, the Soviets vs the world.

An alternate discourse should challenge the current narratives and must be actively encouraged in Afghan society and Pakistan in a way that discourages outside forces from using Afghan soil to further their long-term strategic interests.

The writer is director, news and current affairs at Khyber TV.

[email]hasan.khyber@gmail.com[/email]
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Denial and defeat in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]


Tarak Barkawi


To listen to US and European officials, all is well with the Western project in Afghanistan.

Absent awareness of the irony, President Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron have announced that this project is in its "final phases".
"The trajectory we've set", said an advisor of President Obama's who specialises in strategic communications, "is one of transition and Afghan sovereignty". As the Afghans move into the lead, the US will be able to pull back.

It is as if the symphony of war was set to the rational beats of Western political calendars. For General John R. Allen, the overall commander in Afghanistan, "The campaign is sound. It is solid."

Faced with news of 16 Afghans murdered by a rogue US sergeant and an upcoming NATO summit with politicians eager to pull out of an unpopular war, a European official blandly assured the media: "The most important thing now is the messaging."

Sound bites will not save the West's latest effort to modernise Afghanistan.
We are dealing here with peoples whose historical trajectory has dealt out repeated defeats to the world's greatest empires. You cannot make war successfully in such places as an afterthought to the crises of economy and democracy in the West.

The conflict in Afghanistan is at a decisive juncture, and the West is facing defeat on a scale not seen since Vietnam. Few want to face facts, and the result is a gap between rhetoric and reality of a kind that only wars gone badly wrong produce.

Lost in the rolling crisis that began with the Quran burning is an important upcoming date. At the end of this month, the Karzai regime will see through its threat to force out the private security companies who guard the contractors that carry out development projects across Afghanistan.

Humanitarian NGOs that operate without security will be unaffected. But the contractors who carry out projects funded by Western governments face the prospect of operating under the protection of a hastily raised "Afghan Public Protection Force".

Would you put your business and your life in the hands of such a force?
According to the New York Times, some companies are wrapping up their projects in Afghanistan and leaving; others allow their employees to illegally keep personal weapons; and all are scrambling to make new arrangements.

In the kind of corporate buffoonery that neoliberal privatisation creates, and which has damaged the Western war effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan, one US company is considering suing the US government. The contractors had been assured that they would have a secure environment in which to operate.
Another company is stationing guards with its employees who work in Afghan ministries. So unwelcome are Westerners assisting Afghans in developing their country that the advisors need bodyguards inside government offices. A better indicator of just how illegitimate for Afghans the continued Western presence is could hardly be imagined.

As one frightened US employee of an aid company commented, "We're easy pickings" for insurgents and angry Afghans.

And there are a lot of angry Afghans. Abdul Samad is one of them. He lost 11 relatives to the rogue sergeant in Panjwai. Along with those who have demonstrated against the Quran burnings, the Taliban, and the silent majority of Afghans, Mr. Samad has one demand: It is time for the Americans to leave, all of them.

Therein lays the reality that Western officials cannot face. The West is not welcome in Afghanistan and is only present by force of arms. Westerners prefer to believe that, a few bad apples aside, most "ordinary Afghans" support Western led development.

The basic idea of the "solid" and "sound" campaign is that Western combat forces will depart by 2014, leaving behind a large development assistance programme and a small counter-terrorism and advisory force, shielded by trained Afghan security forces.

Members of these forces have repeatedly turned on their Western advisors, slaughtering them unawares.

Can there be any more sure sign of the moral decay of the West? First it contracts out its dirty work in forlorn campaigns of white man's burden to its professional soldiers, then to its own hired guns, and onwards to Afghan recruits.

Shock is then expressed in all quarters of Western opinion when these Afghans turn on their invaders.

The fiction is that somehow the Karzai regime will be ready to "take the lead". But the regime is a creation of the Western presence, and is mostly an opportunity for corruption for well-connected Afghans. They are moving their money, much of it skimmed off Western development aid, out of the country at an increasing rate. The writing is on the wall and a comfortable exile funded by stolen Western tax dollars beckons.

What is left unexplained in the official story is just how it is that a small Western counter-terrorism force, civilian development contractors, and the pathetic faux-patriotic Karzai can long survive in a country that over 130,000 first line Western troops with their full panoply could not secure.

To be sure, as long as large numbers of Western troops are present, the insurgents cannot win. But neither can those troops decisively defeat the insurgency, nor can they win the allegiance of the Afghan population in the middle of a shooting war.

Inevitably, the troops will leave one way or another and the Karzai regime and the Western development enterprise will be swept away by angry Afghans of many different stripes.

The West's only realistic option is to regroup in a statelet based on the old Northern Alliance, from which it can launch counter-terror operations and continue to deny Afghanistan as a base for terrorism. A problem here is that the Europeans, with their exhausted liberal publics, could never go along with such an exercise in realpolitik.

President Obama, too, probably lacks the ruthlessness, while his political advisors will tell him to cut and run from an unpopular war in an election year.
After all, exiting and forgetting has worked so far in Iraq.

Western opinion and financial crisis have decreed that the troops must come out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Yet the Western project there is doomed without those troops, and even their continued presence guarantees only a longer run for the tragic and bloody status quo.

These contradictions will come to a head before the next two years is out. Withdrawal of Western troops is likely to be followed by a collapse of the Karzai regime and civil war. While some committed humanitarian NGOs will always remain in the country no matter the circumstances, such chaos and disorder will see off the bulk of the Western development presence.
The upshot will be that the West has little to show for over ten years in Afghanistan but the corpses of Osama bin Laden and his fighters.

Source: [url=http://www.weeklycuttingedge.com/index.html]WEEKLY CUTTING EDGE[/url]

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]A Failing US Strategy in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 26, 2012
By Dr Raja Muhammad Khan
Exclusive Article

Western analysts believe that, “Afghanistan was Obama`s war of choice. He picked it in preference to Iraq, ordered up a Petraeus-patented surge, went after the bad guys in Helmand and Kandahar, and now, like George Bush before him, is preparing to declare a victory, whatever the uncomfortable facts of the matter.” Indeed, U.S was able to secure its interests in Iraq, pulled out its combat forces, while leaving behind oil companies and contractors. US declared victory in that country, after having caused instability and division among various ethnic and sectarian groups of that country. After a decade, it has not been able to control even 50% area of Afghanistan. In the wordings of renowned US writer Steve Coll, US “policy was disintegrating under the weight of its own wrong assumptions and would not last until 2014.”

In the recent past, three gruesome incidents committed by US forces in Afghanistan indicate its imperial mindset. The first incident was urinating on the bodies of the Taliban by US soldiers. While committing this callous act, US soldiers appear to be amusing themselves and as if they have done something of pride, as video indicates. Another act was the burning the Holy Quran by US soldiers in a US Military Base in Afghanistan. By doing that U.S uniformed persons gave an impression that they wilfully disrespect the Muslim belief and their religion, in a country whose inhabitants are very strict followers of the religion. The third incident was killing of sixteen innocent civilians by a US Sergeant mercilessly and burning them too. Most of those targeted were women and children.

These incidents were deliberate, thus cannot be treated as isolated ones, as US media and officials portray. Just as an example, it was a group of U.S marines, who urinated on the bodies, not a single individual. Someone out of those could have stopped occurring the incident. Nevertheless, all gave the impression as if they have done something worth appreciating, and as a mark of triumph. Burning of the Holy Quran at a US Base in Afghanistan was not an individual act. A military base after all is always well guarded and soldiers do not live in single rooms like peacetime in ones own cantonments.

In the third incident, leaving the base and getting inside the houses to kill innocent cannot be an individual act. After all the exit and entrance of the base must have been guarded by a certain number of security personnel. Why did they allow him to leave the base in the dark hours of the morning, while being heavily armed and all alone? Can US afford its soldiers wandering individually in any part of Afghanistan even in broad day hours? More over, as President Karazai suspects, this killing cannot be one man’s job, therefore, let us be fair in accepting that. For the US and its marines, all these incidents might have been fun and mark of victory, but for the Afghans, all these events and many others are humiliations and loss of precious lives. How can they pull on with these daily happenings? After over a decade of the occupation, they were not expecting such a humiliating treatment, but a fair handling.

Probably, US policy makers are in a strange miasma. Economic disaster back home compels the US to wrap-up as soon as possible through a strategy, “how to get out fast without appearing to get out fast.” This strategy was even focused in the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron on March 14/15 in Washington. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has already signalled the likely US wrapping up by end of 2013. Even the American and European analysts feels that, “As they watch these moves, Afghans, the Taliban and neighbours such as Pakistan can reasonably conclude that the United States, rather than trying to win the war, is racing to implement an exit strategy in which the interests of Afghans and their government are slighted.”

Nevertheless, such a scenario does not mean that, US would not leave its footprints in Afghanistan after 2013 or as agreed in Lisbon Summit of a drawdown by 2014. After all US has made lot of investment in the Afghanistan and must have a foresight to reap the fruits. Tussle between Pentagon and White House over the drawdown plan is not new. While Obama Administration would like to reduce the overseas defence expenditures by ending military engagements, the Pentagon is sticking to the continuation of military engagement indefinitely. What to talk of 2014, the Pentagon would like to continue even after that; a period from ‘transition to transformation’ 2015-2024). With these opposing poles, there are two more actors; the American masses and the US soldiers on Afghan soil. While majority of US masses sees the military engagement as non-productive, would thus like US soldiers to leave that country without anymore-economic expenditures and investments made there. The US soldiers themselves are tired and indeed sick-of the hostile environment in Afghanistan, are more than willing to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible. Soldiers of US and other coalition partners are indeed compelled to stay in these environments, thus at time commit acts which embarrasses the super power and EU partners. According to a Guardian writer, Simon Tisdall, “in Afghanistan, it`s time to swallow pride and wise up, before it really is too late.” Even now, there is a time; US should buy this sincere advice.

Even after having analysed and acknowledged the difficulties on ground, the areas which NATO and U.S failed to invest, is the Afghan society and political integration. So far, the billion of dollars NATO and US have spent are on making the military bases to secure their own forces and military equipment and establishing a shaky Afghan National Army and Police. Would this rickety and raw ANA and ANP be able to integrate the Afghan society, or bring the political harmony among the Afghan society? Whether deliberate or otherwise, this non-productive US investment is now harming its own long-term objectives in the region. Today, a common Afghan has no regard for the US and NATO forces. Except the US rewarded class, Afghan masses take US military presence as an occupying power, exploitative in nature and humiliating and degrading Afghan traditions and culture, besides driving wedges among various Afghan factions and ethnic groups.

While talking to Taliban, US did not take into confidence its own handpicked President Karazai. Now after these incidents, Karazai demanded US to vacate the villages and move the forces to bases. Indeed, as per British reporter Sandy Gall, “Mr Obama and his aides have done much to damage the relationship between the two countries and public morale on both sides.” These incidents and US arrogance over these have brought the Qatar dialogue between Taliban and US to a grinding halt.

The issue is not of the US failure in Afghanistan, but leaving it in a lurch. “Afghans already feel that electoral considerations are more important to the west than the key question of whether the raw, new Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police will be up to the task of guaranteeing the country`s security.” After so many years of civil wars and invasions, Afghans cannot afford another civil war and factional fighting. Therefore, it would be rather in the interests of either party if U.S recognises that its current policies have failed, thus should not persist on those. Rather, along with other partners, it “considers, for example, paying greater attention to the broad political goals enunciated by Afghan leaders, and not just by Karzai.” This all has to be done before, it is too late.

The writer is an analyst of international relations. He is also a regular contributor to pkarticleshub.com Email; [email]drmk_edu@yahoo.com[/email]

thank you
 

thank u soo much sir for providing such great articles on all the topics...may
Allah bless u and give you loads of success,,ameen

[QUOTE=manya;416783]thank u soo much sir for providing such great articles on all the topics...may
Allah bless u and give you loads of success,,ameen[/QUOTE]

Thanx alot dear for kind wishes for me:))Wishing u a great Success in your life, Ameen:))

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]US defeat won’t be Afghan victory[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 26, 2012
By Pervez Hoodbhoy

Ever since US Sergeant Robert Bales surrendered after calmly massacring Afghan women and children, he has been depicted as a man under unusual personal circumstances. A high-ranking US official told the New York Times: “When it all comes out, it will be a combination of stress, alcohol and domestic issues – he just snapped”. Unlike those sentenced to death by drones flying high over Waziristan, Bales will enjoy a thorough investigation. Whisked out of Afghanistan, he may or may not ever be convicted. If convicted, the penalty is unlikely to exceed a few prison years; “good behaviour” may qualify him for an early parole.

Although President Obama and Secretary Clinton habitually apologise to the Afghan people after every such atrocity — of which there is a long list — the fact that they happen is inevitable. Indian troops in Kashmir, and Pakistani soldiers in Balochistan, have not behaved any differently. At the core, the problem is the forcible occupation by an army of another country or people.

The Bales case has added one more reason for cash-strapped Americans to leave, speeding up the endgame. President Obama has announced plans to shift US forces to a supporting role next year and pull out most of the 90,000 U.S. troops in the country by late 2014, with 23,000 gone by this October. US Republicans — strong enthusiasts for overseas wars and interventions — are now criticising Obama for being too slow! Rick Santorum, a leading presidential candidate, said last week “We have to either make the decision to make a full commitment, which this president has not done, or we have to decide to get out, and probably get out sooner.” A day earlier, Newt Gingrich declared in even more direct terms that it was time to leave the country.

America’s “good war” — to be distinguished from the Iraq war — is rapidly collapsing and becoming more unpopular by the day. But it once had support across the world and military success had been almost instant. Weeks after 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda was chased out and, eventually, bin Laden was killed. With time the earlier support evaporated. Except for Marine Gen. John Allen and a few others, the pretence that the US can win is almost over. It has been unable to create a stable, non-hostile Afghan government that could stop extremist groups from using Afghan territory once again. The Taliban are smelling victory.

But, much as one welcomes the US exit, America’s defeat will not be Afghanistan’s victory. The crimes of foreign occupation pale in front of the enormous crimes committed by the Taliban government, 1996-2001. Although the outside world knew the Taliban largely for having blown up the 2000-year old Bamiyan Buddha statues and their cruel treatment of women, their atrocities were far more widespread. Going from door to door, they had executed thousands in Mazar-i-Sharif after ascertaining that they were ethnic Hazaras or Shias. A 55-page UN report says that Mullah Omar’s men, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians.Fifteen such massacres were committed during the period of the Taliban government until it was mercifully removed by the US invasion.

Eqbal Ahmed, who worked for Muslim causes from Palestine to Algeria, was by far the most perceptive and knowledgeable social activist and intellectual I have known. We had occasional disagreements but he too saw the Taliban as a social cancer that, if unchecked, would reduce Muslim society to medieval primitivism.

In 1998 — a year before he died — Eqbal had visited two cities under Taliban rule, Qandahar and Jalalabad. Soon after visiting a “land without music”, he wrote: “I have seen the future as envisioned by contemporary Islamists. It horrifies.” The Taliban had proscribed the pursuit of happiness: “Music is banned in historic Qandahar which had once been famous for its bards and story tellers. Play is forbidden.”

Eqbal tells of a boy he saw paraded through the bazaar; a rope around his neck, hands on his shaven head. This unlucky lad had broken the Taliban’s law. “He had been caught red handed, I was told — playing ball. Football is forbidden under Taliban rule as are basketball, volleyball and other games involving the movement of body. Boys playing ball can constitute undue temptation to men.”

Walking through the bazaars, Eqbal observed: “They are stacked with small electronic products, including transistor radios. Yet, none is playing. These bazaars are devoid of music which is banned in Qandahar, in homes no less than in public. Television is similarly banned. Homes are regularly raided, and people are harshly punished for listening to music. The chowkidar in the house next door to mine was caught in the act, and badly mauled. He misses his recorder and the tapes of ‘sweet Afghan naghma.’”

But if the Taliban are a social cancer then what cocktail of chemotherapies can work to prevent a second recurrence? There is zero chance of a secular, pluralistic democracy. Tribal Afghan society, locked into primitive concepts of honour and revenge, is likely to remain unenlightened and torn apart by internal conflicts well into the distant future. So the real question is: what could be the least bad outcome? Since we Pakistanis must live with a theocracy next door, then one can only wish for a relatively enlightened version rather than a barbaric one.

A relatively peaceful future will require that power in post-withdrawal Afghanistan be pluralistically shared by the country’s diverse ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, etc. Else there will be civil war. Regional actors can and must prevent this, as well as prevent a repeat of earlier Taliban horrors. To this end, Pakistan should give up its craving for ‘strategic depth’, Iran should be brought in to the picture by the US as a helpful ally, India should refrain from intrusions into Afghanistan that might antagonise Pakistan, and China must not signal the Taliban that it can fund them in exchange for mining rights. None of this is likely but, still, why not ask for the moon. What else to do?

The Express Tribune

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]The long war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]

Roedad Khan
Tuesday, March 27, 2012

On March 11, 2012, a US army sergeant, without any provocation, methodically killed 16 unarmed civilians, nine of them children, in three villages in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Some of the bodies had single, execution-style bullet wounds in the head. The villagers had barricaded themselves in their homes, blocking the doors with odd pieces of furniture in a vain attempt to protect themselves and their womenfolk from the attacker. According to reports, US soldiers, often under the influence of drink, roam the streets and nobody feels safe. Afghan women are paralysed with the all too justified fear of being raped.

The deadly rampage of a heavily armed US soldier, in the wake of other similar provoking incidents like the desecration and burning of the Holy Quran at Bagram air base and a video showing US marines urinating on a dead Taliban fighter provoked countrywide outrage, an outpouring of revulsion against the US army and a threat of vengeance from the Afghans.

It was another country in another time but the actions was similar. On March 16, 1968, soldiers of US “Charlie” Company of 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Brigade of the American Division murdered between 347 to 504 unarmed civilians in South Vietnam which later came to be known as the M? Lai Massacre. Most of the victims were women, children (including babies), and elderly people. Some of the bodies were later found to be mutilated. While 26 US soldiers were initially charged with criminal offenses for their actions at M? Lai, only Second Lieutenant William Calley, a platoon leader in the Charlie Company, was convicted. Found guilty of killing 22 villagers, he was originally given a life sentence, but only served three and a half years under house arrest! Anyone who thinks that the perpetrator of the Kandahar massacre would be brought to justice and executed must have his head examined.

Afghans are no strangers to foreign military interventions in their country. After nine years of occupation, the last Soviet soldier left Afghan territory on Wednesday, February 15, 1989 at 11:55 A.M. local time. General Boris V Gromov, a hero of the Soviet Union and commander of all Soviet forces in Afghanistan, walked across the Steel Friendship Bridge to the border city of Termez in Uzbekistan. “There is not a single soldier or officer left behind me”, General Gromov told a television reporter waiting on the bridge. “Our nine-year stay ends with this”.

“The United Nations negotiated the Russian exit,” said the Times of London on April 27. “Its job is now done. The world has no business in that country’s tribal disputes and blood feuds”. Americans too walked away from Afghanistan. The rest of the world also forgot Afghanistan and abandoned the Afghans to their fate. Afghanistan was plunged into a bloody civil war.

The Taliban capture of Kabul in 1996 virtually terminated the civil war in which over 50,000 people had lost their lives. Now, after more than thirty years of foreign occupation Afghanistan is a country of demolished cities, disabled war veterans, amputees, young widows, orphaned children, torn-up roads and hungry people.

Afghans are helpless victims of a war foisted upon them by the US that has only brought misery and produced a catastrophe. “Fighting beyond one’s border”, Chairman Mao famously said, “is criminal”. The US war in Afghanistan now in its 11th year is a war of choice. Not a war of necessity. The overwhelming desire of the Afghans is to see the war end along with the fervent wish to see the back of the US army. It has hardened their determination to fight for their country, to defend their homeland against what they view as an alien, repugnant and inhumane enemy.

The Americans are sinking more and more deeply into the fetid quagmire of Afghanistan and neither the president nor General Petraeus nor anyone else has the slightest clue about how to get out. The counterinsurgency zealots in the military want the president to completely scrap his already shaky timetable for the beginning of a withdrawal. Getting into a war is generally a piece of cake. Getting out tends to be another matter altogether – especially when the commander in chief and his commanders in the field disagree on the advisability of doing so.

How long is it going to take for the US to recognise that the war it so foolishly started is a fiasco – tragic, deeply dehumanising and ultimately un-winnable? How much more time, how much more money and how many more wasted lives is it going to take? One thing is clear. Peace and stability will never resume as long as aggression continues and US soldiers remain on Afghan soil. Instead of enacting a charade, the US should turn the country over to a genuine international coalition headed by the United Nations and get out. Playing the world’s policeman is not the answer to the catastrophe in New York in 2001. Playing the world’s policeman is what led to it.

Until the turn of the 20th century, US foreign policy was basically quite simple: to fulfil the country’s manifest destiny, and to remain free of entanglements overseas. The US favoured democratic governments wherever possible, but abjured action to vindicate its preferences. John Quincey Adams, then secretary of state, summed up this attitude in 1821. “Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled there will her (America’s) heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own”. Today, contrary to John Adam’s advice, US stalks the world alone in search of monsters to destroy.

Washington wants to retain bases, special forces and military advisors in Afghanistan until at least 2024. It wants to keep sufficient forces on the ground that can both continue to hunt Al-Qaeda and prop up a corrupt administration in Kabul. One thing is clear that the Afghans will never accept this. The continued presence of US forces will make agreement with the Taliban impossible, so the war will continue.

“A democracy”, General George C Marshall once said, “cannot fight a seven years war”. The US war in Afghanistan has been going on for eleven long years and victory is nowhere in sight. President Obama will be well advised to follow the first rule of holes, stop digging and extricate his troops from the “Graveyard of Empires?”

The writer is a former federal secretary. Email: [email]roedad@comsats.net.pk[/email], [url]www.roedadkhan.com[/url]
The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Way to end war in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 28, 2012
Jonathan Power

After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and got totally bogged down there was a joke circulating in Moscow. “Why are we still in Afghanistan? Answer: We are still looking for the people who invited us”.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, architect of US policy in Afghanistan when he was president Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor, was convinced Afghanistan would become the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. In fact the Soviet Union’s Vietnam has become America’s Afghanistan.

There is truth in both these cynical observations. And there are lies, distortions and self-delusion built into the narrative. Only Russia has been more or less honest. Under president Mikhail Gorbachev it decided to cut its losses and withdraw, and was open about the reason it did so.

Today the debate in the US is contorted. The White House cannot come to terms with the fact that unlike the Soviet Union, the US and Nato are effectively defeated — the Soviets were always militarily on top but it was the attrition waged by the mujahideen that made them decide to go.

Vietnam did not go to the dogs or lead an advance of communism right through Southeast Asia as many policy-makers argued would happen. The “domino effect” the White House called it. Vietnam, after the communists of the north overcame the US-orientated south, is now a capitalist economic dynamo, gradually liberalising on human rights.

Afghanistan without the US and Nato would also evolve, but not in the same way. The Taleban —the dominant mujahideen movement — would be socially regressive, especially with women (but not as severely as many say), but there would be, more or less, peace- the most important factor in everyone’s life. It would be capitalist and open to Western investment.

After Obama’s three fruitless years of waging war (how he reconciles this with his Nobel Prize speech only God knows) there is now a plan to end US engagement by 2014. However, the US will keep hundreds of troops in Afghanistan as advisers and trainers. As veteran Guardian newspaperman, Jonathan Steele, writes in his new book, ‘Ghosts of Vietnam’: “Although US troops would be quartered on nominally Afghan bases, these plans undermine the prospect of Afghan independence and threaten to make a peace deal with the Taleban impossible. Neither the resistance nor regional neighbours would accept this. Washington should plan for a complete withdrawal. If Washington rushes ahead to negotiate a bilateral document on long-term strategic agreement with the government of President Hamid Karzai before trying to negotiate with the Taleban and other resistance groups, it will be sabotaging the chance for a comprehensive peace.”

A powerful statement of the case for political settlement was made a year ago by former high State Department official Thomas Pickering and Lakhdar Brahimi, a sophisticated UN negotiator. They argued that the war was a stalemate. They poured cold water on the US and UK policy of reintegration that tries to get Taleban leaders and commanders to defect. They suggested that the Taleban were becoming more willing to talk as they realised they could not regain total control over Afghanistan.

In an important departure from the usual top-down approach the Brahimi-Pickering report recommended local ceasefires, as part of a confidence-building process that could start before full-scale talks got under way. They suggested a trade-off in which the US ended its assassination of Taleban leaders and the militia ended its placing of roadside bombs and the assassination of government officials. Other confidence-building measures would be the release of Taleban and other insurgent detainees and the removal of sanctions list.

In other words, as Winston Churchill once said, “Jaw, jaw not war, war”.
Jonathan Power is a veteran foreign affairs commentator
Source: Khaleej Times

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]This senseless war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 28, 2012
By: Sami ur Rahman

First, it was the incident of the US marines’ urinating on the dead bodies of the alleged Taliban fighters. Then it was the burning of the copies of the Holy Quran that sparked massive demonstrations and killings in Kabul and elsewhere. And now the wanton killing of 16 innocent Afghans, including women and children, by a serving US soldier.

Tragically enough, he did not stop at that. When he had killed his targets, he collected the bodies, lit a match, and set them on fire. Bravo, young soldier! Your country is proud of you -the country that is dubbed as land of the free and home of the brave. What a bravado and what a nonsense.

The drone attacks on the Pak-Afghan border and the regular midnight Special Forces operations in the volatile Afghan provinces are only routine news items now, that both the media and masses take for granted. The official reaction to this incident was also a routine one. The refugee-turned-businessman-turned-puppet, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, called it as an “assassination” and “furiously” demanded an explanation from Washington. The man in the Oval House, on the other hand, phoned Karzai and expressed his “shock and sadness at the killing and wounding of Afghan civilians.” How convenient!

Initially, the name and rank of the said sergeant was kept secret due to “safety reasons”. In fact, he was “safely” flown out of Afghanistan to his home country. And why not? He is, after all, a serving US soldier. What if the somnambulate GI killed a handful of Afghan civilians? It is a war. People do get killed in a war. Yes, they do. But not like that. You cannot even call it a collateral damage. It is just one beastly act of barbarism and butchery.

Questions are raised whether it was an individual act or a teamwork. It seems a bit immaterial. One is enough, when he has got a gun and other lethal weaponry in his armour gear – and especially, when the targets are fast asleep. A death squad of the US soldiers in Afghanistan has, nonetheless, been uncovered a few months back, which was found guilty of killing at least three pedestrians.

The sergeant is said to have served thrice in the Iraq war. God knows how many “terrorists” he would have killed there in his attempt to “liberate” Iraq out of the clutches of the ruthless, Saddam Hussein, and to introduce his country’s demonic brand of democracy. They say he was drunk; that he had a row with his wife on the night; that he had domestic problems; that he was suffering from stress; and that he simply snapped. That is to say, he was a perfect example of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). That must be so!

He must be having nightmares about his past. No question about his derangement and dementia either. Uncle Sam is just so good at producing such invertebrate nephews. Every time it indulges in war, it generates a fresh breed of PTSD patients – right from the Korean War in 1950 to the wars in Formosa, Vietnam, Haiti, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Panama and so on and so forth.

Overall, there seems no prospects for an immediate solution to the Afghan problem. Just the other day, the Taliban announced its withdrawal from the negotiations due to its snail-paced progress. Also, there seems a strange paradox to the Afghan conundrum.

Karzai and his coterie just cannot survive without the US help. While insofar as there is the US presence in the country, there will continue to be the Taliban resistance. That is to say, unless the US withdraws its combat forces, there won’t be any peace. One can take a cue from the Iraq war. As soon as the US withdrew its forces from the country, a palpable decrease in violence was witnessed.

In a sense, the US, which deems itself part of the solution, is more like part of the problem now. And that is only natural for a country that is harbouring pro-Muslim sentiments on paper and anti-Muslim ambitions on the ground.

As for the Pak-US relations, they are at the all-time low. The supply line is still closed. The Shamsi Airbase is evacuated. There is no US aid to our armed forces anymore. The drone attacks were stopped for a while, but they are again gaining momentum. However, if there has been some tacit understanding between the two governments, one just does not know. We also do not see the frequent visits of the US army generals and CIA top guns to our GHQ, since the retirement of Admiral Mike Mullen.

As for the Pak-Afghan relations, they are hanging in the balance as always. We have, perhaps, never had any good relations with Afghanistan during our entire history. Or if we had, it was only during the rule of the Taliban, when no one really recognised the country, except the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. There have always been rows over the border – the Durand Line – killings, crossings, the Pakhtunkhwa issue, accusations of meddling in each other’s affairs and suchlike matters.

War, strife and mutual bickering are not a solution to any problem. It does not profit anybody – not the US, Afghanistan, Pakistan or even the Taliban. Whenever there is a war, there is a tragedy – the like of which we just witnessed on March 11, when the US soldier massacred 16 innocent civilians. Either the leaders of the three countries lack imagination and are incapable of coming up with a practical solution. Or they simply don’t want to solve the problem, but only to maintain the status quo. Either way, the tragedy goes on unabated!

The writer is a freelance columnist.
Email: [email]samiurn@yahoo.com[/email]
-The Nation

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Regional security[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
March 28, 2012
Najmuddin A. Shaikh

MEETING his Iranian, Afghan and Tajik counterparts in Dushanbe President Zardari made all the right noises.
A stable Afghanistan was in Pakistan’s interest; the nexus between militancy and drug trafficking needed to be curbed; non-state actors wanted to destabilise Afghanistan and, implicitly, they should not be allowed to do so; cooperation in all spheres among the four countries would assume added significance after the withdrawal of foreign forces in 2014; etc.

Separately, all four leaders agreed that terrorism and militancy needed to be tackled jointly. This clichéd repetition of public stances adopted earlier should not be the only thing to emerge from the quadrilateral summit. They must have discussed the implications of the following developments and raised the following questions:

One development has been the increase in ‘green on blue’ incidents, the latest example being the killing of two British soldiers by an Afghan at a military base in Helmand and the confirmation that the man was from the Afghan army. Separately, an Afghan policeman shot an American soldier. These brought the number of such incidents in 2012 to 10.

The US commander in Afghanistan, Gen Allen, has conceded that these incidents have led to an erosion of trust between allied and Afghan forces, though earlier he had suggested “we should expect that this will occur in counter-insurgency operations”.
Yesterday 16 people were arrested from the Afghan Ministry of Defence, at least some of them Afghan soldiers intending to use suicide jackets stored in the ministry itself to blow up buses bringing workers. Where then will trust come from?

In a New York Times poll conducted before the latest incidents, more than two-thirds of those surveyed think that the US should not be at war in Afghanistan when four months ago only 53 per cent felt that way. As regards the state of the war, 68 per cent thought the fighting was going “somewhat badly” or “very badly”, compared with 42 per cent who had those impressions in November 2011. Will there be any support, in the face of these polls and the green on blue incidents, for a continued, albeit reduced, presence of American troops at jointly operated Afghan bases?

Did the participants seek confirmation from Karzai that even if the US agreed to halt night raids he would only sign off on a general strategic partnership document and that the question of basing rights for the Americans would need another year of negotiations? Or was this not raised because of the known Iranian opposition to continued US presence?

Earlier, Gen Allen in his testimony before Congress said that the build-up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 352,000 would be completed by the end of 2012 and that these forces would be maintained at that level until 2017. It has been estimated that at present pay and maintenance levels such a force would cost $7-8bn annually.

On the other hand, it appears that Ambassador Grossman had difficulties in securing firm commitments from European allies for a contribution to the $4.1bn annually, post 2014, to support a reduced ANSF force of 230,000. Even if the $4bn target is met who will plug the gap for the three years that the ANSF will remain at its present level?

Certainly, Congress would have no appetite for this in the face of the opinion polls cited earlier and the general weariness with the decade-long conflict. What would be the consequences for stability if the forced demobilisation of lethally trained soldiers added to the ranks of the unemployed in an economy strained by the massive drop in foreign aid?

The Taliban have suspended talks with the US ostensibly because of the latter’s vague and erratic stance. Is this the real reason or is it because the Taliban do not want to publicly renounce ties with Al Qaeda or its affiliates — among the latter would be large sections of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan — or because hard-liners in their ranks believe that they can resist regional pressures, wait for Nato forces to withdraw and then restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan? If the hard-liners prevail in Taliban ranks will the result be anything other than a civil war for which the minority ethnicities are now better prepared than ever before?

Could the participants in the summit take the initiative to seek the appointment of a UN special representative along the lines of the Cuellar/Cordovez mission of the 1980s to bring together the government and ‘armed opposition’, the only precondition being the renunciation by the armed opposition of ties with terrorist organisations?

Could the participants call for a meeting of all regional countries for a reiteration of the 2002 Kabul declaration on good-neighbourly relations and ensure that this time pledges of non-interference would be honoured? Would something along these lines work when vested drug trafficker and warlord interests within Afghanistan actively seek to subvert it? Can the government and opposition in that country, unlikely as it may seem, work together to eliminate this threat?

The quadrilateral summit in Dushanbe coincided with the fifth Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan. As against the 11 countries that attended the first conference in Kabul and the 24 that attended the third in Islamabad more than 80 countries and a host of international organisations are present in Dushanbe.

International interest in working for a stable Afghanistan after the Nato withdrawal is obviously at its peak. Any worthwhile initiative by the summit participants and other regional countries will win international support. Pakistan must take the lead because it is Pakistan, as I have shown in earlier columns, that would be most affected by continued instability in Afghanistan.

The writer is a former foreign secretary.
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]The lost war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]

Ayaz Wazir
March 30, 2012

Winning the war in Afghanistan was never an easy proposition. After the Americans’ decade-long stay in that country, discovery of a way out which is acceptable to the US is almost an impossibility. Nevertheless, the US seems bent upon proving all the negative indicators wrong.

The declared objective at the time of invasion of Afghanistan was overthrow of the Taliban and destruction of Al-Qaeda. Bringing democracy was not part of the stated policy, nor was development despite the long stay ahead.

The real cause for this long-drawn-out war seems to be something other than the stated objectives. If that were not the case, the US troops could have been withdrawn immediately after the Taliban’s removal from authority and Al-Qaeda’s defeat. On the contrary, the US is engaged in a war whose end is not within sight and the course uncertain. Many believe it in reality to be what President Bush once said, which was later covered up as a slip of the tongue—i.e., a “Crusade.” Or, reportedly, as a “clash of civilizations, a clash of religions and a clash of the whole way of life.” Indications from across our western border certainly point in that direction.

While the Taliban have been dislodged from government they certainly are not defeated. Their resilience in fighting the war, and that too against the world’s sole superpower and its allies, has been tremendously effective and has worn out the occupying forces. In turn, in their frustration these forces have resorted to brutalities which can indisputably be called war crimes.

We recently saw a horrifying example of the consistently bestial behaviour of American troops when 17 civilians, including women and children asleep in different houses, were woken up and butchered. There have been innumerable incidents of brutal killings of innocent civilians in the past as well but were invariably swept under the carpet, after some inane US expression of regret, with the collusion of the government in Kabul which appeased relatives of the dead by sending them for Hajj, allocating houses in posh area in Kandahar, or financial compensations.

Such actions expose them thoroughly, bringing to the fore their hatred for Islam and the cultural values of the Afghans. Cutting off fingers of dead Taliban as trophies, urinating on corpses and killing innocent people in night raids in their homes are just a few incidents in a long list of atrocities committed by them. But the abhorrent incident at Bagram airbase when US soldiers burnt copies of the Holy Quran inflamed passions. The violent reaction that followed was but natural. Every Muslim worth the name would have reacted that way, to say nothing of the Afghans who have always upheld Islamic values above everything else. It also led to a security cleared Afghan worker, not a Taliban, losing control of himself and killing two American advisors in the ministry of interior whom he was supposed to protect. It was only after learning the lesson the hard way that the US made it mandatory for troops to undergo a short course to familiarise themselves with the religious and cultural values of the Afghans.

Anti-American feelings over the burning of the Quran had barely cooled when the Kandahar killing of the 17 took place. This butchery has infuriated Afghans so much that they react against foreign troops whenever and wherever they can. The attack by a young Afghan interpreter at an airport in Helmand province last week is a case in point. He tried to run over and kill a top US commander, Maj Gen Mark Gurganus, with his vehicle last week. The general, along with his British deputy and other senior military officers, was at the air strip to greet visiting US secretary of defence, Leon Panetta. The Afghan, it is believed, was not aware of the expected arrival of Panetta. He would have caused a disaster had he crashed his speeding vehicle a few minutes later into the path of Panetta’s landing aircraft.

Such incidents, on the one hand, fuel concern about a surge in attacks on foreign troops and on the other lend support to the resistance of the Taliban whose movement has now turned into a national war for every Afghan, whether he admits that or not.

A decade is a long-enough period of firing on mosques, wedding parties and funeral processions and riding roughshod over not just the bodies of innocent Afghans but also Afghan values and sensibilities. During this period the Americans should have learnt to respect the religious and cultural values of their Afghan allies if they were really serious about winning their hearts and minds.

Another important lesson they should have learnt long ago but do not want to is to find a workable, durable and permanent solution to the problems in Afghanistan. They should have entered into serious negotiations with all the stakeholders by now but the situation that exists is to the contrary. The Taliban have called off the dialogue process for which they had opened an office in Doha, Qatar. With Iran they are not on talking terms and with Pakistan their relations are on the lowest ebb. It is another matter that the government wants to restore them to the previous level, at least, by setting new rules of engagement with the US, while sheltering behind parliamentary action to this end.

In short, the war in Afghanistan has been lost and so is the case with their stay after 2014 in that country. The patience of the Afghan is worn out and their anger mounting high. It will only be prudent for the US to give up on military pursuit of resolving the problem there. It should concentrate on finding a political solution before it becomes a distant reality and they are forced to leave in haste and abandon Afghanistan like other great powers before them.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Email: [email]waziruk@hotmail.com[/email]
The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Disconnect between US strategy and reality[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 3, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

A series of recent developments have renewed doubts about America’s Afghan strategy even though the US officials insist their plans are “on track” and the strategy warrants no change. These statements mask the growing disconnect between Afghan realities and Nato’s transition deadline of 2014, when all foreign combat troops are to leave the country.

There is rising concern across the region that the situation in Afghanistan is in danger of spinning out of everyone’s control. Two key planks of the US strategy aimed at securing an orderly transition are clouded in uncertainty: partnering with Afghan forces as they assume charge of security and persuading the Taliban to join a peace process. This calls into question the viability of the present exit plan.

To avoid an unravelling, Washington needs to review its approach and revise its strategy by aligning its military mission to the stated goal of finding a political resolution of the war. This means transitioning from a fight-talk strategy to a talk-talk one.

Last month’s violent backlash in Afghanistan following the burning of copies of the Holy Quran by US servicemen and the massacre of 16 Afghan civilians by an American soldier has been a telling indicator of growing public resentment against foreign occupation. Rising incidents of Afghan soldiers turning their guns on Nato personnel signalled how deep that resentment is.

Far from being isolated, these incidents reflect intensifying animosity between Western and Afghan forces. According to figures released in February by the Pentagon 80 Western servicemen have been killed by Afghan soldiers since 2007, mostly in the past two years. “The longer we stay”, admitted on American official to me, “the greater the risk of such incidents”. Intensifying public anger has already urged President Karzai to demand that Nato forces immediately leave Afghan villages.

On the heels of these incidents came the Taliban’s withdrawal from talks with American interlocutors. Although US officials see the suspension as a negotiating tactic rather than abandonment of talks, the blow to the nascent peace dialogue came at a delicate juncture in the approaching endgame.

Washington’s mounting regional difficulties are of course not limited to Afghanistan. Relations with Pakistan have yet to normalise. With the Nato supply route closed for the past four months and parliament taking its time over defining the new terms of engagement, America’s regional strategy is in flux.

The prolonged diplomatic impasse with Pakistan and the setbacks in Afghanistan have already led to a scaling back of US expectations from the Nato summit. Scheduled for May 20-21 in Chicago, the summit had been cast by US officials as a landmark event that would unveil a comprehensive plan to achieve the 2014 transition, as well as announce the start of a formal Afghan peace process. Now more modest aims are being set for the conference. Announcement of peace talks and formal opening of a Taliban office in Qatar are likely to again be postponed.

Although there are other reasons too behind an informal American offer to Pakistan to participate in the Chicago summit this is also being proposed as an “incentive” for Islamabad to expeditiously reopen the ground lines of communication (or GLOCs). The top US military officer General Martin Dempsey said recently that the restoration of GLOCs was being “urgently” sought before May. This was necessary, he explained, not just to ensure military supplies for the spring fighting season, but the departure of equipment from Afghanistan when the drawdown gets underway. In the next 18 months thousands of Nato forces will pull out including 22,000 “surge” forces this September; removal of military hardware will accompany this.

For Obama a summit that lays out a credible plan to ‘responsibly’ wind down the war is especially important in an election year. This will be his last big international event before the election campaign takes over. He might also announce an accelerated withdrawal. While the US military commanders would disapprove, his public would welcome this.

Recent setbacks have already shifted American public opinion decisively against the war. The latest New York Times/CBS poll found that 69 percent of the Americans did not support the war, reinforcing other poll findings that show majorities want the US troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Meanwhile with the Chicago summit approaching, American efforts have intensified to conclude a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul. This would allow the US a longer-term military presence after 2014, including access to Afghan bases. News reports suggest frenetic attempts to reach an agreement before May.

Given the Taliban’s opposition to the presence of any foreign forces, the agreement is seen by American officials as another way to press them to resume talks and regain the diplomatic leverage they have steadily lost as the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. Whether this agreement can be a negotiating lever and not a deal-breaker with the Taliban is yet to be determined.

Such an agreement is certain to erode the already fraying regional consensus. All of Afghanistan’s neighbours and key regional powers oppose an undefined, indefinite US military presence, irrespective of its size or configuration. Even Kabul has now sought answers from Washington on bases and the nature of the residual force.

As for the stalled peace talks, the Taliban have kept the door open for future negotiations. Their resumption however will require the Obama Administration to expend greater political capital than it has been prepared to do. The tardiness of its opening diplomatic move has much to do with Washington’s concern with the political fallout of talking to those it has been fighting for ten years. But it is also characteristic of President Obama’s modus operandi – a reluctance to remain consistently engaged and put his weight behind his own policy.

The Taliban have insisted on the transfer of five prisoners from Guantanamo Bay to Qatar before the start of formal negotiations. Unwilling to use political capital to overcome Congressional opposition, the Obama Administration has procrastinated and insisted that the Taliban agree to a number of ‘confidence-building measures’ including joining a political process with “other Afghans” (i e the Karzai government).

Taliban representatives have thus far rejected what they describe as new conditions, citing these and Washington’s “inexplicable delay” on the prisoners’ transfer as the reason for last month’s halt to the talks. Taliban spokesman also cited vitiation of the atmosphere by a string of “brutal actions” as another reason to break off talks.

Unless the US is prepared to focus more energy and political capital on the diplomatic process and set realistic terms it will be difficult to swiftly put talks back on track. Washington may calculate this is at present politically costly and prefer to wait until after the presidential elections. But delay and making peace negotiations hostage to the election calendar will imperil the 2014 transition because that rests principally on progress towards a negotiated settlement. The closer the 2014 timeline draws without diplomatic headway the less the Taliban’s incentive to negotiate.

The question that Washington has yet to squarely address – which has far reaching regional implications – is whether it simply wants to head for the exits with an ‘appropriate’ face saver or genuinely search for a peace settlement, and be ready to make strategy adjustments and compromises to achieve this.

If the latter, then more important than assembling a showpiece Nato summit are the changes Washington makes to its strategy. This means directing efforts to secure the mutual de-escalation of violence and negotiating regional ceasefires to wind down the fighting. More fighting will not just delay but compromise chances of a peaceful end to the war. A strategic pause in the fighting will create conditions for meaningful negotiations and accelerate the peace process. This can start with an end to night raids in return for the Taliban ceasing its campaign of assassinations.

The Obama Administration says there is no military solution in Afghanistan. The time to turn these words into strategy is now. This will align the US objectives with those of the region, as well as make the reset with Pakistan easier and perhaps more lasting.
-The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]After Nato what?[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 3, 2012
Paula Newberg

With tensions mounting between Afghanistan and the United States over embarrassing errors of judgment and disagreements about means and ends, both governments now acknowledge that Nato is on its way home.

The conversation about an early exit of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan has focused on numbers of soldiers, combat strategy, territory and ideology — and about whose policies have been thwarted, whose interests have been undercut, who cuts deals with whom and who will run Afghanistan when the West has left.

These questions are critical to the future of Afghanistan and its neighbours. They are also short-term, transactional and, ultimately, incomplete lenses through which to view a complex country and an even more complicated regional political economy that, after decades of war, is barely headed to recovery. After years of insisting that building the Afghan “nation” was irrelevant to Western aims, it turns out that building the Afghan state was precisely what was needed and what is dangerously lacking now.

The evidence, easy to find, is damning. Anticipating the departure of foreign troops, the World Bank and the Afghan government recently examined Afghanistan’s post-Nato economic prospects and reported what insiders have known for a long time: The foreign military presence has driven international aid priorities, often to the exclusion of basic needs. Though skewed toward the military mission, this aid has been essential to the survival of the Afghan government and state. In Nato’s absence and with deep donor discord about Afghanistan’s future, civilian assistance is likely to diminish, too.

With security compromised by this huge financing shortfall, essential investment for development will become increasingly difficult. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s complaints about abuses committed by foreign security forces notwithstanding, it is already difficult, if not impossible, for aid organisations to function in insecure environments. Worse may come when troops leave. Crunch the numbers, and the same truths emerge: Without security, assistance disappears; without aid, the state barely survives.

Afghanistan cannot live hand-to-mouth at the mercy of foreign donors. This admonition will sound familiar to those who followed Afghanistan’s failed-state troubles in the 1990s. Karzai’s early, ambitious development strategies were meant to build an increasingly self-sufficient state, but 10 years of war thwarted this goal. Nato’s departure may provide the economic shock needed to persuade Afghans that an accountable and capable state is necessary to avoid future penury, and Afghanistan’s neighbours — particularly Pakistan, still home to two million Afghan refugees — that helping to solve Afghanistan’s economic woes is in its best interests, too.

That sounds like a lot for Pakistan’s military to swallow. But endless interference across the border, meant to stabilise Pakistan’s own security, hasn’t worked: Military and civilian casualties are very high; insurgency has grown at home even as the army claims anti-Taleban victories along the Afghan border; and younger generations show little patience for a garrison state armed with intrusive intelligence officers, tone-deaf generals and corrupt politicians. Recent public opinion polls show profound dissatisfaction across the political spectrum and are forcing politicians, judges and, no doubt, some generals to rethink their roles and the nature of the state they’ve built over the past 60 years.

This is the political message that could drive new relationships between the two countries. The starting point is not encouraging, but the logic of change is. Pakistan’s economy, although larger and more diverse than Afghanistan’s — Afghans can barely imagine Pakistan’s per capita income of close to $3,000 — is not flourishing. The costs of war have hit the budget hard, the price of regional mistrust and instability are calculated in investment losses. These are the consequences of military adventures in Afghanistan, and, many Pakistanis would argue, recent misplaced alliances with the United States. If Afghanistan can teach Pakistan anything, it is that security is not solely about armies, fighting doesn’t fix poverty, closed borders won’t stop frightened, hungry refugees — and spoilers inevitably lose the big battles.

Without Nato in Afghanistan and with an inevitably declining American presence in Pakistan, both countries have to rethink their bilateral relationship; with economics at the center, they stand a chance of succeeding where they have previously failed. This is one way to think seriously about how these two neighbours recover from the worst they have inflicted on one another.

Nato was always going to leave Afghanistan. The hard work now needs to be done where it is most needed — at home in Kabul and Islamabad.
Paula Newberg is the Marshall B. Coyne Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University

© Yale Center for the Study of Globalisation
Source: Khaleej Times

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghan disaster
[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
Franklin C Spinney
Monday, April 09, 2012

The PR disasters over the last three months – including pictures of American troops urinating on Afghan corpses, the burning of Qurans, and the massacre of Afghan civilians, including women and children, by at least one deranged American soldier – have morphed into a grand strategic debacle. From the perspective of the Afghan insurgency, these are gifts that will keep on giving.

Why do I use the modifier grand strategic?

Because these incidents have (1) increased the moral strength of the Afghan insurgents by handing them a coup to rally supporters and attract the uncommitted to their cause. They also widen the existing rift between the United States military and the Karzai government, which in any case is viewed by many Afghans as a corrupt, illegitimate, quisling lapdog of the US.

And (2), they are visibly weakening the rapidly crumbling solidarity at home. Recent polls in America, for example, suggest the already overwhelming majority of Americans who now think it is time to exit the Afghan enterprise is growing again. Moreover, an increasing number of politicians and editorial boards are now beginning to reflect the views of the majority of American people.

These incidents have magnified the already widespread perceptions among Afghans of a grotesque mismatch between the ideals we profess uphold and what we do.

The emerging moral asymmetries between the US and its insurgent adversaries go well beyond trite comments about staying the war weariness and make a mockery of Defense Secretary Panetta’s wildly optimistic claim that we reached a turning point thanks to the 2011 surge. The US is leaving Afghanistan, the only questions left are how soon and how messy the departure will be?

Two recent essays help one grapple with some implications of these questions:

The first is an op-ed, “Why the Military needs to leave Afghanistan, and Soon,” by Phil Sparrow in the Sydney Morning Herald. Sparrow explains why people who argue we should remain in Afghanistan, because the Afghan people don’t want us to leave, simply don’t know what they are talking about.

Certainly, the one per cent living in fortified compounds who have profited from the corruption unleashed by the torrent money we have poured into that impoverished country have been enriched by our presence, but what about the other 99 per cent?

Sparrow explains why the time to leave has arrived, and the sooner we depart the better.

“Afghanistan: A Gathering Menace” is a deeply troubling essay by Neal Shea in the current issue of the American Scholar. Shea paints a grim portrait of how the confrontation dynamics of the Afghan guerrilla war are evolving violent psyches in some of the American troops who are being tasked to carry out the endless patrols and night raids.

These search-and-destroy operations have morphed the aim of winning hearts and minds into a futile attrition strategy aimed at killing insurgents faster than the local population can replace them ... and according to Shea, the unfocused violence emerging from this strategy is having frightening side effects on the psychology of some of our soldiers.

History has seen this peculiar kind of unemployment affliction before – for example, the unemployed hoplites in ancient Greece, selling their killing services to the highest bidder, or the unemployed German soldiers after World War I donning the brownshirts – and the results are never pretty.

The writer is a former military analyst for the Pentagon.

Courtesy: [url]www.counterpunch.org[/url]
The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghanistan beyond 2014[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 10, 2012
Mahmood Shah

The US plan for a drawdown from Afghanistan by 2014 had always appeared to be dictated more by US domestic political compulsions, rather than the on-ground situation in that country, which is why its success looked doubtful. These plans have hit serious snags lately. President Obama and his advisers thought that by increasing the number of troops in his “surge” they would be able to bomb the Taliban to the negotiating table, and at the same time, enable the Afghan army and police to take over the country’s security responsibility by the drawdown deadline. The Americans are nowhere near these ambitious objectives.

Recent events like the killing of French and British soldiers, the desecration of the Quran, the shooting of two senior US officials by an Afghan intelligence officer and the massacre of 17 Afghan civilians by Staff Sgt. Bales have shaken the US, even though Washington is putting a brave face. There are differences among Mr Obama’s political team, the Pentagon and the State Department, and deeper ones between the United States and Nato countries on the Afghan issue.

The situation in Afghanistan has not only created problems between the US government and the Afghan government but deep differences within the Afghan government itself. The harsh words recently exchanged between President Hamid Karzai’s chief of staff and his media adviser, in the presence of Gen John Allen, the senior allied commander in Afghanistan, and US ambassador Ryan C Crocker, is a case in point.

The Afghan government has asked that the US/Nato forces be pulled out from villages and outposts to their main bases and the Taliban have quit the Qatar negotiations. Meanwhile, the deliberate US/Nato attack at Salala on November 26 has seriously affected Pakistani-US relations and the efforts underway to repair them would not be easy.

Under these circumstances, there is general uncertainty about Afghanistan’s future beyond 2014. What is certain is that the US, which has vital interests in the region because of its geo-strategic importance with China and Russia in the neighbourhood and its rich mineral resources, will stay on by retaining bases in Afghanistan after 2014, even though this will be unacceptable to both the Afghan government and Taliban.

While the Afghan government may accept that fate in exchange for monetary assistance, the Taliban, the dominant force in southern and eastern Afghanistan, are likely to fiercely oppose continued US presence. In the very least, the Americans would want to retain Bagram Airbase near Kabul and Shindhand Airbase near Herat in western Afghanistan, but this would leave southern and eastern Afghanistan to the Taliban who, if they decide to, will be free to re-establish their Islamic Emirate, with Kandahar as the temporary capital until they recapture Kabul.

This could mean a division of Afghanistan, and no country in the region would want that. In that scenario, the Americans would be likely to maintain bases in the west and in northern Afghanistan, which is under the Northern Alliance area. But even that will work only if they are able to improve governance in their occupied region and to strengthen the army and police there.

As for southern and eastern Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban, the region will continue to be punished with drone and air strikes by US and Nato forces. This would be an extremely dangerous situation from Pakistan’s point of view. That danger is compounded by the fact that the US and Nato have encouraged the Afghan government to provide safe havens to Pakistani Taliban fugitives in the country’s Kunar and Nooristan provinces.

The Afghan government has issued these people with identity cards by giving them refugee status and is providing them shelter and rations. Kunar province is Pakhtun-dominated area but the governor is a Northern Alliance nominee. These fugitives, under the command of Maulvi Fazlullah, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Wali Muhammad, continue to threaten Mohmand and Bajaur agencies and the districts of Dir, Swat and Chitral. This is done with the purpose of turning the area into a buffer against any threat to areas controlled by the Northern Alliance where the US intends to consolidate its bases.

The Taliban in the south and east may continue to harass the Northern Alliance but they will be unable to threaten Kabul because of the presence of US bases. For this reason the present Afghan government will have to sign an agreement for the US bases to continue to stay beyond 2014.

This is the situation the Pakistani government should use as a hypothesis for its own plans Afghanistan. The government also needs to critically rethink its policies and course of action regarding the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and the jihadi networks within this country.

The writer, retired brigadier, is a former home secretary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

Email: [email]mahmoodshah@mahmoodshah.com[/email]

-The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]The war is over[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 14, 2012
Salman Tarik Kureshi

This piece is not about the 33-year long war in Afghanistan. Nor is it about the so-called war against terror, which some Islamists, ironically echoing Huntington, see as a war between Islam and the west. The war I am talking about is the Cold War, which ended in 1989, with the economic and political collapse of the USSR.

The historian Phillip Bobbitt holds, in his book Terror and Consent, that the Cold War was itself only a part of what he called the “epochal war of the twentieth century”, which began at Sarajevo in June 1914. This war, or a consecutive series of wars, was the climax of nationalism and the evolution of the nation state, which, in Bobbitt’s view, is now in the process of being replaced by the ‘market state’.

According to Bobbitt, earlier states were born of the conquests of princes and monarchs. These monarchic states were amoeboid entities, which shrank, expanded or coalesced according to the relative military and political skills of their rulers. A new kind of state began to emerge, first in western Europe, one that was not necessarily congruent with the monarch’s power. In England in the 17th century, the people cut off the head of their king on behalf of the British state. In the 18th century, the French people also beheaded their king, along with much of the titled aristocracy. Thus, painfully and violently, the specifically modern institution of the nation-state emerged on the stage of history. Now, the point of the nation-state — whether its justification lies in claims of ethnic homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious differentiation, ideological commitment, or any other motivation — is that it is a more or less unified geographical area that commands the continuous institutionalised loyalty and commitment of its citizens. And it defends its citizens militarily against other, usually neighbouring, states.

The stability or otherwise of a nation-state is not really affected by its ethnic or linguistic homogeneity. The Germans have arguably been among the most intensely nationalistic people in Europe, yet the German nation is divided among the three state entities of Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Pakistan’s northern and eastern neighbours, China and India, despite their enormous vertical and horizontal diversities and competing consciousnesses, are massively stable facts of geography.

In his earlier work The Shield of Achilles, Bobbitt described the evolution of the state over the last six centuries, through the princely state, the kingly state and the nation-state. He is most interested in what lies beyond the nation-state. This new entity he calls the ‘market-state’.

The nation-state, developed over six centuries as the optimal institution for waging war and organising peace, derived its legitimacy from improving the welfare of its citizens through the provision of security and order, towards which end it used military force and the rule of law. The new market-states, Bobbitt suggests, use various forms of market relationships, offering to optimise the opportunities of their people. They are, or are developing as, states whose borders may even be hazy, compared to earlier rigid territorial markers, since the defence of those borders is not the primary preoccupation of their leaderships. Instead, the energies of these societies move increasingly towards trade and regional interdependence. One observes these kinds of developments happening in, for example, Europe, China and the ASEAN countries.

Just as the market-state flourishes best in a cross-border, globalised environment, its adversaries have also harnessed cross-border, globalised methods of combat. It is an interesting thought that not only amorphous entities like al Qaeda and the Taliban, who use atavistic militancy and armed violence against the forces of modernisation, but also American militarism and ‘exceptionalism’ are obstacles to the emergence of the globalised market state.

So are states like Pakistan, whose reactionary identity narratives and recidivist militarism are entirely out of sync with the times. Pakistan’s strategic role in the Cold War was as part of the US’s anti-communist cordon sanitaire in southern Asia, and this helped us build a strong army and air force and to lay the basis for the kind of elitist economic development we had selected for ourselves. More, we were the military nemesis to the largest non-communist Soviet ally, India, and thereby helped divide the possible Third World unity. We were the US’s conduit to China, and thereby helped break up the communist monolith. Later, we were a staging post for the US’s anti-communist Islamist warriors.

All this strategic utility to the US ended in 1989 and only a transactional on-again-off-again relationship remained. But the Pakistani powers-that-be have not grasped that the Cold War is over and the benefits thereof are no longer available. There are no longer two superpowers, between whom one can choose sides or play off against one another. There is only a loose, but fairly uniform set of values embodied in the phrase ‘international opinion’, against which Pakistan’s continuing preoccupations and attitudes are seen as negatives.

Let’s face it. We cannot expect to snap and snarl at the sole superpower on one side, while seeking its largesse on the other. As Ahmed Rashid pointed out in a recent interview published in this newspaper: “The leadership is not waking up to the really sad realities. There’s this feeling that somehow the Americans will come bail us out, the Chinese will come bail us out. In this day and age, nobody will.”

Since the Cold War ended, numerous other nations have aligned themselves with the new scenarios, experiencing an era of reforming and reshaping their economies, reorienting societal values, embracing new technologies, developing regional trade relationships, and most importantly, establishing peaceful borders. All these changes simply bypassed us.

And there lies the problem. Whether it is our intelligence agencies, with their bizarre double games, or our armed forces, with their expensive shopping lists, or our civilian elite, who skimmed their shares from the inflow of goodies, nobody seems to grasp that the Cold War is long over. The pre-1989 goodies that flowed are simply not there anymore.

Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda was a former Japanese army intelligence officer who remained in the forests of the Philippines until 1974, refusing to accept that World War II had ended nearly 30 years ago. Is this characterisation valid for our civilian and military elites? Will we continue to let history go on passing us by, increasing only in numbers as we sink deeper into denial, squalor and internecine violence?

The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet
-Daily Times

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Before the Afghan drawdown[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 17, 2012
Razeshta Sethna

IN a series of brazen attacks in Afghanistan on Sunday, the Afghan Taliban attacked key Nato bases, embassies, parliament and government buildings in Kabul and three eastern provinces, stoking fears of stalemate in any peace negotiations.

Even as Nato forces termed the attacks ineffectual, emphasising the preparedness of Afghan army units, seven heavily guarded sites in Kabul were targeted. Apparently planned over months, these attacks expose Afghan intelligence failures and the loopholes in Nato’s transition policy.

“These operations have been a regular feature of Taliban strategy over recent years seeking to show that they can strike at the centre of Afghan and international power as well as elsewhere in the country in their own heartlands,” said terrorism expert, Jason Burke.

In 2014, the US will have fought a 13-year-war in Afghanistan. Though there is fear that once the foreign forces exit, the country will fall into civil war with Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan unleashing extremists to destabilise the region, the latter’s role in achieving regional stability cannot be understated.

The approaching end of this war comes at a time when a troubled relationship between the US and Afghanistan and continued anti-American sentiment in Pakistan reflects little common strategic interest and more the short-term desire for the US to extricate itself from this conflict.

The recent Kabul attack, aimed at humiliating the government and its western allies, is not a one-off, and could undermine the peace process by giving the Taliban more bargaining power. Any negotiation is a contest of force and this is a demonstration of the Taliban, Burke adds. “This war is a long-running trial of stamina as much as anything. With the US and Nato allies clearly on the way out the Taliban do have a number of internal issues to address but are generally happy to wait until they leave.”

The major challenge is the lack of a clear agenda for a two-year transition period. Internal political divisions and external pressures have weakened the government and made it susceptible to a power vacuum to be filled by war profiteers of all kinds waiting for the international community to leave with or without a stable settlement.

The assumption that Afghanistan will remain stable after 2014 is incorrect: President Karzai might stay in power perpetuating political conflict; the Taliban will threaten Kabul; Pakistan will face increased militant activity.

The West cannot economically afford to fight in Afghanistan anymore where leaving a self-sustaining government and an army to take over responsibilities of security and governance is the only option for it. The current peace dialogue comes with the recognition that the Taliban could overrun troop surge gains over 2009-10; and that Pakistan has refused to clamp down on Afghan Taliban sanctuaries.

The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies reported the US had spent $25bn from 2001 to 2010 training and equipping the Afghan army and police forces. It spent another $14bn in 2011. A 2010 International Crisis Group study stated the army could disintegrate after the US withdrawal. And given high attrition rates and low retention, an Afghan army capable of fighting the Taliban will cost billions of dollars a year.

Writer and Kandahar resident Alex Strick van Linschoten explains only one kandak or basic unit is able to operate ‘independently’ of international assistance within the Afghan National Army and there’s a long way to go in terms of training and supporting the logistical backend of the Afghan security services. The current strategy also supports militia (warlords) forces, allowing the US to withdraw troops from various parts of the country, at least for a few years, but in the long-term these forces are a ‘ticking time bomb of insecurity’ themselves.

Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus wants its fair share of strategic interference or it might become a deal-breaker; so if the Haqqanis are unavailable on the negotiating table, cross-border attacks will increase. Burke’s assessment is that this is probably because any access to them is mediated at the very least — if not controlled — by Pakistani intelligence services. It is the latter rather than the Quetta Shura which has a greater influence over the Haqqanis.

That those safe havens need to be destroyed if stability is to be brought to Afghanistan is another concern for the US when wanting to negotiate with the Haqqanis using the Pakistani intelligence’s ‘traditional’ links. Suggesting that Turkey might be “an example of what success might look like in such a volatile region,” regional expert Ahmed Rashid writes in Pakistan on the Brink: “Pakistan must act as a normal state, not a paranoid, intelligence service-driven entity whose operational norms are to use extremists and diplomatic blackmail.”

Karzai’s lack of leadership and his reconciliation efforts have been criticised by ethnic minorities, civil society and women who claim he is shoring up support among a conservative Pakhtun constituency. His government has received $784m for the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme, for convincing low-level insurgent fighters to denounce violence. So far, a little more than 3,000 fighters, the majority of them non-Pakhtuns from the north, have signed up.

In a bid to shore up confidence, the US signed a deal with Karzai’s government that authorises night raids only after the sanction of an Afghan review board. This agreement removes one of the obstacles in what is termed the Strategic Partnership Document, outlining the basis for cooperation for the years after Nato’s 2014 drawdown.

Without a regional strategy, these fractured relationships and political disagreements will precipitate mistrust. The US has not engaged Afghanistan’s neighbours — Iran, Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Their historic relationships are decisive having worked in the past with local warlords and ethnic groups, pumping in money through proxies as Richard Holbrooke had noted in 2009.

There has been no formal engagement with Iran or Pakistan as partners on the Afghan endgame. If the US leaves responsibly, guaranteeing security, the end result could be satisfactory, even at the cost of the hundreds of thousands of lives that have been lost and the Taliban regaining their foothold in the southern and eastern provinces — but without claiming associations with Al Qaeda and without providing safe haven for the latter.

The writer is a senior assistant editor at the Herald.

[email]razeshtas@gmail.com[/email]
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghans at the crossroads[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 17, 2012
Michelle Bachelet

The once remarkable gains in protecting and promoting equality between women and men in Afghanistan are now facing their most serious challenges.

Two questions must be asked: Are the emerging challenges to women’s rights an indication of an overall backslide in security and stability in Afghanistan? Is this evidence of women’s rights being negotiated away as part of the peace and reconciliation process?

The struggle of Afghan women is not one that can be separated from the overall struggle of the Afghan nation to achieve peace and stability. The situation of women and girls — their progress, their opportunities and their access to real justice — must be one of the primary indicators to measure the direction and success of the reconciliation process in Afghanistan.

A decade ago, as the global debate on Afghanistan’s future raged, it was the plight of Afghan women that captured the world’s attention. The persecution of women and girls was stark: from restricted mobility and highly limited access to education; to needing male guardians to go out in public; to the rampant policing and persecution of “moral crimes” committed by women; to the exchanging of women and girls between families to settle disputes.

Afghan women have fought for over 10 years to ensure that their sisters, daughters and families never again face such a future. Yet in 2012, as the world redefines its role in Afghanistan, policy makers and peace negotiators need to look to the situation of women and girls as a barometer of how inclusive, democratic, secure and stable Afghanistan is today.

Important gains have been made, namely a Constitution that enshrines equality between women and men, a Parliament in which women hold 28 per cent of the seats, the implementation of the country’s first law on ending violence against women, and the establishment of shelters and services for women and girls recovering from violence. In addition, girls are back in school — constituting 2.4 million of the more than seven million children in primary and secondary education.

That Afghanistan has taken so many steps in so short a time is highly notable — and a sign of hope for a stable, just and democratic country. But as the peace and reconciliation process evolves, as the International Security Assistance Force draws down, and as more and more parties are encouraged to come to the negotiating table, Afghan women are seeing that the pace of change as regards women’s issues has not only slowed down but in some ways has gone into reverse.

Early-warning indicators are there, but not yet being heard. Violence against women and girls — in the form of physical and emotional abuse, and forced marriages — remains at almost pandemic levels. Impunity of the perpetrators of violence is almost absolute. Women who run away from forced marriages continue to be jailed. Women are often pressured to withdraw complaints and opt for mediation by elders even in cases of serious crimes of violence, leaving them without any protection or justice. Religious leaders recently released a statement justifying certain types of domestic violence, proposing limitations on women’s education and employment opportunities.

Afghan women are now better positioned to articulate their rights. They have important roles on the High Peace Council and in Parliament. They see firsthand the need to monitor the peace and reconciliation process and recognise the importance of engaging with the families of insurgents. They also know that the international community must not forget its commitment to Afghan women and girls beyond 2014.

Policy makers in Afghanistan and in capitals around the world must see that the worsening situation for women has come with a worsening political and security environment. Women have suffered immeasurably during the last 35 years of war — and it is unacceptable that they should now pay the highest price for any peace deal. Women cannot accept peace at any price, nor should the international community. We must stop relegating women’s issues to a side agenda at international forums on Afghanistan. The summit meetings in Chicago and Tokyo need to make space for women. If Afghan women continue to be ignored within the major political decision-making processes affecting their country, the vision of a more secure, prosperous and stable Afghanistan cannot be realised.

Michelle Bachelet, president of Chile from 2006 to 2010, is executive director of UN Women, which advocates gender equality and empowerment of women

© International Herald Tribune

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Taliban offensive[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 20, 2012
Gwynne Dyer

IN the midst of the Taliban attacks in central Kabul on Sunday, a journalist called the British embassy for a comment. “I really don’t know why they are doing this,” said the exasperated diplomat who answered the phone. “We’ll be out of here in two years’ time. All they have to do is wait.”

The official line is that by two years from now, when US and Nato forces leave Afghanistan, the regime they installed will be able to stay in power without foreign support. The British diplomat clearly didn’t believe that, and neither do most other foreign observers.

However, Gen John Allen, commander of the International Security Assistance Force, predictably said that he was “enormously proud” of the response of the Afghan security forces, and various other senior commanders said that it showed that all the foreign training was paying off. You have to admire their cheek: multiple simultaneous attacks in Kabul and three other Afghan cities prove that the western strategy is working.

The Taliban’s attacks in the Afghan capital on Sunday targeted the national parliament, Nato’s headquarters, and the German, British, Japanese and Russian embassies. A large number of people were killed or wounded, and the fighting lasted for 18 hours.
There was a similar attack in the centre of the Afghan capital only last September. If this were the Vietnam War, we would now have reached about 1971.

The US government has already declared its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan in two years’ time, just as it did in Vietnam back in 1971. Richard Nixon wanted his second-term presidential election out of the way before he pulled the plug, just as Barack Obama does now.

The Taliban are obviously winning the war in Afghanistan now, just as North Vietnam’s troops were winning in South Vietnam then. The American strategy at that time was satirised as “declare a victory and leave”, and it hasn’t changed one whit in 40 years. Neither have the lies that cover it up.

The US puppet government in South Vietnam only survived for two years after US forces left in 1973. The puppet government in Kabul may not even last that long after the last American troops leave Afghanistan in 2014. But no western general will admit that the war is lost, even though their denial means that more of their soldiers must die pointlessly.

“It is consuming me from inside,” explained Lt-Col Davis, and he wrote two reports on the situation in Afghanistan, one classified and one for public consumption. The unclassified one began: “Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and the American people as regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognisable.”

Col Davis gave his first interview to the New York Times in early February, and sent copies of the classified version to selected senators and representatives in Congress. But no member of Congress is going to touch the issue in an election year, for fear of being labelled ‘unpatriotic’.
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghanistan: back to the drawing board![/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 23, 2012
By: Khalid Iqbal

The recent violence in Kabul has exposed various myths. Foremost is that the US policy of winning ‘Afghan hearts and minds’ is mere rhetoric; the ground reality is the recurring barbaric practices of the American soldiers in Afghanistan, who have been acting like occupation forces of the medieval era. Recently, the pictures published in Los Angeles Times show soldiers from the American army’s 82nd Airborne Division joyfully posing with dismembered body parts of insurgent corpses. Earlier in January, a video had surfaced showing the US marines gleefully urinating on Afghan corpses. In February, the desecration of the Holy Quran at an American base triggered countrywide riots. In March, a US army sergeant went on a night-time shooting rampage in two Afghan villages killing 17; reportedly, this incident also involved rape. The sequence looks like a planned monthly calendar of activities.

About the latest photographs, Commander Isaf General John R. Allen said: “It represents a serious error in judgment by several soldiers, who have acted out of ignorance and unfamiliarity with US Army values.” The American Embassy in Kabul also released a similar statement: “Such actions are morally repugnant, dishonour the sacrifices of hundreds of thousands of US soldiers and civilians…….and do not represent the core values of the United States or our military.” After every incident an ‘investigation’ is launched to determine the cause; but in all probability, no meaningful punitive action is taken. Hence, the recurrences go on!

The aura of a successful Nato/Isaf military mission after a decade-long hard work seems to have evaporated into thin air. The well coordinated attacks on seven sites in the heart of Kabul, including four Embassies, and three sites in Paktia, Logar and Nangarhar were aimed at humiliating the Afghan government and the foreign forces. The fact that insurgents retain the capacity to launch extensive and long duration attacks confirms that the US/Nato is years away from neutralising them. These attacks have enhanced Taliban’s bargaining power. For months after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there were no Taliban attacks in Kabul. But now they are frequent and fatally effective. This is just one yardstick of measuring their progress. According to a senior US army officer, the Taliban now roam freely across much of the country. The occupation forces barely control the territory they can see from their highly fortified bases.

The Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, told a Reuters’ correspondent that the 30 specially trained mujahideen had spent months working with mock-ups of the targets to rehearse the attacks. He claimed that heavy machineguns, rocket grenades and ammunition had been put in place before the assault with inside help from the Afghan security forces. Mujahid said: “The attacks were very successful for us and were a remarkable achievement, dealing a psychological and political blow to the foreigners and the government…….These attacks are the beginning of the spring offensive and we had planned them for months.” These attacks, therefore, reinforce the belief that the Taliban have hardened sympathisers even among the most elite security forces on whose support they could count on for stacking vital logistics, like weapons, in sensitive zones and facilitating infiltrators to reach and use them whenever required.

“Knowing that foreigners lack the will to remain in Afghanistan, their intent is to show that Afghan forces are unable to effectively fight the Taliban after the foreign withdrawal. The Taliban’s operating here at both physical and psychological levels,” said Professor Rohan Gunaratna, the head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University. In the same vein, Dipankar Banerjee, the Director of New Delhi’s Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, said: “We’re only going to see an increase in these attacks. It helps [the militants] ensure political dominance in the new order as they slowly take over.”

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and police are years away from evolving into cohesive national entities. The Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies reported that America had spent $25 billion from 2001 to 2010 on their training; it spent another $14 billion in 2011. A 2010 International Crisis Group study stated that the army could disintegrate after the US withdrawal. Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis, too, maintained that “it is neither competent nor trusted.” In the absence of firm financial guarantees, however, the Afghan army and police may disintegrate.

Last week, the US/Nato officials discussed the size and amount that is required to sustain the Afghan security forces after 2014; rough estimates are $4.1 billion a year. Afghan President Hamid Karzai wants the US to commit that it would provide “at least $2 billion” a year after its troops withdraw. Meanwhile, the US/Nato expects the Afghan forces to grow to 352,000. The current model of the Afghan security forces is focusing heavily on maintaining an army, which is trained and equipped to handle aggression by other countries. Ironically, the post-withdrawal Afghan government would require strong armed forces capable of maintaining law and order within the country.

President Karzai has criticised both Nato and the Afghan forces. He said: “The fact that terrorists were able to enter Kabul and other provinces was an intelligence failure for us and especially for Nato.” But US Defence Department Spokesman George Little claimed that the Pentagon did not believe there had been an intelligence failure. “If we’re held to the standard to have to know precisely when and where each insurgent attack is going to occur, I think that’s an unfair standard,” he said. While Defence Secretary Leon Panetta at a news briefing stated: “We had received a great deal of intelligence that the Haqqanis were planning these kinds of attacks.” Two captured insurgents, reportedly, claimed that they represented the Haqqani network. This shows that the Haqqanis now have sufficient presence and strength within Afghanistan to carry out such activities. However, Panetta and Dempsey were cautious enough not to link the attack to Pakistan. “We’re not prepared to suggest that this emanated out of Pakistan,” Dempsey said. Fixated in his campaign year framework, Senator John McCain opined that such attacks reflected the risk of the drive to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan!

According to the objectives of the two-track strategy, the Afghan war was supposed to end with the Taliban begging for negotiation after they were appropriately “degraded” by the US/Nato forces. But exactly the opposite is happening! The Americans are ready to give in anything in exchange for the rhetoric of “victory”, while the Taliban do not seem interested in allowing them even such symbolic concession. Against this backdrop, the Americans do not have a dialogue partner with whom they could negotiate with a fair degree of assurance that whatever is agreed to would be implemented. So, back to the drawing board!

n The writer is a retired Air Commodore and former assistant chief of air staff of the Pakistan Air Force. At present, he is a member of the visiting faculty at the PAF Air War College, Naval War College and Quaid-i-Azam University.

Email:khalid3408@gmail.com
-The Nation

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghanistan: Ides of March or Badal[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 24, 2012
By: I. M. Mohsin

A series of well coordinated attacks by the Taliban led to shock and awe in the high security zone of Kabul. Amid insinuations from foreign military commanders, emphasising that the Taliban had no capacity to disrupt the well guarded city’s way of life, the rockets appeared to be awesome. Reportedly, the brunt of incursion was directed against the Diplomatic Enclave, especially the US, the UK and German Embassies as well as Nato headquarters and bases.

As the firing got intense, a loudspeaker from the US Embassy howled: “Duck and cover. Move away from the windows.” Parliament also bore the terrible onslaught and President Hamid Karzai had to abandon his palace to seek security of the foreign troops. The bloody drama went on for about 18 hours before the Afghan forces claimed to have killed about a 100 assailants conducting the raid. Likewise, the countries whose Embassies got smacked claimed that only minor damages had been done, as did the army commanders.

The Afghans, according to history, stop fighting during the winter season. Following the same tradition, the Taliban went into hiding that encouraged the foreign troops to philosophise about the collapse of their ‘enemy’ in the ongoing counterinsurgency. Bruce Riedel and Michael Edward O’Hanlon, in an article, observed: “The insurgency persists, but if the US doesn’t withdraw prematurely, the Afghan security forces will be able to contain it by 2014.” The American powerbrokers identify their struggle as insurgency, despite being in the hole in this war.

The Taliban, who were once derided for by many segments of local population, have been claiming that they are fighting for the freedom of their homeland from the occupation forces. Since 2006, they have been very helpful to their brethren in many ways. Quite often, the foreign forces had to look the other way to stay peacefully in the area of their deployment. Several reports indicate that sometimes the troops also collaborated with the locals/Taliban in the production and smuggling of opium. Enquiries were ordered against them, but were hushed up.

The Taliban spokesman claimed to have launched the latest attack to avenge the burning of the Holy Quran as well as the crime committed by Sergeant Bales wherein 17 Afghans were killed. Going by their tradition, too many Afghans would have complimented the ‘enemy’ for such a daring break-in. Karzai, however, acknowledged a collective intelligence failure, but was mainly critical of Nato’s reaction when Kabul was under siege.

As the attack ended, it provoked pervasive debate about its purpose. Some see it as the Ides of March, destiny-related, as explained in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Others perceive it as a way to humiliate the US and prove that the Taliban will prevail no matter what.

Senator John McCain considers that the attack highlights the risk of reducing US deployment in Afghanistan, as against Obama’s stand on it. Despite having been a POW in Vietnam, he forgot how the US had to abandon the country. US Ambassador Crocker, who is said to be doing some political manipulation among the Afghans, expressed the feeling that the Taliban could not have staged it by themselves, blaming Haqqani network. However, Secretary Clinton called Foreign Minister Rabbani and urged solidarity between US and Pakistan to meet the emerging threats. Then Defence Secretary Panetta and Chairman JCSC General Dempsey indicated that they had no intelligence reports as to who did the deplorable deed. Against this backdrop, the latest attack underlines the following facets of the war.

First, even after 10 years, the US/Nato is at bay on intelligence collection.

Second, the foreign forces appear to be more conscious of their own security concerns and less about ‘winning the hearts and minds of the locals’.

Third, If history is any guide, the Taliban will win wider support among the Afghans, if they continue their current onslaught against the foreign troops.

Last, foolish tactics, like the burning of the Holy Quran or the massacre in Kandahar, would not frighten the Afghans. It incites religious reaction that would be like a windfall for the Taliban.

The US is in a soup in Afghanistan. It being an election-year, both Republicans and Democrats are in a spin. The machinations of the neocons under George W. Bush have brought the US almost to a point of no return. Since 9/11, the fear-complex has been cultivated by various means to justify the Iraqi misadventure and the Afghan debacle. Now, the US is looking for an exit strategy that is yet to be defined. Having suffered from the war for 10 years, the Afghans are ready to mount pressure for an equitable settlement so that the foreign forces leave. That is why Oalf Caroe, rightly, said: “Unlike other wars, Afghan wars become serious only when they are over.”

n The writer is former secretary interior.

Email: [email]imnor@brain.net.pk[/email]
-The Nation

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]America’s Afghan dilemma[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
April 27, 2012
By Patrick Seale

The gloomy topic of Afghanistan is expected to dominate the Nato summit in Chicago on May 20-21, when the assembled leaders will have to wrestle with three uncomfortable facts:

The first is that talks with the Taliban have broken down, removing any immediate prospect of a negotiated exit from the conflict. This conjures up the spectre of a forced Nato retreat — in other words of a humiliating defeat.

This month provided worrying evidence of the Taliban’s growing ability to mount coordinated attacks all over the country, even in areas of maximum security. On April 15, Taliban suicide fighters infiltrated into Kabul and attacked the heavily-defended Embassy Quarter and Parliament. In the ensuing gun fights, some 36 insurgents were killed as well as 11 members of the Afghan security forces.

The second uncomfortable fact is that public opinion in the United States and its allies is weary of war and seems unconvinced that fighting and dying in distant Afghanistan makes them safe from terrorist attack. The Obama administration has not yet come round to this view, as may be seen from a recent statement by Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Kabul: “To get out before the Afghans have a full grip on security, which is a couple of years out, would be to invite the Taliban, Haqqani [a Pakistan-based Islamist network], and Al Qaida back in and set the stage for another September 11. And that, I think, is an unacceptable risk for any American.”

But is Crocker right? Some US allies clearly do not think so. One or two of them have already announced their decision to quit before the previously agreed 2014 deadline. Australia’s Prime Minister Julia Gillard said this week that Australia’s 1,550 soldiers would shift from a front-line role to a largely support function by mid-2013. At Chicago, she is expected to try to persuade her fellow leaders that mid-2013, not end-2014, should be the date to end Nato’s combat role in Afghanistan. France’s Francois Hollande has gone one better. If he is elected President of France on May 6 — as is widely expected — he has pledged to bring France’s 3,550 troops home by the end of this year.

Thirdly, because of what it sees as a continuing terrorist threat, the US seems determined to maintain some sort of long-term presence in Afghanistan — much to the displeasure of Iran and Pakistan. Nato leaders are bound to squabble in Chicago over who will foot the bill for continued assistance to Afghanistan after 2014. Because budgets are tight, Nato members have agreed that it will no longer be possible to fund and equip an Afghan army of 352,000 — an overly-ambitious target which is expected to be reached this year. Instead, the force is to be reduced to 230,000, at a cost to donors of about $7 billion (Dh25.7 billion) a year. The US will probably have to pay the lion’s share, with the rest coming from other Nato countries.

Contentious issues

But if the Afghan army is slimmed down, as is proposed, what will happen to the 120,000 men laid off? Armed and trained, they might join the insurgents — a nightmare scenario for Nato. A disturbing development this year has been a rash of incidents in which Afghan soldiers turned their guns on their Nato trainers. Since January, 16 Nato troops have been killed by Afghan soldiers.

Agreement was reached last weekend on a draft US-Afghan strategic pact, providing for counter-terrorist cooperation and US economic aid for at least another decade after 2014. In the lengthy negotiations, two contentious issues were resolved which opened the way for agreement on the strategic pact. First, the US agreed to hand over to Afghans the detention centre at Parwan, where suspected insurgents are held and interrogated, and secondly, the US agreed to give Afghans control over night raids on houses of terrorist suspects by US Special Forces. To the outrage of many Afghans, these night raids often involve the forced entry into houses where families are asleep. The violation of the privacy of women has caused particular anger.

One wonders when the US will grasp that its counter-terrorist policies create more terrorists than are killed by its drone attacks, air strikes and other violent acts. America’s ongoing ‘war on terror’ has aroused fierce anti-American feeling in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and other Muslim countries, undermining the legitimacy of leaders in these countries, who are seen to be collaborating with the US in waging war on their own people.

Earlier this month, the US offered a $10million reward for information leading to the arrest of Hafiz Saeed, the founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani militant group. Apparently undaunted, Saeed continues to criss-cross Pakistan making fiery anti-American and anti-Indian speeches. He does not seem to be in danger of arrest. Pakistani opinion is still inflamed by a US air strike last November which accidentally killed 24 Pakistani border troops. A Financial Times report from Islamabad this month noted that US-Pakistan relations had sunk to their lowest level in a decade.

Several shocking incidents have greatly damaged America’s reputation and seem to point to poor training of young American soldiers and a breakdown of discipline. In January, a video was released showing American soldiers urinating on dead Afghan insurgents; in February, the accidental burning of copies of Quran at Bagram Air Base led to widespread rioting. In March, a US sergeant went on a rampage killing 17 Afghan civilians, including women and children; in April, the Los Angeles Times published photos (allegedly taken in 2010) showing grinning American soldiers of the 82nd airborne division posing with mangled body parts of Afghan insurgents.

The US might perhaps ask itself why it has aroused such hate in the Islamic world and what it might do to restore its reputation. It might care to consider the following suggestions: Wind down the ‘war on terror’ and stop killing Muslims; put a firm check on Israeli colony building and promote the creation of a Palestinian state; reduce the US military presence in the Gulf States by reverting instead to an ‘over the horizon’ naval presence.

Above all, the US should strive with maximum goodwill to reach a fair settlement with Iran over the nuclear issue. In return for a verifiable Iranian pledge to stop enriching uranium above the limit allowed by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the US should end its economic warfare against Tehran. Instead of inciting the Arabs against Iran — and thereby fuelling Sunni-Shiite antagonism — the US should encourage Gulf States to include Iran in the region’s security architecture.

Washington seems unaware that it will need Iran’s help if peace and stability are ever to be established in Iraq and Afghanistan. ‘Crippling sanctions’ on the Islamic republic are unlikely to win its cooperation. This is not the least of the many incoherent features of American policy.

Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs.
Source: Gulf News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]The US confusion[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 1, 2012
By Waheed Hussain

The entire Afghanistan peace process is hanging between the optimism and pessimism!

Whenever there is a bilateral, trilateral or multi-lateral negotiation process aimed at achieve a lasting peace and stability in the war-hit Afghanistan, hopes seem to be running high. Optimism is an objective approach for finding a brighter future for Afghans; however, one has to keep in mind the ground realities of the Afghan conflict and uncounted difficulties connected to it.

The recent trilateral core group meeting of Pakistan-US-Afghanistan ended with lot of optimism in Islamabad last week. The member countries of the core group agreed to establish two sub-groups with an idea for achieving peace and security through the reconciliation process.

According to the details, the first group comprising of experts will arrange a “safe passage” for those Taliban who are willing to be engaged in the negotiation process and like to travel through Pakistan to other countries and within Afghanistan.

All the three dignitaries representing their respective countries – Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Jalil Abbas Jilani, Deputy Foreign Minister of Afghnaistan Jawed Luden, and US Special Representative for Afghanistan Marc Grossman – in their joint press conference declared the agreement a great accomplishment.

In the diplomatic circles, the new proposal might be a mighty achievement, but in reality there are many ifs and buts attached to the so-called ‘safe passage’ proposal. Initially, nothing has been elaborated so far as to what really the ‘safe passage’ means? Is it to provide security to those Taliban who are willing to enter into any kind of negotiation? Or, is it to facilitate their travelling within and outside Afghanistan, facilitating in acquiring visa and other traveling documents? Or, is it only the facilitation or also influencing and convincing various factions of Taliban, ethnic groups, war lords and hardcore militants to participate in the talks?

The Afghan junior minister Jawed said, “We really welcome this initiative of ‘safe passage’ which will mean our experts can meet and take this process further, we need to be able to find them, those who are willing to talk.” There are certain serious and confusing questions about the phrase ‘our experts.’

Naturally, Mr Jawed was referring to Afghans but who those experts would be? Representatives from the Afghan government, members of the High Piece Council, an Afghan government sponsored body, politicians of different ethnic/nationalists’ groups? What would be the mandate of that expert group? What would be the fundamentals for negotiations?

By introducing new linguistic terminologies like ‘safe passage’, neither the safety nor the passage would be ensured. Those who are well-versed with the Afghan conflict know that the basic issue in Afghanistan is the persisting trust deficit among the various stakeholders including Taliban, Afghan government, United States and Pakistan. None of them have full confidence in each other; everyone believes that the other is working against its interest.

This environment of distrust has remained the biggest hurdle in the path of finding a viable solution to the Afghan conflict. That’s why the Afghan Taliban, within 24 hours of the declaration of ‘safe passage’ agreement, refused to accept any such proposal which they feel is tantamount to dividing the Taliban.

The fate of the second sub-group proposed to be established at the United Nations with the three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, US, as members remains unclear too. What mandate the said group would have? Will the US agree to delist the names of Taliban form the self created terrorist list? On what grounds the Taliban would be convinced to respect the initiative?

Basically, the fact of the matter is that Americans have miserably failed to achieve their peace dream in Afghanistan. All the five centres of powers in the United States, including the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the Congress are confused and divided over the Afghan conflict’s solution.

President Obama is in a hurry regarding the ‘Afghan War’ because of his aspiration to stay in the White House after 2012. In this state, he looks completely confused and does not know what policy or the strategy should be adopted to bring some kind of workable peace initiative in Afghanistan.

At the same time, so far the US administration’s diplomatic efforts have also failed to re-engage Pakistan after unprovoked Salala attack by its troops from across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border last year. The US is not willing to tender apology to Pakistan and find out some kind of mechanism regarding the most castigated drone attacks in the FATA area killing more civilians than the terrorists. The egoistic and stubborn attitude adopted by the US will not pave way for early NATO supplies’ resumption as there is a lot of pressure on the PPP government from within and outside the parliament.

In wake of American troops’ barbaric night assaults on the innocent civilians, the public opinion in Afghanistan about the US and President Karzai’s government is not in their favour as well. The world witnessed large scale street protests after the desecration of Holy Quran, urinating the dead afghan bodies, killing of 17 civilians by a marine and setting them on fire are some of the hated actions being committed by the US troops in the recent months, which make all peace efforts difficult rather impossible to succeed.

The recent attack on the Kabul along with four other Afghanistan provinces by the Taliban was a clear message to the US that the Taliban were still not willing to join the peace negotiation from a weaker position and would not participate in any US or Afghan government sponsored reconciliation process.

Zalmay Khalilzad, the former US Ambassador to Kabul, in an article published in the Foreign Policy magazine recently, has acknowledge the fact that “US leverage in Afghanistan is likely to decline in the coming years. The key challenge in the next year is working with the Afghan government on talking corruption, integrating the Taliban and reaching an understanding with Pakistan. After a decade-long military campaign, prudent diplomacy could allow the United States to wind down the mission with its core interests secured.” But, Mr Zalmay did not spell out what that diplomacy was?

Finally, under these circumstances no core or the sub-groups initiatives could succeed until the US is practically out of its confusion and openly tells Afghanistan, Pakistan and to the rest of the world as to what it actually wants in Afghanistan.

The writer hosts a primetime talk show on a TV channel and can be contacted via email: [email]waheed.h35@gmail.com[/email]
-Pakistan Today

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Another US decade in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 2, 2012
Zafar Hilaly

The Americans have decided to prolong their occupation of Afghanistan till 2024. So, what difference will another ten years make? What can Washington achieve in the next ten years that it has so comprehensively failed to do in the previous ten?

Better security? How will that happen with only a fraction (15,000-30,000) of the US force level that they presently maintain (140,000). As for the Afghan National Army, Obama’s weapon of choice, it is essentially a band of rustic vagabonds who over the course of the last three months have killed more American soldiers – 25 percent of Americans killed in the past few months were accounted for by rogue ANA soldiers – than have the Taliban. Moreover, the ANA’s desertion rate makes even the Somali army appear like a cohesive unit.

America’s Afghan policy seldom made sense to anybody. For example, America demands that the Taliban emir disarm his forces, agree to share power with the ‘quisling’ Karzai and accept a western styled constitution before he arrives at the peace table. Needless to say, there is as much chance of the Taliban accepting that as the Saudis of incorporating gay rights in their constitution.

But thinking that the Americans don’t know what they are doing would be imprudent and plain wrong. They do and their future plan for Pakistan seems a devilish one.

Consider. The US pre-conditions are only a gambit. Washington knows what has not been won on the battlefield cannot be won on the conference table. It is equally aware that securing Afghanistan and making it safe for the likes of Karzai can never happen without the elimination of Taliban safe havens in Pakistan. Panetta, Petraeus et al, are on record saying that. Hence, Pakistan must be brought to heel.

A pliable Pakistan is doubly advantageous for the US because it fits in snugly with America’s long term global objective which is to maintain US global primacy and thwart the rise of China. Of course, if, in the process of putting the squeeze on Pakistan, through drones, covert operations and, what Americans are particularly good at, false flag operations, like the Gulf of Tonkin affair and sheer lies, like the farce America choreographed at the UNSC before the invasion of Iraq, Pakistan is destabilised or even Balkanizes, then so much the better.

Besides if, during such confused times, the opportunity arises to denuclearise Pakistan, a long and cherished American desire, America would be over the moon.

For all this to happen, therefore, the war in Afghanistan must continue, notwithstanding the drivel about peace talks because only then can the drones continue to wreak their havoc and Islamabad made to yield or, alternatively, take the false step that will justify Obama, very much a war micro manager, to send in his planes, special teams et al.

Lest some think that is being overly alarmist I recall a conversation, a year ago, with an American contractor engaged in the work of building $15 billion worth of fortifications for US forces in Afghanistan (and the billion dollar US embassies in Karachi and Islamabad). I asked him why the need for building bases in Afghanistan if the US intended to drawdown its forces within a couple of years and leave. Looking me straight in the eye, he responded, ‘Mister, we are not building them to hand them over to anyone.’

Consider further. Notwithstanding our vexed relationship with India, Obama has wooed India in a way that seems intended to cause affront here. If he wished to flaunt India’s role as America’s pit-bull in the region and that Pakistan had better watch out, he could not have done a better job. The jihadist parties in Pakistan had a field day. So much so that Pakistan today is an even more formidable redoubt for extremists than before the war. Indeed, if a few more drones miss their targets and innocent lives are lost, the Haqqanis could become an irresistible attraction for all those here who can wield a gun.

All this, of course, hardly bothers Obama. But it should. Because when the smoke from the drone raids clear and the bodies are taken away for burial many more Pakistanis would have rallied to the cries of America’s enemies.

But Obama is too busy fashioning the world in America’s own image. He does not believe that he has bitten off in Afghanistan more than he can reasonably chew. He prefers to go on adventuring and hanging around protecting the likes of Karzai and chasing Pollyanna-ish ideas about democracy perhaps because he is doing so in pursuit of a larger plan. He probably does not believe his tactical reverses matter as long as the strategic situation moves in America’s favour. In short, he is determined to fulfil America’s ambitions.

Whether the Zardari government is up to what the Americans are into, is not clear, at least, judging by Islamabad’s response. There was no point, for example, of suggesting that all cooperation with the US was predicated on receiving an apology for the Salala slayings. That apology is now worthless, much like any apology that is obtained under duress or in expectation of some return. It’s hollow, in fact counter-productive. The public has already formed an impression of Obama’s humanity and it’s the right one. Why try and change that?

It would have been far better for our side to say frankly why it is impossible for Pakistan to go after the Haqqanis and that we do not have the resources, the equipment or, frankly, the political will, especially after Salala. And that any such move would dangerously exacerbate domestic political differences. Just restoring the Nato supply route will cause us enough problems. Presumably some such reason is also why the Americans are unwilling to prevent cross border raids by the TTP from Nuristan, where thousands of them have taken shelter. We have not made a song and dance about that. Nor have we sent our planes to bomb them.

The trouble with Obama, like most men who hold an office far above their competence and experience, is the exaggerated stress they lay on not changing their minds lest they appear weak and inexperienced. Given some introspection Mr Zardari would have discovered that he too suffers from the same fault, and for precisely the same reason, as when, for instance, he foolishly and stubbornly refused to restore the chief justice till he was forced to so by Kayani.

The problem is that Pakistan is isolated today and, weaker in many respects than at any time of our history. Actually, we are seen as a country in the throes of an economic meltdown, governed by thieves and one which could implode momentarily. Admittedly, that’s not the case in reality but the Americans are taking advantage of it to drive a hard bargain. What makes matters worse for Pakistan is the belief among some here in key posts that the longer the US hangs on in Afghanistan, the more it will need Pakistan’s cooperation and hence the greater the benefit we will be able to derive from them. That betrays woeful ignorance.

It’s time to wake up and smell the coffee. The days, when the US looked on us with special favour are over; mutual distrust is now palpable. And trust, like a fine Chinese vase, once broken can never be properly repaired. The blemish remains as a distracting reminder of a better past. Worse, it compounds our own confusion when dealing with the US.

There is really no need for sordid compromises and shameful secret pacts. We must learn to do without the US, and we can. And we should begin this process now. As someone said, ‘allowing ourselves to be seduced by America was bad enough but getting raped on its account is intolerable’.

Email: [email]charles123it@hotmail.com[/email]
-The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]US must focus on upcoming leadership change in Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 3, 2012
By Javid Ahmad

The exit sign is blinking in Afghanistan. Yesterday, President Obama secretly traveled to Kabul and signed a pact outlining US support for Afghanistan after the troop pullout in 2014. He also spoke to Americans about the war in a prime-time address. The US focus is, and has been, primarily on security support for Afghanistan. But what about Afghanistan’s political transition? The Afghan presidential election is also slated for 2014, but the buzz is that it may be moved up to 2013 to avoid overlap with the planned NATO troop drawdown.

Yet there is still no practical plan for a smooth transfer of political power. Policymakers should be asking what the Afghan and US governments could do to ensure a smooth transfer without leaving behind a looming political vacuum and potential civil strife.

While Afghanistan has traditionally lacked effective national leadership, the Afghan and US governments over the years have failed to develop a mature political class from which the Afghan people can democratically select its leaders.

This failure extends to the civil service, which is largely corrupt and inept and operates under a vast network of political patronage and nepotism. Ten years and counting since the US invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and wipe out its support for al Qaeda, the Afghan civil service is still incapable of delivering basic services to the Afghan people.

Meanwhile, concern is growing in Kabul that Mr. Karzai may attempt to “pull a Putin” at the next election.

As with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2008, Karzai is not eligible to run for a third term. However, it is now speculated that he will hand pick a successor who will serve as president while Karzai retains his strongman status and runs the show from behind the scenes – keeping the seat warm until Karzai’s return.

Depending on whom Karzai might pick as his successor, such a move would spark outrage among many in Afghanistan, specifically among members of the opposition group, the erstwhile Northern Alliance.

Several names are in play, including Qayum Karzai, the president’s multimillionaire older brother, influential in Afghan politics and security.

However, President Karzai’s personal favorite may be Farooq Wardak, the current minister of education. Like Karzai, Mr. Wardak is a Pashtun. The two have a close relationship. If Karzai chooses to publicly announce his support for a potential Wardak candidacy, that could garner widespread public support among Pashtun voters who would likely rally to get him elected. Despite his lack of charisma, Wardak is regarded as one of Karzai’s most competent cabinet ministers.

Members such as Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican from California, seem aligned with Afghanistan’s opposition figures who want to radically revamp the state and decentralize it. Mr. Rohrabacher’s disdain for Karzai is well known, and US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton personally asked him not to join a congressional delegation in Kabul in April. He did not travel to Kabul, but other members did, and met with opposition figures.

The Obama administration itself does not support decentralization. Such an Afghanistan could involve, among other things, granting the provincial councils legislative power and having provincial governors elected rather than appointed by the president. The elected governors would have considerable power, including the ability to levy their own taxes and make all key provincial appointments.

This may work in America, but Afghanistan is not America.

Giving provincial governors the authority to hire and fire civil servants, and levy their own taxes with no input or control from Kabul risks creating and supporting local “strongmen” and parallel power structures that could be potentially destabilizing.

Such an arrangement also risks turning up the heat on already simmering ethnic tensions. It could create a Pashtun-dominated “Pashtunistan” separated from a confederation of provinces dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

Such a strategy of soft partition would open the door for ethnic cleansing. A cursory look at history, including that of India, Bosnia, Palestine, and Cyprus, suggests that the partition of mixed political entities has almost always been accompanied or preceded by ethnic cleansing and/or colossal ethnic violence.

US support in Afghanistan over the past decade has been invaluable and American officials have the right to criticize the Afghan government, but any move toward decentralization or support for one faction over another amounts to meddling in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and must be avoided.

What the Obama administration and Congress can and must do is to begin pivoting from an emphasis on security to one that builds Afghanistan’s political and governing capabilities.

Rather than cozying up to insatiable warlords, former jihadi leaders, and other insalubrious characters that the US has supported in the past, America must do all it can to assist the development of moderate leaders in each of the factions – without “taking sides.”

Through education and leadership training of young Afghans, as well as foreign exposure, especially in the United States, America must nurture the next generation of dynamic young leaders. Afghanistan and the US have a valuable opportunity to support technocrats, visionary leaders, and capable civil servants who will lead the country into a positive future.

The 2014 election is of crucial significance. Real and tangible steps must be taken toward a smooth and responsible transition of power. Time is running out.

Javid Ahmad, a native of Kabul, is program coordinator with the Asia Program of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. The views reflected here are his own.

Source: Christian Science Monitor

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Time for change in Afghan leadership[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 5, 2012
By Javid Ahmad

The exit sign is blinking in Afghanistan. On May 1, US President Obama secretly travelled to Kabul and signed a pact outlining US support for Afghanistan after the troop pullout in 2014. He also spoke to Americans about the war in a prime-time address.

The US focus is, and has been, primarily on security support for Afghanistan. But what about Afghanistan’s political transition? The Afghan presidential election is also slated for 2014, but the buzz is that it may be moved up to 2013 to avoid overlap with the planned Nato troop drawdown.

Yet there is still no practical plan for a smooth transfer of political power. Policymakers should be asking what the Afghan and US governments could do to ensure a smooth transfer without leaving behind a looming political vacuum and potential civil strife. While Afghanistan has traditionally lacked effective national leadership, the Afghan and US governments over the years have failed to develop a mature political class from which the Afghan people can democratically select its leaders.

This failure extends to the civil service, which is largely corrupt and inept and operates under a vast network of political patronage and nepotism. Ten years and counting since the US invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and wipe out its support for Al Qaida, the Afghan civil service is still incapable of delivering basic services to the Afghan people. Meanwhile, concern is growing in Kabul that President Hamid Karzai may attempt to “pull a Putin” at the next election. As with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2008, Karzai is not eligible to run for a third term. Depending on whom Karzai might pick as his successor, such a move would spark outrage among many in Afghanistan, specifically among members of the opposition group, the erstwhile Northern Alliance. Several names are in play, including Qayum Karzai, the president’s multimillionaire older brother, influential in Afghan politics and security.

However, Karzai’s personal favourite may be Farooq Wardak, the current minister of education. Like Karzai, Wardak is a Pashtun. The two have a close relationship. If Karzai chooses to publicly announce his support for a potential Wardak candidacy, that could garner widespread public support among Pashtun voters. Despite his lack of charisma, Wardak is regarded as one of Karzai’s most competent cabinet ministers.

True or not, there is a growing perception in Afghanistan that the US is trying to be a political kingmaker in domestic politics. Recent outreach to Afghan political figures by several members of Congress has emboldened this perception. Members such as Representative Dana Rohrabacher, a Republican from California, seem aligned with Afghanistan’s opposition figures who want to radically revamp the state and decentralise it.

The Obama administration itself does not support decentralisation. Such an Afghanistan could involve, among other things, granting the provincial councils legislative power and having provincial governors elected rather than appointed by the president. The elected governors would have considerable power, including the ability to levy their own taxes and make all key provincial appointments.

Soft-partition strategy

Giving provincial governors the authority to hire and fire civil servants, and levy their own taxes with no input or control from Kabul risks creating and supporting local ‘strongmen’ and parallel power structures that could be potentially destabilising. It could create a Pashtun-dominated ‘Pashtunistan’ separated from a confederation of provinces dominated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.

Such a strategy of soft partition would open the door for ethnic cleansing. A cursory look at history, including that of India, Bosnia, Palestine, and Cyprus, suggests that the partition of mixed political entities has almost always been accompanied or preceded by ethnic cleansing and/or colossal ethnic violence. US support in Afghanistan over the past decade has been invaluable and American officials have the right to criticise the Afghan government, but any move toward decentralisation or support for one faction over another amounts to meddling in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs and must be avoided.

What the Obama administration and Congress can and must do is to begin pivoting from an emphasis on security to one that builds Afghanistan’s political and governing capabilities.

Rather than cozying up to insatiable warlords and other insalubrious characters that the US has supported in the past, America must do all it can to assist the development of moderate leaders in each of the factions — without ‘taking sides.’

Through education and leadership training of young Afghans, as well as foreign exposure, especially in the US, America must nurture the next generation of dynamic young leaders. Afghanistan and the US have a valuable opportunity to support technocrats, visionary leaders, and capable civil servants who will lead the country to a positive future.

The 2014 election is of crucial significance. Real and tangible steps must be taken toward a smooth and responsible transition of power. Time is running out.

Javid Ahmad, a native of Kabul, is programme coordinator with the Asia Programme of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C.
Courtesy: Christian Science Monitor

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Obama Signs Strategic Pact In Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 6, 2012
By Peter Symonds

President Obama billed his secretive, fly-in, fly-out trip to Afghanistan in the early hours of Wednesday morning as marking a new dawn—the withdrawal of American troops and an end to more than a decade of war. In reality, the visit has set the stage for an open-ended US military presence in Afghanistan in line with Washington’s aims to transform the country into a permanent base of operations in Central Asia.

Obama’s unannounced trip to Afghanistan on the anniversary of the assassination of Osama bin Laden was also pitched towards his re-election campaign. He took the opportunity once again to glorify his role in ordering bin Laden’s murder and to posture as the leader who had successfully ended the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Obama met briefly with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to sign an “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement” between the two countries. While the plan is to withdraw the bulk of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 and shift responsibility for security operations to the Afghan army and police, US special forces and trainers will remain, ostensibly in a support role, for at least a decade.

In a speech from the huge Bagram military complex, Obama declared that the US did not seek permanent bases inside Afghanistan. However, as well as the continued presence of US troops, the US military will have access to and use of Afghan facilities beyond 2014. A new bilateral security agreement will be negotiated over the next year to supersede the current Status of Forces Agreement giving US troops unfettered access throughout the country.

Obama claimed that the agreement marked the beginning of “an equal partnership between two sovereign states”, but the terms of the arrangement were clearly dictated by the US to its puppet regime in Kabul. Karzai remains completely dependent economically and militarily on Washington. Afghan security forces, which are due to peak at 352,000 in October before dropping to 230,000 in 2017, will be almost completely funded by Washington and its allies.

The timing of the visit was bound up with a NATO meeting due to take place in Chicago on May 20 to discuss the withdrawal of NATO combat troops. A number of US allies, facing widespread hostility to the war at home, have announced the pull-out of troops prior to the 2014 deadline. The Obama administration will use the meeting to pressure other NATO countries to commit to funding the Afghan security forces and providing other financial aid.

In his speech, Obama claimed that the US had reached its main goal, declaring that the defeat of Al Qaeda “is now within our reach.” Whatever the exact state of the Al Qaeda network, more than a decade of brutal neo-colonial war has embittered the Afghan population, providing a ready stream of recruits for anti-occupation militias such as the Taliban and the Haqqani network.

Just hours after Obama flew out of Afghanistan, Taliban fighters attacked a heavily-fortified residential compound in Kabul housing foreigners including American military contractors and defence employees. Suicide bombers detonated their explosives, blowing open the main gate. Fighting continued for hours before Afghan forces and private guards finally silenced the attackers, leaving at least seven Afghans and a guard dead.

The ability of the Taliban to mount high-profile attacks in the heavily-guarded capital underscores the tenuous character of the US-led occupation. While Obama claimed that “the tide had turned” against the Taliban insurgency, most analysts are pessimistic about the future of the Karzai regime once most US forces leave the country.

In an essay published on Tuesday, Anthony Cordesman from the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies wrote: “The broader problems in creating effective Afghan forces is increasingly questionable, the insurgents are clearly committed to going on with the fight, and relations with Pakistan seem to take two steps backward for every apparent step forward.”

Despite tactical reversals, Cordesman explained, the Taliban and other insurgents were not defeated. The present US strategy “will almost certainly fail to secure the south and east of Afghanistan” prior to 2014. Given this bleak picture, Cordesman advocated concentrating on shoring up areas still under Afghan government control and boosting pro-government local militias and warlords, despite their corruption and brutality.

Obama claimed that the strategic agreement signed yesterday will help “strengthen democratic institutions”, “advance development and dignity” for the Afghan people, and protect human rights. But this is belied by the corrupt and autocratic character of the Karzai regime and the social crisis confronting the vast majority of the Afghan people.

After more than a decade of American occupation, 70 percent of Afghans struggle to survive on less than $US2 a day. Unemployment is rampant and will certainly worsen as sectors of the economy dependent on the occupation decline or collapse. Food prices are rocketing due to drought. According to a report in the Independent earlier this year, more than 30,000 children die every year in Afghanistan due to the lack of nutritious food, leaving them vulnerable to diseases such as pneumonia or diarrhoea.

Far from ending a decade of war, Obama’s drawdown of US troops from Afghanistan is the preparation for new military adventures. The NATO war to oust the Gaddafi regime in Libya is being followed by escalating threats of intervention in Syria. At the same time, the US, together with its ally Israel, is threatening to attack Iran.

Even more recklessly, the Obama administration is refocussing the American military in the Asia Pacific region as part of its diplomatic/strategic efforts to undercut Chinese influence. By deliberately raising tensions with China, the US is increasing the danger of a slide towards a catastrophic conflict between two nuclear-armed countries.

Source: Countercurrents

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Two blowbacks from Afghanistan[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
By Khaled Ahmed
Published: May 5, 2012

The writer is Director South Asian Media School, Lahore [email]khaled.ahmed@tribune.com.pk[/email]

Pakistan is about to face the second ‘withdrawal’ blowback from Afghanistan. The first, after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, came under General Ziaul Haq, whose policies metamorphosed Pakistan into an adventurist, fundamentalist nation with its face turned to the past. The second is upon us now, as the US Army gets ready to withdraw. Both events will coalesce to cause severe existential disorder in Pakistan.

In General Zia’s war, the blowback for Moscow was in the shape of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The US became the sole superpower after that. The blowback for it was silently taking shape within the Islamic warriors it had mustered in Pakistan. The post-Soviet euphoria was expressed through the term ‘New World Order’. Pakistan, sunk under its own Ziaist legacy, delivered the 2001 punch to the US in the shape of the al Qaeda attack.

Iran defeated the US in Iraq, and its people are paying a price for this victory with their freedoms. Pakistan’s non-state actors (Taliban, etc.) and foreign warriors have defeated the US in Afghanistan under Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ — and the people of Pakistan should get ready to pay a price for this victory too. General Zia spawned madrassas and tried to create a pattern of governance resembling the khilafat. Pakistan became a Machiavelli’s nightmare — who had warned the Medici of Florence not to employ mercenaries to fight their wars — crawling with “civilian warriors” sharing internal sovereignty with the state.

As it gets ready for the blowback from the American defeat in Afghanistan, ‘victor’ Pakistan’s parliament is presiding over a state without internal control, while protesting external sovereignty against American drones. Almost 60 per cent of its territory is controlled by terrorists and insurgents. The terrorists are led by al Qaeda, whose certified capacity to control the behaviour of Pakistan’s large madrassa network is paralleled by its growing penetration into the army rank and file. Violence and its corollary, intimidation, persuade the population — the rich and the poor alike — to embrace al Qaeda’s ‘nation-building’.

What Iran did not face because of its oil and totalitarianism is economic collapse and loss of internal sovereignty. In Pakistan, the masses can no longer bear the burden of ‘victory’ and are increasingly willing to overthrow the current system of governance — not through another takeover by a general but by anyone who would give them the capacity to survive. No one who would win their support can even think of governing without first swearing hatred of the US and acceptance of the terrorists as “our brothers”.

The winds that blow from the Muslim world are not reassuring after the chastening experience of the Arab Spring. Olivier Roy says that the youth that gathered at the Tahrir Square lacked the will to take over Egypt when it was ripe for the plucking and let it be snapped up by the Islamists. Irfan Husain in his book Fatal Faultlines: Pakistan, Islam and the West (Harper Collins India 2012) says that when he googled ‘rightwing militant groups’ on his computer he got 392,000 websites spewing plans to “remake the world in their own vision of utopia, and never mind the collateral damage”.

Implosion caused by an outdated Pakistani mind, or collateral damage caused by the West trying to survive against Islamic aggression, may doom Pakistan in its present shape. It may ape Afghanistan and survive by giving up its internal writ, some of it already given up in preparation. A path-dependent, economically damaged Islamic state threatens its neighbourhood with jihad because its vision for the future is untenable.

-The Express Tribune

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Unknowns of the Afghan endgame[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 8, 2012
Dr Maleeha Lodhi

The timing of President Obama’s recent trip to Afghanistan – coinciding with the one-year anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s killing – may have been driven by election politics, but its purpose went beyond that.

His televised speech from Bagram base was designed to send several important messages to different audiences. For his war-fatigued nation he held out the assurance that an end to the war was in sight. To Afghans he signalled that America would not rush for the exits or abandon them but remain committed to the country after most Nato combat forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. Pakistan’s cooperation was sought as an “equal partner” to build regional peace and stability.

Most significantly, President Obama offered an open door for dialogue to the Taliban. Many members of the Taliban, he said, “have indicated an interest in reconciliation”. “A path of peace is now set before them.”

The speech elicited no comment from Islamabad. Obama’s call for a “negotiated peace” in Afghanistan is what Pakistan has long urged, even if Washington has taken a decade to reach this conclusion. The acknowledgement that his administration is in “direct discussions” with the Taliban marked the first time that the president took public ownership of last year’s secret contacts with Taliban representatives aimed at establishing a peace process.

This aligns the US approach more closely with what Pakistan has for years been advocating. But this potential convergence is overshadowed by the persisting impasse between Pakistan and the US over the terms of re-engagement, and what should be its starting point. This explains Islamabad’s silence over elements of Obama’s speech that it would otherwise concur with.

The most significant message that President Obama’s visit to Afghanistan aimed to convey ahead of the Nato summit in Chicago, was that he had a credible and ‘responsible’ plan to wind down America’s longest and increasingly unpopular war. And that he was on course to accomplish this. The goal he had set – “to defeat Al-Qaeda and deny it a chance to rebuild – was now within reach.”

Before the prime-time speech, Obama signed the ‘strategic partnership agreement’ with President Hamid Karzai in Kabul. This endorsed the transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014, while committing the US to military and economic support for a decade after 2014.

Forged after twenty months of on-off negotiations, the agreement seeks to define the post 2014 relationship between the two countries. But it contains few specifics other than the offer to provide military training and equipment and development assistance till 2024. It refrains from spelling out the level of funding or troop numbers – leaving this and a status-of-forces agreement to negotiate over the next year as part of a more detailed accord.

A residual force comprising military advisers, special operations and counter terrorism personnel will stay on in the country after 2014 but the agreement provided no details. President Obama’s claim in the Bagram speech that the US did not seek permanent bases sidestepped the fact that Washington will have access to several Afghan bases as ‘joint facilities’. The agreement was silent on this as well as the number of forces that will stay on as part of a long-term US military presence.

Predictably the agreement evoked opposition from Taliban leaders. Taliban statements denounced the agreement for giving “legitimacy to the occupation of Afghanistan” and warned this would lead to “further insecurity and political instability”. A Taliban spokesman also cast an armed attack on Kabul that occurred hours after the president left the capital as a “clear message to Obama not to think about permanent bases in Afghanistan”.

The vagueness of the strategic partnership agreement means that difficult issues have been postponed for later resolution. The imprecision may be deliberate so as not to over commit resources or ignite controversy and produce problems in a shifting strategic landscape in Afghanistan and changing national mood in America. Whatever the reasons, the ambiguity might turn out to be useful, as it leaves open diplomatic space for negotiations in the Afghan ‘reconciliation’ process. Leaving much content to be determined later holds an opportunity to modify some of the terms when and if this figures in serious peace talks.

For now the agreement gives President Obama something to showcase at Chicago as a ‘tangible’ indicator of progress. But it hardly addresses the confusion in US strategy for the next, decisive phase of the Afghan endgame, which is expected to be more complex and challenging. It certainly does not add up to a credible game plan to wind down the war. Instead the pillars on which a viable plan should rest remain clouded in uncertainty.

Any plausible strategy to ‘responsibly’ end the war hinge on four factors: 1) progress towards what President Obama now calls a “negotiated peace”; 2) regional support for such a settlement; 3) Afghan governance capacity and 4) the ability of Afghan forces to hold their own and carry out security duties independently of their Nato patrons.

The unknowns on all four counts are far more than the knowns at this point. For all the recent Pentagon claims about Afghan forces operating effectively and being able to thwart the coordinated Taliban assaults on Kabul and other provinces on April 15, the integrity and coherence of the ANSF remains in deep doubt. So do questions about their professional and representative character.

Uncertainties also abound about the Afghan political transition that will coincide with the 2014 withdrawal deadline. The constitutionally prescribed two-term limit means Karzai cannot run in the presidential elections due in 2014. There is speculation that elections might be brought forward to 2013 and that Karzai is positioning himself as the ‘king-maker’ to install a pliant nominee. None of this offers any assurance of a smooth transfer of political power, and even less of avoiding controversies like those over ballot fraud that marred the last presidential election. Hopes of enhanced governance capacity remain just that – hopes.

Meanwhile Washington’s troubled relations with Teheran and unresolved obstacles in normalising ties with Islamabad have complicated the building of a firm regional consensus for a tidy Afghan endgame as well as a stable post-2014 order.

But lack of headway towards what many American officials acknowledge as the “most important pillar” – Afghan reconciliation – poses the biggest challenge to American plans for a smooth transition and peaceful end to the war.

Washington should have focused all its diplomatic energy to move this process forward. The opening bid depended on the administration showing clarity, resolve and accommodation to put a full-fledged peace process in place. Instead its inability to settle in-house rifts, override the Pentagon’s objections and reluctance to use its political capital to release five detainees from Guantanamo – earlier accepted as the first step of a confidence building package – triggered developments that resulted in the suspension of talks by the Taliban.

If recent indications are correct that the White House is encouraged by the American public’s approval of President Obama’s Bagram narrative to end the war and pursue a “negotiated peace”, this should spur a renewed bid to revive the talks rather then prevarication and waiting until the presidential election is over. By then valuable time would be lost and an opportunity squandered. The lack of domestic traction for Republican criticism of ‘talking to the Taliban’ should persuade the administration to see progress on reconciliation as a winning political proposition.

Without expeditious movement to resume the talks and make meaningful progress, the dynamics of the coming fighting season will take over, blighting prospects for a “negotiated peace”. More fighting will imperil the reconciliation goal and dwindle chances of a political end to the war. If progress in peace talks is not accomplished well before 2014, the various actors will have diminished ability to control events in Afghanistan. This could confront the country with the spectre of chaos.

-The News

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]US-Afghan strategic partnership: genesis of new cold war[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 8, 2012
Musa Khan Jalalzai

The long awaited strategic partnership agreement between the United States and Afghanistan signed in May 2012 sparked a reaction in neighbouring states like Pakistan and China, demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. This agreement will widen distances between Afghanistan and its neighbours, as they understand that the US could use Afghanistan for creating instability in their states. “Today, we are agreeing to be long-term partners in combating terrorism with the Afghan security forces, strengthening democratic institutions, supporting development and protecting human rights of all Afghans,” President Obama said.

Afghans from all walks of life termed this agreement as a long-term enslavement of Afghans, because the US and its allies neither strengthened democratic institutions, nor trained the Afghan army or protected human rights. The Obama administration and the CIA killed, humiliated and severely tortured innocent Afghans, destroyed their country, and sectarianised and ethnicised state institutions, specifically the army and police. The US and NATO failed to bring peace and stability to the country while distrust between the Afghan National Army (ANA) and their foreign partners may further create problems in the days to come as the Taliban have already infiltrated into the rank and file of the security forces and the police.

Recently, segments of Afghan society criticised the US policy of strengthening war criminals and militias in the Uruzgan province. The US’s military commanders and Australian generals have signed a contract with Matiullah Khan (commander of a 2,000-strong militia) to provide security to their military convoys. Matiullah Khan receives $ 340,000 per month ($ 4.1 million annually). Without the consent of the ANA, this contract created a lot of misunderstandings between the NATO allies and the Afghan security forces. The Afghan army views the process of rearming private militias and Mujahideen as controversial and counterproductive.

Recently, four US senators have demanded the downsizing of the Afghan security forces after 2014. Mr Obama and his Pentagon friends want to heavily downsize the ANA to reduce the burden of military expenses on the US and the NATO allies. Prominent Pakistani military analyst Brigadier Asif Haroon Raja in his recent article warned, “The US military supported by the armies of 48 countries, including 27 of NATO, swooped upon heavily sanctioned, impoverished Afghanistan, devoid of regular armed forces, technical and technological means.”

Afghans ask which security forces the US wants to train if it does not trust the ANA military command and its intelligence reports. During the Panjwai incident, the Afghan army chief, Sher Muhammad Karimi, severely criticised the US for the killing of 17 innocent Afghan villagers and complained that the US forces did not allow the ANA investigation team to enter the village until the evidence was covered up. Sher Muhammad said that the killing of 17 Afghan civilians, including nine children in Kandahar, was a premeditated murder plan.

The Afghans complain that NATO and the US are struggling to establish their own rogue, private militias, instead of strengthening the Afghan security forces, while NATO and the US complain about Taliban infiltration within the ANA. Consequently, the process of the establishment of a strong ANA remained in limbo. Different affiliations, inclinations and associations within the Afghan security forces and intelligence infrastructure created many suspicions about their loyalties to the state and the government.

As we understand, the deepening distrust between the NATO allies and Afghan security forces jeopardised efforts in the war on terror. The latter have started viewing NATO and the US forces as occupying forces. In their comprehension, the way NATO is tackling the insurgency in Afghanistan is ultimately wrong because they kill innocent civilians instead of terrorist Taliban militias. Experts and analysts understand that there is little chance things would work out as per the US’s plans.

The recent Pentagon China-phobia policy, its containment of China, the emergence of a new military intelligence agency and the US hegemonic designs in South and Southeast Asia have become a hot debate in the electronic and print media in Europe. The increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, its capture of European and African markets, together with the improvement of the Russian economy and military have caused unending torment for the US. The Pentagon authorities did not sleep a wink since the commencement of the recent joint Russia-China naval exercise in the Yellow Sea, between the east coast of China and the Korean Peninsula, and their stance on the Arab Spring.

These new developments and the recent US policy in Afghanistan, negotiations with Taliban insurgents and the deterioration of Pak-US relations signal new military challenges for China, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The clouds of a new war are about to spread, while either Afghanistan or Pakistan might become the battlefield of this intelligence game in the near future. This is the beginning of a new economic war as the US Defence Secretary, Leon Panetta declared that his country was at a strategic turning point after a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Having realised the sensitivity of the recent political and military developments in the region, the Pentagon established a new military intelligence agency to strengthen its control over the region.

The writer is the author of Policing in Multicultural Britain and can be reached at [email]zai.musakhan222@gmail.com[/email]
-Daily Times

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Afghanistan: deal or no deal[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 9, 2012
Mahir Ali

DURING his unannounced visit to Kabul last week, President Barack Obama sought to invest the murkiness of the moment with some sort of significance.

“In the pre-dawn darkness of Afghanistan,” he declared in an address to Americans from the US base at Bagram, “we can see the light of new day on the horizon.”

That light is not visible to everyone. During Obama’s visit, he signed an agreement with Hamid Karzai that supposedly lays out the parameters of the relationship between the US and Afghanistan for a decade following the pullout of most foreign troops in 2014.

It’s a vague pact, intended to signal that the military withdrawal will not be tantamount to abandonment, but with all too many specifics yet to be worked out.

What it will mean — in fact, whether it will mean anything — is uncertain. The propaganda value of the visit was underlined by its deliberate coincidence with the first anniversary of Osama bin Laden’s extrajudicial execution in Pakistan, and Obama underlined the fact that the operation was launched from a base in Afghanistan.

His verbiage also focused more on Al Qaeda than on the Taliban, given the former’s presence in Afghanistan is now believed to be minuscule while efforts at negotiations with the latter have stalled but not been given up.

That Obama arrived under cover of darkness suggests the security situation even in the Afghan capital isn’t exactly rosy, a point underlined by Taliban attacks in Kabul shortly after the US president’s departure. It’s gratifying that they were taken by surprise, but the same cannot be said about their continuing ability to infiltrate the capital more or less at will.

Much was made last month of the improved ability of Afghan special forces after concerted Taliban strikes — possibly an attempt to replicate the 1968 Tet offensive that decisively turned the tide in Vietnam — were repelled.

More broadly, however, the capacity of troops supposedly loyal to Karzai to hold out against the Taliban without western assistance is far from clear. In theory, negotiations that could lead to the Taliban, or sections thereof, being brought into the tent make sense, but whether they can lead anywhere remains indeterminate.

An intriguing report in The Washington Post on Monday, meanwhile, offered some details of a clandestine project whereby “high-level detainees” have sporadically been released from the Parwan detention centre in Afghanistan in an attempt “to quell violence in concentrated areas where Nato is unable to ensure security”.

The report cites one case relating to a Hezb-i-Islami commander whose release led to the Hezb “providing useful intelligence on the whereabouts of Taliban fighters”. Quoting a senior US officer, the report goes on to say: “Before long, the US troops and Hezb-i-Islami fighters were conducting joint operations, travelling in the same vehicles and sleeping on the same bases.”

The Hezb-i-Islami — a key component of the Mujahideen alliance during the 1980s, when the faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was particularly favoured by both the CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) — has also been known to collaborate with the Taliban. The so-called endgame makes for interesting bedfellows.

There are striking parallels, incidentally, between the present circumstances and the period of the drawn-out Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s.

At that time, the occupation forces were keen to strike local deals in the interests of security — notably with the forces of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was perceived by elements in the Soviet hierarchy as more of a nationalist than a religious fanatic, and a worthy opponent who could potentially be persuaded to join a non-communist coalition in Kabul.

Najibullah, however, was dead set against any deals with Massoud; he was more keen on working out a modus vivendi with fellow Pakhtun elements of the Mujahideen. He failed — and, according to Massoud, declined an offer of safe passage out of Kabul when the Mujahideen regime retreated to make way for the Taliban takeover.

That Najibullah defied predictions by holding out for three years after the Soviet troop withdrawal may bring some consolation to Karzai, although he can ill-afford to shut out the grotesque images of the last Soviet-sponsored leader’s ultimate fate.

The Red Army’s pullout followed an agreement under United Nations auspices, but Moscow’s efforts to convene a regional conference with the aim of persuading Afghanistan’s neighbours to play a constructive role in the nation’s future came to naught.

There are no such initiatives at the moment. The vacuous US-Afghan agreement preceded a Nato conference in Obama’s political home ground of Chicago, where more empty promises are likely to be made.

Perhaps the biggest parallel between the Soviet and the US-led occupations of Afghanistan is the eventual dismal failure. The Soviet intervention, intended to prop up an unsustainable regime, was a monumental error — and influential individuals in Moscow began to realise this within a couple of years, but undoing the misdeed took far longer than anticipated.

The US would have been better off pursuing police action rather than military invasion in the wake of the Sept 11 terrorist attacks. The Al Qaeda threat deserved to be taken seriously, but it was neither existential nor apocalyptic.

The tiny fraction of documents released from the cache captured at Bin Laden’s hideout near Abbottabad hardly conveys the impression of a once-formidable organisation in its death throes.

There’s cause for mild amusement rather than alarm in discussions over PR efforts, and perhaps the same could be said about Bin Laden’s determination to put Joe Biden in the White House by assassinating “the head of infidelity” — a description of Obama with which loonies on the fringes of the American right would surely concur — as a means of sparking a crisis in the US.

Deal or no deal, what lies ahead in Afghanistan remains hard to predict in the face of innumerable uncertainties and imponderables.

In the quest for symptoms, however, one could do worse than focus for a moment on the $80m the US spent on building a compound in Mazar-i-Sharif, “envisioned”, according to American press reports, as the nation’s “diplomatic hub in northern Afghanistan”. The plan has now been abandoned because the location was deemed “too dangerous”.

[email]mahir.dawn@gmail.com[/email]
-Dawn

[CENTER][B][FONT="Georgia"][SIZE="5"]Will Pakistan attend the NATO Summit in Chicago?[/SIZE][/FONT][/B][/CENTER]
May 14, 2012
Dr Moeed Pirzada

Will Pakistan be able to attend the NATO summit in Chicago? And if yes, then on what terms and conditions? Monday morning in Islamabad will begin with considerable feverish anxiety around these two questions.

A tripartite commission consisting of NATO’s commander in Afghanistan, General Allen, and the military chiefs of Pakistan and Afghanistan kept on meeting in Rawalpindi on Saturday and Sunday to brainstorm the border control measures and how untoward incidents like the Salala tragedy of November 26 can be avoided. It is expected that the Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC) will meet, with PM Gilani in the chair on May15 and 16 and some analysts predict that Pakistan will be announcing opening the NATO supply route on May 17.

The public argument shaped by the US interlocutors, diplomats and media, and something that has been wholeheartedly bought by many in the Pakistani government and the opinion making circles is that Pakistan overplayed its hand, ended up using its trump card, i.e. ‘NATO supplies’, and has not gained anything in return and is now forced to resume what is described as GLOC’s under NATO’s ultimatum because missing the Chicago summit means being kicked out of the important decision making in the endgame of Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s press briefing of last Friday has added to this gloomy interpretation. Many are also worried for the imminent shortfalls in the forthcoming budget and point out that the ministry of finance has already added CSF reimbursements into its calculations. The much calculated posturing by the US House of Representatives that recommends various kinds of sanctions against Pakistan, including those involving preferential imports, certainly focuses minds on the forthcoming challenges if the impasse is not resolved before Chicago.

Since the approval of the parliamentary committee’s recommendations, the whole media discourse is built around two main points only: the US apology for Salala and end of drone strikes. Going by this, it appears that these are the only two sticking points. However, sometimes it is important to revisit the fundamentals of a problem before you could be sure of the solutions.

So let’s take a step back. Why is the Salala tragedy that led to the closure of the NATO supply routes so nerve wracking for Pakistanis? No doubt, the chilling details of the incident that appeared like an orgy of blood played with the lives of Pakistani soldiers jolted an already traumatised nation. But coming in the climate shaped by the US attack of May 2 to kill Osama bin Laden, it convinced many that the US or perhaps more specifically, the Pentagon in its desperation in Afghanistan, and the way it builds its public narrative, has reached a stage where it sees a certain kind of solution in punishing Pakistan. Arguments like the one advanced by Professor Stephen Krasner of Stanford only confirm this mood.

It’s true that the US side explains Salala as a horrible outcome of mistakes in procedures and communication, but to most Pakistanis, Salala was a deliberate act of ‘punishment’ meted out by the Pentagon for failing to cooperate or playing ‘double games’ as it is repeatedly alleged by US officials and media. Pakistan’s robust decision to close NATO supplies was to jolt the US and its allies into a rethink. The US may or may not realise that its actions are adding to societal meltdown and collapse in Pakistan. This resultant chaos may or may not hurt the US and its regional allies like India, but will definitely destroy the equilibrium of a political and social order where the majority sees the ruling elite kowtowing to US dictation and where the military establishment has lost much of its moral authority since the events of 9/11 when it unwillingly became a partner in the US-led war against terrorism. From the US narrative, it is obvious that, in their singular obsession with the endgame in Afghanistan, they have either no realisation of how their actions are adding to a societal meltdown in Pakistan or they don’t care. But for Pakistanis it matters.

It is in this scenario that the discussions of this tripartite commission on Saturday and Sunday and the understandings reached and conveyed between General Allen, General Kayani and General Karimi become supremely important.

‘Apology’ started to loom large after the parliamentary committee’s recommendations. But before that Pakistan’s foreign minister and foreign secretary were on record insisting, in the most unambiguous terms, that we were not seeking an apology; what we want is the US to understand Pakistan’s red lines and to respect them. By now, we also know for sure that by the beginning of February, some sort of apology was being offered and the Pakistani foreign ministry wanted this to be postponed until the end of the parliamentary review.

The test for the DCC to which General Kayani will report his findings after his meetings will be to assess if Pakistan and the US agree to the wording of a joint statement where the latter affirms that it understands Pakistani concerns arising from the tragedy of Salala; that it respects Pakistani sovereignty and that both sides are determined to work with procedures and communication protocols that will ensure that incidents like Salala do not recur. Pakistan, in the same statement, will need to ensure that it understands the US concerns in FATA and will do everything possible to reduce the misuse of its territory against US troops.

But this assurance is impossible without coming to some sort of understanding on the issue of drone strikes with the US for its narrative describes Pakistan as either unwilling or unable to control the action against its troops from FATA. The US military and administration, now victims of their narratives, will not be able to sell at home a total cessation of drone strikes, especially in an election year.

In the last few weeks, the US has tried, for the first time, accepting responsibility for the drone strikes. First, President Obama made an admission and then his national security adviser, John Brennan, attempted adding moral justifications to the policy in his presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Centre. The sheer ugliness and perhaps immorality of the drone policy requires several doctoral theses from different perspectives, but in a real politic framework, it compels Pakistan to come forward and accept responsibility for permitting limited drone strikes.

Without such an admission, it cannot ask for a framework of mutual intelligence sharing and a modicum of control on this policy. A jointly agreed framework may ensure fewer strikes, a more defined focus on al Qaeda, and can work towards a cessation timetable since Obama has defined his goal as the end of al Qaeda, which he again repeated at his speech from Bagram Airbase on May 2, 2012. After all, in the ever raging debate on drone strikes, no one has raised this question so far that irrespective of all sorts of arguments for and against, could this continue till eternity? However, this vexing question and what kind of language is needed on this issue, will confront the DCC with its biggest nightmare, especially given parliament’s reaffirmed position.

But any understanding to make any sense on this tricky and emotive issue will be incomplete without tying it with the Afghanistan endgame. How do we interpret what President Obama described for the first time as “negotiated peace” and how will this be supported by neighbours, including Pakistan? After all, isn’t the summit in Chicago about Afghanistan and its endgame?

Without any clarity on these issues, the optics of Chicago may become meaningless for Pakistan. Though in a mood of desperation no one dares to ask the common sense question: will in our absence the Chicago summit not have a hole as large as the size of Pakistan in terms of the final solutions related to the withdrawal from Afghanistan?
But while the DCC grapples with these difficult questions, intractable solutions and their inevitable political fallout, it may benefit tremendously from keeping this common sense question in mind. Options never end; you have to keep finding them.

The writer is Director World Affairs and Content Head English with Pakistan Television. His website is [url]www.facebook.com/MoeedPirzada[/url]
-Daily Times