Sectarianism (Important Articles)

[Roshan wadhwani]

Where are the sane voices?

Muzaffar Iqbal
Friday, April 06, 2012

Many years ago, we stopped in a picturesque valley on our way to Gilgit to pray on a huge flat rock someone had put by the roadside. It was an experience unlike any other I have had: the chirping birds, the sound of river water gushing far below, and the majesty of the mountains around the spot all seemed to have joined in the glorification of the One who created that marvellous valley. Far away, neatly tucked beneath the surrounding mountain tops, several houses were visible where hardy and innocent people have lived for centuries.

Two strangers joined us in our prayer, but they were both disappointed to see that I combined the noon prayer with the afternoon prayer and muttered a few angry words before leaving. They were true Hanafis, who shorten but do not combine prayers while travelling. I was struck by the strength of their belief as well as their ignorance of the position of the various legal Sunni schools on the issue.

While the four Sunni schools of Islamic law have been able to live in relative peace with each other over the centuries, the Sunni-Shia divide is more volatile and has experienced many violent periods in history, but none has been as wide-spread as the current time. There are reasons for this.

The greatest factor contributing to a worldwide resurgence of sectarian violence in the Muslim world is the invasion of Iraq and what it has begotten: a sharply divided polity where Shia Muslims, who had been the subject of state oppression during the Saddam era, and the Sunni population, are settling scores. But there is more to it than mere religion.

Following the invasion of Iraq and disappearance of that terrible man called Saddam Hussein, Sunni-Shia sectarian hatred has flared up all over the Arab world. Fanned by fears of Shia uprisings in other countries and supported by petro-dollars by the self-styled sheikhs and kings, the Shia-Sunni divide has cut across all previous thresholds.

The greatest factor in the flare up of this hatred is, however, politics, not religion. This is so because Sunnis and Shias have lived with their theological differences for centuries and while it is true that these differences are irreconcilable, it is also true that differences between the four Sunni schools of law are also irreconcilable; most Muslims have little understanding of the theological differences which separate these legal schools. But the violence amongst the four Sunni schools has never been anything close to what it is between the Sunnis and Shias.

One additional factor which distinguishes the Sunni-Shia divide from intra-Sunni divides of various kinds is the pronounced and emotionally charged attitudes of the two groups. These attitudes are an instantaneous cocktail of fire and petrol: once ignited, it immediately closes all doors to any sound and reasonable discussion on the historic differences between the two groups. Flames rage and violence takes over. The newspaper reports of men hauling other men from buses and shooting them in cold blood by the wayside on Karakoram Highway are a self-explanatory proof of that inane force which takes over when the light of reason and sound faith is extinguished by the flame of hatred.

What is really disconcerting in this regard is the role of religious leaders both in the Arab world as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan where sectarian killing has become routine. Instead of understanding the new realities, which have been unleashed through the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the religious leadership in the Muslim world is playing in the hands of those who have opened up this centuries-old floodgate of hatred with new force.

For centuries, Muslims have not been able to find satisfactory answers to the theological differences amongst themselves, but that alone is not a matter of concern, because these differences are the basis of diversity in matters of practice of Islam, which is the intended purpose of the Law and which is supported by sound practices of the Noble Messenger, upon him blessings and peace.

The Book in which they believe and the practice of the Noble Messenger, which they uphold, absolutely denies Muslims the liberty of taking another life. Anyone who kills another human being without a justification enshrined in the Book is simply creating his or her own place in the eternal fire; this is the Divine threat and promise and this must be repeated over and over until everyone understands it. This is one of the greatest needs of the Muslim world today: to understand the limits of personal responsibility in the face of rising sectarian strife.

That serenity and peace of Gilgit-Baltistan now seems a thing of the past, as is the case for Baghdad, Kufa, Karbala, and Najaf, all centres of constant strife and bloodshed. The villains who unleashed sectarian hatred in Iraq may be smiling; they rightly found the nerve centre for the internal collapse and destruction of the Muslim world, but is the Muslim religious leadership so blind that it cannot see this plot? Is it willingly playing the devil’s tunes or has it lost the light of the Book to such an extent that it is now blinded by ignorance of the pre-Islamic era? Where are the sane voices?

The writer is a freelance columnist.

Email: quantumnotes@gmail.com
The News

[Roshan wadhwani]

From the wreckage of sectarianism

April 13, 2012
Aasim Sajjad Akhtar

DESPITE the virtual media blackout of Gilgit-Baltistan it is becoming increasingly clear that sectarian violence in the entire region is spiralling out of control.

Meanwhile, the systematic attacks on the Hazaras of Quetta continue unabated. It is hardly surprising then that Shias everywhere are talking conspiracy even as militant Sunnis of all varieties are doing everything in their power to prove the conspiracy theorists right.

A conspiracy is that which is hidden from the public eye, a plan hatched by unknown elements hell-bent on causing maximum possible harm to the adversary. By this definition, organised attacks such as those that have been carried out in recent times are a conspiracy only in the sense that immeasurable harm has been caused to the community being targeted. Who is doing the killing is hardly a secret.

In Quetta, a couple of ‘banned’ and ‘defunct’ organisations have taken responsibility for most of the attacks. It scarcely matters that the killers have not been as forthcoming in Gilgit-Baltistan (or the media willing to break with the ‘greater national interest’ in its adhering to the terms of the blackout).

The Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ), after all, is just another name for a nexus of social forces and state institutions that has unapologetically transformed Pakistan’s social and political landscape since the dark years of Ziaul Haq.

Madressahs, a retrogressive public educational curriculum, a pro-jihadi media discourse — these and many other dimensions of Pakistan’s love affair with millenarianism have been in and out of the news for years, in the English press at least.

Commentators, myself included, have emphasised the continuing refusal of our holy guardians to give up on hare-brained schemes such as strategic depth that have shredded the innards of this society.

But there has been, till now, not enough focus on arguably the most dangerous trend of all: that otherwise forward-thinking people spread out across the length and breadth of this country, almost despite themselves, are starting to conform to the exclusivist discourse that the militants on all sides are championing.

Beyond the alarmism that afflicts the chattering classes the objective evidence is relatively conclusive; most Pakistanis are not bigots, even if many are cowed into silence by the issuers of the proverbial fatwas.

At best most of us are hypocrites who have imbibed the Ziaist imperative of demonstrating religiosity in public and otherwise engaging in distinctly ‘un-Islamic’ practices — as far as the mullahs are concerned — in the comfort of our own homes.

Minority communities that have been victimised consistently over a period of time — some even before the 1980s — have understandably looked within themselves to cope with the tyranny of the majority. This tendency has, however, not necessarily given rise to reaction. In fact, there have been many notable progressive outcomes, including a marked desire of more affluent members of the community to look after those endowed with much less.

Where some form of reaction has come to light, as in the case of Shia militancy in the 1990s, a significant part of the community has rejected it. Many young, educated Shia who have, for one reason or the other, been taken in by the appeal of Shia militancy, subsequently recanted and generally espouse a principled politics of non-violence and promote inter-faith harmony.

But it is now important to ask whether or not there may be countervailing trends emerging. Individuals hailing from minority communities active in the social media are starting to evince more alienation than might have been the case even a few years ago. Anger and resentment are becoming more common as the perception of perennial victimhood becomes more pronounced.

Balochistan is the best example of how systematic brutalisation can precipitate extremely dangerous social conflicts between relatively disempowered communities. Ethnic Baloch have long felt victimised by the Pakistani state, but xenophobic trends within the Baloch nationalist movement have historically remained relatively muted.

The Shia Hazara community settled mostly in Quetta has, for the most part, coexisted with Baloch and Pakhtuns and integrated itself into the wider society. Pakhtuns are probably the most upwardly mobile of the three major communities, but this is not to suggest that they constitute a dominant ethnic group per se.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that tensions between all three communities have intensified greatly in recent times. Hazaras and Baloch in particular have become less likely to express any measure of empathy for one another, and it is noticeable that otherwise eloquent progressives on both sides are now in the business of competing over which community faces more systematic and structural violence.

The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan has been on knife-edge for much longer. Sectarian clashes which were a minor speck on the social landscape before the Zia years erupt in all their fury at almost regular intervals, radicalising otherwise ordinary people and arousing suspicions that persist long after the particular phase of violence has passed.

Of course, it matters that those charged with protecting the public peace are heavily implicated in destroying it, and that our holy guardians and their sycophants jealously guard the ideological apparatuses that produce hate and violence.

But simply reiterating that the state is culpable will not force it to change its historical posture. The fact of the matter is that too many people in society are starting to believe they have to take sides in a manner that makes it more difficult in the long-term to build an alternative consensus. It is necessary to face up to this growing polarisation and then do something about it.

In particular, as many of us as possible need to speak up not only for our own but for all those who are victims of wanton violence and systematic exclusion. The biggest burden must be owned by majorities, especially religious and ethnic ones. But the sane voices within minority communities have a role to play too, as they have in the past.

If all those who believe that there is still something to be salvaged from the wreckage of sectarian and all other forms of organised violence do come together and say what needs to be said, there is hope yet that all the blood that has been spilt will not have been in vain.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
-Dawn

[Roshan wadhwani]

Is secularisation of Pakistan possible?

April 16, 2012
Yasser Latif Hamdani

In view of the Constitution of 1973 and the many authoritative pronouncements of our judiciary regarding Pakistan’s status as an Islamic state, it is logical to question whether secularisation of Pakistan is possible. Opponents of a secular Pakistan claim that since the state itself was founded in the name of Islam, secularisation is antithetical to it. This post hoc view on the raison d’etre of Pakistan is inconsistent with the historical facts leading to the partition of India and should have been void ab initio. However, the enactment of the 1973 constitution has given it the cover of legal fiction, i.e. Islamic ideology, which is said to be the grundnorm of the state.

Our stock myth is that our society was largely moderate until it was radicalised by the state’s Islamisation in the last few decades, when the reality is the opposite. The state’s Islamisation 1970s onwards was a faithful reflection of the bigotry that was ingrained in our society. The famous Munir Report in 1954 details instances of religious extremism and fanaticism not just in the early years of the new state but also during the British Raj. Parties like the Majlis-e-Ahrar, who paradoxically wanted a united India under the banner of the Congress Party and were dead set against the creation of Pakistan, had been involved in numerous incidents of religious violence in Punjab against Ahmedis, Shias and non-Muslim communities. The urban centres of Punjab had witnessed religious violence between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims since the early 1900s. The decade of the 1920s saw further deterioration of the communal situation, where firebrand Muslim and Hindu orators were at each other’s throats in public and involved in the so-called ‘pamphlet wars’. The Ahrar particularly benefited from the Shahid Ganj dispute in the 1930s politically.

Similarly, the anti-Ahmadiyya movement started by the Ahrar was wildly popular in Punjab. Ahrar had used the anti-Ahmadiyya movement both before and after partition primarily to attack the Muslim League that allowed Ahmedis to be members of the party. Shias were also attacked, especially because the key leaders of the Muslim League were and historically had been Shias.

The Punjab Muslim League was not blameless either. In the 1946 elections, it too sullied its good name by resorting to abrasive religious rhetoric against the Unionist Party, which on its part also utilised clerics to denounce Muslim League leaders as kafirs (infidels). After partition, Punjab Leaguers actively encouraged the Ahrar against the central Muslim League leadership in Khawaja Nazimuddin’s tenure. All this is documented in the previously mentioned Munir Report.

The key difference is that Pakistani leaders before 1970 — more or less unanswerable to the electorate — were better placed to withstand populist sentiments. Very logically, the necessary empowerment of the common people that accompanied Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s rise to power also meant those in power could no longer afford to remain ambivalent to the ideas of these new participants in national life. Therefore, since the 1970s, Pakistan has seen a more vocal religious right with greater mob support. The ill-advised Afghan jihad and the state’s co-option of the Islamist sentiment to create warriors of Allah added to this radicalisation.

Now 30 years later, we bear the full brunt of this vicious cycle but at the same time, arguably Pakistan has simultaneously experienced secularisation at a very fundamental level. Commercial and economic considerations are beginning to trump religious ones. For example, women from all backgrounds are becoming part of the workforce as economic hardship forces the lower middle classes to seek two incomes instead of one. With women out of the chador and char devari (four walls), the Mullah, who practises control primarily through the regulation of women’s clothing and conduct is becoming powerless.

There are substantial indicators of secularisation of not just the mainstream of society but also its Islamist fringes. Committing themselves to the 1973 Constitution, most religious parties have been forced to check their more extremist rhetoric, though by no means is an Islamist party like Turkey’s AKP, which accepts separation of mosque and state, in sight. To a lesser degree, however, Pakistan’s Islamists have been forced to operate within the confines of the constitution, which while professing a great deal of commitment to Islamic ideology remains nevertheless a democratic constitution. Those religious parties have given up — at least in their rhetoric — the idea of a pan-Islamic caliphate or even a Pakistan-specific one. Instead of religion, they are forced to emphasise issues such as inflation and the economy. The flip-flop of Maulana Fazlur Rehman on NATO supplies further underscores the fact that other than the flowing robes and beards, there is hardly anything that distinguishes run-of-the-mill politicians from the religious leaders when it comes to power politics and crass opportunism.

Does this necessarily mean that Pakistan will become a secular state in the near future? No. In fact, to the glee of our anti-secularists, there is still occasion for the country to shoot itself in its metaphorical foot, repeatedly. Secularisation and state secularism, however, are distinguishable. The former is an evolutionary process and the latter a constitutional expression of the state’s impartiality to all religious considerations. On a long timeline though, things cannot remain constant. Historical trends afford evidence of eventual acceptance of secularism in other religious states. It is very likely our posterity will also make a decisive break with ‘ideology’ and make Pakistan a normal democratic state sans hyphenation of any kind, because progress and the onward march of humanity is unstoppable. If Pakistan’s raison d’etre was the material progress of its people, as I believe it was, then it shall be realised only when a paradigmatic shift — a Copernican revolution of sorts — is brought about in the discourse on religion’s role in Pakistan.

The writer is a practising lawyer. He blogs at
hhtp://globallegalforum.blogspot.com and his twitter handle is @therealylh

[Roshan wadhwani]

Shia genocide: nameless crime, faceless victims

April 26, 2012
Dr Mohammad Taqi

“When people’s lives are at risk from persecution, there is a strong moral obligation to do what is reasonably possible to help. It is not enough to seal up the windows against the smell”– Jonathan Glover.

But as far as the Shia genocide goes, sealing up the windows is precisely what seems to be happening in Pakistan. The media, mullahs, most politicians and, most importantly, the military, are all complicit in this conspiracy of silence. The activists, on the other hand, remain weak, under threat and consumed by semantics to highlight, forcefully and meaningfully, the systematic extermination of the Shia. The ordinary Pakistani’s apathy is reminiscent of the second part of Glover’s quote: “The world would be a terrible place if the whole truth about this aspect of us was what Norman Geras had called ‘the contract of mutual indifference’: we leave other people in peril un-rescued and believe that others will do the same to us.”

The overarching reasons for the complicity, silence, indifference and thus inaction are the fear of the perpetrators and a desire to seek their political favour. Shortly after the recent spate of killings of the Shia Hazara community, there was a large political rally in that city by the up and coming party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI). To the utter dismay of the Quetta Shia community, the leader of the PTI, Imran Khan, failed to condemn from the podium the persecution of the Shia. Khan, instead, quietly showed up at the Hazara Shia Imambargah in Nichari, Quetta, to offer routine condolences. Contrarily, the PTI President, Javed Hashmi proudly claims to have christened the Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) — a conglomerate of assorted jihadist and religio-political groups including the reincarnation of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The PTI’s vice-president Chaudhry Ijaz is seen unabashedly rubbing shoulders on the DPC stage with the SSP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jamat-ud-Dawa leaders. Similarly, Imran Khan loudly praises the Musharraf crony, General (retired) Ali Jan Orakzai, whom the Kurram Shia consider the architect of their persecution. The PTI consorting with jihadis and issuing meek condolences has everything to do with its quest for electoral gains in Punjab where the India-oriented jihadist groups are the virtual kingmakers now.

The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) has played an equally dubious and dirty role in its tacit support of the Punjabi militant groups. In the PML-N’s case, a doctrinal transformation of its leadership due to influence from and/or to appease its Saudi mentors, an increasing recognition of jihadist power in Punjab and quite significantly, the fear factor played a role in the party’s change of heart from hunting down the militants to its leaders actually paying tribute at the tombs of SSP’s terrorist leaders. Ironically, the SSP/LeJ terrorist late Riaz Basra had once not only masterminded a bomb attack on Nawaz Sharif, then the prime minister of Pakistan, in January 1999, but also came within arm’s length of him.

Owen Bennett Jones chronicles in his book, “Riaz Basra showed his contempt for the police’s capabilities when he turned up at one of Nawaz Sharif’s political surgeries (khuli kacheri). Having slipped in with the petitioners who wanted to see the prime minister, Basra positioned himself directly behind Nawaz Sharif and got one of his accomplices to take a picture. Three days later, the staff at the PM house received a print of the photograph. The faces of Sharif and Basra, within a few feet of each other, had been circled and underneath there was an inscription — it’s that easy.” Interestingly, the Punjab government, on the orders of the Punjab High Court, had been giving Basra’s then-imprisoned successor Malik Ishaq’s family a monthly stipend! Little wonder then that Ishaq has been thumbing his nose at the law enforcement agencies for years now, including at the DPC rallies.

The fear instilled in the media, human rights activists and the politicians is however not just because of the ruthlessness of the Punjabi Taliban, a la SSP, LeJ and LeT, et al. There is an acute awareness, especially in the political class, that these groups have been given the most favoured jihadist status by the Pakistani security establishment. Just like the Jalaluddin Haqqani terror network on the western frontier, the India-oriented, Punjab-based jihadists receive a kid-glove treatment from the deep state operatives, complete with protection or rescue from police custody and operational freedom.

The Iran connection and nonsense peddled about the imaginary tit-for-tat sectarian warfare are red herrings to divert focus from the compact between the Pakistani military establishment and its jihadist proxies used as lynchpins of the Pakistani foreign policy agenda. The seeds of this symbiosis were sown right at the inception of Pakistan, with each subsequent military regime continuing to do its part in grooming the relationship. The adoption of Islam-based national ideology under Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haq’s wholesale Islamisation, Pervez Musharraf’s duplicitous policy of using jihadists while milking the west for ‘enlightened moderation’, and ultimately General Kayani’s overt India-centricity has provided the Islamist terrorists a continuity of patronage to the extent that now the tail may be wagging the dog.

The Nobel laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn had written, “The imagination and the spiritual strength of Shakespeare’s evildoers stopped short at a dozen corpses. Because they had no ideology.” The Pakistani brass had made a conscious decision to not just deploy ideology but religious ideology to further its domestic and foreign policy agenda, and along the way, chose a particularly virulent strain of exclusivist religious extremism whose thirst would hardly be quenched by Shia blood. To paraphrase Arundhati Roy, Pakistanis perhaps view the sectarian cleansing and genocide as direct threats to their furniture. They are oblivious that the exclusivist ideologies like Takfir or Nazism never stop at one victim group — or stop on their own.

In the face of public indifference, lack of political will and the state might protecting the perpetrators, honest witnessing and reporting takes on an unprecedented importance and urgency. Had the Jewish people thrown into gas chambers been identified merely as Germans or Poles, the world conscience might have never been awakened. It is therefore imperative that the Shia victims are identified and named accurately. And equally important is to name the perpetrators, when possible. When mass media misrepresents or obscures information about these atrocities, it becomes incumbent upon the human rights activists to report that neither the crime is nameless nor the victims faceless — it is a Shia genocide. They should be the last ones to seal up the windows.

(Concluded)

The writer can be reached at mazdaki@me.com. He tweets at http://twitter.com/mazdaki
-Daily Times

[Roshan wadhwani]

Insight By Aziz Ali Dad

Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan has deeper roots than mere presence of terrorists

Gilgit's sectarian conundrum

It seems that the smoldering fire of sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan has turned into a full blown conflagration that has engulfed the entire region. In response to the recent killings, the local administration plans to carry out operations to purge the region of militants and weapons.

But the roots of sectarianism go deeper than mere existence of militants. Various socio-political, economic and religious factors have contributed to the emergence of a mind that does not hesitate to execute inhuman acts against people who hail from a different denomination. Not satiated with target killings of innocent individuals, the terrorist have now resorted to mass killings, as seen in the murder of six people in Gilgit, 18 in Kohistan and 13 in Chilas recently. The extent and expansion of violence has all the hallmarks of genocide.

The lethal combination of weapons and mistrust has turned Gilgit into a killing field for sectarian outfits

To prevent the region's slide into a path of death and destruction, it is indispensible for the government and peaceful sections of the society to take drastic measures to bring about a paradigm shift in the hearts and minds of the people. Rehman Malik claimed that a third hand is involved in Kohistan and Chilas carnage. Time and again we hear about invisible, foreign, third and nefarious hands involved in sabotaging Pakistan, but never witness any of them. Even if a third or a foreign hand is involved in sectarian strife in Gilgit-Baltistan, there are strong local factors that need to be looked at. To defeat the scourge of sectarian violence we need to have a strategy that is capable of dealing with indigenous as well as exogenous factors and actors .

Although the seeds of sectarianism hatred were sown in the decade of 1970s, it took a violent turn during the reign of General Ziaul Haq in 1980s. Since then, local communities developed a trust deficit with the state as well as sister communities. The insecurity led to weaponization of society. In response to threat to their existence, local communities have taken refuge in the safe cocoon of their respective sects. The lethal combination of weapons and mistrust has turned Gilgit into a killing field for sectarian outfits.

Traditionally, the society of Gilgit was pluralistic, where people managed to live in harmony despite sectarian differences. Propagation of a reductionist narrative of religion for the last three decades has stifled spaces that accommodated diversity. The complex psycho-social processes of religiosity have reduced the multiplicity of identities into monolithic one in which every action in public and civic domain is viewed through the jaundiced eye of the sect. In this process kinship relationship, indigenous linkages and affiliations were condemned as betrayal of religion. Consequently, a tendency emerged in 1990s where all cultural activities were either labeled as contrary to the injunctions of religion or incorporated within the new radical discourse of religious identity.

Ghulam Nabi, a prominent social activist and analyst from Diamer, says, "Often when traditional systems are abolished without practical alternatives in place, societies get disillusioned. This is precisely what has happened in Gilgit-Baltistan. Our traditional governance systems were abolished without any alternate system relevant to the geographical, religious and ethnic diversity. What we have seen as alternative is lawlessness, mistrust, and hatred among the various groups."

With the passage of time the gradual drifting away of communities from each other paved the way for emergence of a mindset that perceives the very existence of the other as threat to its existence. The mental rift of society on sectarian basis manifested itself on the physical landscape of Gilgit city, which has been divided along sectarian lines. Until recently, people with different religious backgrounds but with same tribal and linguistic background, were living together in peace and harmony. However, the scenario changed in the last seven years with the escalation of violence and target killings in Gilgit. It has forced people to migrate to the areas where the people of their sect are in majority. Things have come to such a pass that the very process of administrating city has changed. Currently, the markets, settlements, schools and hospitals and even transport have been divided on the bases of sects.

Commenting on sectarian politics and violence, Ali Ahmed Jan, a political activists and analyst, said, "The current developments - the Presidential Order of Self-Governance and Empowerment, 2009 and the construction of Diamer Basha Dam - are also seen through the sectarian lens. One of the sects feels the Self Governance and Empowerment Order as a threat to its interests because the other sect is in majority. Similarly, the other sect feels that the displaced people from the Dam site would be settled in the main town of Gilgit which will also end their demographic dominance. The sectarian thinking along with the struggle for political power is the root cause of current conflict." The sectarian faultlines in the capital Gilgit have spread out to other areas.

Given the extent of the violence, reliance on bureaucratic measures only will not help in ameliorating the situation. There is a need to synergize administrative measures with cultural solutions. To fight with one-dimensional sectarian mentality, it is the need of the hour to chalk out a multi-pronged strategy and introduce a pluralistic narrative that derives its source and legitimacy from the very cultural roots of the society. Considering the expanding tentacles of sectarianism, it is important to intervene at various fronts which include education, economy, administrative setup, legislation and independent judiciary.

Besides local dialectics of sectarianism, there is an element of regional politics between the neighboring states. Gilgit-Baltistan is situated in a geo-strategically sensitive area because it borders with India, China and Afghanistan. Karakorum Highway is the only line of communication between China and Pakistan. The massacre of innocent passengers in Kohistan and Chilas took place on KKH. With the closure of KKH, suspension of cellular services, incessant curfew in the capital and spread of violence to other parts, the region is now virtually in incommunicado with rest of Pakistan. Already, direct inland communication between Pakistan and China has been severed by Attabad Lake.

Now, certain sections of the KKH have become unsafe for local communities to travel. After the killings in KKH a particular section demanded reopening of traditional routes of Astore-Srinagar, Chorbat-Nubra, Sham-Skardo, Drass-Gultari and Kharmang-Kargil. In the wider context of Pakistan, inability of the state to protect lives of the people has forced the residents of Parachinar and Upper Kurram Agency to use Afghanistan to reach Pakistan.

This is a very dangerous development because it will alienate the region from mainstream Pakistan.

Given the gravity of situation, the government needs to support the voices of peace. The litmus test of government's performance lies in showing a clear stance on sectarian violence and taking concrete steps, like punishing the perpetrators of violence, and empowering cultural resources that can contribute to the restoration of peace in the region. Otherwise, the rent seeking approach and measures of government will worsen the situation and society will move towards death and destruction.

The writer is Islamabad based social scientist from Gilgit. azizalidad@hotmail.com

-FridayTimes

[Roshan wadhwani]

The state has no business deciding someone’s faith

June 3, 2012
By Saroop Ijaz

One of the most majestic and arresting structures of Europe is the Great Mosque of Cordova. Apart from exquisite architecture, the unique thing about the mosque is that it is not really a mosque. Built in the eighth century by the Umayyad Caliphate as one of the greatest mosques, it was converted into a cathedral in the 13th Century after the Christian reconquest of Spain. Today, it is a building with an identity crisis, a mosque with a cathedral erected in the middle. Yet, anyone who has been a tourist there would know that one has to ask for directions to the Mezquita (mosque) or the Mezquita-Catedral (Mosque Cathedral) as that is what the locals refer to it as even after more than seven centuries of it being a cathedral. It stands as a symbol of defiance to the impulses of conquest and rebranding of buildings and indeed history. The obsession with demolishing, branding and rebranding buildings has not been extinguished with the Crusades, the Babri Mosque fiasco being a representative example. More recently, a court in Lahore had a petition asking that an Ahmadi place of worship should have the dome and minaret demolished, lest it misleads the faithful into believing that it is a mosque.

Its action would have been stupid at all times, yet the idiocy and sinisterly nature is compounded by a couple of reasons. Firstly, the place of worship in question is one of the two where the biggest massacre in Lahore since partition took place and the perpetrators of the mass murder remain at large. Secondly, the court was approached one or two days after the second anniversary of the obnoxious and shameful murderous episode, which incidentally was very deliberately ignored by our free and independent media and by the public at large. The oversight cannot be completely attributed to apathy, but rather to a certain degree of maliciousness. Devotional architecture has never been a particular area of interest of mine, yet it is obvious that the Pakistani State and the courts make an extraordinarily grand claim for themselves when saying that they will decide what place of worship is fit for those wanting to pray to the Almighty.

I did not see any statement from any public figure, particularly a politician, on the occasion of the anniversary remembering and extending condolences to those who passed away in the dastardly act. One reason could be that the massacre in Lahore is condemned to be eclipsed by hyper-nationalist and jingoist celebrations of becoming a nuclear power, falling round about the same time. Another reason is fear, yet the most disturbing potential reason is that many are not actually, really that angry at the incident. Stereotypical and boiler-plate statements and reactions such as “the loss of innocent lives is always regrettable” etc. do not cut it. It is not just the loss of innocent lives but rather the loss of innocent lives belonging to a group that is actively being hunted in this country and the need for the State to end this persecution and rise up to the additional responsibility of ensuring extra protection for them.

The slightly clichéd analogy with Nazi Germany and that those armbands may just be around the corner is not really as farfetched as it seems. Anti-Semitism is qualitatively different from other forms of racial and sectarian prejudices, since while all sorts of pejorative terms are used to describe the group against which one is bigoted, yet very rarely is malice or conspiracy alleged in regards to the group as an entirety. The rage against the Ahmadis might not be completely theocratic. A lot of Muslims consider other Muslims as non-Muslims, yet ordinarily they would object to (or at least one hopes that they would) to having public death warrants issued and displayed, except for the Ahmadis. Hence, like anti-Semitism it is something more than mere difference in religious interpretation; it is as if they are positively evil or insincere to the country. I hope you believe me when I say that I do not exaggerate, Ladies and Gentleman, this is the stuff of Auschwitz and gas chambers or at least this how it all begins.

I dearly look forward to a time where one would not need to somewhat apologetically state why this bigotry, repression and bloodlust should be resisted and is suicidal and self-destructive for everyone. If people from one sect can be murdered without much commotion being created, the justification immediately becomes useable for all. The Hazara Shia are a case in point. A cheap and low response to the question of Ahmadi killing and persecution is the pathetic counter-question of why are you obsessed with them, there are other people dying every day. We have heard the justification after Salmaan Taseer’s murder (who was one of the very few who vocally spoke against the Ahmadi massacre and whose birthday I am told recently passed away without much notice).

Some people have the nerve to go hoarse and lurid about minarets being banned in Switzerland while having nothing to say about the same in the Land of the Pure. There is another reason why this government, particularly federal, has a higher onus to act. Declaring Ahmadis as non-Muslim is the most disobliging skeleton in Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s closet and it is time that the record be set straight, befittingly by his own party. The State has no business declaring anyone from any sect, or fussing about religious architectural structures.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah who was a Shia, although probably completely secular at a personal level, had a standard answer to the silly rather intrusive question of whether he was a Shia or a Sunni. He responded by asking if the Holy Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was a Shia or a Sunni. Fortunately for him, that response apparently ended the discussion. Lucky for him, I guess that he is not alive today. Since it is quite possible that Mr Jinnah would have been murdered by the faithful today just for that.

The Express Tribune

[Roshan wadhwani]

Politics of Blood: Is MQM the Target?

Farheen Rizvi

How did Karachi lose more than 50 people in Abbas Town with hundreds of apartments and shops reduced to rubble? One bomb-packed car rampaging around the neighborhood rummaged it all? Government announced the day of mourning on the incident but is anyone willing to claim responsibility for the act? No. Is anyone accountable for that? No. This only shows that meeting political ends in Pakistan mean far more than human values and all our law-enforcing agencies have failed.

We, Karachiites have seen countless sectarian eruptions since1980s where Shiite processions and neighborhoods were attacked by other sects. Last riot witnessed were during Zia era in Liaquatabad had many houses were burnt and Shiits were forced to leave the neighborhood. Then, the mercurial rise of Muttahidda Qaumi Movement as Muhajir Qaumi Movement changed the entire perspective of the city. MQM united both the sects under a common flagship and out of sectarian skirmish.

The “sectarian harmony” turned out to be the core strength of MQM, and both sects started to live peacefully under slogan of “Muhajirs”. The recent attack in Abbas Town is the example of that harmony; in this attack not only Shiite but many Sunni brothers living in a common locale lost their lives too. MQM has been enjoying this unique power over Karachi by winning more than 85% of the mandate of Karachi for decades.


Suddenly a new wave of Shiite killings has started in KPK, Baluchistan, South Punjab and Karachi. But this time it is worse and of fairly different nature. There are no neighbors or commoners involved in the killings but groups of terrorists under different labels are playing hooligans.

Unfortunately, there have been instances where politicians are found pulling each others’ collars for the mighty blame game and accusing intelligence agencies of having ties with these groups but no institution has so far taken any action against the cold-blooded killers. Let me add, Hamid Mir, in his recent column titled “A day in Khuzdar’ has proven the ties between intelligence agencies and some extremists groups in Baluchistan.

Reportedly, the electoral allies Ahle-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) with PML-N and Muttahida Wahdatul Muslemeen (MWM) is now allying with PTI for the upcoming elections. Both alliances will only affect the election results in Karachi by bifurcating the Urdu speaking vote bank among Shiites and Sunnis – just like before it was divided among Jamat Islami and PPP.

The described political scenario is no different than the concerns showed by MQM chief. Although Rehman Malik insists these attacks are only a part of delaying the election process because some hidden forces don’t want to see democratic process in Pakistan. Recently, he has accused two banned outfits, Tehreek Taliban and Lashkar Jhanvi, playing role in sabotaging election process. If the dots from Hamid Mir’s journalism to Rehman Malik’s information are correct then Altaf Hussain has correctly analyzed that these attacks in Karachi are against MQM’s democratic vote bank.

If banned outfits are playing the worse role for establishment then ASWJ and MWM are playing the clean role by dividing a democratic vote bank of MQM. But the two groups are unaware that they are throwing the 85% population of Karachi in the deadly sectarian division.

It is precisely the time for people of Pakistan especially Karachiites to come out with sectarian harmony against the forces bend on dividing them. We can’t forget the fact that Abbas Town is the Shiite dominated neighborhood but more than 30 Sunnis were killed in the attack too. If we live together and die together then we have to muster together to defeat the bad and evil forces. Whether Altaf Hussain’s concern is right or not but Karachi is not ready to go back in the history of sectarian riots and bloodshed which will not only cost us lives of our innocent people but also the solidarity and sovereignty of the country.

http://www.thenews.com.pk/