Identity crisis in Pakistan — I

[HASEEB ANSARI]

Identity crisis in Pakistan — I
By Mudasir Nazar

Since its birth Pakistan has undergone an identity crisis and the contested versions of the religious nature of the post-colonial state in large part explain its history of instability

The post-colonial state of Pakistan is faced with identity-related challenges, and is struggling to define its identity, particularly from the onset of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Parallel movements are running across the landscape of Pakistan, as some demand an Islamic state, some a multinational state, some fight for a secular one, and some a democratic Islamic republic, and if Islamic state, again beset with complexity as to what type of Islamic state — Shia or Sunni — Pakistan should be and to what degree. In between, the issue of minorities in the Pakistan state is central to the identity debate currently going on in Pakistan. But the country is repeatedly failing to define it under complex pressures from both within and without. The nature of the post-colonial state’s identity can be understood through different parameters of religious versus secular identity, inter-religious and intra religious identity, communal identity, central versus provincial identity, ethnic identity, and by the construct of majority versus minority identity and their relations and effect on the state and society, which in turn describe the nature of the post-colonial state of Pakistan’s identity in general.

Since its birth Pakistan has undergone an identity crisis and the contested versions of the religious nature of the post-colonial state in large part explain its history of instability, fragmentation and power abuse. From 1947, especially after the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948, the question was of whether Pakistan was intended to be an Islamic state that favoured Muslims, or a Muslim nation state that would guarantee the equality of all its citizens. The freedom struggle left the question unresolved whether Pakistan should be run on secular lines or Islamic. Indeed the debate about Islam’s role in Pakistanis’ public life still rages after over a half a century since independence. Equally contested is the relationship between Pakistani nationalism and ethnic and linguistic allegiances, of which the latter were partially submerged during the freedom struggle.

The problem started with the Objectives Resolution, which defined Pakistan both as an Islamic republic as well as a democratic and federal state. On the one hand, government was established on the basis of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, and on the other, all sovereignty was declared in the hands of the Almighty. The Objectives Resolution was interpreted by both modernists and traditionalists in their own way, and the ulema (clergy) demanded a bigger role in the law-making process from and for the state. This was one of the reasons for the failure of civilian governments in Pakistan in its earlier phase. They played an immense role in shaping Pakistan’s identity and its reflection manifested from time to time. All constitutions of the state described Pakistan as an Islamic republic. The manifestation of the Islamic identity in the constitution was kept alive by the blasphemy laws, which have recently become highly controversial in Pakistan. This Islamic identity of the post-colonial Pakistan has brought havoc on both inter-religious minorities and outer-religious ones. The inter-religious minorities means minority groups like the Shias or Ahmedis; while the former are continuously struggling to maintain their separate Islamic identity under the Sunni-dominated Muslim state, the latter were declared as non-Muslims in 1974, during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s regime through the 2nd Amendment to the constitution.

The claims of purity and ownership by one group create alienation in another, leading to violence. Thus Pakistan is engulfed with religious intolerance and communal violence. The rift between Shias and Sunnis was there earlier too, but from the 1970s rivalry and conflict got spurred and aggravated due to lack of a properly defined identity of the state. Sunnis often claim that it is ‘their’ country, and they try to suppress the rights of other groups. The seeds of Islamisation were innate to Pakistan, but flourished particularly during the reign of General Ziaul Haq. However, it was only under the reign of Mian Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto that sectarian violence increased between the Shias and Sunnis. Atrocities had already been visited on the Ahmedis during the 1950s.

Every second day people die on roads, public places and mosques due to suicide bombings. The identity issue has reached such a level that the state seems to have been paralysed, unable to solve it. The Islamists have taken a revolutionary stand to defend the constitutional Islamic laws. For instance, in January 2011, the governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, was killed by his bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, who said he was angered by Mr Taseer’s support for amendment of the blasphemy law. Although there were large scale protests against his assassination, yet the impotence of the government was evident in January 2011 when the Pakistan People’s Party’s Member of Parliament Sherry Rehman dropped her attempt to amend the blasphemy laws, accusing her party “of appealing to extremists by ruling out any changes to the law.”

The last democratic government remained unable to control it. Often the state is viewed as pro-Sunni and anti-Shia, and although government justifies certain bans on Shia processions during Moharram on considerations of instability, yet the question remains why only the Shia community has to face these restrictions, and why there is so much internal religious interference?

The post-colonial state has become biased towards different sections of society and has more and more of a Sunni character. The identification of the state with the particular Sunni theology is a dangerous trend and remains a stimulant factor for religious or communal disturbances and dissatisfaction of the Shia community. The obvious trend is that the Shias of Pakistan identify themselves more with Iran and less with Pakistan, and that even for holy matters Saudi Arabia has minuscule importance for the Shias.

(To be continued)

The writer is a student of M.phil South Asian studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and can be reached at mnazar00@gmail.com

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...9-4-2013_pg3_6

[HASEEB ANSARI]

Identity crisis in Pakistan — II
By Mudasir Nazar

Taking recourse to secularism seems to be the only remedy for many of its ills. However, the post-colonial Pakistan is neither secular nor theocratic but a precarious mixture of both

Pakistan is divided into four linguistic-ethnic groups and lacks a national ethos. Again these are irreconcilable trends leading towards two different poles, and the post-colonial state of Pakistan has failed to bridge gaps between them by taking recourse to secularism, the only alternative to end fragmentation. However, it is not easy under a conservative and religious divide. What we have observed from the case of blasphemy law and its rejection subsequently led to assassination of the minster for minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti after the governor of Punjab was killed. Pakistan has to develop its own version of secularism, suitable for its own situation rather than taking direct inspiration from western secularism, secularism that would entail respecting each religious sect besides respecting each religion.
The post-colonial Pakistan has remained unsuccessful in accommodating diversity-- diversities of ethnic groups, languages and religion, as firstly evidenced in its bitter conflict with the Bengali nationalist demand, which culminated into another partition in 1971, and now manifest in Balochistan and others tribal provinces. The ethnic regional-polarisation emerged with the partition but presently it has reached a new intensity. The regional identities like Sindhi, Baloch, and Pathan, after the independence, have felt alienation from the “Punjabisation of Pakistan”. Then, the ruling elite, used militarisation and Islamisation as strategies to paralyse the voices of regional identities but from 2008, the dialectical contradiction between centralizstion or centre and regional identities widened, caused political instability. Non-Panjabi ethnic classes are highly discounted with the Punjabi ruling elites, who are reluctant to accept the multi-ethnic composition of the country, reducing it to law and order problem rather than national integration.
The central-centered identity of Pakistan as a newly created ‘unified entity’ was imposed on the divergent ethnic sub-nationalities, which produced a clash between ethnic nationalities and state-sponsored nation building projects; these sub-nationalities feel alienation from the state-sponsored nation building process and continues to look it with suspicion. The ethnic sub-nationalities feel marginalisation of their identity and are very conscious of their separate identity; for instance, Wali Khan, a Pashtun nationalist, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, declared in the 1980s, “I have been a Pashtun for 4,000 years, a Muslim for 1,400 years and a Pakistani for 40 years.”
Therefore, the post-colonial Pakistan has an ethical bias and is an undefined identity state. Recently, the debate is going on the nature of the identity of the Pakistan and Jinnah is resurrected everyday through newspapers and periodicals and even discussed in news platforms. The Jinnah of 1947, “You are free;... free to go to your temples, ... free to go any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan, you may belong to any religion caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of state... that we are all equal citizens of one state. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense... but in the political sense as citizens of the state.”
However, everybody knows that Pakistan is not going towards this direction but in its reverse. But there is debate now, and in between widespread ethnic and sectarian violence is the desire of people to live in peace, but there are many who want to make Pakistan a religious state. There is a reassertion of religious identity among the youth, who equally wants secularism to prevail and the major claim put forth is that Pakistan was never governed by any religious party, which is true. Pakistan has never been able to solve such contradictions, yet taking recourse to secularism seems to be the only remedy for many of its ills. However, the post-colonial Pakistan is neither secular nor theocratic but a precarious mixture of both. It remains to be seen whether Pakistan would be able to define its identity and solve such contradictions or not and whether it would be able to implement secularism to protect minorities in its territory or not post the 2013 elections.

(Concluded)

The writer is a student of M.phil South Asian studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and can be reached at mnazar00@gmail.com

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default...0-4-2013_pg3_6