A routine summit

[ABDUL JABBAR KATIAR]

BY Asif Ezdi - The writer is a former member of the Pakistan Foreign Service.
THE NEWS, 14-11-2011

The most remarkable thing about the meeting last week between the Pakistani and Indian prime ministers on the sidelines of the Saarc Summit was that it was so unremarkable. The previous three meetings between Gilani and Manmohan Singh, held in Sharm el-Sheikh (July 2009), Thimphu (April 2010) and Mohali (March 2011), had sought to resume the suspended or stalled dialogue between the two countries. But now that the process has been restarted, the two prime ministers still went over much the same old agenda, said more or less the same things and avoided any in-depth discussion on the real issues which are the source of tension and hostility between the two countries.
Neither Kashmir, which Pakistan has traditionally considered as the core issue in its relations with India, nor the Indian role in Afghanistan, where India is stepping up its presence in anticipation of the withdrawal of US combat troops, was taken up seriously by Gilani. Also Manmohan Singh, for his part, did not bring up either issue, despite Delhi’s keenness to revive the back-channel dialogue on Kashmir, and the wish, privately expressed by Indian officials, for talks with Pakistan on the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Manmohan probably saw the futility of raising these matters with a dummy prime minister when real power rests elsewhere.
With little to show on matters of substance, the main result of the summit was to maintain the positive atmosphere between the two countries created by recent developments, among them Pakistan’s decision in principle to grant MFN status to India and the prompt return by Pakistan of an Indian army helicopter which had been forced to land near Skardu after it “strayed” 20 kilometres into the Pakistan side of the Line of Control.
The withdrawal by Delhi of its objections to the EU’s plan for tariff cuts on Pakistani textiles and India’s support to Pakistan’s candidature for election to the Security Council last month, for which Gilani thanked Manmohan, have also contributed to the relaxed atmosphere, although these were relatively inconsequential gestures. The EU’s planned tariff concessions, which would be for a limited period of two years and would give only a small boost to Pakistani exports, is certainly of trifling value compared to the grant of MFN status to India. As for Pakistan’s election to the Security Council, India is believed to have been one of the 129 countries that voted for us, although we cannot be sure, because the voting is secret and it is very common for countries to promise support, also in writing, but then vote for another candidate.
As expected, the Indian side took up the Mumbai terrorist attack of November 2008. Manmohan emphasised that for a meaningful dialogue it was important for Pakistan to bring to justice those who were responsible and to take action against the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Jamaat-ud-Dawah. But this was not made into a make-or-break issue. The Pakistani side promised to bring the trial of the seven persons accused of involvement in the Mumbai attacks to conclusion and pointed out that the judicial commission that would be visiting India soon to record the statements of Indian officials would have a positive impact in speeding up the judicial process. Rehman Malik, in another display of utter crassness, surprised even his hosts by calling for sending Kasab to the gallows, although his appeal to the Indian Supreme Court is still pending.
The fact that little fresh ground was covered in the talks explains why for the first time in the history of bilateral relations between Pakistan and India no joint statement was issued after a formal summit meeting. In their short joint appearance before the press, where no questions were allowed, they both promised that the “next round of talks” would be more productive. The two prime ministers also spoke ambitiously of writing a “new chapter” in the history of bilateral relations.
In his statement to the media after the summit, Gilani said the two prime ministers had discussed “all core issues” at their meeting. He expressly mentioned water, terrorism, Sir Creek, Siachen, trade and Kashmir – in that order. But concrete follow-up action will clearly be limited only to those issues, mostly of peripheral or secondary importance, to which India attaches priority. Kashmir, Siachen and Sir Creek will not be among them.
One of the issues that will be getting high attention is trade. A meeting of the commerce secretaries in Delhi this week will be discussing steps to be taken by the two sides, especially Pakistan, to grant MFN status to India. According to the Indian foreign secretary, the two countries are already planning to move on to the next step in trade liberalisation, namely the conclusion of a preferential trade agreement. The bilateral joint commission, which has not met since 2005, is also to be revived. Technical working groups will meet first to prepare for the meeting of the joint commission.
The meeting of the commerce secretaries will be followed by talks between the interior secretaries in December. A meeting of the water secretaries to discuss water disputes is likely. The two sides also decided to introduce a more liberalised visa regime and to speed up implementation of measures that were agreed upon in the meeting in July of the foreign ministers to facilitate trade and travel across the Line of Control.
The Maldives meeting shows once again how much the agenda, direction and pace of the bilateral dialogue is being driven by India and how far Pakistan has moved from the original concept of those who had launched it. When the process was started in the ‘90s, Pakistan had insisted that Kashmir should be on top of the agenda and that progress on all items should be interlinked and should take place on parallel tracks. This was meant to ensure that the Kashmir issue would not be sidelined and that movement on other items would be matched by movement on Kashmir.
The reality of the dialogue today is very different. The demand of the Kashmiri people for self-determination has in fact been completely sidelined. India is prepared to talk on Kashmir only to discuss those steps (incorrectly termed as “confidence-building measures”) which it thinks serve to legitimise its occupation of the state and entrench Kashmir’s division along the Line of Control. That, rather than any desire to alleviate the hardship of separation between divided families, or to promote intra-state trade, is the reason why India has agreed to allow limited movement of people and goods across the LoC.
India hopes also before long to resume the back-channel dialogue on Kashmir that was initiated by Musharraf in 2004. The reason is simple: a settlement on the lines of Musharraf’s four-point plan, which former foreign minister Kasuri continues to tout to this day, would nullify the UN Security Council resolutions and legitimise Indian occupation of two-thirds of the state. What it would not do is bury the urge of the Kashmiri people for azadi or end their struggle for freedom; nor would it bring peace to the region.
No Pakistani leader has damaged the Kashmir cause more than Musharraf and he did it only to retain Washington’s backing for his rule. Now, his example is now being followed by Zardari. He was not only prepared in 2008 to resume the back-channel dialogue on Kashmir, but last May agreed to grant MFN status to India, breaking a long-standing national consensus. Some Kashmiri leaders have strongly urged the government to withdraw this decision. But Zardari is considering going even further and giving India transit trade rights through Pakistani territory to Afghanistan and Central Asia, as Washington has been demanding.
Our political parties are also at fault. It took Nisar five months after the May announcement before he spoke out against granting MFN status to India and in the three weeks since then, he and his party have failed to raise this issue effectively in parliament.
Email: asifezdi@yahoo.com