Winding down the Afghan war

[mano g]

Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Wednesday, February 15, 2012

The writer is special adviser to the Jang Group/Geo and a former envoy to the US and the UK.

Earlier this month US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta declared that his country hoped to end its combat role in Afghanistan in mid 2013, more than a year before the deadline for the drawdown of Nato forces from the country. Coming on the eve of a Nato meeting in Brussels the statement took America’s coalition partners aback.

The idea of setting an intermediate milestone before 2014 to transfer greater responsibility to Afghan forces had been circulating for some time. But the media depiction of Panetta’s pronouncement as a decision Washington had already taken sparked confusion in the Nato ranks. As did the timing and the manner of the Pentagon chief’s remarks.

The widespread expectation was – and is – that these issues would be discussed and decisions announced at a Nato summit in Chicago on May 20-21. This is regarded by the Obama administration as a landmark meeting to map out a strategy for the 2014 transition when all the Nato combat troops are due to leave Afghanistan.

Panetta’s mission-change ‘disclosure’ well ahead of the summit aroused concern in European capitals and in Kabul. This prompted a series of explanations from Washington. A White House spokesman clarified that the defence secretary was not referring to what had been decided but what “could happen.” Others said his remarks did not yet represent formal policy.

These explanations did not prevent different constructions being put on Panetta’s statement. Some saw this as ‘a rush to the exits’, with the 2013 transition timeline being a ‘gamble’ by an administration anxious to extricate itself from an unsustainable and unpopular conflict. A common take on the statement was to see it as politically motivated and part of American election year politics. Others interpreted it as an effort to influence the internal debate raging in the administration about the appropriate strategy in Afghanistan including the speed and scope of the planned troop withdrawal.

Irrespective of whether Panetta’s statement had been over read it did signal an acceleration of the Afghan endgame. His deliberately timed remarks seem to be part of an administration plan that is taking more concrete shape and might be rolled out at Chicago. Contemplating a change in the US-led Nato mission from combat to a “train, aid and advise” role to Afghan forces could be designed to test the Afghan army’s fighting capability ahead of 2014.

More importantly it comes as the first tentative sign of a move toward aligning the US military mission with Washington’s stated political objective of seeking a negotiated solution to the war. The anticipated shift from fighting to training could in time help to reconcile the two parallel tracks of the US strategy of fight and talk.

For all the consternation it may have momentarily caused among its Nato allies, Panetta’s statement seemed designed to prepare the ground for the Chicago summit, which has both political and strategic significance. Political because it will be an opportunity in the middle of the election season for President Obama to play to his party base by showing he is charting a way out of the war. Strategic because it will be an occasion for the US to present a comprehensive plan for the 2014 transition and have it affirmed by Nato countries.

Panetta’s comments come on the heels of renewed US diplomatic engagement with the Taliban – following a year of outreach efforts in that direction. Talks, which Taliban representatives now publicly acknowledge, are said to be continuing about opening a Taliban office in Qatar. This would mark the first step towards formal negotiations. A quickening in the pace of these diplomatic efforts can be expected in coming months. The apparent aim of the current contacts is to agree on a number of confidence building measures that can pave the way for negotiations.

If an agreement can be forged on the CBMs the Chicago summit could announce the start of an ‘Afghan-led’ peace process (what was once envisaged for last December’s Bonn conference). Seen in this perspective holding out a possibility of change in the military mission helps to open diplomatic space for talks and for CBMs to come fully into play.

If this is the emerging US plan a number of daunting obstacles lie ahead to both its military and political components. A significant hurdle is within the administration itself. The American military and intelligence communities remain sceptical about what talks with the Taliban can yield. They also oppose the idea of a combat stand down before 2014. Instead many Pentagon officials advocate ‘at least two more fighting seasons’ in Afghanistan to put pressure on the Taliban.

It was probably in deference to these views that Panetta clarified at the Munich security conference that he did not mean Nato forces will cease fighting in 2013 but that the ‘hope’ was for the lead role to be taken by the Afghan forces. Getting the military on board for peace talks and shifting the dynamic between fight and talk remains a challenge for Washington. Already Panetta’s comments invited criticism from some quarters that pre-mature public signalling about stepping back from combat will erode the American negotiating position with the Taliban.

Then there are Kabul’s apprehensions over any plan for a faster security transition. This was reflected in media reports quoting Afghan officials who pointed to the lack of readiness by their security forces to take over next year or even by 2014. As for Kabul’s response to the Qatar office President Karzai has been blowing hot and cold at different times. Although the office now has his support and that of the High Peace Council, he has continued to complain about being excluded from direct parleys between American officials and Taliban nominees.

But Karzai himself has yet to make a serious effort to overcome opposition to talks with the Taliban from non-Pashtun groups in his country. Installing a full-blown peace process will rest on his ability to build consensus in favour of this.

Then there are problems inherent in starting a peace process. The confidence building effort is still stuck on the release and transfer of five prisoners from Guantanamo to Doha that Taliban leaders insist must precede the opening of formal negotiations. Opposition from Congress and from within the administration seems to be preventing movement in this regard. Sharp criticism of talks with the Taliban by the Republican presidential candidate, Mitt Romney, maybe another constraint.

The administration expects the Taliban to trade the movement of prisoners with renouncing their links with ‘international terrorism’. With the CBM effort bogged down and inhibited by these factors it is uncertain whether progress can be achieved before May for serious negotiations to commence after the Chicago summit.

Casting a lengthening shadow over this and the transition plan – whatever its final shape – is the increasingly fraught situation in the region marked by mounting tensions between the US and Iran. With Washington refusing to rule out the military option and some officials even suggesting that Israel could launch an attack to thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions the danger of escalation and conflict persists. This can derail efforts for an Afghan settlement and imperil any transition strategy.

Also Washington has yet to normalise relations with Pakistan, which has a pivotal role to play in the Afghan reconciliation process. Unresolved tensions and clashing red lines on for example US drone strikes in Pakistani territory continue to stand in the way. Pakistan’s ability to play a more meaningful role is also being affected by Islamabad’s delay in completing a parliamentary process mandated to evolve a revised policy towards the US. Opportunities can be missed if the delay persists.

All these factors make for uncertainty in the months ahead and can impact on the headway that can be made before the Chicago summit. What is widely accepted though is that there is no other way to end the Afghan war but by negotiations. For that fighting must cease sooner rather than later to establish the conditions for real peace talks.



Winding down the Afghan war - Dr Maleeha Lodhi