The news coming from Swat is both encouraging and worrying. Encouraging on two accounts; firstly, because Pakistani Security forces have killed a large number of militants in large-scale land-air military campaign. Secondly, COAS General Kayani has declared that Pakistan Army has developed full-scale facilities to focus on ‘Low-Intensity Conflict’ related operations and will employ requisite resources to ensure a ‘decisive ascendancy’ over the militants.

The more worrying news is that the mass exodus from Swat and adjoining areas has reached a level which if not properly and timely handled could eclipse the gains made on the military front. According to the latest estimates, almost a million people could be displaced as a result of this conflict and this could be the beginning of a huge humanitarian crisis on the scale Pakistan had faced after the October 2005 earthquake.

Although the government has announced relief efforts and donations but unfortunately the mood of the civil administration and political leadership does not reflect the same will, sense of urgency and commitment that a nation at war needs. A full blown campaign on a divison-level theatre is afoot in Swat but the government and public support it needs hasn’t got the necssary momentum yet. President Zardari has been outside the country at this crucial hour whereas the NWFP government is repeatedly calling the aid money announced by Prime Minister Gillani as far from satisfactory. The PML-N is pre-occupied with trying to deflect PPP’s continued demands to join the federal cabinet while the religious parties, including the JUI, have already begun to distance themselves from the military action. The media is divided between those supporting the war and Taliban apoligists. The international dimension of Swat conflict is even more complex and poses a unique set of challenges to Islamabad’s long-term security interests. Although allied for almost eight years since 9/11 against terrorism, the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to compete for conflicting interests in the region. Islamabad and Kabul’s distrust in each other is not restricted to occasional banters from the Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Amidst rising Taliban insurgency, until last year Mr Karzai did not control most of his country and had begun to lose favours with Washington, forcing key policy-makers there to look for his alternatives. This year, Mr Karzai has succeeded in shifting the eye of the storm of war on terror from his country to Pakistan and in convincing Washington that Afghan Taliban cannot be taken care of until the Pakistani Taliban were dealt with. Only a couple of days before the tripartite summit in Washington between Presidents Obama, Zardari and Karzai, the Afghan Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Said Jawad accused Pakistan of not discontinuing support to militant groups and said that Pakistani security institutions do not consider extremism and terrorism as ‘a serious threat’.

As regards the US, Obama Administration’s regional apporach towards the war on terrorism highlights three things; recognition of costly lessons learnt in Iraq and admission by Washington that it cannot go solo in Afghanistan. Secondly, need for an exit strategy. Thirdly and perhaps linked to the second point and most importantly for Pakistan, the recognition of New Delhi as a ‘critical partner’ in the future of Aghanistan.

The last point poses serious security as well as economic challenges for Islamabad in a region it has traditionally considered its own backyard. Despite the much-hyped recent transit trade related MOU signed in Washington, it is unlikely that Islamabad’s security establishment will easily digest giving Delhi a free trade corridor right across the strategic and industrial heart of Punjab and the NWFP.

In fact, this MOU could create new frictions between the Zardari government and the military, further complicating matters domestically. In their eyes, it is like handing Pakistan’s not only security but also economic interests over a silver platter to New Delhi for free at a time when India is reluctant even to restart the peace process, five months after the Mumbai attacks. This is particularly peculiar considering the fact that even amidst the best of diplomatic climates during the composite dialogue, Islamabad was still not willing to accept Indian demand of a trade route to Afghanistan via Pakistan. It also needs to be noted that only recently Mr Rehman Malik has on the floor of the house categorically accused India of being involved in sabotage activities inside Pakistan.

At this rate, conflict of interests between US, Pakistan and Afghanistan could enlarge the deficit of trust between them and seriously jeopardise joint efforts in the areas of intelligence-sharing and choice and priority of targets. But most important and possibly the decisive factor in the outcome of this war on terror and determining the fate and shape of this region could be how the rising human, economic and political costs of this war against terrorism are shared and met by these allies.

The history of ‘low-intensity or ‘fourth generation war’ tells us two very important lessons. Firstly, an enemy is not defeated by physically routing it on the battlefield but by breaking its will to fight. Pakistan lost East Pakistan not merely because of Indian intervention or its support for ‘Mukti Bahni’ militants but because the Pakistani government and forces lost support of the Bengali people.

Let’s hope the government and the army have learned their lessons from 1971 and would use force judiciously only where it is necessary with optimal utilisation of all available credible intelligence about militants and avoid all possible collateral damage and civilian casualties. We don’t want to turn the loyal Pakistanis of Swat into Taliban because their houses were bombed due to error of judgement.

This is a lesson from the US air campaign in Afghanistan when whole tribes joined in the fight against the US when their houses were bombed due to poor intelligence or pilot error. Secondly, unlike a conventional war, low-intensity conflicts whether it is against Tamil Tigers, IRA, ETA or Al Qaeda, it usually is a long term conflict and requires patience and perseverance both by government, armed forces and even more so by the affected common people.

Lastly, the best way to counter Taliban insurgency is to take care of the displaced people of Swat as best as we can even if it takes cutting corners in other areas of government spendings at the moment. It is a matter of urgent national security interest that these displaced people are provided the necessary food, clothing, shelter and medical aid not only during the present conflict but appropriate resources are also generated at this stage for their post-war rehabilitation when they return to their homes.

Let them know that the moderate, liberal, peace-loving and educated Muslim nation of Pakistan can take care of its own people only then we can hope to eliminate the support base which the ideology and mindset of insurgents like Taliban survive on. Let our nation stand together with the armed forces this time by helping our Swati brethren so that the million people fleeing from their homes in Swat can one day return in safety to hope for a better future and not lose hope and confidence like our East Pakistani brethren did in 1971.