Pakistan faces a deadly internal war that threatens its future as an effective and coherent nation-state. This threat from extremist Taliban groups entrenched in the tribal areas and their affiliates in mainland Pakistan. The terror attacks in Peshawar, Lahore and Nowshera last week clearly showed that terrorist groups will resort to any method to fulfil their agenda of paralysing the Pakistani state and government and establishing a territorial domain as a base for their operations in Pakistan and abroad.

The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the people are faced with three choices: challenge these groups straight on; comply with their dictates; or face death threats.

The sudden spurt in Taliban violence in urban centres is a retaliatory move against the military action in Swat, Dir and Buner, as well as limited operations in Hangu and South Waziristan. The Taliban have extended the scope of conflict by taking it to the cities, hoping that the government and the army would not be able to pursue the war simultaneously on different fronts.

During the last week, the Taliban focused on Peshawar, resorting to excessive violence in the NWFP capital to disrupt civil life and discredit state institutions and functionaries. They want to destabilise the ANP provincial government because it has extended full support to the federal government and the army for undertaking military operations in Swat and elsewhere in the province.

The ANP agreed to tough action against the Taliban after the Swat peace deal was subverted by Sufi Muhammad’s attempt to arrogate to himself the right to manage the new judicial system, and Fazlullah and other Taliban leaders interpreted the agreement as the caving-in of the provincial government. They moved out into adjoining areas to establish their firm control on the region at the expense of local administration. Having entrenched themselves in the Swat valley, the Taliban could not comply with an agreement that would have restricted their activities and helped local and provincial administrations assert their primacy.

Among the several terror attacks on Peshawar last week, the city’s only five-star hotel was hit by a massive truck-bomb on June 9. Two days later, a police check post in the city was attacked, followed by a suicide bombing at the same place. Security forces exchanged fire with terrorists after the incident. On the same day, the motorcade of a provincial minister was attacked in Darra Adam Khel; the minister narrowly escaped, his security personnel were killed.

The Taliban are targeting Peshawar because of its proximity to the tribal areas; they can travel easily between Peshawar and the tribal areas. Other cities close to the tribal areas have also been facing varying degrees of Taliban pressure and violence. Most Taliban operating in and around Peshawar are familiar with the city and can undertake their missions even if they do not have local facilitators.

Another high profile suicide attack took place on June 12, when a mosque in Nowshera was targeted. The same day, a suicide bomber assassinated Mufti Naeemi, a well-known Islamic scholar in Lahore who was known for anti-Taliban views.

The killing of a recognised Islamic scholar shows that the Taliban are no longer restricting their attacks to government installations and personnel. They are targeting all those who openly oppose them.

Mufti Naeemi’s assassination may also cause Islamic sectarian tensions, which have been on the rise in the recent past, especially in areas like Dera Ismail Khan. These incidents appear to be intended to inflame sectarian tensions and thus create a host of new administrative problems, which in turn will divert the government’s attention away from Swat and the tribal areas.

The roots of the current spurt in Taliban violence can be traced to the decision of the federal government and the army in April to counter the Taliban efforts to expand their operations to urban centres. By mid-April, it had become quite clear that the Taliban wanted to paralyse state institutions and processes, and that the Taliban were willing to use violence and coercion to achieve this objective. Their activities also encouraged mainland Pakistan-based hardliners and militant groups to identify with the Taliban; these affiliates began to function as Islamic vigilantes in Pakistan’s urban centres.

The Swat operation is the first major success of the army in dislodging the Taliban, although military presence will have to be maintained to ensure that the Taliban do not return. Operations in the adjoining areas of Buner and Dir have also been successful. The army is now pursuing a similar operation in Bannu and Hangu. A limited operation has also been undertaken in South Waziristan.

Success in Swat and the adjoining areas cannot be consolidated unless the federal government and the army take comprehensive and firm action in South and North Waziristan, strongholds of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and also of the foreign fighters said to be located there. Military action in Waziristan would require more planning and greater effort than Swat, but Pakistan cannot neutralise the Taliban threat unless it takes action in the tribal areas.

The Taliban’s attacks show their organisation, determination and enough connections with local militants to challenge the government in mainland Pakistan. This is being done to show that the Taliban have the capacity to hit back. Further, the Taliban think that if security forces get bogged down in securing the cities, they would not be able to pursue counter-insurgency operations. The Taliban also expected that the people, scared by bombings, would pressure the government to stop military action. Their hope did not materialise as the recent bombings have further alienated Pakistanis from the Taliban. Citizens are demanding tough action terrorists and their patrons.

The exceptions are the Islamic parties, a section of religious leaders sharing the Taliban perspective on Islam and Imran Khan’s PTI, which opposes military action. However, these people are in a minority and have very limited electoral support.

The military operation in the Swat area has created an extremely serious humanitarian problem as over 2.5 million people have been displaced from their homes. As the government and societal groups undertake relief work in refugee camps, pro-Taliban elements are exploiting the refugee issue to blame the government and the army for creating this problem.

The outcome of the present internal war will determine the future of Pakistan as a viable nation-state. The mainstream and regional parties that get around 90 percent of the vote in general elections support this operation. Pakistan does not have the option of stopping the operation or not undertaking similar action in the tribal areas. The success of these operations and tackling their humanitarian aspect will further weaken opposition to the army’s efforts to assert the primacy of the Pakistan state.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst.

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier