DEFENCE & ARMS
By Chietigj Bajpaee, OINR 13/2/06
http://www.pinr.com
Feb 13, 2006, 12:42
After an initial lull in piracy attacks following the Asian tsunami, which devastated coastal communities and resulted in an increased naval military presence in the region, attacks have resumed. With 60,000 vessels transiting through the Straits each year, carrying half of the world's oil supplies and a third of world trade, the stakes are high in maintaining stability along these sea-lanes.
The vulnerability of the Straits has been heightened by the presence of a multitude of Islamic insurgencies and separatist movements in the region, existing in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. There is also a fear of the Straits emerging as a security "black hole" with the use of the waters to engage in arms, narcotics and human trafficking, which has been highlighted by the periodic discovery of arms shipments headed to the Tamil Tigers (L.T.T.E.) in Sri Lanka, terrorist organizations in Bangladesh and separatist groups in northeast India.
The growing fear of terrorist groups taking to the water has also been highlighted by the attacks in Yemen on the USS Cole in 2000 and the French-owned supertanker MV Limburg in 2002, along with the bombing of a ferry in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf group in February 2004. In March 2003, an Indonesian chemical tanker was hijacked for an hour while its equipment and technical documents were stolen. It is believed that this incident may have been a training exercise for a future terrorist attack.
It would be relatively easy to cripple shipping along the Malacca Straits given that the 1,015 kilometer-long (630 miles) channel is just 2.4 kilometers (1.5 miles) wide at its narrowest point. There is a fear that an oil tanker could be used as a floating bomb and piloted into a port city such as Singapore. The decision by the London-based Lloyd's Market Association's Joint War Committee group to classify the Malacca Straits as a "war risk" in June 2004 has further highlighted the threat of piracy and terrorism along the strait. [See: "The Malacca Straits and the Threat of Maritime Terrorism"]
There has been a proliferation of initiatives by littoral and extra-regional states to secure the Straits. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand have agreed to conduct joint air and sea patrols as part of the Malacca Straits Security Initiative (M.S.S.I.). Every year at regional forums such as the A.S.E.A.N. Regional Forum and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies-sponsored Shangri La Dialogue, extra-regional states such as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the United States offer to play a greater role in securing the Straits. However, littoral states such as Indonesia and Malaysia are reluctant to accept external assistance. Even private security organizations have become involved in the act by offering their services to ships transiting the region.
Maritime Territorial Disputes and the Competition for Naval Supremacy
Nevertheless, the race to secure the Straits has highlighted a new, potentially more destructive threat on Asia's sea-lanes as a result of growing competition for naval supremacy in the region. This inter-state naval posturing has been fueled by the importance of the waters for international trade, as well as the presence of a series of long-standing maritime territorial disputes and reports of oil and gas deposits in the disputed waters of the region. Furthermore, while these territorial disputes are over tangible resources, many of them are rooted in intangible issues of national identity.
For instance, in early 2005, relations between Indonesia and Malaysia hit a low when tensions flared over a territorial dispute in the Sulawesi Sea sparked by Malaysia awarding oil exploration rights in an offshore oil field in the disputed territory. A war of words ensued with racist slurs and Sukarno-era anti-Malaysian slogans accompanied by protests, attacks on Malaysian websites and the deployment of military aircraft and naval vessels to the disputed region.
Another long-standing maritime territorial dispute in the South China Sea concerns the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The Paracel chain, which has been occupied by China since 1974, is also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan while the Spratly chain is claimed partially by the Philippines, Brunei, and Indonesia, and is claimed in their entirety by Vietnam, Taiwan and China. Relations between China and A.S.E.A.N. have improved in recent years with China signing onto A.S.E.A.N.'s Treaty of Amity of Friendship and Cooperation in 2003 and all sides signing the Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002.
China also began joint exploration of the disputed territory with the Philippines and Vietnam in March 2005 following the signing of the Agreement on Joint Marine Seismic Work in the Agreed Region of the South China Sea. Nevertheless, tensions remain. In violation of the 2002 agreement, five states have permanent military garrisons on the atolls in addition to surveillance facilities under the guise of "bird-watching" towers, weather huts and tourist facilities. The fact that Taiwan is not a signatory to any of these agreements is also a cause for concern.
Maritime inter-state friction is not limited to the waters of Southeast Asia. Across the region, a series of maritime territorial disputes have flared up in recent months prompting regional and international powers to augment their naval power projection capabilities. Japan has three significant maritime territorial disputes with South Korea, Russia and China over the Takeshima/Dokdo (or Tokdo) islets, the South Kuriles/Northern Territories and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, respectively. Japan's emergence as a "normal" country is linked to its ability to resolve these territorial disputes and to its military playing a more significant role in regional security.
The territorial dispute in the Sea of Japan, which South Korea refers to as the East Sea, is over the Takeshima/Dokdo (or Tokdo) islets. The seas around the islets, which are currently occupied by South Korea, are rich fishing grounds and possibly possess natural gas and mineral deposits. Emotions in South Korea flared when a vote in Japan's Shimane Prefecture Council in February 2005 declared February 22 as "Takeshima Day." This resulted in protests across South Korea and increased South Korean military patrols and civilian tours in the disputed territory. [See: "The Importance of Strong Relations Between Japan and South Korea"]
Japan's relations with Russia have also been strained, as both states have not signed a formal peace treaty ending the hostilities of World War II due to a territorial dispute over the South Kuriles or Northern Territories. This tension is undermining cooperation in the energy sphere. Russia had given the go ahead to construct an oil pipeline from Taishet to the Pacific port of Nakhodka on the Sea of Japan over a route favored by China to Daqing in northeast Heilongjiang Province. However, Russian-Japanese friction over the territorial dispute has delayed construction and forced Russia to consider building a branch of the pipeline to China first.
The territorial dispute between China and Japan over the demarcation of the East China Sea includes the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands and the Chunxiao, Duanqiao and Tianwaitian oil and gas fields (known as Shirakaba, Kusunoki and Kashi in Japanese). Japan regards the median line as the boundary of its Exclusive Economic Zone, while China claims jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf. Although the fields are on the Chinese side of the median line, Japan claims that China may be siphoning energy resources from the Japanese side. While both sides have agreed to discuss the option of joint development, neither side is able to agree on what territory to jointly develop.
A military dimension has been added to this dispute; a Chinese naval destroyer took aim at a Japanese military P3-C surveillance aircraft near the disputed waters in September 2005, and a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine entered Japanese waters off the Okinawa Islands in November 2004. On a number of occasions, Chinese research vessels have also intruded into Japanese waters without giving prior notification.
Resolving this dispute is becoming increasingly difficult given China's and Japan's long-standing tensions over Japan's wartime legacy and recent frictions over China's opposition to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, visits by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the publication of a Japanese textbook that allegedly whitewashes Japanese wartime atrocities. The fact that the disputed territory may possess oil and gas deposits, and that China and Japan are the world's second and third largest oil importers respectively, presents a further element of difficulty in resolving their territorial dispute. A volatile combination is being created by a tangible dispute over territory rich in energy resources and intangible disputes rooted in historical rivalry.
China's Naval Ambitions and Military Modernization
Coupled with the presence of these long-standing territorial disputes, regional powers are modernizing their militaries as the prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region translates into expanding defense expenditures. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of China, which has been gradually expanding its blue water naval capabilities.
China's core maritime interest in the region is to develop a sufficient force to deter Taiwan's declaration of independence, deter and delay U.S. involvement in a potential conflict over Taiwan, and ensure a swift victory in a conflict over the island. Beijing is also interested in securing the narrow Malacca Straits, through which 80 percent of China's oil imports flow, and resolving long-standing maritime territorial disputes in the region.
While the issue of Taiwan is the primary driver of China's naval military modernization, the accomplishment of its primary goal is not mutually exclusive to achieving its secondary goals. Some Chinese military analysts have highlighted that control of Taiwan would allow China to expand its maritime defense perimeter, increase its control over sea lines of communication and expand its naval power projection capabilities. As General Wan Zongren, Political Commissar of the P.L.A. Academy of Military Science, has stated, the Taiwan Strait dispute is of "far reaching significance to breaking the international forces' blockade against China's maritime security…Only when we break this blockade shall we be able to talk about China's rise."
China's surface fleet presently comprises 64 vessels including 21 destroyers and 43 frigates, while its underwater fleet consists of 57 vessels including 51 diesel submarines and six nuclear powered attack submarines. Beijing is in the process of replacing obsolete ships with the acquisition of Russian Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines, and the construction of 052B- and 052C-class guided missile destroyers, 039 and 039A diesel submarines and type 093 and 094 nuclear-powered submarines. China has also expressed an interest in acquiring an aircraft carrier, which is not directly linked to the Taiwan Strait dispute and has more to do with naval power projection beyond the East China Sea. [See: "The Modernization of the Chinese Navy"]
China has adopted a multi-pronged approach in expanding its naval presence in the region. Apart from importing military hardware, China has also been integrating its civilian and military infrastructure. For example, China now has the world's third largest shipbuilding industry, which accounts for ten percent of the global market in terms of dead weight ton production with many merchant shipyards co-located with military shipyards. China's recent launch of its first domestically built liquefied natural gas carrier in December 2005 also demonstrated the increasing sophistication of China's shipbuilding abilities.
China is also pushing to acquire a national fleet of Very Large Crude Carriers that could be employed in the case of supply disruptions brought on by an accident or terrorist attack along the Malacca Straits or a U.S.-led blockade during a conflict over Taiwan. Currently, only ten percent of China's crude oil imports come aboard Chinese vessels. China's growing anxiety over the security of its oil imports was demonstrated in June 2004 when China conducted its first anti-terrorism exercise simulating an attack on an oil tanker.
China has also assisted in the development of port facilities in the region in order to bypass chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz in case of disruptions caused by accidents or conflict along the waterways. This "String of Pearls" strategy, as it has been characterized, has been demonstrated by China's development of port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, at Akyab, Cheduba and Bassein in Myanmar, at the Coco Islands, and at Chittagong in Bangladesh.
Additionally, China is investing in the construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus linking the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Siam while pursuing an improving relationship with Sri Lanka in an attempt to gain access to the deep water port of Trincomalee and fortifying its naval facilities on Hainan Island. Beyond expanding China's naval power reach, these port facilities offer alternative overland routes for China to import resources, most notably energy supplies.
The port facility in Gwadar offers China the ability to link the Arabian Sea with the markets and raw materials of Afghanistan, Central Asia and China's Xinjiang Province. Construction on the port began in 2002, although it has been delayed by an ongoing insurgency in the Baluchistan region, which has included attacks on Chinese nationals working on the project. The Sino-Pakistani project is competing with an India-Iran project to jointly develop the Iranian port at Chabahar as well as the road linking the port to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It has also fueled fears in India of its encirclement by China. [See: "China's Strategy of Containing India"]
The Indian Navy has countered these moves by setting up a Far Eastern Naval Command (F.E.N.C.) facility off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands. F.E.N.C. can monitor China's naval activities in the region and expand India's naval power projection capabilities into the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea region. [See: "India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power"]
Finally, China has manipulated history in order to justify its expanding maritime interests. Just as China's claim over the ancient kingdom of Koguryo offers justification for future intervention in the Korean peninsula, so China's increasing attention to the voyages of Admiral Zheng He in the early 15th century may be an attempt to highlight China's historical claim to naval superiority in the region, and thus justify its current aspirations. The voyages of Zheng He may also be used to reassure regional powers of China's non-threatening ambitions since Zheng's voyages were not accompanied by an overt attempt to control states in the region, with the exception of a brief intervention in Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka).
There has been a tendency to exaggerate China's military capabilities given the low base from which it has been upgrading its strength and the lack of transparency regarding China's military spending and long-term strategic objectives. There is still a significant gap in China's military ambitions and capabilities as illustrated by the lack of a Chinese role in relief efforts following the South Asian tsunami in December 2004, which was in contrast with a significant Indian and U.S. presence in relief operations.
Nevertheless, an increasing Chinese naval presence in the region is likely to draw concern from littoral states, some of which have territorial disputes and historical rivalries with China. The United States also has cause for concern given that China's attempt to strengthen its naval power projection capabilities for the purpose of securing sea-lanes and chokepoints could be used against the United States during a conflict over Taiwan.
Conclusion
Since the September 11 attacks, it has become fashionable to cite the threats posed by non-state actors, including terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations engaging in arms, people and narcotics trafficking. On the high seas, this has manifested itself with growing concern over piracy. However, in most cases the presence of a weak state fuels the influence of non-state armed groups. Whether it is the inability or unwillingness of the Indonesian government to police its waters that leads to the rise of piracy in the Malacca Straits, or the Taliban regime in Afghanistan providing safe haven to al-Qaeda, the root cause of most non-state security threats is a state providing intentional or inadvertent support.
While the threat of terrorism and piracy is apparent in Asia, it is the combination of long-standing maritime territorial disputes, growing nationalism and defense expenditures, and increasing resource and energy needs by countries in the region that is setting the stage for a more volatile situation on the high seas of the Asia-Pacific region.
Plz pray,
Sardarzada