The US presence in the CAS is likely to have far-reaching impact on the Russia-Central Asia relations, a fact that is not lost upon the Russian government. Even before the events of September 11, there were tensions between the CAS and Russia. One major reason was the separatist movement by the Chechens, which led to war. After the first Chechen war (1994-96), around four thousand Russian troops and thousands of innocent Chechen civilians were killed.13 The inhumane killings of thousands of innocent Muslims in Chechnya raised sympathies of the Muslim population in the CAS, especially when the Russian government asserted that it would fight the threat of Islamic militancy at all levels and in every former Soviet republic. The Chechen war raised fears of Russia’s intentions to interfere in the internal affairs of other Caucasian and Central Asian states, since Russia insisted that their weak and fragile regimes needed Moscow’s active support in their internal affairs if they were to survive.14 Economically, on account of being dependent on the export routes of Russia for the Central Asian goods and energy resources, the CAS remain wary of Russian dominance. Russia not only pays poorly, but is also very tardy with payments whether it is the government or private sector. Many Russian companies reportedly owe millions of dollars to the CAS.15
Getting the desired economic and political support from the US does not mean that for CAS it will be easy to abandon Russia. Both Russia and the CAS are economically inter-dependent. Approximately 50% of Russian foreign currency revenues are generated by the Central Asian region’s oil and gas sales, in which the Kazakh energy resources are a major contributor. Gas from Turkmenistan flows into Russian markets and supplements Russia’s European exports.16 Turkmenistan is entirely dependent upon Russia’s state-owned gas giant, Gazmprom, for its gas exports, except for a small pipeline that it runs to Iran. The same is the case with the oil-rich Kazakhstan, where only one pipeline to the Russian Black Sea port carries Kazakh oil to the outer world. Although the recent trans-Afghan pipeline deal has raised hopes in Central Asia for another non-Russian route, but that depends largely upon permanent peace in Afghanistan.
For security reasons as well, the CAS cannot end their association with Russia, because of the presence of a large Russian diaspora in these states, which may resist such a move. That, too, could have destabilising effects for the entire region of Central Asia. The presence of Russian military and security guards in these states, makes Russia an important guarantor of and a factor within the Central Asian security scenario. Russia’s historical involvement in the region gives it a deeper understanding of and insight into the regional dynamics, as compared even to the USA. From the CAS point of view as well, the known factor would be preferable to the unknown and uncertain factor.
In fact, Russia itself fears that if regional instability and insecurity, emanating from the illicit drugs and weapons trade, political suppression, religious extremism, and international terrorism, is left unchecked, it may spill over into its own territory.17 That is why since the independence of the region in 1991, Russia has laid emphasis on close security relations with CAS, to attain its own security objectives in the region, as well as to provide the much-needed security to the CAS. The events of 9/11, and the consequent US military presence in the region, only served to increase the emphasis Russia places on multilateral and bilateral cooperation with its neighbours in Central Asia.18 The recent Russian military exercises in the Caspian Sea (7-15 August, 2002), involving around 60 warships and 10,000 men alongwith some Kazakh and Azeri units, is a manifestation of how Russia has accelerated its efforts to pursue and maintain its security influence in this region. The stated objective of these exercises is to check the preparedness of the Russian seamen for tackling any sort of regional and international threats, linked to international terrorism in particular. As the Russian Navy Commander, Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov, stated, these exercises show that Russia can protect its interests in the Central Asian and Caucasus region.19 Moreover, the Russian readiness skills for interaction with other Caspian states, will be improved accordingly.20 Some of the regional states, particularly Iran, are sceptical of the Russian designs in the region.
Following the official statements emanating from the US State Department and Pentagon, with respect to the stationing of the US troops in the CAS on a long-term basis, Russia’s resolve to play a decisive role in Central Asian region has also increased. Wary of the US intentions with respect to its future strategy vis-à-vis the CAS, Russia desires to solve all the regional problems by involving the regional states, and minimising the role of outside powers in any future economic, political and security problems of the region. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), held at St. Petersburg (Russia) in June 2002, and the first Summit meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held at Almaty (Kazakhstan) from June 3-5, 2002, is a step in this direction. The fact that the charter of the SCO was signed in the said meeting and a decision also reached in that very meeting on the establishment of a counter-terrorism centre in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), is ample proof of the fact that the revitalisation of the organisation at this crucial hour testifies to Russia’s desire to play a more proactive role in its backyard. Also Russian efforts at the CICA conference, which was attended by nearly 16 countries, testifies to Russia’s ambitions to play a more predominant role in world affairs as a Eurasian power.
Although, at present the geopolitical balance in Central Asia seems to be in favour of the US, in the long run Russia would not allow the US to totally outweigh its own influence in the region. A recent meeting of heads of state of CAS, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, discussed the post-war political situation in Afghanistan, and the prospects of increasing economic cooperation among these states with Russia. In fact, both the CAS and Russia are aware of the fact that sidelining each other in their policies will create security and economic problems for them, that is why all of them are trying hard to maintain a balance in their ties in the American presence in the region. Roger N McDermott, a political consultant at the Scottish centre for International Security at University of Adenburg, commenting on Central Asia-Russia security interdependence, quite rightly points out; ‘… the truth is that the Central Asian states know that Moscow cannot afford to turn its back on them and their struggles and see militant Islam spread further northwards: for them it is not a choice Moscow or Washington, so much as Moscow-plus.’21
Plz pray
Sardarzada

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God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How shall we console ourselves, the most murderous of all murderers? The holiest and the mightiest that the world has hitherto possessed, has bled to death under our knife....