THE recently enacted Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 of the United States (Kerry-Lugar law) has come in for adverse criticism from various quarters for allegedly being a blatant attempt to undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan and to create a rift between civilian and military institutions.

The opponents of the Act have called upon the government to reject it, because, according to them, the conditions for US assistance thereunder are too stringent.

The government, on its part, has defended the legislation as it promises increased economic and military assistance to Pakistan at a time when the country is in dire need of foreign capital inflows. The government had also launched a diplomatic initiative to get the conditionalities contained in the Act softened.

However, all that those efforts realised was an explanatory statement accompanying the legislation denying that Washington disregarded the sovereignty of Islamabad. Hence, now the Pakistan government has the Hobson’s choice to either accept the Act as it is or reject it altogether.

The Kerry-Lugar law provides for annual economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014. The purposes of the assistance include consolidation of democratic institutions, supporting expansion of rule of law, promoting sustainable economic development, supporting investment in people and strengthening public diplomacy.

The assistance period may be extended to another five years (till 2019) ‘subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan.’ However, half of the total annual assistance ($750 million) will be subject to certification by the president’s special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan to Congress that the aid is making ‘reasonable’ progress towards achieving principal objectives of US assistance to Pakistan.

This condition may be waived if the secretary of state certifies that such a waiver is in national security interest of the US. The civilian assistance will be audited by the concerned US authorities/departments for which they may establish their offices in Pakistan.

The legislation also provides for unspecified amount of security or military assistance to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014. The purposes of such assistance are to: support Pakistan’s counter-insurgency capability, improve border security including preventing any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist activities, coordinate action against extremists and terrorists, and help consolidate democracy in Pakistan including promoting control of military institutions by a civilian, elected government.

The security assistance, as well as export of arms to Pakistan, will not be made unless the secretary of state certifies to Congress that: (a) Pakistan is cooperating with the US in efforts to dismantle nuclear supplier networks, such as providing information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals linked to such networks; (b) Pakistan is making ‘significant’ efforts towards combating terrorist groups; and (c) security forces of Pakistan (including the armed forces and intelligence agencies) are not “materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” Additionally, the security assistance will only be provided to ‘civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan’. However, this condition may be waived if doing so is in national security interest of the US.

The legislation further provides for a report to be submitted to Congress by the secretary of state describing US policy and strategy with respect to aid to Pakistan under this Act. The president will be required to develop a comprehensive regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan. A report to this effect will be submitted to Congress. The Act also provides for monitoring reports to be submitted by the secretary of state to Congress.

The reports, inter alia, will carry an evaluation of the efforts made by the Pakistan government in dismantling terrorist groups, closing terrorist camps, ceasing support for terrorists and extremists, preventing attacks into neighbouring countries, improved monitoring of madaris, closing madaris linked to terrorists/extremists, improving counter-terrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, and checking nuclear proliferation.

The reports will also assess civilian control over the military including approval of military budgets, promotion of senior military officers and military involvement in civil administration.

An analysis of the Kerry-Lugar legislation must take into account the fact that one country provides assistance (economic or military) to another if doing so is perceived to be in the donor’s interest. The strings attached to such assistance are designed to ensure that the recipient pursues policies that are instrumental in achieving the purposes for which assistance is meant.

This does not mean that foreign aid disregards the interest of the recipient. However, the recipient’s interest must in turn promote the interest of the donor.

In a nutshell, the Kerry-Lugar legislation promises increased US civilian and security assistance to Pakistan provided the country demonstrates the commitment to fight extremism, terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons—the major items on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. And the commitment has to measure up to US standards, because it will be for the US administration to certify that the level of commitment demonstrated by Islamabad is such as to justify American assistance.

In certain cases, that limitation may be waived but only if it is deemed to be in US interest. It is this conditionality together with the allegation that Pakistan is a sanctuary for terrorists who have the support of security establishment that lies behind condemnation of the Act.

However, from US standpoint, this conditionality is only logical, because the enhanced aid aims at increasing the capability of the Pakistan government to fight terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The provisions of the Act relating to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, non-interference of the armed forces and agencies in political matters and civilian control over military affairs are rooted in the US perception of involvement of security forces of Pakistan in terrorism and nuclear proliferation. From American standpoint, aid is the means and counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation is the end. If the end is not achieved, the means are of little avail.

The war against terrorism is a drawn-out one. A relationship which is based on this war should also be long-term. Hence, the legislation exhorts the US administration to establish a long-term, multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan. The relationship will be instrumental in achieving American objectives all of which relate to rooting out extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and making the country a moderate democratic state.

However, this is not to suggest that war against extremism is not in Pakistan’s national interest. Rather religious extremism is a potent threat to the stability, security and development of Pakistan.

And therefore, it is the foremost duty of the government in Pakistan to stem the rising tide of extremism. Since it is the point where American and Pakistani interests converge, the pressure as well as assistance from Washington is likely to be instrumental in shoring up Islamabad’s campaign against extremism.

The policy framework established by the legislation will result in increased US engagement with Pakistan. This means that Islamabad will be under increased pressure to crackdown on militants and smash networks involved in proliferation of nuclear weapons. This also means greater US interest, as well as interference, in political developments in Pakistan at variance with the principle of state sovereignty. The important question is should the likely increased US interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan be a ground for rejecting the American aid?

To answer this question, one needs to look at the present predicament of Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar legislation has been enacted at a time when Pakistan is passing through a most critical period—economically, politically and socially.

The economy is in a shambles and but for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, the country would have defaulted. However, there is no dearth of political leaders who aver that Pakistan should break the begging bowl and take ‘bold’ decisions notwithstanding the state of the economy.

Every nation, no doubt, has to take some bold decisions. But such decisions require a credible leadership. Do we have such leadership? Do we have leaders who can stand by the people in their hour of trial, who can share their enormous wealth with the masses, and are ready to part with their privileged position in society? It is a nice political slogan that the nation should prefer eating grass to begging for foreign assistance.

But who will eat grass? The leaders who say this have a most luxurious lifestyle, which will make even the richest in the developed world envious of them, and have scores of gun-toting body guards to protect them.

Such leaders can hardly be expected to share the price of safeguarding state sovereignty with the people. Hence, it will be the ordinary people, already squeezed by the galloping inflation in an increasingly laissez-faire economy, who will have to pay the price. It is hard to take bold decisions when such leaders are around.

And rejecting the Kerry-Lugar legislation will be a very bold decision probably beyond the competence of the present leadership on both sides of the political divide.