THE recently enacted Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 of the United States (Kerry-Lugar law) has come in for adverse criticism from various quarters for allegedly being a blatant attempt to undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan and to create a rift between civilian and military institutions.

The opponents of the Act have called upon the government to reject it, because, according to them, the conditions for US assistance thereunder are too stringent.

The government, on its part, has defended the legislation as it promises increased economic and military assistance to Pakistan at a time when the country is in dire need of foreign capital inflows. The government had also launched a diplomatic initiative to get the conditionalities contained in the Act softened.

However, all that those efforts realised was an explanatory statement accompanying the legislation denying that Washington disregarded the sovereignty of Islamabad. Hence, now the Pakistan government has the Hobson’s choice to either accept the Act as it is or reject it altogether.

The Kerry-Lugar law provides for annual economic assistance of $1.5 billion to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014. The purposes of the assistance include consolidation of democratic institutions, supporting expansion of rule of law, promoting sustainable economic development, supporting investment in people and strengthening public diplomacy.

The assistance period may be extended to another five years (till 2019) ‘subject to an improving political and economic climate in Pakistan.’ However, half of the total annual assistance ($750 million) will be subject to certification by the president’s special representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan to Congress that the aid is making ‘reasonable’ progress towards achieving principal objectives of US assistance to Pakistan.

This condition may be waived if the secretary of state certifies that such a waiver is in national security interest of the US. The civilian assistance will be audited by the concerned US authorities/departments for which they may establish their offices in Pakistan.

The legislation also provides for unspecified amount of security or military assistance to Pakistan for the period 2010-2014. The purposes of such assistance are to: support Pakistan’s counter-insurgency capability, improve border security including preventing any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or conduit for terrorist activities, coordinate action against extremists and terrorists, and help consolidate democracy in Pakistan including promoting control of military institutions by a civilian, elected government.

The security assistance, as well as export of arms to Pakistan, will not be made unless the secretary of state certifies to Congress that: (a) Pakistan is cooperating with the US in efforts to dismantle nuclear supplier networks, such as providing information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals linked to such networks; (b) Pakistan is making ‘significant’ efforts towards combating terrorist groups; and (c) security forces of Pakistan (including the armed forces and intelligence agencies) are not “materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.” Additionally, the security assistance will only be provided to ‘civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan’. However, this condition may be waived if doing so is in national security interest of the US.

The legislation further provides for a report to be submitted to Congress by the secretary of state describing US policy and strategy with respect to aid to Pakistan under this Act. The president will be required to develop a comprehensive regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan. A report to this effect will be submitted to Congress. The Act also provides for monitoring reports to be submitted by the secretary of state to Congress.

The reports, inter alia, will carry an evaluation of the efforts made by the Pakistan government in dismantling terrorist groups, closing terrorist camps, ceasing support for terrorists and extremists, preventing attacks into neighbouring countries, improved monitoring of madaris, closing madaris linked to terrorists/extremists, improving counter-terrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, and checking nuclear proliferation.

The reports will also assess civilian control over the military including approval of military budgets, promotion of senior military officers and military involvement in civil administration.

An analysis of the Kerry-Lugar legislation must take into account the fact that one country provides assistance (economic or military) to another if doing so is perceived to be in the donor’s interest. The strings attached to such assistance are designed to ensure that the recipient pursues policies that are instrumental in achieving the purposes for which assistance is meant.

This does not mean that foreign aid disregards the interest of the recipient. However, the recipient’s interest must in turn promote the interest of the donor.

In a nutshell, the Kerry-Lugar legislation promises increased US civilian and security assistance to Pakistan provided the country demonstrates the commitment to fight extremism, terrorism and proliferation of nuclear weapons—the major items on Washington’s foreign policy agenda. And the commitment has to measure up to US standards, because it will be for the US administration to certify that the level of commitment demonstrated by Islamabad is such as to justify American assistance.

In certain cases, that limitation may be waived but only if it is deemed to be in US interest. It is this conditionality together with the allegation that Pakistan is a sanctuary for terrorists who have the support of security establishment that lies behind condemnation of the Act.

However, from US standpoint, this conditionality is only logical, because the enhanced aid aims at increasing the capability of the Pakistan government to fight terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The provisions of the Act relating to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan, non-interference of the armed forces and agencies in political matters and civilian control over military affairs are rooted in the US perception of involvement of security forces of Pakistan in terrorism and nuclear proliferation. From American standpoint, aid is the means and counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation is the end. If the end is not achieved, the means are of little avail.

The war against terrorism is a drawn-out one. A relationship which is based on this war should also be long-term. Hence, the legislation exhorts the US administration to establish a long-term, multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan. The relationship will be instrumental in achieving American objectives all of which relate to rooting out extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and making the country a moderate democratic state.

However, this is not to suggest that war against extremism is not in Pakistan’s national interest. Rather religious extremism is a potent threat to the stability, security and development of Pakistan.

And therefore, it is the foremost duty of the government in Pakistan to stem the rising tide of extremism. Since it is the point where American and Pakistani interests converge, the pressure as well as assistance from Washington is likely to be instrumental in shoring up Islamabad’s campaign against extremism.

The policy framework established by the legislation will result in increased US engagement with Pakistan. This means that Islamabad will be under increased pressure to crackdown on militants and smash networks involved in proliferation of nuclear weapons. This also means greater US interest, as well as interference, in political developments in Pakistan at variance with the principle of state sovereignty. The important question is should the likely increased US interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan be a ground for rejecting the American aid?

To answer this question, one needs to look at the present predicament of Pakistan. The Kerry-Lugar legislation has been enacted at a time when Pakistan is passing through a most critical period—economically, politically and socially.

The economy is in a shambles and but for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, the country would have defaulted. However, there is no dearth of political leaders who aver that Pakistan should break the begging bowl and take ‘bold’ decisions notwithstanding the state of the economy.

Every nation, no doubt, has to take some bold decisions. But such decisions require a credible leadership. Do we have such leadership? Do we have leaders who can stand by the people in their hour of trial, who can share their enormous wealth with the masses, and are ready to part with their privileged position in society? It is a nice political slogan that the nation should prefer eating grass to begging for foreign assistance.

But who will eat grass? The leaders who say this have a most luxurious lifestyle, which will make even the richest in the developed world envious of them, and have scores of gun-toting body guards to protect them.

Such leaders can hardly be expected to share the price of safeguarding state sovereignty with the people. Hence, it will be the ordinary people, already squeezed by the galloping inflation in an increasingly laissez-faire economy, who will have to pay the price. It is hard to take bold decisions when such leaders are around.

And rejecting the Kerry-Lugar legislation will be a very bold decision probably beyond the competence of the present leadership on both sides of the political divide.

THE deadly blast in Iran’s Sistan province, bordering Pakistan, last October 17 has just added another gory dimension to the saga of mayhem and murder already engulfing Pakistan and Afghanistan. The wave of terror has reached the shores of Iran, a relative island of tranquility until now.

It’s an open secret that Iran has long been in the cross-hairs of those who would like to redraw the map of the region around Iran and Pakistan. They have developed enormous stakes in it, especially since the occupation of Iraq. Ace investigative journalist, Seymour Hersch, reported in The New Yorker, last year in spring, about the elite Special Services Group (SSG) sleuths and saboteurs being active inside Iran for quite sometime. SSG at that time was led by General Stanley McChrystal, since anointed by President Obama to bail him out of the Afghan cul de sac.

Washington has both long- term and short- term interests vested in Iran and these two have been running in parallel.

The long-term interest is to ensure that Iran doesn’t have nuclear power to threaten Israeli and American stakes—in that order, precisely—in the region. The short-term interest dictates, per se, that in order to guarantee the realisation of the long-term objective there should be a non-hostile regime—the euphemism for a caged ruling elite—in Tehran. It irks Washington enormously that the only piece missing on the chess-board it has been trying so hard to arrange for the region is Iran, which refuses to be boxed in.

This looks all the more jarring to Washington’s chess masters that a defiant Tehran continues to play ‘catch-me-if-you-can’ with them against the backdrop of a subdued Iraq, an

Afghanistan half in the bag, half still outside of it, and a Pakistan whose surrender can be taken for granted; it has never been more than a phone-call-away.

So much as some well-heeled Washington votaries—moles strategically ensconced in vantage places inside Pakistan as well as among the Pakistani diaspora abroad—may jump to their feet to pooh-pooh any suggestion of a conspiracy theory, a tactical nexus between elite American operatives inside Iran and Jundallah, the Baluch front that carried out the dastardly Sistan operation, can’t be ruled out. The abject failure of a foreign-sponsored scheme to stir a popular uprising against the regime—following Ahmedinejad’s re-election as president—the temptation to try another tack may have become hard to resist.

The Baluchs have been in violent ferment on the Pakistani side of the border for long. On the Iranian side the Baluch restiveness has been comparatively low-keyed. But one shouldn’t overlook the fact that a similar bomb blast, on a smaller scale, greeted Ahmedinejad in Zahidan, close to the border with Pakistan, during his campaign for re-election. That it didn’t light a fire under his feet, the next best option to give his government a rude jolt could only be to stir the Baluchi pot in Iran a little more vigorously. Interestingly, it was perpetrated only a day before Iran entered into crucial talks in Vienna with IAEA to thrash out the nuances of its voluntary offer to have its enriched Uranium further processed in Russia for use in medical isotopes. Those talks are making good progress.

But the Iranian leadership, ever so sensitive to criticism much less active opposition, hasn’t done itself any proud by coming out instantly firing at all cylinders against Pakistan. Roping Pakistan into the rogues’ gallery, along with more plausible suspects, just because the leader of Jundallah, one Abdul Malik Rigi, is said to be based in Pakistan was a knee-jerk reaction. It could only be symptomatic of the Iranian leaders’ fear of encirclement. But while it’s worth a sympathetic evaluation, it still doesn’t give them a license to beat everyone with the same stick. Pakistan, after all, is such an old and trusted neighbour of Iran and deserves to be treated separately from those whose animus toward Iran is so well known and proven time and again.

However, it doesn’t mitigate the tragedy Pakistan has invited upon itself. This should be a moment of somber introspection and reflection that a neighbour as old and close as Iran has had reason to point the finger, instantly, at Pakistan for complicity in the mayhem of Sistan, largely because of the common perception that it has become a kingpin in the American agenda for the region, of which Iran is a principal target.

Of course Pakistan has a sound brief of its own to argue back that it’s now being made to pay the heaviest price of the horrid chaos buffeting the region as a whole. It’s Pakistan fighting a deadly and costly war, in terms of resources and numbers, to make sure that the low-intensity war in next-door Afghanistan doesn’t flare up into a full-blown civil war on the Pakistani soil to challenge the existence of the state. Pakistan is guilty, no doubt, of having blindly taken on the role of a frontline American ally in the war against Afghanistan—a lethal legacy of that tin-pot dictator who’s now masquerading as a statesman of sorts to line his pockets with money doled out to him at stage-managed ‘lectures’ at American universities and ‘think-tanks’ (what an oxymoron).

Whether Pakistan’s alibi soothes Iran’s frayed nerves and puts them at rest is beside the point. What has far greater urgency and priority for the Pakistanis is to grapple with the fallout from a war that wasn’t Pakistan’s, in the first place, but has become one under the train of circumstances triggered by Musharraf’s sell-out to US interests and agenda in the region.

Pakistan is now reaping a deadly harvest of the seeds sown on the morning after Musharraf cast the die for a subservient Pakistan, all by himself at the cost of 170 million Pakistanis. The chickens are coming home to roost violently, without doubt, when the dare-devils of the Taliban can attack GHQ in broad daylight, or assault the precincts of the Islamic University in Islamabad with impunity. The obvious inference is that the high and the mighty lords (or robber-barons?) ensconced in Islamabad’s power corridors have not yet had any inkling of what an enormous burden they have taken upon themselves, and are proving thoroughly incapable of coping with it.

By the same token, have we apprised ourselves of what’s at stake in the latest, large-scale, military offensive involving 30,000 troops begun in Waziristan? Has there been any pre-evaluation of the geo-political and demographic fallout from a military venture started at a time when such an operation should be winding down because of the approaching winter?

And, given the fact that the offensive is focused on Fata, abutting on Afghanistan where there are a hundred-thousand–plus American and Nato troops supposedly fighting their own war, has our military offensive been coordinated with them?

Indications on the ground suggest that there’s very little, if at all any, coordination between our military commanders and their ISAF counterparts on the Afghan side. In a bizarre move, the Americans and their European allies have removed—lock, stock and barrel—each one of nearly half a dozen military posts they had been operating on the Afghan side of the border with Pakistan as soon as our military offensive began. It points to much more than literally stabbing Pakistan in the back.

Even a layman’s uninformed military sense would suggest that ISAF troops should be sealing the Pak-Afghan border with heavy deployments to deny any escape routes to the Taliban as the Pakistan army closes in on them. In pure military terms, it should have been an ‘anvil-and-hammer’ operation, with Pakistan using the hammer and ISAF putting up the anvil. Instead, the Taliban will now have all the escape hatches open to seek sanctuaries in Afghanistan to fight the Pakistanis another day of their choosing.

It’s deplorable that for years we have been black-balled for not sealing our side of the border to deny sanctuaries to the terrorists. But now that the boot is on the other foot, the BBC-type, instant analysts and experts are just throwing up their hands that it’s impossible to seal the border from the Afghan side. This is hypocrisy at its worst.

In political terms, it could only suggest that the American and Nato allies’ objective is to let Pakistan be saddled with a long-drawn conflict that drains its military assets as well as strains the country’s political fabric to a point where it collapses under its weight.

It seems the Americans are taking a breather, in military operations, while egging on their frontline Pakistani cohorts to fight on. President Obama is still pondering how to respond to his military commander’s cry for an additional 45,000 troops for Afghanistan to contain the Taliban.

The military-political paralysis in Afghanistan is worse-compounded by the macabre presidential election of two months ago, still without a denouement. Now that Karzai has relented to a second round, run-off, contest against his main rival, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the suspense over how the chips would fall in Afghanistan has only deepened.

The American and European sympathies in the contest between Karzai and Abdullah are obviously with the latter. Strange that they are now betting on a non-Pushtun to tackle the problem focused on the Pushtun Taliban and seek a political end to a costly military adventure that has very little to show for hundreds of billions of dollars spent on it, and tens of thousands of casualties incurred on all sides.

Whereas in Pakistan the betting, apparently, is on the army hammering out a military solution of the Pakistani Taliban, no matter what it costs politically. It should be a moment of concern for those successors of Musharraf who, walking blindly in his foot-steps, don’t know when and where to draw the line and say, ‘no more’ to their mentors.

CURRENT practices of non-con ventional banking in the name of Islamic banking are subject to criticism from several quarters. One of them is a group of economists. On September 27, Dr. Aqdas Ali’s article on Islamic banking, published in this space, represented the dilemma these economists are subject to.

To them capital is one of the four factors of production without which production and economy cannot run. Since interest is the price of capital, talking of its elimination is nothing but fatuous. The reason these economists think interest indispensable is that they could not understand truly what Riba is.

The Islamic concept of Riba is not just what interest in economics is. Riba is a broader term in the sense that it also includes some other transactions that are not called interest in economics. At the same time it is a narrower term in the sense that it does not include some remunerations that are named interest in economics. In economics “capital is man-made production factor” so if Mr A provides a machinery to XYZ company on a monthly payment of ten thousand rupes, economists will say that Mr A is charging interest to XYZ but Islam does not call it riba.

But we do not mean here that interest and riba are entirely different concepts. This is because in economics capital also includes money so providing money on fixed or determinable remuneration is interest in economics and riba in Islam. This is also not true for riba that it is reward for waiting because riba is said to have occurred in the transaction where you exchange rupees hundred with rupees one hundred and one even on spot.

There is also a misconception that anything that guarantees fixed return is riba. So when it is observed that lessor has fixed his profit by leasing the asset and seller on deferred payment has booked his profit without assuming the business risk of the buyer, the return to lessor and seller is perceived by some people as interest. First fixing or flexing the return does not render the transaction Halal or Haram. If return on money lent is benchmarked with LIBOR or KIBOR, return is not fixed but it is Haram.

On the other hand if rent of a house let is fixed, return is though fixed transaction and is not interest based. These misconceptions have led to the perception in some minds that Islamic banks are charging interest in the name of profit and rent. And this lack of apprehension about the definition of riba let us to conclude that Islamic banking is a mythical and a contradictory concept. Secondly business relationships with other party is not always that of participatory (risk sharing), it might be trade based (where you buy or sell) it is sometimes rent based (where the owner does not transfer title but right to use) and at times it is service based. Islamic banks are using all these modes of business.

The claim that abolition of interest will result in economic disorder and disaster is yet to be tested practically but there are strong theoretical grounds to believe the contrary. As above discussion cleared that ban on interest will not stop owner of building and machinery to earn rent from their assets nor will it bar seller to sell on deferred payment at price higher than spot, half of the question that how financing needs of the business will be fulfilled, is solved. For rest of financial requirements where money rather than asset has to be provided financing on the basis of risk sharing gives perfect substitute of lending. Even interest based lending is not entirely free from risk as here also downside risk exists if borrower default which is not rare. However the writing is not meant to elaborate PLS model in detail. We will just try to demystify Islamic banking.

Interest is a major contributor to social and economic evils but no scholar has yet claimed that all economic problems such as unemployment, inflation, depression, income inequalities, poverty, etc have sole

reason; interest. Banking is a part of economic system and above-mentioned problems have their roots in fiscal and administrative policies as well. It is also wrongly understood that only interest is prohibited by Shariah in economic activities. Unjust taxation system, gambling, restricting trade practices favouring one or certain groups at the expense of general public etc are such activities the have no space in Islamic economic system. Even in Islamic banking not only riba is avoided but other restricted practices of gambling, short selling and financing non-permissible business is also abstained from.

If western secular companies are opening Islamic banking branches it should not be a wonder to us nor do we think that they are convinced of the superiority of Islamic banking over interest based model. They are willing to enter into any new but profitable venture. Exploiting opportunities is their business which they earn from. Islamic banking should not be taken as spiritual or religious product but rather a business product. So it is not like Salah that only Muslims can gain rewards by offering.

That risk sharing is truly an Islamic mechanism is without any doubt but can it replace interest norm is a matter of thinking. We argue that logic behind risk sharing has partially been accepted long ago when first limited liability company came into existence and borrowers liability was limited to assets of the business. It seems very logical that while lender is burdened with lower side risk he should share part of profit of the business that is above expected return.

Conventional practice of building risk premium in lending rate does not give optimal result because it depends on the nature of the security and not on the viability and desirability of the investment. Suppose Mr A wants Rs10mn for an investment expected to yield 20 per cent and offers security of Rs20mn. Now even if the chance of the success of the business is 50 percent bank will be inclined to lend because of strong security.

On the other hand if Mr B has a project expected to yield 30 per cent and lesser chances of failure, he will not get the loan in case he fails to provide security. What is the impact on economy? Resources have been utilised for a project having lesser utility while economics calls for application of resources in order of utility. Thus it is justified to claim that PLS rather than interest based model can give optimal results.

The link between Islamic banking and Islamic economic system is a matter that leaves many confused. Actually the statement that “true Islamic banking is contingent with the establishment of Islamic economic system” does not imply that current Islamic banking is false. It has two aspects; first, parallel running of conventional banking with Islamic banks sometimes puts the latter in a position less favourable competitively, especially where their conventional counterparts, owing to no Shari’ah constraint with them, are able to provide the facilities which Islamic banks are not allowed by their charter.

Second, even the presence of Islamic banks cannot remove the social and economic evils caused by prevalent economic system thus the environment which banking industry is working in, is polluted which no firm in the industry can remain free from.

The allegation that Islamic banks are camouflaging the norm of interest under esoteric nomenclature such as mark-up, rates of return, profit ratio etc, is just over-simplification of the situation. Matching features in two things does not mean that things are exactly the same. Could we say that salary, commission and performance bonuses of a director have no difference despite the fact that these all represent compensation?

Similarly rent of a building, profit of a sale and interest on money all, though fall within the category of “return”, do indeed show different nature transactions. There is nothing esoteric in Islamic banking. This is just lack of our knowledge in Shari’ah.

We are not in a state of self-conceit. We do realize that milestones have yet to be achieved, dust of riba has polluted the whole environment and financial system surrounding us is a major hurdle to purity and chastity we aspire for. Islamic banking is an attempt at micro level addressing those who are reluctant to interest. For coping with problems like inflation and poverty attempts at macro level will be more useful and abolishing interest altogether would be an important part of it.

OCTOBER has been a cataclysmic month for Pakistan. The GHQ was attacked by extremists as was the police training establishment in Manawan near Lahore and the aeronautical complex at Kamra. More than a score of explosions took place in major cities killing hundreds and setting in motion a wave of alarm and panic across the country. With this backdrop the military operation in South Waziristan was launched. The political scene was no less hectic.

The Kerry-Lugar bill, which had been a subject of deliberations during President Zardari's visit to the US and was claimed a great achievement for Pakistan, became the object of great controversy among the political circles in the country. Though American aid has never been without conditions as had been the case with earlier Symington amendment in the sixties and Pressler amendment in the eighties, the furore over the Kerry-Lugar bill was extraordinary. The GHQ publicly expressed its reservations on the bill which tipped the already negative balance of opinion.

Then came the NRO which created two well defined camps in the country. Both these issues were brought up for discussion in parliament belatedly after a great deal of public debate. However, President Zardari and Nawaz Sharif met on October 26 after an interval of four months. There was no agenda for the meeting which ended without any tangible result, as was already expected by the political observers.

The conundrum of a functioning democracy has been a problem in our national life since the birth of Pakistan. Unless the nation correctly analyses the problem and, more importantly, takes practical measures to resolve it, we will move from coup to coup with interregnums of so-called democratic rule. The term ‘so-called’ is appropriate because apart from elections and a parliament, there is no actual change in society, nor an effort to bring about a change.

A callous attitude towards the pressing problems faced by the people and alienation of the rulers from the masses remains the general pattern when the military is not in power. People participate in elections with great hope and enthusiasm but get disappointed soon after. It is high time we learned something and grew out of it.

Every political system evolves from the economic structure of a given society. Parliamentary democracy, as we know it, evolved with the development of capitalism in Europe from the year 1500.

It has been a long journey for capitalism and a long journey for democracy. The landed aristocracy which ruled Europe during the early 17th and 18th centuries, arbitrarily distributed privileges and monopolies, exercised control on trade and manufacturing, and levied taxes at will.

The new emerging capitalist class found this unacceptable and required a new political and legal order for its growth and the consolidation of its power. The resulting clash with the feudal interests gave rise to a civil war in England. One king lost his head and another his crown, before the supremacy of parliament and capitalism was established. This is the classic model of parliamentary democracy which Britain's former colonies tried to adopt.

When the British withdrew from the subcontinent in 1947 the region that constituted Pakistan was dominated by semi-tribal, semi- feudal relations of production. Industry was at a nascent stage and mainly existed in the state sector. The bourgeoisie as a class was weak and consisted of some mercantile capital and professional classes.

White collar workers constituted the lower end of the spectrum. The capitalist forged an alliance with the feudal class and the civil and military bureaucracy to rule the new nation. This alliance also had the blessings of British imperialism.

Thus, the idea of a democratic society, though paramount in the scheme of the founders of Pakistan, was stillborn. It was this unholy alliance that was to blight the future of Pakistan.

Feudalism is not only a retrograde system but a concentrated expression of its political and economic construct in the form of culture is pernicious, pervasive and virtually perpetual. In many societies the cultural impact of feudalism can still be seen long after the feudal economic structure has been dismantled. Authoritarianism, bigotry, intolerance, and resistance to progress which are the dominating features of today’s society in Pakistan are a legacy of feudalism.

Therefore, even political parties and public institutions are run like feudal estates to the exclusion of the broad masses of the people. The bourgeoisie have given up their historically progressive role and instead opted to compromise with imperialism on one hand and the feudal/tribal elements on the other. The status of elections and parliament in such a situation is a little more than a farce.

This is not to suggest that elections need not be held. They must be held but must not be reduced to a mere ritual — a dangerous ritual of anointing a new group of people with a right to plunder the resources and oppress the people.

Pakistan today stands on the brink of an abyss. Growing American presence and total interference in government policies by the IMF and World Bank , economic meltdown, breakdown of law and order and pervasive corruption are making life impossible for most Pakistanis. The people naturally look towards the government which is a coalition of major political parties in the country. But it appears incapable of resolving the core problems.

We have been there in the past too. We have faced similar situations during the rule of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif in the nineties. Gen Musharraf's military rule is too recent to forget. The reason is not difficult to see.

The leadership of all major political parties comprises the same feudal, tribal and comprador elements and their allies, the civil and military bureaucracy — that has led the country into the mess it is in, in the first place.

This is irrespective of the distinction of a civilian or military regime. Their class interests are similar. Therefore, their policies are also similar. The recent sugar and flour crisis in the country and the helplessness of the government to tackle it is a vivid example of this.

Since 1970 when the first free and fair elections were held in Pakistan, the ideal of a sovereign, free and truly democratic Pakistan remains as distant today as it turned out to be then. But the solution does not lie in the forcible regime change.

For a genuine change the people of Pakistan will have to close their ranks, fight a long-drawn battle and determine their destiny themselves. They will have to create a genuine, viable alternative to the present political culture. How this would happen is difficult to say.

THE attack on Army General Headquarters in Rawalpindi has demonstrated that the terrorists have the audacity and the ability to strike anywhere and that not even the most heavily guarded installations are completely safe. It doesn’t matter that the attackers were quickly contained and eventually overwhelmed with most of the hostages they took freed. In psychological terms the advantage went squarely to the terrorists.

The attack on the Islamic University in Islamabad demonstrates that the terrorists have the will to attack any target. No place is sacrosanct. This is no longer a campaign waged by a hardcore group of militants against the state apparatus, the political leadership and western interests.

The old balance of terror which involved weekly attacks against high profile targets is being discarded in favour of a broader and more intense campaign involving almost daily attacks in major metropolitan centres on security-related institutions and individuals. The federal capital, which already looks like a city under siege, along with Peshawar and Lahore appear to be at this stage the principal zones of operation for the terrorists.

There are divergent explanations of the underlying causes for the escalation in terrorist activities. The government is of the view that the spike in terrorist violence is a reaction to the success of the Swat campaign and the growing antipathy of the public towards the violent extremists. The South Waziristan offensive and the drone attacks have turned the terrorist leadership desperate. In their desperation, the terrorists are throwing in their reserves hoping that an upsurge in violence may compel the government to negotiate a modus vivendi. Pakistan’s fever, the government assures us, will rise before it is broken and recovery can begin.

While there is merit in the official line it has all been heard before. It seems that the default setting of Pakistan’s sorry excuse for a political class is to argue that things will get worse before they get better. Regrettably, things keep getting worse after they get worse and after five years of bloodshed that shows few signs of abating and many signs of escalating, the old mantra is not particularly convincing.

The other view is that the militants are too deeply embedded in the fabric of Pakistani society to be uprooted by any number of military operations. Pakistan’s state apparatus has been so gravely weakened that it is not capable, whatever the government policy, of implementing the requisite changes on the ground. The police and intelligence services on the civilian side, moreover, are managed with such hideous arbitrariness and disregard for merit, integrity and efficiency that no amount of additional material inputs will enable them to prevail against the terrorists.

One claim that the government has made, perhaps to justify its inability to stop terrorist attacks, is that the planning for 80 per cent of such attacks takes place in South Waziristan. A victorious military operation in South Waziristan might well substantially reduce the number of attacks. By the same logic, stalemate (or retreat) is likely to produce a substantial increase in the level of terrorist violence. That the military is saying that this operation will take at least two months and has been candid about the determination and strength of the adversary is sobering. At the very least this means that the next few months are going to be exceptionally hard on everyone.

At the same time, the military’s candour inspires a measure of confidence in its resolve and rationality. In the longer term the military may have to carefully consider raising an additional corps and stationing it permanently in the Waziristan region while unilaterally proceeding with the fencing and mining of the Durand Line leaving only designated check posts for cross border movements. Such measures will no doubt provoke angry denunciations from the mayoralty of Kabul but given Nato’s astonishing unwillingness to help the Pakistani military plug gaps on the Afghan side of the border even with a military operation in full swing in South Waziristan, there seems to be little choice in this matter.

Military might alone will not be able to compensate for the overall softening of the Pakistani state apparatus. This is a point that is almost completely lost on both the political class and Pakistan’s foreign benefactors. The former, after each terrorist strike, issue condemnations and go boldly forth into television studios to regurgitate tired clichés about unity, the people, democracy, policy planning and the ever popular ‘fool proof’ security measures. The media laps it up while its cameramen and reporters provide coverage live from the battlefield elbowing each other to give the public a better view of the dead and wounded. While this publicity admirably serves the policy of the terrorists it appears that the government’s only real policy is publicity.

Pakistan’s western allies, if Kerry-Lugar bill is any indication, remain resolute in their faith in democracy, civil society, education reform, vocational training, women’s empowerment, etc., as the key to defeating terrorism. They are simply incapable of making the connection between the arbitrary and irrational exercise of power by Pakistan’s rulers, which undermines the executive functions of the state, and the inability of the state to implement policies.

It is not so much a question of insufficient resources but of inadequate administration. Pakistan urgently needs to restore the writ of the state not only in parts of the NWFP troubled by militancy but also in Karachi, Quetta and the rural and semi-rural hinterland. The intellectual and moral decline of civilian bureaucracy brought about by decades of political whimsicality and non-seriousness cannot be rolled back overnight. But, this decline must be reversed if the state is to be rehabilitated. Salvation by the sword alone is likely to prove illusory.

One illusion that is remarkably persistent is that ‘foolproof’ security measures can and ought to be taken. The problem is that there is plenty of proof that the terrorists are no fools. Of course, security measures can and do contain and disrupt terrorist strikes on sensitive and well guarded sites. But if the terrorists are adopting an Iraq-style strategy that combines suicide attacks on heavily fortified high profile installations with random acts of violence, suicide bombings and targeted killings, then no defence protocols can succeed.

The casualties that terrorism inflicts are in the eyes of the perpetrators a collateral benefit for what really matters is instilling fear in the hearts and minds of the living. It is not possible to physically cover every public transport, place of worship, school, market, hospital, restaurant, etc. To do so would entail the permanent disruption of normal life which is precisely what the terrorists want to achieve. Pakistan’s major cities offer target-rich environment and reactive security measures are hampered by quantitative and qualitative personnel and material constraints.

A more aggressive approach aimed at pre-empting attacks may make more sense and better serve Pakistan’s interests. Just as the military has gone on the offensive against militant sanctuaries the police and civilian intelligence agencies can formulate and implement security plans for the federal capital and the provincial capitals. These plans would require a concentration of counter-terrorism resources in metropolitan centres and include a comprehensive crackdown on terrorist sympathisers and support networks. They would aim to force the terrorists to choose targets outside the federal and provincial seats of government.

The panicked reaction to the report of firing in F-8 Markaz in Islamabad on October 22 show how frayed nerves are in the capital city. That earlier the same day a brigadier was gunned down in sector G-11 underscores the credibility of the terrorist threat. It is a measure of the government’s lack of imagination that it does not seem to have contemplated the fallout of its counter-terrorism campaign and failed to predict threats against soft targets or anticipate a change in tactics by the terrorists. One hopes that the government’s assessment of the ongoing escalation in militancy and terrorism is correct and that the militants are in fact running out of options. Experience and the fear that now stalks the major cities of Pakistan suggests otherwise.

The writer is a faculty member of the Quaid-i-Azam University, Department of History, Islamabad.

IT was a brilliantly calculated tactical move timed to precision and delivered with devastating accuracy.

Just when the cocky tribunes of the once truly ‘people’s’ party, but lately hijacked by Zardari, were literally dancing in the air, convinced that they had the numbers in the parliament to ram the ignoble NRO down the throats of a largely moribund assembly of befuddled ‘people’s representatives,’ the MQM pulled the rug from under their feet with a finesse its leaders and cadres haven’t, recently, been known for.

MQM’s unexpected decision to not endorse Musharraf’s palpably self-serving and clearly anti-constitutional ‘black’ law sent the PPP stalwarts into tail- spin. The spin doctors of Zardari had been counting their chickens long before the eggs were hatched. They were pretty confident that with MQM and ANP on board, and an ever-obliging Maulana Fazlur-Rehman always within hailing distance of the highest bidder, they could romp through the barrier in the National Assembly with comfortable ease.

In the abstract sense of the arcane numbers game the jubilation of Zardari’s factotums wasn’t all that misplaced.

With its own 124 members in the assembly; a 25-strong bloc of MQM supposedly in tow right behind; and an increasingly inane ANP throwing its 13 (little wonder this party has been behaving so weirdly!) hats in the ring, and not discounting JUI-Fazal Group’s six votes, the ruling elite could see itself touching the finish line with little effort. In the present house of 337 ( 5 seats being vacant in the house of 342) the victory target was 169; and the ruling party could always count on Zardari’s men to pick up a couple of independent members.

All that looked perfectly hunky-dory to the likes of Babar Awan and Fauzia Wahab to gloat that once the assembly put its seal of approval on the black bill, no court in the realm could undo it or breach the supposedly immune bunkers of the beneficiaries of Musharraf’s macabre largesse. But while the PPP heavy-weights were busy building their castles-in-the-air, and the people of Pakistan were grappling with Hillary Clinton’s very robust charm offensive, the MQM leadership, for a change, was doing some serious homework, as per Dr Farooq Sattar’s subsequent public affirmation of it.

Those doing the homework clearly understood the importance of their 25 votes in any possible reckoning on the floor of the assembly. Whatever permutation or combination could be worked out, given the sharp cleavage between the PPP and PML-N on the prickly issue of NRO, MQM, wittingly or unwittingly, had acquired the weight to swing the issue one way or the other.

Altaf Hussain’s suggestion, from his perch in London, to President Zardari to make a ‘sacrifice’ in the interest of democracy must have been shattering for him and his acolytes. Remember it was Altaf Hussain who had taken the lead, after last year’s national elections, in proposing Zardari’s name for president. However, the same proposer was now asking his nominee to throw in the towel and give primacy to the country over his own interest.

Altaf Hussain’s blunt call set the tone for his party to make a U-turn in its unabashed partisanship on Zardari’s behalf. In the process, they may have sealed his fate for all intents and purposes.

The obvious question, why did MQM choose to rock the boat for Zardari, has more than one answer.

For one, MQM’s vote of no confidence in Zardari is solely focused on him and his persona. He is the one in the eye of the storm. The people of Pakistan hold him responsible for all their plight, penury and sufferings. In the eyes of a common Pakistani, it’s Zardari who personifies rampant corruption and cronyism eating into the vitals of the country and

grinding them down into abject penury.

By singling out Zardari, the MQM has thrown its weight behind the public uproar in the country that faults him for all that currently afflicts Pakistan. Call it MQM’s first real effort to work its way back into the popular mainstream from which it has been noticeably absent, since that black day, of May 12, 2007, when its armed gangs held Karachi hostage and shut its doors on Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

The MQM volte face has nothing to do with the PPP and doesn’t impinge on the equation both parties have worked hard to cultivate and promote over the years. For that reason, it has let it be known that it has no intention of quitting the government. Well, that may reflect its cadres’ lust for power; they would like to milk the cow in their hands to its last drop. But, in a cynical way, MQM’s decision to hang on to power may have, unwittingly, done a service to the present democratic order in the country still struggling to find its feet.

There’s nary a doubt that if the MQM had decided to pull out of the coalition, it could have derailed the wobbly Gilani government, and opened the door for the dissolution of this assembly, and mid-term elections, which neither PPP nor MQM itself has stomach for at this stage.

However, the most powerful concern behind the sea-change in MQM’s hitherto unabashed flirtation with Zardari and his shenanigans could well be its desire to worm its way into Punjab, the majority province of Pakistan from which it has been so conspicuous by its absence. A clue to it could be found in the recent contacts between MQM and PML-N, the news of which was purposely leaked to the media to prepare the MQM followers, viscerally, for the change in the offing.

This scribe has long argued with the MQM ‘biggies’ in regard to the need for building bridges of understanding with the majority province: if you have to live within the federation, a modus vivendi with the political forces dominating its biggest component must be found. It’s something ineluctable. We should learn from our Himalayan blunder of not having cultivated the Bengalis when they were the majority in Pakistan.

Jumping off Zardari’s sinking ship may be derided by his votaries as unprincipled and self-serving. That may well be so. However, in the larger context of enlarging its own base and ridding the country of the blight of corruption and cronyism, it’s a decision that deserves to be complimented, especially in full knowledge of the fact that MQM cadres have benefited in spades from NRO, and should now be ready to face the music.

More than anything else, it’s an expedient move by the MQM to ingratiate itself with PML-N whose support would be crucial to gain a foothold in Punjab’s political culture. In fact, it is a quantum leap in the direction of its old nemesis. It may have been akin to biting the bullet, but it did so with some panache not expected of it, given its shady past. But the ball is now in the court of Nawaz Sharif. He has the challenge on his hands to not only give MQM the credit for its well-timed coup de grace against Zardari, but also meet it more than half-way as a senior partner, and not a big brother.

It can’t be dismissed as a flight of fancy that a genuine entente between MQM and PML-N in Punjab could also be beneficial to PML-N in Sindh, where it has virtually no presence as of now.

Taking the argument a little further, it’s high time, in view of the country’s life-and-death struggle against the nihilistic forces of terrorism and religious obscurantism, for progressive forces from across all ideological and party-divides to come together at some common platform to fight this epic battle as one.

The catalyst of détente between MQM and PML-N could encourage aficionados of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s and Benazir’s pristine PPP — as against the hijackers of the party under Zardari’s buccaneer banner — to jump ship, too, and coalesce around a moderate leader provided he shows some real backbone and doesn’t buckle under pressure. That would be a formidable defence against any attempts to shipwreck democracy.

IT was a brilliantly calculated tactical move timed to precision and delivered with devastating accuracy.

Just when the cocky tribunes of the once truly ‘people’s’ party, but lately hijacked by Zardari, were literally dancing in the air, convinced that they had the numbers in the parliament to ram the ignoble NRO down the throats of a largely moribund assembly of befuddled ‘people’s representatives,’ the MQM pulled the rug from under their feet with a finesse its leaders and cadres haven’t, recently, been known for.

MQM’s unexpected decision to not endorse Musharraf’s palpably self-serving and clearly anti-constitutional ‘black’ law sent the PPP stalwarts into tail- spin. The spin doctors of Zardari had been counting their chickens long before the eggs were hatched. They were pretty confident that with MQM and ANP on board, and an ever-obliging Maulana Fazlur-Rehman always within hailing distance of the highest bidder, they could romp through the barrier in the National Assembly with comfortable ease.

In the abstract sense of the arcane numbers game the jubilation of Zardari’s factotums wasn’t all that misplaced.

With its own 124 members in the assembly; a 25-strong bloc of MQM supposedly in tow right behind; and an increasingly inane ANP throwing its 13 (little wonder this party has been behaving so weirdly!) hats in the ring, and not discounting JUI-Fazal Group’s six votes, the ruling elite could see itself touching the finish line with little effort. In the present house of 337 ( 5 seats being vacant in the house of 342) the victory target was 169; and the ruling party could always count on Zardari’s men to pick up a couple of independent members.

All that looked perfectly hunky-dory to the likes of Babar Awan and Fauzia Wahab to gloat that once the assembly put its seal of approval on the black bill, no court in the realm could undo it or breach the supposedly immune bunkers of the beneficiaries of Musharraf’s macabre largesse. But while the PPP heavy-weights were busy building their castles-in-the-air, and the people of Pakistan were grappling with Hillary Clinton’s very robust charm offensive, the MQM leadership, for a change, was doing some serious homework, as per Dr Farooq Sattar’s subsequent public affirmation of it.

Those doing the homework clearly understood the importance of their 25 votes in any possible reckoning on the floor of the assembly. Whatever permutation or combination could be worked out, given the sharp cleavage between the PPP and PML-N on the prickly issue of NRO, MQM, wittingly or unwittingly, had acquired the weight to swing the issue one way or the other.

Altaf Hussain’s suggestion, from his perch in London, to President Zardari to make a ‘sacrifice’ in the interest of democracy must have been shattering for him and his acolytes. Remember it was Altaf Hussain who had taken the lead, after last year’s national elections, in proposing Zardari’s name for president. However, the same proposer was now asking his nominee to throw in the towel and give primacy to the country over his own interest.

Altaf Hussain’s blunt call set the tone for his party to make a U-turn in its unabashed partisanship on Zardari’s behalf. In the process, they may have sealed his fate for all intents and purposes.

The obvious question, why did MQM choose to rock the boat for Zardari, has more than one answer.

For one, MQM’s vote of no confidence in Zardari is solely focused on him and his persona. He is the one in the eye of the storm. The people of Pakistan hold him responsible for all their plight, penury and sufferings. In the eyes of a common Pakistani, it’s Zardari who personifies rampant corruption and cronyism eating into the vitals of the country and

grinding them down into abject penury.

By singling out Zardari, the MQM has thrown its weight behind the public uproar in the country that faults him for all that currently afflicts Pakistan. Call it MQM’s first real effort to work its way back into the popular mainstream from which it has been noticeably absent, since that black day, of May 12, 2007, when its armed gangs held Karachi hostage and shut its doors on Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

The MQM volte face has nothing to do with the PPP and doesn’t impinge on the equation both parties have worked hard to cultivate and promote over the years. For that reason, it has let it be known that it has no intention of quitting the government. Well, that may reflect its cadres’ lust for power; they would like to milk the cow in their hands to its last drop. But, in a cynical way, MQM’s decision to hang on to power may have, unwittingly, done a service to the present democratic order in the country still struggling to find its feet.

There’s nary a doubt that if the MQM had decided to pull out of the coalition, it could have derailed the wobbly Gilani government, and opened the door for the dissolution of this assembly, and mid-term elections, which neither PPP nor MQM itself has stomach for at this stage.

However, the most powerful concern behind the sea-change in MQM’s hitherto unabashed flirtation with Zardari and his shenanigans could well be its desire to worm its way into Punjab, the majority province of Pakistan from which it has been so conspicuous by its absence. A clue to it could be found in the recent contacts between MQM and PML-N, the news of which was purposely leaked to the media to prepare the MQM followers, viscerally, for the change in the offing.

This scribe has long argued with the MQM ‘biggies’ in regard to the need for building bridges of understanding with the majority province: if you have to live within the federation, a modus vivendi with the political forces dominating its biggest component must be found. It’s something ineluctable. We should learn from our Himalayan blunder of not having cultivated the Bengalis when they were the majority in Pakistan.

Jumping off Zardari’s sinking ship may be derided by his votaries as unprincipled and self-serving. That may well be so. However, in the larger context of enlarging its own base and ridding the country of the blight of corruption and cronyism, it’s a decision that deserves to be complimented, especially in full knowledge of the fact that MQM cadres have benefited in spades from NRO, and should now be ready to face the music.

More than anything else, it’s an expedient move by the MQM to ingratiate itself with PML-N whose support would be crucial to gain a foothold in Punjab’s political culture. In fact, it is a quantum leap in the direction of its old nemesis. It may have been akin to biting the bullet, but it did so with some panache not expected of it, given its shady past. But the ball is now in the court of Nawaz Sharif. He has the challenge on his hands to not only give MQM the credit for its well-timed coup de grace against Zardari, but also meet it more than half-way as a senior partner, and not a big brother.

It can’t be dismissed as a flight of fancy that a genuine entente between MQM and PML-N in Punjab could also be beneficial to PML-N in Sindh, where it has virtually no presence as of now.

Taking the argument a little further, it’s high time, in view of the country’s life-and-death struggle against the nihilistic forces of terrorism and religious obscurantism, for progressive forces from across all ideological and party-divides to come together at some common platform to fight this epic battle as one.

The catalyst of détente between MQM and PML-N could encourage aficionados of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s and Benazir’s pristine PPP — as against the hijackers of the party under Zardari’s buccaneer banner — to jump ship, too, and coalesce around a moderate leader provided he shows some real backbone and doesn’t buckle under pressure. That would be a formidable defence against any attempts to shipwreck democracy.

AT the outset of the classes I teach, I always address the question of bias in the social sciences. In one course — on the history of the global economy — this is the central theme.

It critiques Eurocentric biases in several leading western accounts of the rise of the global economy.

This fall, I began my first lecture on Eurocentrism by asking my students, How Eurocentric is your day? I explained what I wanted to hear from them. Can they get through a typical day without running into ideas, institutions, values, technologies and products that originated outside the West — in China, India, the Islamicate or Africa?

The question befuddled my students. I proceeded to pepper them with questions about the things they do during a typical day, from the time they wake up.

Unbeknownst, my students discover that they wake up in ‘pajamas,’ trousers of Indian origin with an Urdu-Persian name. Out of bed, they shower with soap and shampoo, whose origins go back to the Middle East and India. Their tooth brush with bristles was invented in China in the fifteenth century. At some point after waking up, my students use toilet paper and tissue, also Chinese inventions of great antiquity.

Do the lives of my students rise to Eurocentric purity once they step out of the toilet and enter into the more serious business of going about their lives? Not quite.

I walk my student through her breakfast. Most likely, this consists of cereals, coffee and orange juice, with sugar added to the bargain. None originated in Europe. Cereals were first cultivated in the Fertile Crescent some ten thousand years BCE. Coffee, orange and sugar still carry — in their etymology — telltale signs of their origins, going back to the Arabs, Ethiopians and Indians. Try to imagine your life without these stimulants and sources of calories.

How far could my students go without the alphabet, numbers and paper? Yet, the alphabet came to Europe courtesy of the ancient Phoenicians. As their name suggests, the Arabic numerals were brought to Europe by the Arabs, who, in turn, had obtained it from the Indians. Paper came from China, also brought to Europe by the Muslims.

Obstinately, my students’ day refuses to get off to a dignified Eurocentric start.

In her prayer, my Christian student turns to a God who — in his human form — walked the earth in Palestine and spoke Aramaic, a close cousin of Arabic. When her thoughts turn to afterlife, my student thinks of the Day of Judgment, paradise and hell, concepts borrowed from the ancient Egyptians and Persians. ‘Paradise’ entered into English, via Greek, from the ancient Avestan pairidaeza.

Of medieval origin, the college was inspired and, most likely, modelled after the madressah or Islamic college, first set up by a Seljuk vizier in eleventh century Baghdad. In a nod to this connection, professors at universities still hold a ‘chair,’ a practice that goes back to the madressah, where the teacher alone sat in a chair while his students sat around him on rugs.

When she finishes college and prepares to receive her baccalaureate at the graduation ceremony, our student might do well to acknowledge another forgotten connection to the madressah. This diploma harks back to the ijaza — Arabic for licence — given to students who graduated from madressahs in the Islamicate.

Our student runs into fields of study — algebra, trigonometry, astronomy, chemistry, medicine and philosophy — that were introduced, via Latin, to western Europe from the Islamicate. She also encounters a variety of scientific terms — algorithm, alkali, borax, amalgam, alembic, amber, calibrate, azimuth and nadir — which have Arabic roots.

If my students play chess over the weekend and threaten the King with ‘check mate,’ that phrase is adapted from Farsi — Shah maat — for ‘the King is helpless, defeated.’

When she uses coins, paper currency or writes a cheque, she is using forms of money first used outside Europe. Gold bars were first used as coins in Egypt in the fourth millennium BCE. With astonishment, Marco Polo records the use of paper currency in China, and describes how the paper used as currency was made from the bark of mulberry trees.

At college, my student will learn about modernity, ostensibly the source and foundation of the power and the riches of western nations. Her professors in sociology will claim that laws based on reasoning, the abolition of priesthood, the scientific method, and secularism — hallmarks of modernity — are entirely of western origin. Are they?

During the eighteenth century, many of the leading Enlightenment thinkers were keenly aware that the Chinese had preceded them in their emphasis on reasoning by some two millennia. By the end of this century, however, a more muscular, more confident Europe chose to erase their debt to China from its collective memory.

Similarly, Islam, in the seventh century, made a more radical break from priesthood than the Reformation in Europe. In the eleventh century, an Arab scientist, Alhazen — Latinised name — devised numerous experiments to test his theories in optics, but, more importantly, theorised cogently about the scientific method in his writings. Roger Bacon, the putative ‘founder’ of the scientific method, had read Alhazen in a Latin translation.

When our student reads the sonnets of Shakespeare and Spenser, she is little aware that the tradition of courtly love they celebrate comes via Provencal and the troubadours (derived from taraba, Arabic for ‘to sing’) from Arab traditions of love, music and poetry. When our male student gets down on one knee while proposing to his fair lady, he might do well to remember this.

On a clear night, with a telescope on her dormitory rooftop, our student can watch stars, many of which still carry Arabic names. This might be a fitting closure to a day in the life of our student, who, more likely than not, remains Eurocentric in her understanding of world history, little aware of the multifarious bonds that connect her life to different parts of the ‘Orient.’

The writer is Professor of Economics, Northeastern University, Boston, and the author of Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism (Palgrave Macmillan: 2009).