President Barack Obama’s new Afghanistan policy builds on his first policy statement in the last week of March this year and represents continuity and change. It aims at effectively countering terrorism in and around Afghanistan, stabilising Afghanistan and setting the stage for a gradual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The continuity in the policy includes the reiteration of the determination to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” al Qaeda and its affiliated Taliban. The induction of new troops implies a renewed emphasis on the use of coercion to push back the Taliban to reclaim the control of territory and assert the primacy of the US and NATO troops.

The change in the policy has manifested in four ways. First, the addition of 30,000 combat troops means that the US would have over 90,000 combat troops in 2010. The NATO troops are in addition to this. The US plans to initiate the withdrawal of its troops in July 2011.

Second, the US wants to work toward building the governance capacity of the Karzai administration by controlling corruption, inefficiency and poor orientations. This is going to be coupled with greater attention to training the Afghan National Army and the Police at a faster pace. NATO has also got several training teams for strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s security apparatus.

Third, the option of dialogue and accommodation with the dissident Taliban that are prepared to abandon violence is being kept open. Though the chief of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mulla Omar, has rejected dialogue with the Karzai government or the US authorities in Afghanistan, the latter will continue to search for accommodation with some of the Taliban.

Fourth, the US has re-emphasised Pakistan’s key position in its strategy for containing terrorism in the region and stabilisation of Afghanistan. While addressing the joint press conference with Indian Prime Minister in Washington DC in late November 2009, President Obama said that Pakistan had “an enormously important role” in the security of the region. While announcing the new policy on Afghanistan President Obama said on December 1: “We will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”

Many analysts are not sure if the US would be able to turn the tide in Afghanistan to such an extent that it would start withdrawal from July 2011. The track record of US troops in Afghanistan does not support optimism for the future.

Two other issues are expected to influence the outcome. What would be the new military strategy to dislodge the Taliban and hold onto the territory so that the Taliban do not return? Whether the military operation will be launched all over the Taliban-dominated southern parts of the country or the US military would first target some selected areas and then move to new areas after consolidating the position in the selected areas first?

The other issue pertains to capacity building of the Kabul administration. Given the abysmal performance of the Afghan government since Hamid Karzai assumed power (December 2001), one wonders if its governance capacity can be significantly improved in the next 18 months.

The greater challenge is to build a professional army out of the present army that includes a large number of loyalists of Tajik and Uzbek war lords and local leaders. Their professional capacity and identification with the Afghan nation-state are dubious. More attention will be required to improve the quality of police training. Further, there are serious complaints of absence of full determination to fight the Taliban because the elements within the Afghan Army are either sympathetic to or afraid of the Taliban.

The Pakistan government is favourably disposed towards the latest troops surge and the US determination to fight terrorism. Pakistan is expected to cooperate with the US but Pakistan and the US differ on the operational side of fighting terrorism. President Obama’s assertion about a ‘safe-haven’ for al Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the ‘threats’ to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are bound to cause strains in their relations. Pakistan’s official circles feel that the US is overplaying these issues, which do not help problem solving. Capitalising on US statements, India uses these two issues for propaganda against Pakistan. Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction that Obama has raised the issue of safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Pakistan’s security authorities are not convinced that they should change their counter-terrorism strategies as and when demanded by the US. Pakistan cannot afford to open all counter-terrorism fronts simultaneously at a time when the Indian military and diplomatic pressure is a genuine threat. Different terrorist fronts are: the militants based in Punjab, the Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Waziristan, other militant groups and the Taliban in other tribal agencies, the networks of Haqqani, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar and some al Qaeda elements. Pakistan does not have capacity to simultaneously launch offensives against all of them. It is moving in a graduated manner, focusing first on the elements that directly threaten Pakistan.

The Pakistan military and the civilian government can no longer be accused of ambiguity on the Taliban and other terrorist groups. They have developed unanimity of views on coping with terrorism.

There is a strong feeling in Pakistan’s official and non-official circles that the US does not pay adequate attention to Pakistan’s perspective on the security issues of the region. Pakistan is perturbed by Indian campaign against Pakistan in connection with the Mumbai terrorist incident and its alleged use of Afghan territory for helping dissident elements in Balochistan and the Taliban in the tribal areas. Pakistan expects the US to help ease this pressure and show an understanding of how Pakistan is dealing with the terrorist threat in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan.

The major Pakistani concern is the possible US response if Pakistan is unwilling or unable to satisfy the US on the safe haven issue and does not take action against the groups identified by the US. The lack of understanding of the Pakistani perspective on these issues is likely to cause serious strains in Pakistan-US relations.

In case Pakistan does not remove these safe havens to US satisfaction, will the US expand and intensify drone attacks? Will the US send its special forces into Pakistani tribal areas? These strategies, especially the use of ground forces in Pakistani territory, will be highly destabilising for Pakistan.

In case US troops are not able to tame the Taliban in Afghanistan, there will be a lot of domestic American pressure on the Obama Administration by those who have opposed the current surge. They will describe this as the failure of the Obama Administration, which will have negative ramifications for Obama’s political future. In such a situation, the US may deflect domestic pressure by resorting to military action in Pakistan’s tribal areas for destroying the safe havens of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Pakistan and the US need to evolve a shared approach to deal with each other’s security concerns so that they can cooperate for implementation of new US policy in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs to be assured how US troops would behave in the coming months. Any unilateral attempt to coerce Pakistan to comply with the US agenda in the region is likely to threaten the internal political order and stability in Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

__________________
CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier