Is terrorism the gravest internal threat to Pakistan? The answer is yes and no. Any quick review of Pakistan’s domestic situation shows beyond doubt that the Pakistani state and society are threatened by religious extremism and terrorism. The frequent suicide and car bombings in Peshawar have posed the most serious security challenge, not merely to the city, but also to the whole country.

However, the political disposition of the major political parties like the PML-N, PML-Q and MQM hardly suggests that terrorism is a major threat to Pakistan. If we aggregate the statements of the senior leaders of these parties over the last one month, terrorism appears to be a low priority issue. Their leadership condemns bomb blasts but they hardly talk of the overall threat of terrorism and how to cope with it.

The only parties that talk about terrorism are the Islamic parties and, to some extent, Imran Khan’s PTI. These parties express varying degrees of sympathy for the Taliban and describe them as a friend of Pakistan. They are opposed to the ongoing security operations against the Taliban in the tribal areas and want these to stop. The other major theme in their political discourse is a sharp criticism of the US policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The anti-US perspective makes it easy for Islamic parties to communicate with other sections of the political circles, including the major political parties, because anti-US sentiments are shared in varying degrees by the activists of the major political parties and others.

Islamic parties are vocal in expressing their perspective on terrorism and the US role in the region. Major parties like the PML-N, PML-Q and MQM pursue an ambiguous position on these issues. They express tepid criticism of terrorist incidents and support security operations. However, they do not want their support to countering terrorism as being seen as an endorsement of the federal government’s counter-terrorism policy.

The PPP faces a difficult situation. It has to support all aspects of counter-terrorism policy because the ultimate responsibility to cope with this threat is that of the PPP-led federal government. However, the PPP government’s faltering political support and erratic interaction with its allies diverts its attention from counter-terrorism to political survival.

Despite the acuteness of internal challenges, the political parties are finding it difficult to rise above their partisan interests. Their major interests have tended to focus on building pressure on the PPP with reference to the text of the Kerry-Lugar law, the NRO and how far its non-approval by the parliament would cause political problems for the PPP leadership, especially President Asif Ali Zardari.

It is a positive development that in his recent interview to a private television channel, Nawaz Sharif has delinked himself from the rumours about the possible changes in the political arrangements at the federal level. He has also vowed to contest any attempt to change the government by unconstitutional means.

Nawaz Sharif’s current conciliatory tone is in sharp contrast to his confrontational style in the aftermath of the Supreme Court judgment to disqualify him and Shahbaz Sharif from contesting elections and the imposition of Governor’s rule in Punjab (February 2009). This implies that the changed style reflects the contextual change rather than a change of heart. Further, Nawaz Sharif’s soft tone needs to filter down to the second line of the PML-N leadership that has been toeing a hawkish approach inside and outside parliament towards the PPP government for the last couple of months.

The political parties have a tendency to revert to their traditional style of engaging in a war of words whenever their partisan interests demand. This trend manifested itself in a stark manner during the recently concluded elections to the legislative assembly in Gilgit-Baltistan. The major political parties, the PML-N, PML-Q, MQM and PPP, accused each other of manipulating the elections, including the use of violence. The political discourse of some of the parties was non-democratic and highly confrontational.

A new series of polemical exchanges is expected to start from November 28 when the NRO lapses. Legal experts diverge on the status of the cases settled under the NRO. The political elements targeting the PPP leaders would seek the revival of the cases and demand the resignation of such leaders from official positions. One is not sure what will be the disposition of the MQM whose leaders and activists have also benefitted from the NRO.

The opposition is hoping that either the Supreme Court will interpret the post-NRO legal position of the settled cases in a manner that the PPP government, especially President Zardari, find it difficult to hold on to power, or the military will pressure Zardari to quit. Alternatively, the political forces will return to their confrontational politics for political changes.

The PPP also needs to review its political strategy in the context of new ground realities marked by the growing popular alienation from the PPP and dissatisfaction about the performance of its government even among the PPP circles. Some of the PPP’s problems are of its own making. These are the outcome of a dismissive attitude of the presidency towards the capacity of the opposition to build pressure and the failure of the presidency to honour its commitment on constitutional and political changes.

Pakistan’s political leadership needs to recognise that the current challenges to internal political and social coherence, order and stability cannot be addressed effectively if they continue with their current political disposition and methods. Whether in power or not, they need to rise above their narrow partisan interests and immediate gains and focus on a long term perspective and shared goals. They can continue trading charges and counter-charges, score points against each other and create partisan political narratives. But if the present political system cannot survive, the political class will be the main loser. Power will either shift to the streets or powerful and integrated state institutions will once again adopt a hegemonic role.

The key issue is not whether the PPP is a better ruler or the PML-N. The survival of the current political order is at stake. The challenge of terrorism and a faltering economy threaten to unravel the political system.

Even if Zardari is out of office and the PPP government collapses, what is the guarantee that the PML-N government will perform better if the present ills of the political system are not rectified? How do we know that one civilian leadership will definitely be replaced by another civilian leadership?

The political leaders and parties need to give up, at least temporarily, their efforts to delegitimise each other and pull each other down. By doing this they are hastening the collapse of the current democratic order. They need to discard their highly partisan and personalised worldview and pool their resources for elimination of the various manifestations of terrorism because these threaten Pakistan rather than the ruling party. The other immediate threat is the troubled economy that cannot currently sustain itself without external support. All political leaders should pay attention to improving the economy and reducing its dependence on foreign doles. Non-recognition of these problems and spending more energy on their partisan interests or non-issues will reduce their options.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

Pakistan’s politics is always at boiling point because the key political players pursue their political discourse in an election campaign mode. The government and the opposition engage in political wrangling on each and every issue and trade charges and counter-charges. Partisan considerations and the attempts to delegitimise the role of the political adversary are the hallmarks of our politics.

President Asif Ali Zardari’s address to the PPP convention on November 25 was a defiant rejoinder to the pressures generated on him and the PPP government by the opposition parties over the last couple of months. The opposition had been successful in creating the impression that Zardari’s days in the presidency were numbered. Many people in the opposition ranks, especially the PML-N, thought that either he would quit under intense political pressure, or the military top brass would force him to resign, or the Supreme Court would knock him out. The opposition never talked of his removal through parliament because they know that they do not have the required votes to impeach him.

For the last six months or so, various opposition leaders and parties seem to be targeting the PPP-led federal government in general and Zardari in particular. A section of the media has also joined this campaign. The debate on the trial of Musharraf, the Kerry-Lugar Law, the NRO and the minus-one formula shows the targeted and personalised nature of the campaign.

The most interesting posture was adopted by the MQM, which is a coalition partner of the PPP. It refused to support the NRO, forcing the government to abandon its effort to seek parliamentary approval for the Ordinance. The MQM maintained that it did not benefit from the NRO. Later, its leaders argued that its activists were not involved in corruption cases. However, the list of the NRO beneficiaries showed that the MQM was the major beneficiary among the political parties. A large number of criminal cases were withdrawn against its senior leaders and other activists. The MQM defended itself by arguing that none of its members were involved in financial corruption and that the criminal cases against its leaders and activists were false, implying that the PPP whose12 names appeared in the NRO beneficiary list was the culprit. This strained MQM-PPP relations, especially when Sindh’s interior minister threatened to reopen these criminal cases against the MQM activists.

Meanwhile, the PML-N and other opposition parties focused only on the alleged corruption by 12 PPP leaders rather than talking about the 8,041 people who got their cases cleared under the NRO. A section of the media joined this campaign.

Zardari’s rejoinder may not silence the opposition. In fact, they now have additional reasons to take him on and build pressure on the PPP-led government. The key issue is not who is corrupt or criminal and whether the PPP and Zardari should stay in power. The political leaders need to do serious soul searching whether their political activities are helping or hindering democracy.

The statements of the political leaders hardly address the most serious challenges of internal security, terrorism and the economy. These issues get a passing reference as a part of criticism of the government. Their statements reflect their narrow partisan efforts to delegitimise each other. Their focus is on the trial of General Musharraf, the Kerry-Lugar Law, the presence of US private security personnel in Pakistan, the NRO, and how to pull down the government. The political leaders need to stop their elitist and personalised point scoring and check what the concerns of the ordinary people are.

Pakistan’s political class is amorphous, diversified and highly polarised. It is interesting to note that with the exception of Islamic parties, this class has become less ideological. The decline of ideology makes it easy to adopt a flexible political approach. However, this makes politics more partisan, personalised and vendetta-driven.

Another factor that adversely affects the institutions of democracy and politics of restraint is the common practise of viewing defiance as a sign of power. The widely appreciated norms in society are tough and rude talking, open challenges to the adversary, especially when it happens to be the ruling party, and calling upon the people to defy the legal authority or disrupt civic life. A powerful person is the one who defies or bypasses the laws and established procedures. Most political parties preach defiance of law and authority to the people when they are in the opposition but expect everybody to respect the law when they acquire power.

There is a tendency to apply the principles of puritanical justice, honesty and merit to the political adversaries, especially the government. However, there is very little, if any, effort to apply these principles to one’s own conduct. There have been complaints of financial corruption, nepotism, violation of merit and the use of the state apparatus for serving personal and partisan interests against all civilian governments since1988.

The experience of Pakistan suggests that sections of the political class have joined hands with the military to dislodge their civilian adversaries. They seek immediate gains and sacrifice long term interests. If today the military and intelligence top brass revive their political ambition, they will not have much problem in co-opting some elements from the political class because of the divided nature of this class and a strong desire on the part of some elements to get rid of the PPP government or at least President Zardari.

The political class talks of democracy and constitutionalism but its overall disposition is heavily laced with non-democratic and highly partisan practices. The leading political groups need to step back from the politics of confrontation and engage in self-analysis to identify the much-needed changes in their political disposition and behaviour for sustaining civilian and democratic institutions.

If the political class is unable to create a credible civilian political alternative to a military-dominated political order, Pakistan’s problems are not going to be resolved no matter who rules — the PPP, the PML-N or any other combination of political forces.

The PML-N needs to soften its political discourse, especially the tone of the second line of leadership who persist in their assault on the PPP. This is despite Nawaz Sharif’s conciliatory tone. They need to focus on issues that directly concern the common people.

The latest MQM-PPP decision to hold back polemical exchanges is a sensible decision that needs to be adopted by other political parties to improve the environment of politics.

The PPP government and especially the Presidency need to recognise that their performance has disappointed many, including the sympathisers of the PPP. These ground realities should be addressed in order to defuse confrontation and seek common ground for bringing some of the opposition on board for addressing the common people’s problems.

The ongoing political tension can be reduced if the government no longer delays constitutional changes, implements the commitment to address the Balochistan problem, removes the impression of increased money-making activities in high government circles, provides some economic relief to the common people or at least explain why it failed to handle the sugar crisis. It seems a tall order keeping in view the government’s problems in policy making and management and the opposition’s impatience for political change to their advantage.

If Pakistan’s political leaders cannot come out of a ‘warlike’ political confrontation, democracy is not likely to endure.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

President Barack Obama’s new Afghanistan policy builds on his first policy statement in the last week of March this year and represents continuity and change. It aims at effectively countering terrorism in and around Afghanistan, stabilising Afghanistan and setting the stage for a gradual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The continuity in the policy includes the reiteration of the determination to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” al Qaeda and its affiliated Taliban. The induction of new troops implies a renewed emphasis on the use of coercion to push back the Taliban to reclaim the control of territory and assert the primacy of the US and NATO troops.

The change in the policy has manifested in four ways. First, the addition of 30,000 combat troops means that the US would have over 90,000 combat troops in 2010. The NATO troops are in addition to this. The US plans to initiate the withdrawal of its troops in July 2011.

Second, the US wants to work toward building the governance capacity of the Karzai administration by controlling corruption, inefficiency and poor orientations. This is going to be coupled with greater attention to training the Afghan National Army and the Police at a faster pace. NATO has also got several training teams for strengthening the capacity of Afghanistan’s security apparatus.

Third, the option of dialogue and accommodation with the dissident Taliban that are prepared to abandon violence is being kept open. Though the chief of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mulla Omar, has rejected dialogue with the Karzai government or the US authorities in Afghanistan, the latter will continue to search for accommodation with some of the Taliban.

Fourth, the US has re-emphasised Pakistan’s key position in its strategy for containing terrorism in the region and stabilisation of Afghanistan. While addressing the joint press conference with Indian Prime Minister in Washington DC in late November 2009, President Obama said that Pakistan had “an enormously important role” in the security of the region. While announcing the new policy on Afghanistan President Obama said on December 1: “We will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan.”

Many analysts are not sure if the US would be able to turn the tide in Afghanistan to such an extent that it would start withdrawal from July 2011. The track record of US troops in Afghanistan does not support optimism for the future.

Two other issues are expected to influence the outcome. What would be the new military strategy to dislodge the Taliban and hold onto the territory so that the Taliban do not return? Whether the military operation will be launched all over the Taliban-dominated southern parts of the country or the US military would first target some selected areas and then move to new areas after consolidating the position in the selected areas first?

The other issue pertains to capacity building of the Kabul administration. Given the abysmal performance of the Afghan government since Hamid Karzai assumed power (December 2001), one wonders if its governance capacity can be significantly improved in the next 18 months.

The greater challenge is to build a professional army out of the present army that includes a large number of loyalists of Tajik and Uzbek war lords and local leaders. Their professional capacity and identification with the Afghan nation-state are dubious. More attention will be required to improve the quality of police training. Further, there are serious complaints of absence of full determination to fight the Taliban because the elements within the Afghan Army are either sympathetic to or afraid of the Taliban.

The Pakistan government is favourably disposed towards the latest troops surge and the US determination to fight terrorism. Pakistan is expected to cooperate with the US but Pakistan and the US differ on the operational side of fighting terrorism. President Obama’s assertion about a ‘safe-haven’ for al Qaeda and its affiliated groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the ‘threats’ to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are bound to cause strains in their relations. Pakistan’s official circles feel that the US is overplaying these issues, which do not help problem solving. Capitalising on US statements, India uses these two issues for propaganda against Pakistan. Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister noted with satisfaction that Obama has raised the issue of safe havens in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Pakistan’s security authorities are not convinced that they should change their counter-terrorism strategies as and when demanded by the US. Pakistan cannot afford to open all counter-terrorism fronts simultaneously at a time when the Indian military and diplomatic pressure is a genuine threat. Different terrorist fronts are: the militants based in Punjab, the Tehrik-i-Taliban in South Waziristan, other militant groups and the Taliban in other tribal agencies, the networks of Haqqani, Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadar and some al Qaeda elements. Pakistan does not have capacity to simultaneously launch offensives against all of them. It is moving in a graduated manner, focusing first on the elements that directly threaten Pakistan.

The Pakistan military and the civilian government can no longer be accused of ambiguity on the Taliban and other terrorist groups. They have developed unanimity of views on coping with terrorism.

There is a strong feeling in Pakistan’s official and non-official circles that the US does not pay adequate attention to Pakistan’s perspective on the security issues of the region. Pakistan is perturbed by Indian campaign against Pakistan in connection with the Mumbai terrorist incident and its alleged use of Afghan territory for helping dissident elements in Balochistan and the Taliban in the tribal areas. Pakistan expects the US to help ease this pressure and show an understanding of how Pakistan is dealing with the terrorist threat in the tribal areas and mainland Pakistan.

The major Pakistani concern is the possible US response if Pakistan is unwilling or unable to satisfy the US on the safe haven issue and does not take action against the groups identified by the US. The lack of understanding of the Pakistani perspective on these issues is likely to cause serious strains in Pakistan-US relations.

In case Pakistan does not remove these safe havens to US satisfaction, will the US expand and intensify drone attacks? Will the US send its special forces into Pakistani tribal areas? These strategies, especially the use of ground forces in Pakistani territory, will be highly destabilising for Pakistan.

In case US troops are not able to tame the Taliban in Afghanistan, there will be a lot of domestic American pressure on the Obama Administration by those who have opposed the current surge. They will describe this as the failure of the Obama Administration, which will have negative ramifications for Obama’s political future. In such a situation, the US may deflect domestic pressure by resorting to military action in Pakistan’s tribal areas for destroying the safe havens of al Qaeda and the Taliban.

Pakistan and the US need to evolve a shared approach to deal with each other’s security concerns so that they can cooperate for implementation of new US policy in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs to be assured how US troops would behave in the coming months. Any unilateral attempt to coerce Pakistan to comply with the US agenda in the region is likely to threaten the internal political order and stability in Pakistan.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The political outlook at the beginning of the year does not appear to be reassuring for democracy in Pakistan. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led federal government, including the presidency, find themselves in a siege environment with pressures coming from the superior judiciary, the military and the political opposition, especially the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). One cannot go to the extent of suggesting that there is a carefully planned conspiracy to pull down the government. However, the political fallout of the developments in 2009 has raised doubts if the post-election 2008 system can stay intact for another year.

The political future of President Asif Ali Zardari is not the only thing in jeopardy. There are more serious issues involved here. Given the fact that Pakistan faces a grave terrorist threat and its economy is heavily dependent on external support, increased political wrangling and a ‘now-or-never’ struggle between the government and opposition can collapse the whole edifice of civilian political order. All political players will lose in the incident of the unravelling of the state and societal order.

The pressures on the current political arrangements are coming from four major sources, in addition to the threats of religious extremism and terrorism. These sources are the military, the judiciary, the opposition political forces and ineptitude of the government.

Traditionally, the military and its allied intelligence agencies have had a profound impact on politics and these continue to be important players even today. However, as the military has adopted a low profile and a subtle approach to power management, the superior judiciary has stretched the domain of judicial activism to build pressure on the civilian political elite, especially those in power. What has increased political bickering is the effort by different political parties to get political mileage against the PPP out of the Supreme Court rulings.

The confrontation between the PPP and the PML-N is going to intensify in early 2010 with a focus on the political future of President Asif Ali Zardari. The statements by Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari on December 31, 2009 clearly show that the battle lines are being sharply drawn. Nawaz Sharif targeted Zardari when he asked the beneficiaries of the NRO to resign and face the courts and argued that “the money deposited in Swiss banks was the property of the people of Pakistan” and that “it must be brought back to national exchequer.” This statement means that Nawaz Sharif has adopted the perspective of the hard-line elements in the party that have long argued for taking on the PPP in unambiguous terms.

Zardari’s address on December 27 carried a clear message that he will fight back against his adversaries. On December 31, he was more categorical in responding to PML-N’s growing hostility towards him. He said that he possessed some “political weapons which he would use when he felt necessary.” He did not explain the nature of his political weapons.

It is noteworthy that parliament does not figure in different scenarios that the opposition is constructing for Zardari’s exit. No opposition leader talks of impeachment of Zardari on the basis the corruption charges because the opposition knows that unsubstantiated charges do not provide a credible basis for impeachment. Further, they do not have enough votes in the two houses of parliament to adopt this method.

The focus of the PML-N is on the developments outside parliament. Three possible scenarios can be constructed. First, the Supreme Court strikes down the presidential immunity from criminal trial and then Zardari is put on trial and convicted. The most dubious assumption is that the Supreme Court will strike down a clearly written article of the constitution and disregard the internationally established political norm of certain immunities to the head of state.

The second scenario hopes that the military top brass will apply enough pressure from the sidelines for Zardari’s resignation and, thus, clear the political deck for the opposition. This scenario is based on the assumption that the military top brass will facilitate the opposition agenda.

Third scenario perceives the PML-N spearheading a nationwide agitation against the backdrop of the alienated judiciary and the military. This agitation will paralyse the government, forcing it to accept the demand for the removal of the president. The dubious assumption in this scenario is that the PML-N can launch a nationwide agitation at a time when its main support is concentrated in Punjab and its political standing is weak in other provinces. Perhaps some religious parties may be willing to help the PML-N but these political parties, too, have major standing in Punjab.

The PPP is not expected to give a walkover to the PML-N, especially when it has strong presence in Sindh and Punjab and has a reasonable presence in the NWFP and Balochistan. There are strong doubts that the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Awami National Party (ANP) and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) will join hands with the PML-N to oust Zardari.

Another set of assumptions relate to the continuation of the PPP government minus Zardari. The underlying idea is that Yousaf Raza Gilani will play ‘Farooq Leghari’ and join hands with the opposition and the military establishment to knock out Zardari.

The available evidence suggests that the minus-one formula is not going to work. The PPP is not expected to stay in office if Zardari is ousted. It will not be an easy job to create an alternate political coalition at the federal level around the PML-N.

If the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence/Military Intelligence (ISI/MI) help to contrive a coalition for the PML-N, how long the PML-N led government will play subservient to these king-makers? Will it be in a position to change Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy and pull out of all security and financial arrangements with the United States to satisfy its rightist and Islamist support base? If it does not do that, how far its policy will be different from the current PPP government?

The revised version of the Bangladesh model whereby the PPP and the PML-N are excluded and a government of technocrats, established with the blessings of the military and the judiciary, is going to run into political and constitutional obstacles. Any deviation from the constitution and established democratic norms, including the election of February 2008, will unravel the political institutions and processes. This will compromise Pakistan’s effort to cope with religious zealots and other extremists who are challenging the domain of the state. As the political forces get bogged down in unnecessary power struggle, these anti-state forces will have greater freedom of action, thereby causing the fragmentation of the state system.

The major political parties should show restraint in pursuing their partisan agendas. The PML-N and the PPP should work out a working relationship within the existing political arrangements. Any attempt to turn them upside down by any means and for any reason will be self-destructive for the civilian political forces. It may be easy to dislodge the present arrangements, but no credible political alternative is going to be available quickly.

The PPP should go ahead with the consensus constitutional amendments at the earliest. President Zardari needs to step back from active role in policy making and management and the federal government should devote more attention to improving governance. However, both the government and the opposition will have to review their present postures simultaneously, otherwise democracy can run aground in 2010.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Most political leaders and parties have long wish lists relating to domestic politics and foreign policy. They talk of the ideal solutions either to mobilise popular support or to apply pressure on the political adversaries. The government and the opposition use this strategy to criticise each other or to show that each can offer a better alternative than the other one. However, they pay little, if any, attention to the operational side of the proposals based on their wish lists. They do not talk of the precise policy options and the capacity to pursue these options in a given political, economic and security context.

President Asif Ali Zardari is now in Lahore for his much awaited visit to mobilise his party workers and demonstrate his capacity to defy the pressure generated by the opposition, especially the PML-N, after the Supreme Court judgement on the NRO on December 16, 2009. He embarked on this strategy on December 27, 2009, when he addressed a public meeting on the eve of the second death anniversary of Benazir Bhutto. He followed this up with his political footwork in Karachi.

While addressing the PPP activists in Lahore, President Zardari underlined the party’s commitment to respecting and strengthening state institutions and that he was for “no clash among institutions”. He also reiterated the PPP policy of reconciliation with other political forces in order to strengthen and sustain democracy.

This is a positive statement and nobody will disagree with this. The PML-N maintains a similar position on state institutions and democracy. Nawaz Sharif has periodically talked of the centrality of the civilian institutions and the need to protect and promote democracy.

If the major political parties want strong political institutions and robust democracy, why do political analysts often express doubts about the endurance of civilian processes and democracy? The answer can be found by focusing on how the political leaders pursue these goals. Strong institutions and democracy are part of their wish list but each party favours political institutions and processes that serve their partisan interests. Each party exercises the powers of these institutions in a personalised manner, preferring loyalty over professionalism and managing rewards and punishments as a patrimonial system.

Political institutions and processes cannot become viable without respecting their autonomy and enforcement of the rule of law for managing institutions and processes. Unfortunately, the political leaders often preach defiance of law, institutions and processes if they do not serve their partisan interests.

The major constraint on the role of parliament is not the 17th constitutional amendment. It does not restrict the powers of parliament in any way. If the president can dissolve parliament, the matter has to be presented to the Supreme Court within 15 days and the Supreme Court will decide if the dissolution is justified. In this way the president’s dissolution power is limited. Further, Pakistan’s political experience of the earlier phase of democracy (1988-1999) suggests that the president cannot dissolve the National Assembly without the support of the army chief.

There are political obstacles to parliament functioning as a supreme and effective lawmaking body that also monitors the performance of the government. In all parliamentary systems, the political leaders and parties make sure that parliament remains the focal point of lawmaking and related activities. They ensure that enough members participate in its proceedings and its committees function effectively. In Pakistan, the members and party leaders pay limited attention to parliamentary affairs. Their attendance is often poor and the National Assembly has to make much effort to meet the minimum target of working days as fixed by the Constitution. The present National Assembly had only 132 working days in the first year (2008-2009) against the constitutional requirement of a minimum 130 working days. The actual number of days when the National Assembly held its meetings was 97.

The opposition parties, especially the PML-N, have a tendency to use extra-parliamentary pressures to pursue their agendas, which adversely affects the role of parliament. The PML-N preached defiance of the government authority in its public meetings after the Supreme Court disqualified the Sharif brothers from contesting the elections and the federal government imposed Governor’s Rule in Punjab (February 2009). Even for restoration of the chief justice, the PML-N decided to go to the streets rather than moving a resolution or adjournment motion in either House. The same can be said about the PML-N protest against the Kerry-Lugar bill and the trial of Musharraf. It did not move any resolution in the National Assembly or the Senate on these issues. It preferred to apply extra-parliamentary pressure on the government.

Another example of dichotomy between the wish list and the working of the political leaders is the two-track policy of the PPP and the PML-N. Both parties talk of reconciliation. Their top leaders like Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif often avoid direct criticism of each other. However, the second line of their leadership engages in a war of words. The latest PML-N onslaught on the PPP was launched by Chaudhry Nisar Ali, Ahsan Iqbal, Khawaja Asif and Rana Sanaullah. From the PPP the rejoinder was spearheaded by Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, Fauzia Wahab and a few others. Nawaz Sharif has spent a good part of the last month outside of Pakistan, giving sufficient opportunity to his lieutenants to freely take on the PPP.

Neither political institutions can be strengthened nor democracy stabilised if the key political leaders use a highly personalised and non-democratic political discourse. Democracy cannot be promoted if political leaders do not practice tolerance and accommodation and stop using rude and offensive idioms.

The opposition political parties have a tendency to get fed up with the ruling party in less than two years and start exploring the options of getting rid of the ruling party. As Pakistan has a well established tradition of a change in government through military intervention, the political opposition does not mind thinking of options other than constitutional procedures.

The PML-N wish list includes the removal of Zardari, if not the federal government. However, it is not easy to get rid of Zardari through constitutional means because the opposition needs a two-thirds majority in both Houses of parliament to impeach him. They do not have the required number at their disposal. Therefore, they would not mind if he is knocked out of office as an upshot of some judgement of the superior judiciary or the top brass of the military forces him to resign.

The PPP-led federal government should work towards strengthening the political process by relying on political institutions, constitutionalism in letter and spirit, and paying more attention to improving governance. The government’s inability to address the socio-economic problems of the common people has undermined the credibility of the government and provided the opposition with an additional opportunity to mount extra-parliamentary pressures.

Civilian institutions and processes cannot be strengthened by sloganeering and by issuing impressive wish lists. The political forces should offer precise policy options keeping in view the operational, political and economic realities. They should no longer toy with extra-parliamentary methods and stop entertaining the hope that the military or judiciary can facilitate their political agendas.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

There are two types of politics in Pakistan. The elite or high politics focuses on the partisan and narrow interests of political leaders and parties. Their personal and party egos dominate their disposition. This also includes the key personalities controlling the state institutions like the executive, legislature, judiciary and military. They are influenced by professional, personal and corporate considerations. The other type of politics pertains to the concerns and problems of the common people. It focuses on their socio-economic and societal insecurities caused by price hike, growing joblessness and faltering healthcare, education and civic facilities.

The latest example of elite politics is the increased political confrontation in the aftermath of the Supreme Court (SC) judgement on the NRO. This judgement has created the spectre of a clash between the federal government and the superior judiciary, which could destabilise democracy and civilian rule.

Prime Minister Gilani assured the National Assembly on January 27 that “there was no danger to the present democratic system or any prospect of a clash of state institutions”. He made a similar statement on January 28. His confidence seems to be based on the constitutional provisions that stipulate that the president can be removed only by impeachment by the two Houses of parliament.

In a country like Pakistan where the governments are dislodged and the presidents are removed by military takeovers or manoeuvring from the sidelines, constitutional provisions are not an assured guarantee of security of key political offices.

Traditionally, the top brass of the military played a key role in the making and un-making of political governments. Now the superior judiciary is expanding its domain of power and stepping into what has traditionally been the sphere of the executive or legislature under the pretext of judicial activism.

Unless the judiciary and the military recognise that only parliament has the constitutional power to remove the president, the political future of the president will be in doubt and the clash of state institutions remains a possibility. Among these two institutions, the military holds the highest cards on the political future of the president. If it makes it known to the political class and the superior judiciary that it has no interest in Asif Ali Zardari’s removal through unconstitutional or extra-constitutional means, the current campaign for Zardari’s ouster will dissipate.

Some individuals, especially the prime minister, are making an earnest effort to defuse tension between the executive, especially the presidency on the one hand and the judiciary and the military on the other. If these efforts do not succeed, a clash among the state institutions can dismantle the current democratic process and create a more difficult situation for the military and the judiciary than the present predicament. There may not be a solution of the resultant crisis within the framework of the constitution.

Pakistan has lived from crisis to crisis and after every couple of years there are many people who project a doomsday scenario for the future of Pakistan. All such predictions have proved wrong. Let us hope that the possibility of the collapse of the current political system proves to be another false alarm.

The SC judgement on the NRO has created enough opportunity for the political opposition to target President Zardari for his ouster. The ongoing political discourse is focused on one person, although the SC judgement has reopened the cases of 8,041 persons.

The opposition demand that the SC judgement should be implemented is a code phrase for demanding the initiation of court proceedings against President Zardari on the basis of the revived cases. No opposition leader has talked of initiating impeachment proceedings in parliament against Zardari on the basis of corruption charges. They know that they cannot succeed, thus they are raising the issue outside parliament, hoping that the SC would suspend or disqualify him or direct the government to start court proceedings against him. They are also hoping that the army top brass would force him to quit.

The ‘Get Zardari’ agenda has led the opposition to give different interpretations to Article 248 of the constitution that stipulates blanket immunity to the president from all kinds of criminal proceedings. The well-known partisan interpretations are (i) the immunity does not apply to the cases registered before the assumption of office; (ii) court proceedings can be initiated and the court can pass a judgement but the judgement may not be implemented as long as a person is holding the presidency; (iii) the SC can waive the presidential immunity as provided in the constitution; (iv) the constitutional provision does not restrain the government of Pakistan from resuming the cases against the president in foreign courts., i.e. the Swiss courts. Some argue that Zardari’s candidature for the presidential elections of September 2008 has become questionable after the SC judgement of declaring the NRO as unconstitutional from the beginning. Therefore, they argue that his election as president should be declared illegal. An appeal on this issue has already been filed with the Election Commission of Pakistan.

No matter what the Zardari adversaries argue, there is no easy constitutional option available to them to get rid of him. Any deviation from constitution through the SC or the military would have extremely threatening implications for the future of civilian and democratic process and increase inter-provincial tensions. Three provincial assemblies have expressed confidence in Zardari. The Punjab Assembly, dominated by the PML-N, is the only provincial assembly that refuses to do so. Further, the ‘Get Zardari’ campaign is stronger in Punjab than in any other province. The PML-N has increased pressure on the government on the implementation of the SC judgement, especially some action against Zardari, and the new appointments in the SC and the Lahore High Court as recommended by the chief justice.

The current polarisation between the government and the opposition has nothing to do with the concerns and problems of the common people. If we make a content analysis of the speeches and statements of the political leaders of all political parties, most of these are focused on what can be described as elite politics.

Given the challenges faced by Pakistan mainly due to religious extremism and terrorism and the troubled economy, the government and the opposition need to pay more attention to these issues. Other issues that need immediate attention are Pakistan’s increased dependence on foreign economic assistance, declining exports and foreign investment and reduced industrial output. All these factors have negative implications for the lives of the ordinary people.

There is a need to bridge the gap between the preferences of the political elite and the concerns and problems of the common person. The greater the gap, the more insecure is democracy. If the current political trends continue, this gap is likely to increase and, as the political elite continue to pursue their self-serving partisan agenda, the possibilities of an institutional clash cannot be ruled out. This will cause a major institutional breakdown beyond the scope of the constitution.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

Two mutually unrelated incidents last week show the growing dilemma of a large number of Pakistanis to relate themselves in a meaningful manner to the imperatives of citizenship of a nation-state. They may talk of Pakistan and its sovereignty when it is relevant to achieving their individual and group agendas or to pursue some transnational Islamic vision. The key question is, can a person pursue any agenda on the basis of a self-cultivated aura of righteousness or highly partisan considerations while neglecting its negative implications for Pakistan?

The first incident is the statement by Maulana Fazlur Rehman of JUI-F in Peshawar that the military operation against terrorism is directed against a particular religious group and that the Waziristan problem should be resolved through dialogue. He asked the military and the government to side with the people rather than the US.

The second incident was ball tampering by Shahid Afridi in the Perth One-day International. He later maintained that he resorted to this method “in the heat of the moment as the match was a close one”. He knew that ball tampering was an offence in cricket but he was focused on immediate personal gains of consolidating his captaincy by winning the match without giving any attention to its negative fallout for Pakistan in international cricket. This revived the old controversy that Pakistani players engage in ball tampering.

These two incidents raise three questions. First, should personal or group interests and considerations override collective good and reputation? Second, should one focus on immediate and temporary gains without having a clear vision of long-term goals? Third, should a person consider the negative implications of any high profile action for Pakistan as a state in the comity of nations at a time when the growing perception at the international level is that the urge to function as a responsible nation-state is dissipating in Pakistan?

Fazlur Rehman, like other leaders of Islamic political parties, is opposed to military operations against the Taliban and other militants. Islamic political parties often function as the political front for militancy. They were the main supporters of the US policy of helping the Afghan-Islamic resistance to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and benefited from western financial assistance and weapons supply to the Afghan resistance. After the exit of the US from the region in 1989, the Pakistani state patronised selected militant groups, especially the Taliban since 1994-95, and floated new groups to fight in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Pakistan’s participation in the US-led global effort to contain terrorism after September 2001 was a major setback to Pakistan’s Islamic parties. They turned against the US and their differences sharpened with the Pakistani state by 2006-2007. They became more critical of Pakistan’s role in the war on terrorism.

Their disposition towards the Taliban is shaped by religious considerations and group interest. Some support is due to religious-denominational considerations, i.e. Wahabi/Salafi, Deobandi and Ahle-Hadith Islamic tradition, and partly due to ideological and political considerations.

It is interesting to note that some religious groups belonging to the Barelvi Islamic tradition condemn the violent activities of the Taliban but share their perception of an Islamic order on orthodox lines and that the US, India and Israel are out to destroy Muslims.

The Islamic groups and parties hardly take into account the threat of the Taliban to Pakistan as a state. They are not convinced by the assertion that no state can allow a group to impose its political and religious choices on others by force and Pakistan cannot allow some groups to challenge its writ and create a state within a state. The notion of the nation-state is peripheral to their worldview and they talk of the transnational concept of an Islamic Ummah or brotherhood.

Maulana Fazlur Rehman and the Jamaat-e-Islami leaders ask the government to stop military action in the tribal areas but they do not make a similar appeal to the Taliban to end violence against ordinary people and discontinue fighting against the Pakistan military. They often complain that the government has not opted for negotiations with the Taliban as suggested by the resolution of the joint session of parliament in October 2008.

The Islamic parties use the resolution in a highly selective manner. The joint parliamentary resolution maintains that “extremism, militancy and terrorism in all forms and manifestations pose a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the nation state”. Similarly, it suggests that “dialogue will be encouraged with all those elements willing to abide by the Constitution of Pakistan and rule of law”. No Islamic leader calls upon the Taliban to respect Pakistan’s constitution and law. They do not entertain the notion that citizenship of the Pakistani state should get priority over their transnational agendas. They are interested in protecting militant groups without taking into account their threat to the Pakistani state and society.

The Afridi ball-tampering incident can be traced back to the Pakistan state-sponsored education and socialisation project initiated in the mid-1980s by the military government of General Ziaul Haq. This pattern of education and socialisation lasted into the first decade of this century. State education, the state-media and the state’s reward system shifted the focus of young people from Pakistan as a nation-state, civic education in the context of citizenship, and cultural-religious pluralism to Islam as a transnational identity, religious-Islamic explanation and interpretation of the past and the present, greater attention to conservative Islamic ritualism, global conspiracy against the Muslims and admiration for militancy.

These policies produced a generation whose intellectual and psychological ties are weak with Pakistan as a nation-state and it invariably views the domestic and international processes within religious parameters. The main discourse of this generation is Islamic-conservative, and greater emphasis on public display of religiousness. Several cricketers have become Islamic preachers and there were reports of collective offering of prayers in cricket fields. This disposition has got nothing to do with professionalism and sports discipline.

With such a blinkered disposition, one can engage in offensive activities that cannot be condemned from a purely religious point of view. A ‘victory’ against the non-believers is a desirable objective from personal and collective perspectives. Therefore, the rules of the game and professionalism become secondary.

There is a need to reorient not merely the Pakistan sportsmen towards professionalism, discipline and rules and regulations, but also the generation of the late 80s and the 90s that seems to have been lost to religious conservatism and militancy. The focus of education and socialisation needs to return to Pakistan as a nation-state that cannot afford to be at war with every other nation and that diplomacy and good reputation count at the international level. Other issues that need to be emphasised are the obligations of a citizen in a nation-state, constitutionalism and the rule of law, cultural and religious pluralism and service to humanity irrespective of religion, sect, ethnicity and gender.

Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

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CSS 2009, 2010, 2011 Qualifier

The perspective of Islamic parties and the political right that expresses varying degrees of sympathy for the Taliban has seeped into other sections of society that either do not blame the Taliban for the violence or attempt to rationalise their behaviour


There is good and bad news from Pakistan. The threat of the Pakistani Taliban entrenched in the tribal areas has been significantly neutralised in Swat and South Waziristan by the security operation launched by the army, the air force and the paramilitary forces. If Pakistan’s security forces continue to challenge them in the tribal areas, this threat will further decline. Other positive signs are the recent arrests of some key leaders of the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan because the army/intelligence was perturbed by the support of the Afghan Taliban to their Pakistani counterparts. There is greater coordination between the army top brass and the federal government on countering terrorism.


The weakening of the Pakistani Taliban does not necessarily mean that Pakistan will get rid of religious extremism, sectarianism and militancy. These problems have strong roots in mainland Pakistan.


It will be an uphill task to effectively control religious extremism, sectarianism and militancy in mainland Pakistan. The consensus in the military top command, the federal government and the political class on countering terrorism is significant, but it is fragile. There is a broad-based consensus that terrorism and civic violence threaten internal stability. However, if one asks the question as to the source of terrorism and how far the Taliban and their affiliates are responsible for this, the consensus becomes thin and we find a lot of confusion and contradictions in the responses.


Another problem is that consensus at the highest level in the civilian and military establishment is not fully shared by the personnel at all levels in these institutions.


The perspective of Islamic parties and the political right that expresses varying degrees of sympathy for the Taliban has seeped into other sections of society that either do not blame the Taliban for the violence or attempt to rationalise their behaviour. Some of them describe the Taliban as friends of Islam and Pakistan and that the present spate of violence is not carried out by the 'genuine' Taliban, but by criminals and paid agents of foreign adversaries of Pakistan.


Others explain suicide bombings as a reaction to the killings in the tribal areas by Pakistan’s security forces or by US drone attacks. Still others think that the US, India and Israel are sponsoring terrorism to destabilise Pakistan in order to create an excuse to attack Pakistan and capture its nuclear weapons. There are those who hold Pakistan’s pro-US policies responsible for alienating the Taliban. Pakistan should stop cooperation with the US and work with the Taliban, which are fighting against foreign military presence in the region, they believe.


The Islamic denominational groups like the Barelvis and the Shias condemn the Taliban for violent activities and want the government to take tough action against them. However, a good number of followers of these denominational groups share the perspectives of the Deobandis and Wahabis that terrorism is a part of an international conspiracy by the enemies of Islam and Pakistan.


These dilemmas can be traced back to the military government of General Pervez Musharraf that pursued a dual-track policy of joining the US-sponsored war on terrorism and giving ample political space to the pro-Taliban Islamic parties and groups to continue supporting the Taliban and opposing the US policies in and around Pakistan.


Pakistan’s security establishment continued with the dual-track policy after the exit of General Musharraf. The army-dominated intelligence agency used its linkages in the media to play up the anti-US sentiments as a reaction to the US demand to Pakistan to 'do more' and the military/intelligence-related provisions of the Kerry-Lugar Law. The military changed its disposition in April 2009 when the military establishment and the federal government opted for a major military operation in Swat. By the time, this policy had seeped to the lower echelons of civilian and military establishment.


A good number of former military and intelligence officers who retired in the last four-five years — not to speak of those military/intelligence personnel who were involved in building up resistance to Soviet troops in Afghanistan — publicly question Pakistan’s pro-US counter-terrorism policies. Invariably they blame the government of Pakistan and a number of foreign powers, rather than the Taliban, for Pakistan’s current predicament. As they have retired not so long ago, one would assume that they reflect some thinking within the military. There were reports of a small number of army, air force and paramilitary personnel expressing reluctance to participate in security operations in the tribal areas during the last couple of years.


The sympathy for Islamic militancy (Taliban and others) appears to be more pronounced in Punjab than other provinces. As anti-India sentiments are strong in Punjab, the militants play on these sentiments to win over popular sympathy. Many civilian groups engage in sharp criticism of the US role in the region and India’s tough approach towards Pakistan in order to shift the focus away from the Taliban and Punjab-based militant groups.


The PML-N, the leading political party in Punjab, has an ambiguous policy on terrorism. Some of their key leaders have described the war on terrorism as an American war that does not serve Pakistan’s interests. Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif pleaded earlier this month with the Taliban to spare Punjab from suicide attacks because his government, like the Taliban, was opposed to General Musharraf’s policy on terrorism and that his party (PML-N) was not subservient to foreign (i.e. the US) dictates. The party also cultivated a Punjab-based banned sectarian group to secure votes in a by-election in Jhang. The PPP also attempted to win the support of the same banned sectarian group in Bahawalnagar for a by-election there earlier this month.


The PML-N leadership refuses to acknowledge that Punjab-based militant and sectarian groups are a direct threat to peace and stability in the province. There is little realisation that several militant organisations like the Sipaha-e-Sahaba, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-i-Muhammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Harkatul Jihad-ul-Islami and other splinter groups have become quite active in Punjab. They also serve as facilitators for Taliban bombers in Punjab.


The Taliban are just one dimension of the increasingly complex terrorism problem. Even if the Taliban were weakened in the tribal areas, the settled areas-based militancy, especially the Punjab-based militant groups, would continue to challenge the state. They will find new recruits for their causes and pursue their narrow, bigoted and uni-focal religious and political agendas.


Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Daily Times
Sunday, March 21, 2010
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The most serious threat to Pakistan’s political stability and economic development is the growing terrorist attacks by the various Taliban groups and other militant Islamic groups that use violence to pursue their narrow-based religious and political agendas


Pakistan’s societal harmony and political stability is threatened by the complex challenges of religious intolerance, Islamic-sectarian violence, militancy and jihadi culture against the backdrop of the regional and global environment that is not always helpful. These domestic ailments have compromised Pakistan’s capacity to cope with global pressures and improve its bargaining position in international diplomacy.


Pakistan’s most serious handicap is its troubled economy, which depends heavily on economic assistance from international financial institutions and other countries, especially Western countries, including the US. It faces acute problems both at the macro and micro levels, with growing economic pressures on the common people due to inflation, corruption and power shortages. Further, religious extremism and terrorism have dissuaded foreign investors from bringing their capital into Pakistan. Several Pakistani investors have shifted a part or all of their economic activity to the Gulf States, which has adversely affected Pakistan’s economy and weakened its links with the global economy.


In addition to the problems of the economy, Pakistan’s internal harmony and stability are threatened by Islamic-sectarian violence and terrorist attacks in different cities. This type of violence causes serious human and material losses and threatens economic prospects. Suicide attacks and bombings also cause insecurity among the people and weaken their confidence in the government.


The main sources of Pakistan’s current troubles are internal. Religious intolerance has caused social and cultural distortions in Pakistan. This builds societal pressures on non-Muslim citizens who face violent threats from various hardline Islamic groups and the state is often unable to protect them.


Sectarian violence has increased because religious intolerance denies the pluralist nature of Muslim societies. The activists of different sectarian groups fight gang wars with each other. Denominational differences do not adversely affect the day-to-day interaction among ordinary people who live in mixed neighbourhoods.


Sectarian violence is initiated by hardline religious-sectarian groups and their diehard supporters, who also subscribe to the jihadi culture. There were serious incidents of Shia-Sunni violence in December and February in Karachi. The most unfortunate incident took place on the eve of the birth anniversary of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) when the followers of the Deobandi/Wahabi Islamic tradition clashed with the followers of the Barelvi tradition who had taken out a festive procession on that occasion.


It is noteworthy that the students of a madrassa blocked the route of the procession, which resulted in violence. Earlier this month, some religious leaders with known links with a banned sectarian organisation were killed in a daylight assault in Karachi.


The most serious threat to Pakistan’s political stability and economic development is the growing terrorist attacks by the various Taliban groups and other militant Islamic groups that use violence to pursue their narrow-based religious and political agendas.


Pakistani state and society are threatened by reckless violence bred by the Pakistani Taliban, other militant groups based in the tribal areas, and sectarian and jihadi organisations based in Punjab and Sindh. The Taliban launch suicide attacks and bombings in and around government installations and places of public use, including mosques. They also execute their adversaries in public and throw their dead bodies to terrorise people and destroy schools, especially those for girls.


Pakistan’s civilian and military authorities have been taking tough action against them since the last week of April 2009, when they initiated a comprehensive security operation in Swat, followed by a similar operation in South Waziristan in October. Currently, the security forces are engaged in similar operations in other tribal agencies, especially in Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber and Bajaur.


Despite such a massive challenge of religious extremism and terrorism, a large section of politically active people do not fully comprehend the lethality of this threat. The conservative and orthodox Islamic groups and the political rightists are suffering from varying degrees of denial of this threat.


Most of them are not prepared to admit that they have a very simplistic view of the complex security situation in Pakistan. They would condemn terrorism and the killing of innocent people. However, if you ask them to condemn the Taliban or other militant groups, either they do not blame the Taliban and other militant groups or try to sympathise with their cause.


There are religious leaders who argue that the agents of Pakistan’s foreign adversaries and criminals engage in terrorist attacks and that the ‘genuine’ Taliban are not involved in such activities. They argue that the Taliban are true Muslims and friends of Pakistan and that no Muslim can engage in violence. Some openly name India, Israel and the US for sponsoring terrorism in order to destabilise Pakistan.


The ‘foreign devil’ argument is based on the Islamic discourse propagated during and after the years of General Zia’s rule. The Pakistani state socialised young people in regular educational institutions and through the media in Islamic orthodoxy and militancy. Therefore, the minds of a large number of people are receptive to what Islamic hardline leaders and leaders of the jihadi groups argue: that the whole world is determined to destroy the Muslims and Islam. They have a dichotomised view of domestic and global politics: we, the Muslims versus they, the enemies of Islam.

Such a state of mind develops sympathy for the Taliban and other militant Islamic groups, especially those engaged in fighting the Indian troops in Kashmir. The Islamic groups and militants play up the Kashmir issue and anti-India sentiments to sustain their support in society.


The denial problem afflicts the official civilian and military circles where the people at the lower echelons are not fully convinced that the Taliban can be held responsible for Pakistan’s current predicament.


A popular theme with the Punjab government is the denial of existence of the Punjabi Taliban, i.e. a conglomerate of jihadi and sectarian groups. Some Urdu newspaper columnists have argued that talk of the Punjabi Taliban is to create a pretext for military action in Punjab. A Lahore-based Urdu newspaper argued in its editorial on March 21, 2010 that the government should stop using the Pakistan Army against the Afghan Taliban, pull back troops from the tribal areas and post them on the troubled India-Pakistan border.


As long as covert support and sympathy for militancy and jihadi culture is present in Punjab, it is going to be an uphill task to get rid of religious extremism and militancy.


Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Daily Times
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Link

India has adopted a two-pronged strategy for coping with terrorism from Pakistan. There is a return to coercive diplomacy by moving its troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the India-Pak border and tough statements from India’s top civilian and military leadership


Terrorism and jihad overshadow India-Pakistan relations. The meeting of their foreign secretaries in New Delhi on February 25, 2010, failed to agree on a shared agenda for resuming the talks suspended after the terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The outcome of the talks could not have been different because the two sides had divergent official briefs to pursue. Pakistan wanted to revive the suspended talks on eight issue areas, including terrorism. The Indian side was there only to restate what its top leaders had already said: that Pakistan must satisfy India on terrorism before any other issue can be discussed.


Since the Mumbai attacks, India has reduced India-Pakistan relations to a single issue — terrorism — which is one dimensional, i.e. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). India wants Pakistan to decimate the LeT leadership and infrastructure or hand over its leaders to India as Pakistan handed over some alleged terrorists to the US. Other dimensions of terrorism and militancy that threaten Pakistan’s internal stability and security do not interest India.


India has adopted a two-pronged strategy for coping with terrorism from Pakistan. There is a return to coercive diplomacy by moving its troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the India-Pak border. This is coupled with tough statements from India’s top civilian and military leadership, including the repeated threat of "any action" if there is another major terrorist attack in India. There have also been suggestions of surgical air strikes on 'terrorist camps' in Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Kashmir, limited war, and the resort to the Cold Start strategy. India also launched a global diplomatic campaign to mobilise support for its position on "Pakistan as an epicentre of terrorism".


Most Indian statements and diplomatic activities are meant to deflect domestic pressure not only from the opposition parties, especially the BJP, but also from some circles in the Congress Party that think a powerful state like India should play tough with Pakistan.


Pakistan's policies towards Islamic militant groups and their terrorist activities have changed over the last year. Its military is genuinely engaged in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities in the tribal areas and the security authorities are taking limited action against the militant groups based in mainland Pakistan, especially in Punjab.


However, the LeT and other Punjab-based militant groups are at a lower rank in Pakistani priorities for fighting terrorism. The order of priority is:

1. al Qaeda,
2. the Pakistani Taliban and
3. their allies in the tribal area,
4. the Afghan Taliban and
5. Punjab-based groups, including the LeT.

The immediate and direct threat to Pakistan comes from the first three types of groups. The US and others interested in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan also focus on al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.


Pakistan does not have the capacity to take equally firm action — simultaneously — against all these groups when it has to keep a reasonable number of troops close to the Indian border in view of the ongoing troubled relations.


Instead of cooperating with each other to counter terrorism, India and Pakistan have returned to their traditional rivalry. They are now engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan. Their intelligence agencies are working to undermine each other's interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also made repeated complaints of India's financial support to the Baloch dissidents based in Afghanistan.


Another sign of increased trouble between Pakistan and India is the river water issue. Pakistan complains that India is manipulating the river water in Kashmir and working on new water storage and power-generation projects that violate the Indus Water Treaty. The Indian response is that water shortages are due to changing weather patterns and Pakistan's poor water management. India's Indus Water Commissioner visited Pakistan in February and March but the water issue could not be resolved. Pakistan is now planning to take the Kishanganga Dam issue to international arbitration. Pakistan's Indus Water Commissioner is waiting for Indian permission to visit the present and planned dam sites in Indian-administered Kashmir.


India has approached the US and Saudi Arabia for diplomatic support of its terrorism-related demands from Pakistan. The US sympathises with India's position and it has designated the LeT as a terrorist organisation. It has also taken up the issue of the LeT (now operating as Jamaat-ud-Dawa) with Pakistan.


However, the US is not going to do anything beyond expressing concern on this issue because it views al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as greater threats. The same can be said about Saudi Arabia. To them, the LeT is a lesser threat than al Qaeda and their allied groups, which include the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The current security priorities of the US and Saudi Arabia are more in line with Pakistan than with India.


The coordination between Pakistan and the US appears to have increased as the Obama administration launched a new Afghanistan strategy earlier this year, one that focuses on tough military action in Afghanistan, reconciliation with and reintegration of selected Taliban, and Pakistan's sustained military action in the tribal areas. These new strategies aim at creating conducive conditions for a gradual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.


Greater attention on the future of Afghanistan will make the US and other Western states less receptive to India's single item terrorism agenda against Pakistan. India will face increased diplomatic persuasion to improve relations with Pakistan so that the latter can devote full attention to the tribal areas and the Afghan border.


India and Pakistan need to adopt the following steps to neutralise militants from imposing their agenda on Indo-Pakistan relations:


1. India should agree to a comprehensive dialogue on all contentious issues and work towards resolving the less contentious ones. Improved relations create more space for Pakistan to take firmer action against the groups known for their activities in Kashmir and India.


2. There is no military option available to India and Pakistan for solving their bilateral problems. India’s prime minister should not pay attention to those talking about a limited war, surgical air strikes or Cold Start.


3. Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment need to give up altogether the use of jihadis for pursuing their agenda in Kashmir. The blowback of the jihad strategy has undermined Pakistan’s internal harmony and stability. Pakistan can no longer afford such a self-destructive strategy.


4. As immediate confidence-building measures, the two sides should address the water issue, encourage more trade and movement of people across the LoC in Kashmir and liberalise the visa and travel regime.


Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
Daily Times
Sunday, April 4, 2010
Link