Killings During Disarming of East Pakistan Units

28. In the evidence specific allegations were made before the Commission that Lt. Col. Yakub Malik, CO
of 53 Field Regiment was responsible for the killing of 17 Officers and 915 other ranks at Comilla Cantt.,
while disarming 4 EBR, 40 Field Ambulance and Bengali SSG personnel. An explanation was
accordingly called from this officer, in which he has denied the allegation, and has asserted that resistance
was put up by the particular units aforementioned as a result of which casualties were sustained on both
sides. He asserts, however, that in April 1971 when the situation stabilised a large number of disarmed
Bengali personnel detained in the barracks were reported to Headquarters 9 Div., thus implying that no
such killing took place during the disarming process towards the end of March 1971.
29. Similar allegations have also been made before the Commission regarding the disarming of East
Pakistani personnel of 29 Cavalry at Rangpur, although the number of persons said to have been killed is
mentioned as being only two officers and 30 other ranks. An explanation was called from the
Commanding Officer, Brigadier, Saghir Hussain and he has denied the allegation stating that all the
personnel, barring a few who had either deserted or did not return from leave, were safely evacuated to
West Pakistan under arrangements of Eastern Command, and they were later repatriated to Bangladesh
along with other East Pakistani personnel.
30. The evidence before the Commission in respect of these allegations is obviously not conclusive, It is
possible that there may have been other instances of casualties inflicted during the disarming of East
Pakistani personnel. The Commission feels that the Army authorities must conduct a thorough inquiry
into these matters so as to elicit the truth and fix responsibility.
Magnitude of Atrocities
31. In the circumstances that prevailed in East Pakistan from the 1st of March to the 16th of December
1971, it was hardly possible to obtain an accurate estimate of the toll of death and destruction caused by
the Awami League militants and later by the Pakistan Army. It must also be remembered that even after
the military action of the 25th of march 1971, Indian infiltrators and members of the Mukti Bahini
sponsored by the Awami League continued to indulge in killings, rape and arson during their raids on
peaceful villages in east Pakistan, not only in order to cause panic and disruption and carry out their plans
of subversion, but also to punish those East Pakistanis who were not willing to go along with them. In any
estimate of the extent of atrocities alleged to have been committed on the East Pakistani people, the death
and destruction caused by the Awami League militants throughout this period and the atrocities
committed by them on their own brothers and sisters must, therefore, be always be kept in view.
32. According to the Bangladesh authorities, the Pakistan Army was responsible for killing three million
Bengalis and raping 200,000 East Pakistani women. It does not need any elaborate argument to see that
these figures are obviously highly exaggerated. So much damage could not have been caused by the entire
strength of the Pakistan Army then stationed in East Pakistan even if it had nothing else to do. In fact,
however, the army was constantly engaged in fighting the Mukti Bahini, the Indian infiltrators, and later
the Indian army. It has also the task of running the civil administration, maintaining communications and
feeding 70 million people of East Pakistan. It is, therefore, clear that the figures mentioned by the Dacca
authorities are altogether fantastic and fanciful.
33. Different figures were mentioned by different persons in authority but the latest statement supplied to
us by the GHQ shows approximately 26,000 persons killed during the action by the Pakistan Army. This
figure is based on situation reports submitted from time to time by the Eastern Command to the General
Headquarters. It is possible that even these figures may contain an element of exaggeration as the lower
formations may have magnified their own achievements in quelling the rebellion. However, in the
absence of any other reliable date, the Commission is of the view that the latest figure supplied by the
GHQ should be accepted. An important consideration which has influenced us in accepting this figure as
reasonably correct is the fact that the reports were sent from East Pakistan to GHQ at a time when the
Army Officers in East Pakistan could have had no notion whatsoever of any accountability in this behalf.
34. The falsity of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's repeated allegation that Pakistani troops had raped 200,000
Bengali girls in 1971 was borne out when the abortion team he had commissioned from Britain in early
1972 found that its workload involved the termination of only a hundred or more pregnancies. Question
of Responsibility
35. For almost three years now, the world has repeatedly heard a list of 195 names said to have been
prepared by the Dacca authorities in connection with the commission of these atrocities and crimes. As
the Commission has not been supplied with a copy of this list, it is not possible for us to comment upon
the justification or otherwise of the inclusion of any particular names therein. It is, however, clear that the
final and overall responsibility must rest on General Yahya Khan, Lt. Gen. Pirazada, Maj Gen. Umar, Lt.
Gen. Mitha. It has been brought out in evidence that Maj. Gen. Mitha was particularly active in East
Pakistan in the days preceding the military action of the 25th of March 1971, and even the other Generals
just mentioned were present in Dacca along with Yahya Khan, and secretly departed there on the evening
of that fateful day after fixing the deadline for the military action. Maj. Gen. Mitha is said to have
remained behind. There is also evidence that Lt. Gen Tikka Khan, Major Gen. Farman Ali and Maj. Gen
Khadim Hussain were associated with the planning of the military action. There is, however, nothing to
show that they contemplated the use of excessive force or the Commission of atrocities and excesses on
the people of East Pakistan.
36. The immediate responsibility for executing the plan of this action fell on Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan who
succeeded Lt. Gen. Mohammad Yakub on the 7th of March 1971 as Zonal Administrator, Martial Law, as
well as Commander Eastern Command. This last responsibility was passed on by him to Lt. Gen. A.A.K.
Niazi on the 7th of April 1971. From that day until the day of surrender the troops in East Pakistan
remained under the operational control of Lt. Gen. Niazi who also assumed powers of the Martial Law
administrator on the appointment of a civilian Governor in August 1971. It is a question for determination
as to what share of responsibility must rest on these commanders for the excesses allegedly committed by
the troops under their Command. It is in evidence that Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan was always willing to redress
grievances and take disciplinary action whenever complaints of excesses were brought to his notice. It has
also to be said that both these Generals had issued repeated warnings to troops to refrain from acts of
violence and immorality. At the same time there is some evidence to suggest that the words and personal
actions of Lt. Gen. Niazi were calculated to encourage the killings and rape.
37. The direct responsibility of the alleged excesses and atrocities must, of course, rest on those officers
and men who physically perpetuated them or knowingly and deliberately allowed them to be so
perpetuated. These officers and men not only showed lack of discipline in disobeying the directives of the
Eastern Command and Zonal Martial Law Administrator, but also indulged in criminal acts punishable
under the Army Act as well as the ordinary law of the land.
Conclusions and Recommendations
38. From what we have said in the preceding paragraphs it is clear that there is substance in the
allegations that during and after the military action excesses were indeed committed on the people of East
Pakistan, but the versions and estimates put forward by the Dacca authorities are highly coloured and
exaggerated. Some of the incidents alleged by those authorities did not take place at all, and on others
fanciful interpretations have been deliberately placed for the purpose of maligning the Pakistan army and
gaining world sympathy. We have also found that the strong provocation was offered to the army owing
to the misdeeds of the Awami League. It has also been stated that use of force was undoubtedly inherent
in the military action required to restore the authority of the Federal Government. Nevertheless, inspite of
all these factors we are of the view that the officers charged with the task of restoring law and order were
under an obligation to act with restraint and to employ only the minimum force necessary for the purpose.
No amount of provocation by the militants of the Awami League or other miscreants could justify
retaliation by a disciplined army against its own people. The Pakistan Army was called upon to operate in
Pakistan territory, and could not, therefore, be permitted to behave as if it was dealing with external
aggression or operating on enemy soil. Irrespective, therefore, of the magnitude of the atrocities, we are of
the considered opinion that it's necessary for the Government of Pakistan to take effective action to punish
this who were responsible for the commission of these alleged excesses and atrocities.
Inquiries and Trials
39. On the basis of the evidence coming before the Commission, we have been able to indicate only in
general terms the direct and indirect responsibility of certain senior commanders and others, but the
question of fixing individual responsibility and awarding punishment appropriate thereto need to be
determined according to the prescribed procedures available under the Pakistan Army Act and other
applicable laws of the land. We would, accordingly, reiterate the recommendation made by us in
Paragraph 7 of Chapter III of Para V of the main report that the Government of Pakistan should set up a
high-powered Court or Commission of Inquiry to investigate these allegations, and to hold trials of those
who indulged in these atrocities, brought a bad name to the Pakistan Army and alienated the sympathies
of the local population by their acts of wanton cruelty and immorality against our own people. The
composition of the Court of Inquiry, if not its proceedings, should be publicly announced so as to satisfy
national conscience and international opinion.
40. The Commission feels that sufficient evidence is now available in Pakistan for a fruitful inquiry to be
undertaken in this regard. As the Government of Bangladesh has been recognised by Pakistan, it may be
feasible to request the Dacca authorities to forward to this Court of Inquiry whatever evidence may be
available with them.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CERTAIN SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS
In Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Part 5 of the main report we have dealt with the moral and disciplinary aspects
of tee events and causes leading to the defeat of the Pakistan Army in the 1971 war, and have also
touched upon the individual responsibility of certain senior officers. In the preceding two chapters of the
Supplementary Report, we have offered further observations on these aspects and have commented upon
the conduct of certain Army Officers posted in East Pakistan. There, however, still remains the question
of determining whether any disciplinary action is called for against certain senior army commanders for
their failings in the discharge of their professional duties in the conduct ad prosecution of the war in East
Pakistan.
Nature of Disciplinary Action
2. In view of the glaring weaknesses and negligence displayed by some of the senior officers operating in
East Pakistan, we have anxiously considered the nature of the disciplinary action required in the case. We
find that there are several provisions in the the Pakistan Army Act 1952 having a direct bearing on this
matter. In the first place, there is section 24 which is in the following terms:- "24. Offences in relation to
enemy and punishable with death. Any person to this Act who commits any of the following offenses,
that is to say,-
(a) Shamefully abandons or delivers up any garrison, fortress, airfield, place, post or guard committed to
his charge or which it is his duty to defend, or uses any means to compel or induce any commanding
officer or any other person to do any of the said acts;
or (b) in the presence of any enemy, shamefully casts away his arms, ammunition, tools or equipment, or
misbehaves in such manner as to show cowardice;
or (c) intentionally uses word or any other means to compel or induce any person subject to this Act, or to
the Indian Air Force Act, 1932 (XIV of 1932) or Pakistan Air Force Act 1953 or too the Pakistan Navy
Ordinance, 1961, t abstain from acting against the enemy or to discourage such persons from acting
against the enemy;
or (d) directly or indirectly, treacherously holds correspondence with or communicates intelligence to, the
enemy or who coming to the knowledge of such correspondence or communication treacherously omits to
discover it to his commanding or other superior officer;
or (e) directly or indirectly assists or relies the enemy with arm, ammunition, equipment, supplies or
money or knowingly harbours or protects an enemy not being a prisoner;
or (f)treacherously or through cowardice sends a flag of truce to the enemy;
or (g) in time of war, of during any operation, intentionally occasions a false alarm in action, camp,
garrision or quarters, or spreads reports calculated to create alarm or despondency;
or (h) in time of action, leaves his commanding officer, or quits his post, guard, picquet, patrol or party
without being regularly relieved or without leave;
or (i) having being made a prisoner of war, voluntarily serves with or aids the enemy;
or (j) knowingly does when on active service any act calculated to imperil success of the Pakistan forces
or any forces-operating therewith or of any part of such forces' shall, on conviction by court martial, be
punished with death or with such less punishment as it is in this Act mentioned",
. Section 25 is also relevant, and reads as under:-
25. Offences in relation to the enemy and not punishable with death. Any person subject to this Act who,
on active service -
(a) without order from his superior officer leaves the ranks in order to secure prisoner, animals or
materials, or on the pretence of taking wounded men to the rear;
or (b) without orders from his superior officer, willfully destroys or damages any property;
or (c) is taken prisoner for want of due precaution or through disobedience of orders or wilful neglect of
duty, or, having been taken prisoner, fails to rejoin service when he is able to do so;
or (d) without due authority, either holds correspondence with, or communicates intelligence, or sends a
flag of truce to the enemy;
or (e) by words of mouth, or in writing, or by signals, or otherwise spreads reports calculated to create
alarm or despondency;
or (f) in action, or previously to going into action, uses words calculated to create alarm or despondency;
shall on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to fourteen years, or with much less punishment as is in this Act mentioned".
4. Finally, there is section 55 which is of a general nature, and provides;- "55. Violation of good order and
discipline-Any person subject to this Act who is guilty of any act, conduct, disorder and of military
discipline shall , on conviction by court martial, be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to five years, or with such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned"
5. We are fully cognizant of the fact that defeat in war, even entailing surrender, is not necessarily
punishable as a military offence unless it has been occasioned by wilful neglect of the Commander
concerned in the performance of his duties in respect of the appreciation of the situation regarding the
enemy's intention, strength, own resources, terrain, etc; or in the planning and conduct of the operations;
or a wilful failure to take action as required under the circumstances. A callous disregard of the
recognised techniques and principles of warfare would clearly amount to culpable negligence, and could
not be excused as an honest error of judgement. A deliberate failure to adopt the proper courseof action to
meet a certain contingency cannot be covered by taking shelter behind the plea that his superiors did not
advise him properly in time. It further appears to us that every Commander must be presumed to possess
the calibre and quality, appurtenant to his rank, and he must per force bear full responsibility for all the
acts of omission and commission, leading to his defeat in war, which are clearly attributable to culpable
negligence on his part to take the right action at the right time, as distinguished from (illegible) or
circumstances beyond his control. He would also be liable to be punished if he shows a lack of will to
fight and surrenders to the enemy at a juncture when he still had the resources and the capability to put up
resistance. Such an act would appear to fall clearly under clause (a) of section 24 of the Pakistan Army
Act.
Need and Justification for Trial and Punishment
6. Having heard the views of a large number of witnesses drawn fro m all sections of society, professions
and services, the Commission feels that there is consensus on the imperative need to book these senior
army commanders who have brought disgrace and defeat to Pakistan by their professional incompetence,
culpable negligence and wilful neglect in the performance of their duties, and physical and moral
cowardice in abandoning the fight when they had the capability and resources to resist the enemy. WE are
also of the view that proper and firm disciplinary action , and not merely retirement from service, is
necessary to ensure against any future recurrence of the kind of shameful conduct displayed during the
1971 war W e believe that such action would not only satisfy the nations demand for punishment where it
is deserved, but would also serve to emphasise the concept of professional accountability which appears
to have been forgotten by senior army officers since their involvement in politics, civil administration and
Martial Law duties.
Cases Requiring Action by Way of Court Martial
7. In Part III of the present report, we have discussed and analysed at some length the concept of defence
of East Pakistan adopted by Lt. Gen Niazi, and the manner in which he and his Divisional and Brigade
Commanders formulated their plans to implement that concept within the resources available to them in
East Pakistan. We have then narrated the important events involving the surrender of well-defended
strong points and fortresses without a fight , desertion of his area of responsibility by a Divisional
Commander, disintegration of brigades and battalions in frantic and foolish efforts to withdraw from
certain posts , and abandoning of the wounded ad the sick in callous disregard of all human and military
values. We have also seen how the Eastern Command had failed to plan for n allout war with India and
particularly to provide for the defence of Dacca which had been described as the political and military
lynch-pin of East Pakistan. We have also described the painful events leading to the ultimate surrender of
such a large body of men and materials to the Indian Army at juncture when, by all accounts, the Pakistan
Army was still able to put up resistance for anything upto two weeks or more. In this context we have also
taken note of the inexplicable orders issued by the Eastern Command to stop the destruction of war before
material before the surrender , and the abject and shameful attitude adopted by the Commander, Eastern
Command, at various stages of the surrender ceremonies in the presence of the Indian Generals. Finally,
we have observed that during his period of captivity at Jabbalpur (India) Lt General Niazi made efforts to
persuade, by threats and inducements, his subordinate Commanders to present a coordinated story so as to
mitigate his responsibility for the debate.
8. Judged in the light of this analysis of the events leading to the surrender of our surrender of our Army
in East Pakistan, and the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Army Act and the considerations thereto, as
outlined in the preceding paragraphs, we are of the considered opinion that the following senior officers
ought to be tried by court martial on the charges listed against them , and we recommend accordingly.
(1) Lt Gen A.A.K. Niazi, Commander, Eastern Command
(i) That he wilfully failed to appreciate the imminence of all-out war with India, inspite of all indications
to the contrary, namely the declarations of the Indian Prime Minister and other important Government
leaders, the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty in August, 1971, the amassing of eight divisions of the
Indian Army, eleven squadrons of the Indian Air Force, and a large task force of the Indian Navy in and
around East Pakistan , and the clear warning given to him by the GHQ on the basis of reliable intelligence
regarding Indian plans of invasion of East Pakistan, with the n consequence that he continued to deploy
his troops in a forward posture although that deployment had become entirely unsuited for defence against
open Indian aggression;
(ii) That he displayed utter lack of professional competence, initiative and foresight, expected of an Army
Commander of his ran, seniority and experience, in not realising that the parts of his mission concerning
anti-insurgency operations and ensuring that "no chunk of territory" was to be allowed to be taken over by
the rebels for establishing Bangladesh, had become irrelevant in the context of the imminence of all-out
attack by India on or about the 21st of November ,1971, and that the mast important part of his mission
from that juncture onwards was to "defend East Pakistan against external aggression"' and "keep the
Corps in being and ensure the entity of East Pakistan"' with the result that he failed to concentrate his
forces in time , which failure later led to fatal results;
(iii) That he displayed culpable negligence in adopting the concept of fortresses and strong points without
fully understanding its technical implications as regards their ability to lend mutual support, availability
of the necessary reserves to strike at the enemy in the event of his by passing any of the fortresses or
overwhelming them with superior numbers , and the existence of a non-hostile population, with the
disastrous consequence that was forced to surrender even though several of the fortresses and strong
points were still intact on the 16th of December, 1971;
(iv) That he was guilty of criminal negligence in not including in his operational instruction No. 4 of
1971, issued on the 15th of July, 1971, any clear directive for a planned withdrawal of forces behind ??
river obstacles to face the Indian onslaught and to defend what may be described as the Dacca Triangle
for the purpose of keeping East Pakistan in being by giving up non-vital territory;
(v) That he in fact showed wilful neglect and culpable negligence of the worst order in failing to make
any positive plan for the defence of Dacca;
(vi) That he displayed lack of generalship and mature judgement in requiring his subordinate commanders
to simultaneously maintain a forward defence posture, occupy unmanned fortresses, and yet not withdraw
from any position without sustaining 75% casualties and obtaining clearance from two-up, a variation
from the norm of one-up, with the result that several formation commanders felt confused and bewildered
and acted in a manner prejudicial to the sound conduct of operations and resulting in unnecessary
casualties, as well as disorder and chaos arising from haphazard and unplanned withdrawals under
pressure from the enemy;
(vii) That he displayed culpable negligence and wilful disregard of established principles of warfare by
denuding Dacca of all regular troops by moving out 53 Brigade, which had been previously held as Corps
reserve, on the expectation that he would be getting more troops as agreed to by GHQ on the 19th of
November, 1971;
(viii) That he was guilty of criminal negligence in not ensuring beforehand satisfactory arrangements for
transport, ferries, etc., with the result that even his last minute desperate efforts to withdraw troops from
forward positions for the defence of Dacca were unsuccessful, and whatever troops did manage to reach
Dacca did so minus their heavy equipment, besides suffering unnecessary casualties en route.
(ix) That he wilfully failed to defend Dacca, and agreed to a shameful and premature surrender inspite of
his own assertion before the Commission that Indians would have required at least a period of seven days
to mount the offensive and another week to reduce the defences of Dacca, notwithstanding the
shortcomings of his concept and plans, inadequacies and handicaps in respect of men and materials as
compared to the enemy, the absence of air support and the presence of Mukti Bahini in and around Dacca.
(x) That he deliberately and wilfully sent unduly pessimistic and alarming reports to GHQ with a view to
eliciting permission to surrender as he had lost the will to fight as early as the 6th or 7th of December,
1971, owing to his own mismanagement of the entire of war and his inability to influence , inspire and
guide the subordinate Commanders;
(xi) That he wilfully, and for motives and reasons difficult to understand and appreciate, stopped the
implementation of denial plans, with the result that large quantities of valuable war materials wee handed
over intact to the Indian forces after surrender, inspite of the fact that GHQ had specifically ordered by
their Signal of the 10th December ,1971, to carry out denial plans;
(xii) That he displayed a shameful and abject attitude in agreeing too surrender when he had himself
offered a ceasefire to the Indian Commander-in-Chief; in signing the surrender document agreeing to lay
down arms to the joint command of the Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini; in being present at the Dacca
Airport to receive the victorious Indian General Arora; in ordering his own ADC to present a guard of
honour to the said General; and in accepting the Indian proposal for a public surrender ceremony which
brought everlasting shame to the Pakistan Army.
(xiii) That he was guilty of conduct unbecoming a Officer and Commander of his rank and seniority in
that he acquired a notorious reputation for sexual immorality and indulgence in the smuggling of Pan
from East to West Pakistan, with the inevitable consequence that he failed to inspire respect and
confidence in the mind of his subordinates impaired his qualities of leadership and determination, and
also encouraged laxity in discipline and moral standards among the officers and men under his command;
(xiv) That during the period of his captivity as a prisoner of war in Jabbalpur (India) and on repatriation to
the Pakistan he made efforts to subvert the truth by trying to exercise undue influence on his Divisional
and Brigade Commanders by offering them threats and inducements , so as to persuade them to present
before th GHQ Briefing Committee and the Commission of Inquiry , a coordinated and coloured version
of the events in East Pakistan for the purpose of mitigating his own responsibility for the defeat; and
(xv) That, on repatriation to Pakistan, he deliberately adopted a false and dishonest stand to the effect that
he was willing and able to fight but was ordered to surrender by General Yahya Khan, and that as a
dutiful soldier he had no option but to obey the said order against his best judgement.
2. Maj Gen Mohammad Jamshed, ex-JOC 36 (ad hoc) Division, Dacca
(i) That having been appointed as GOC 36 (ad hoc) Division for the express purpose of taking over from
14 Div., major responsibility for the defence of Dacca, he wilfully failed to plan for the same, in
accordance with sound principles of warfare, and showed culpable lack of initiative in this behalf;
(ii) That in the aforesaid capacity he wilfully neglected to point out to Lt Gen Niazi, during various
conference, the inadequacy of the resources at his disposal for the defence of Dacca, pointing out after the
19th of Nov, 1971, when 53 Brigade was sent out of Dacca to Feni;
(iii) That he displayed gross neglect in ordering the abrupt withdrawal of 93 Brigade from Jamalpur to
Dacca without planning for it, well knowing that it was defending Dacca by holding that fortress, and in
consequence of this ill-planed move 93 Brigade got completely disintegrated enroute owing to the capture
by the enemy of the Brigade Commander and a considerable portion of the Brigade;
(iv) That he showed complete lack of courage and will to fight in that he acquiesced in the decision of the
Commander, Eastern Command, to surrender to surrender to the Indian forces at a juncture when it was
still possible, in spite of the paucity o resources, to hold the enemy for a period of two weeks or so;
(v) That he deliberately and wilfully neglected to inform the authorities concerned, on his repatriation to
Pakistan, about the facts that he had got distributed Rs 50,000 out of Pakistan currency notes and other
funds at his disposal or under his control, amongst certain evacuated from Dacca on the morning of
December, 1971, and the manner in which he did so.
(3) Maj Gen M. Rahim Khan, ex-GOC 3? (ad hoc) Division
(a) In Paragraphs 9 to 11 of Chapter III of P art V of the Main Report , we had occasion to comment upon
the conduct of Maj Gen Rahim Khan, GOC 39 (ad hoc) Division, who abandoned his Division , and
evacuated his Divisional HQ from Chandpur , of course, with the permission of the Commander, Eastern
Commander, with no replacement, and with the consequence that his Division disintegrated and had to be
replaced with another Headquarter called the Narayan Sector Headquater under a Brigadier. We had then
recounted that the conduct of Maj Gen Rahim Khan in abandoning his troops and shifting to a place
outside his area of responsibility prima facie called for a proper inquiry to determine whether the General
was guilty of dereliction of duty or/and cowardice. We also added some other points which needed to be
looked into in this behalf.
(b) As Maj Gen Rahim Khan was one of the senior officers serving in East Pakistan during the war, he
voluntarily appeared before the Commission during the present session, primarily for the purpose of
clearing his position. As will be seen from a detailed discussion of the operation of the 39 (ad hoc)
Division in the narration of the military events, the Commission is far from satisfied with the performance
of this General Officer. In the light of the information now available we now consider that he should be
tried by a court martial on the following charges:
(i) That he shameful cowardice and undue regard for his personal safety in seeking, and obtaining,
permission from the Eastern Command to abandon his Division and vacate his Divisional Headquarters
from Chandpur on the 8th of December 1971, simply because Chandpur was threatened by the enemy,
with the result that he deserted his troops and his area of responsibility in the middle of the war with
India;
(ii) That y his wilful insistence on moving by day against competent advise, owing to fear of Mukti
Bahini, caused the death of fourteen Naval ratings and four officers of his own HQ, besides injuries to
several others, and to himself due to strafing by Indian aircraft;
(iii) That in his anxiety to get away from Chandpur, he wilfully abandoned valuable signal equipment
with the result that the communication system of the Division disintegrated and his subordinate
commanders and troops were left to their own fate;
(iv) That he on the 12th of December, 1971, by word of mouth,,, caused alarm and despondency by
General Niazi, Jamshed and Farman Ali that "it is all over , let us call it a day"' and that the Mukti Bahini
might resort to massacre'
(v) That he wilfully avoided submitting a debriefing report to GHQ, on being specially evacuated to
Pakistan in early 1971, so as to conceal the circumstances of his desertion from his Div HQ at Chandpur
with the consequence that the authorities were persuaded to appoint hi as Chief of the General Staff
without any knowledge of his performance in East Pakistan
4. Brig. G.M. Baqir Siddiqui, former COS, Eastern Command, Dacca
(i) That as Chief of Staff, Eastern Command, he was guilty of wilful neglect in failing to advise the
Commander , Eastern Commander, on sound professional lines in regard to the matters mentioned in
charges (i) to (ix) framed against Lt. Gen Niazi;
(ii) That he wilfully collaborated with, and assisted, the Commander, Eastern Command, in sending
unduly pessimistic and alarming reports and signals to GHQ with a view to elicit permission to surrender,
as he had also lost the will to fight owing to his culpable negligence and failure in the performance of his
professional duties as the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command;
(iii) That he showed culpable disregard of sound principles of planning for the war in that he excluded the
Commanders of the supporting arms like signals, engineers, logistics, medical, etc. from full participation
before the plans of the Eastern Command were finalized, with the result that the full benefit of the advice
of these Commanders was not available to Lt Gen Niazi at the proper time;
(iv) That he was guilty of culpable negligence in not properly advising the Commander, Eastern
Command, of the imminence and enormity of the Indian threat even though he had been fully briefed in
this behalf by the GHQ at a conference in Rawalpindi in October 1971, and he also similarly failed to
advise the Commander on the imperative need of readjusting troops to meet this threat;
(v) That he was responsible for abrupt changes in command in the middle of the war , and also for giving
orders to subordinate formations over the head of their superior commanders, thus resulting in uncertainty
and confusion during the critical days of the war;
(vi) That he wilfully, and for motives and reasons difficult to understand and appreciate stopped the
implementation of denial plans with the result that large quantities of valuable war materials were handed
over intact to the Indian forces after the surrender, in spite of the fact the GHQ had specifically ordered by
their of the 10th December 1971 to carry out denial plans;
(vii) That in particular, he instructed the commander Signals to keep the inter-wing transmitter in
operation even after the surrender, apparently for the purpose of conveying recommendations to GHQ for
the grant of gallantry awards etc. with the result that this valuable equipment fell intact into the hands of
the enemy;
(viii)That he was unduly friendly with the enemy during the period of his captivity, so much so that he
was allowed to go out shopping in Calcutta, a facility not allowed to anyone else by the Indians;
(ix) that he acted against good order and the custom of the Service in being instrumental in conveying
threats and inducements to formation commanders for the purpose of presenting a coordinated story
before the GHQ and the Commission of Inquiry in regard to the events leading to surrender in East
Pakistan.
5. Brig Mohammad Hayat, former Comd. 107 bde. (9 Div)
(i) That as Commander 107 Bde., he displayed neglect in not formulating a sound plan for the defence of
the fortress of Jessore;
(ii) That while launching counter attack at Gharibpur he neglected to obtain full information about the
enemy strength, and did not himself command this important Brigade counter attack, in consequence
whereof he lost seven tanks, his en suffered heavy casualties, and the defence of Jessore fortress was
seriously jeopardised;
(iii) That on a report that enemy tanks had broken through the defences of Jessore he, without even
verifying the same, shamefully abandoned the fortress of Jessore without a fight on the 6th of December
1971, delivering intact to the enemy all supplies and ammunition dumps stocked in the fortress, and
without issuing any orders to his unit in contact with the enemy, who had to fight their own way during
the following night.
(iv) That after abandoning Jessore without contact with the enemy, he withdrew to khulna in wilful and
intentional violation of the clear orders of G.Q.C. 9 Division to withdraw to Magura in the event of a
forced withdrawal fro jessore, thus making it impossible for the Divisional Commander to give battle to
the enemy across the Madhumati River.
6. Brig. Mohammad Asla Niazi, former Cod., 53 Bde (39Ad hoc Div.)
(i) That as Commander 53 Bde. he displayed culpable lack of initiative, determination and planning
ability in that he failed to prepared defences of Mudafarganj as ordered by the G.O.C. 39 (As hoc)
Division on the 4th of December 1971, with the result that the place was occupied by the enemy on or
about the 6th of December 1971 , thus seriously endangering the line of communication between Tripura
and Chandpur where the Divisional Headquarters was located;
(ii) That he showed culpable lack of courage, planning ability and determination in failing to eject the
enemy fro Mudafarganj as ordered by the GOC on the 6th of December 1971, with the result that
contingents of 23 Punjab and elements of 21 A.K. surrendered to an Indian unit on the 11th of December
1971 in highly adverse circumstances, without water or food and the ammunition having been nearly
exhausted;
(iii) That he shamefully abandoned the Fortress of Laksham on or about the 9th of December 1971, which
it was his duty to defend;
(iv) That he displayed wilful neglect in failing to properly organize ex-filtration of his troops fro the
fortress at Laksha to Comilla on the 9th of December 1971, with the result that out of a strength of about
4000 men only about 500 or so, including the Brigade Commander himself and C.O. 39 Baluch with
approximately 400 men surrendered to the enemy when he was barely three miles outside Comilla, and as
a consequence 53 Bde and all its battalions thus disintegrated;
(v) That he wilfully acted in callous disregard of military ethics in abandoning at Laksha 124 sick and
wounded with two Medical Officers who were deliberately not informed about the proposed vacation of
the fortress; and
(vi) That while vacating the fortress of laksha he wilfully and intentionally abandoned all heavy weapons,
stocks of ammunition and supplies for the use of the enemy, without implementing the denial plan;

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