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Following is very useful relevant article regarding the thread:

Endgame in Afghanistan
By Irfan Husain
Saturday, 19 Jun, 2010

Scarcely a day goes by without a major story about Afghanistan in mainstream newspapers and TV channels in Britain and America. The tone of these reports is increasingly sombre. More and more journalists and politicians are now convinced that the quicker western forces pull out, the better.

There have been indications that the UK government is focused on an exit strategy that would allow an orderly, face-saving pullout. And the announcement that Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of the British armed forces, would retire several months before he was due to step down, is another indication of major changes in the British defence posture in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

A mounting concern for American politicians and military planners is that to all appearances, Gen McChrystal’s famous surge seems to be petering out. The offensive in Helmand was designed to clear large parts of the province of Taliban fighters, and then hand over the territory to Afghan police and army to provide security. The local forces, trained at considerable expense by Nato troops, have proven to be inadequate for the task, and in many areas the Taliban are back in force.

Indeed, the entire exit strategy for foreign forces rests on the assumption that in time, Afghan police and army would be able to take over from their western counterparts. This would allow Nato to declare victory and go home. Clearly, the fighting capability of the local recruits is still far short of what is expected of them, raising serious questions about what will happen when the foreign troops go home.

All opinion polls indicate that there is wide public disenchantment in the West with the occupation. Canada is all set to begin pulling out its troops. Barack Obama and David Cameron have both shown their impatience with the continuing presence of their troops in Afghanistan.

Another plank in the exit strategy that has proven to be a frail reed is Hamid Karzai. Somehow, diplomats and politicians assumed that better governance would persuade Afghans to reject the Taliban, and help the government to turn the tide against the forces led by Mullah Omar and other extremist leaders. But by hanging on to power after an apparently rigged election, presiding over a thoroughly corrupt administration, and dragging his feet over meaningful reforms, Karzai has alienated his people to such an extent that they see no reason to risk their lives to support him.

Given the weakening of western resolve to continue its occupation of Afghanistan and the likelihood that once foreign forces pull out, the Taliban will be back in Kabul, what do these developments mean for Pakistan? With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that our defence establishment has been preparing for this endgame all along.

For our GHQ, the biggest danger is an alliance between India and Afghanistan that would effectively encircle Pakistan. Given this threat perception, defence planners in Rawalpindi would hardly welcome New Delhi’s increasing clout in Kabul, and its billion-dollar aid efforts in our war-ravaged neighbour. The half a dozen Indian consulates on the Pak-Afghan border have obviously raised suspicions.

Thus, the increased level of activity of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Afghanistan should come as no surprise. In a recent article in the New York Times Alissa J. Rubin gives details of recent operations carried out by this terrorist group against Indian targets in Afghanistan. The Lashkar has gained considerable notoriety because of its bloody campaign in Indian-administered Kashmir as well as within India itself, most notably its terrorist attacks in Mumbai nearly two years ago. There have been strong allegations of links between this group and the ISI.

Given the Pakistani establishment’s threat assessment, the reason underlying its policy of turning a deaf ear to the western demand to ‘do more’ becomes clear. It wants its proxies in place when foreign troops pull out, something it calculates will be sooner rather than later. And it wants a place at the negotiation table when decisions are being made about Afghanistan’s future. It can best do so by having access to the Taliban leadership.

These are legitimate security concerns. What is objectionable are the alleged means through which they are being pursued. The military establishment has been accused of using terrorists to further its agenda. There has always been the basic contradiction built into the policy of using terrorists as pawns, and then expecting them to come to heel when called.

Meanwhile, terror groups that had been established and supported by the Pakistani establishment to do its bidding in India, Kashmir and Afghanistan turn their guns and their bombs on Pakistani security forces and civilians, killing thousands.

This is the problem with developing a security framework without any reference to the people and the political leadership. The military, smug in the belief that only it knows what’s good for the country, has continued to run a secretive, rogue policy that contravenes international law as well as Pakistan’s own interests.

With the Afghan endgame now clearly in sight, it is all the more necessary that India, Pakistan and Afghanistan must resolve their differences and come to some understanding irrespective of the military and domestic compulsions of Nato states active in the region. Unfortunately, the zero-sum game that has characterised Indo-Pak relations will probably prevent this logical convergence of interests.

If the West’s exit strategy fails in its expectation of an orderly handover then Pakistan can expect to be singled out as the scapegoat for a military defeat. The allegations contained in the Waldeman report about the Pakistan government’s links to the Taliban should be seen in this context.

Despite the leaks and rumours about talks with the Taliban, Mullah Omar has made it clear that he will only talk to the Karzai government once foreign forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan. At that point, the only things to discuss with Karzai will be the terms of surrender.
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