Post-Cold War International Relations: Trends And Portents
By
Sharif M. Shuja
Two world wars and the establishment of totalitarian tyrannies have shaken our faith in progress; technological civilization has shown that it possesses immense powers of destruction, for the natural world as well as for the cultural and spiritual environment. The civilization of abundance is also that of famines in Africa and other places. The collapse of totalitarian communism has left intact the evils of the democratic liberal societies, ruled by the demon of money. As the scramble for global wealth unfolds, international banks, transnational corporations are anxious to play a direct role in shaping financial structures and policing economic reforms.
One can find modem societies repellent on two accounts. On the one hand, they have taken the human race and turned it into a homogeneous mass: modern humans seem to have all come out of a factory, not a womb. On the other hand, they have made every one of those beings a hermit. Capitalist democracies have created uniformity, not equality, and they have replaced fraternity with a perpetual struggle among individuals. The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War have brought neither economic stability nor social democracy to the world. Instead of 'a New World Order', based on democracy, open markets, law and a commitment to peace, we witness a geopolitical disorder.
On the positive side, it has paved the way for the universal aspiration for democracy as the only form of acceptable government because of its vital self-correcting capacity. It is said that we now live in one world, often called a global village. It can be argued that in many ways, particularly in terms of instant communications, of economic value, of a desire to avoid war, of a functional integration, of disease control, monetary and trade policies and so on, we are more of an integrated global community than ever before.
The dynamic transfer of people, information, capital and goods is progressing on a worldwide scale. Globalisation and an expansion of information technology have given rise to a new wave of changes in international relations. In this global era, people from numerous countries and civilizations will be blessed with the opportunity to work together.
While discovering in the next section the general trends in post-Cold War international relations, this article does not deal with how to learn the tricks of international relations. It is rather a reflection on some pretty powerful underlying forces which govern our lives unless we understand and take control of them.
Trends in Post-Cold War International Relations
These general trends can be identified in post-Cold War international relations.
First, on the security front, we have observed the decline in the salience of strategic nuclear weapons. The world is in transition from nuclear to conventional deterrence at the central (global) level. In the Cold War era, the strategic pillar of mutual assured destruction (MAD) made conquest difficult and expansion futile by either camp. The futility of expansion accounted for robust deterrence. Moreover, nuclear deterrence was robust for at least two other reasons: (1) due to the futility of 'overkill', it was possible for the superpowers to reach a weapons parity, and thus equilibrium, bringing stability to the system; and (2) ever fearful of the massive destructive might of nuclear weapons, each superpower had a powerful incentive to constrain its followers, lest a reserve proxy war break out unwittingly.
Thus, on the security front, we recognize that there is a growing trend toward depolarization, with the United States as the sole superpower. With the danger of thermonuclear warfare greatly diminished, the world has become more peaceful. But at the same time, the revival of nationalism, fundamentalism and ethnonationalist disputes in some part of the world has become a threat to international peace and the integrity of nations. New short and long-term security challenges also have come to the fore, such as the ongoing mid-intensity regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and uncertainties surrounding the reform process in the former Soviet Republics (Commonwealth of Independent States) and in other former socialist countries.
One important aspect is that the concept of security is now broadening to encompass issues, such as national development and economic interdependency, environmental protection and the promotion of democracy and human rights.
Second, on the economic front, there is a continuing trend toward tripolarity, with the European Union (EU), North America, and East Asia as the major poles. Each of them accounts for approximately one-fourth of the world's gross national product (GNP). The importance of economic factors in defining international relationships has grown relative to politico-security factors, and one of the major economic challenges facing us today is, of course, the possibility of increased friction among the three major economic poles.
This perception of tripolar economic alignments, in turn, makes us ask ourselves the following questions: Will the transatlantic security partnership run into trouble? Will transpacific trade friction intensify? Can regionalism and interdependence coexist in such a way as to maintain an open trading system, despite, or perhaps facilitated by, the tripolar economic arrangement?
Finally, on the ideological front, the ideas of market democracy, civil society, transparency and accountability of government, and market economy are becoming universalized.
The collapse of communism left the USA and its allies as the pre-eminent voices in intellectual, policy and scholarly discourse -- many of the values that the Soviets espoused have been discredited and generally rejected. Command economies and many of the elements of socialism are in disrepute; market principles, private property and competition are hailed as the essentials of economic health. Communist Party monopoly of power and extensive and intrusive state bureaucracies are rejected; elections, democratic governments and civil society are widely seen as the hallmarks of good governance.
The values and institutions associated with Western societies during the Cold War do not, of course, provide panaceas. They will undoubtedly undergo serious challenges, and modifications. International policies will continue to influence such choices, but will presumably not dominate them to the degree that bipolar politics did during the past half-century. Scholarship will continue to shape and clarify social, political, and economic options, but should operate in an atmosphere of greater openness and flexibility.
These fundamental transformations of international relations have undoubtedly produced profound changes in the Korean Peninsula. First of all, the major foreign policies and relationships of both the South and the North have undergone significant changes. Although Pyongyang seems reluctant to acknowledge these publicly, the tremendous changes that have taken place within its major allies and friends must have produced a profound impact on North Korea. The most obvious example is that North Korea together with South Korea as a Korean team participated in the XXVII Olympic Games in Sydney from 15 September to 1 October, 2000.
The Asia Pacific region is undergoing extensive and unprecedented change and the trend today is towards greater integration, democratization, and deregulation. Market forces have become the instruments of change and transformation in international relations and nowhere more so today than in the Asia Pacific region. The forces for global change are economic in origin, but they operate within particular political systems and deeply rooted cultures that will modify and condition their effect. The impact of global change upon the many disparate cultures and political systems of the Asia Pacific region is one of the most important issues of international relations today. Is globalisation a set of processes dominated by Western countries to their own advantage? It is not easy to answer, but the implication is that globalisation refers to a complex of changes rather than a single one. No single country, or group of countries, controls any one of them. Economic globalisation, of course, has been and is shaped by U.S . foreign and domestic policy.
Globalisation will not have the same effect in the Asia Pacific region as in North America or Europe, and it would be senseless to imagine that the impact would be similar, or that the results of globalisation would be uniform and comparable for all regions and cultures. At this stage we need to look at this globalisation issue more closely.
Globalisation and the Knowledge Divide
There is every indication that globalisation will increase. Western powers and the Western-based NGOs are likely to continue to promote the universalisation of values, rules and institutions. However, the pressure for homogenisation will intensify the struggle for diversity, autonomy and heterogeneity. Dr Samuel M. Makinda of Murdoch University's School of International Politics argued in 1998, in Current Affairs Bulletin (April/May), that:
The question of how to reconcile differences with uniformity, universalism with particularism, and globalisation with fragmentation, will remain central to policy makers at the national, regional and global levels. Political leaders will continue to determine policies that facilitate or frustrate globalisation, taking into account domestic and external pressures. But, at the same time, transnational forces will continue to lobby the states, regional organisations and the UN to try to influence those policies. It is this inter-subjective relationship between the policy-makers and the transnational forces that determines the character of globalisation.
However, the assumption that the real driving forces are the markets suits many political leaders. Government officials will, Dr Makinda further argues, 'often try to blame globalisation for their policy failures. They will claim that they were powerless to do much for their countries in the face of globalising forces. But, as always, they will claim credit for any positive results from globalisation'.
Conclusions
This article identifies four challenges that we should face in the 21st century. The first is that of peace. Since the end of the Cold War, a fourth
category of countries has appeared on the international stage, in addition to the industrialized and developing countries and those in transition. It comprises countries at war or emerging from conflict in which the state has been foundering in genocide and intercommunal massacres.
The second challenge: will this 21st century witness the onset of a new kind of poverty whose victims will live side by side with unprecedented wealth?
Sustainable development and the wise management of the global environment pose the third great challenge. Everywhere humanity is draining the resources which could have fed tomorrow's generation. We have to find our way towards another type of development. One that is more economic, more intelligent, more caring.
The fourth challenge is that of the 'erratic boat' syndrome. As a result of globalisation, many states appear to have mislaid their maps, compasses and direction-finding instruments, even the will to set a course. They are tossed about by the waves, who can no longer be controlled -- financial markets, raw materials markets, statistics of all kinds.
Yet awareness of these problems has sharpened and solutions exist: hope remains. We need the international community to return to the basic principles of international co-operation and introduce the idea that a minimum level of science and technological capability, including access to the Internet, is an absolute necessity for developing countries, and should be the subject of international solidarity. And greater co-operation between nation states, multinational corporations, the NGOs and the global business community are needed in meeting these challenges.
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