In the proposed NACB 2012, there are a few areas where the would-be NAC can be considered an improvement over NAB
The National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) functional currently was promulgated by General Pervaiz Musharraf and it led to the constitution of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) in 1999. Now, the incumbent government has been preparing a National Accountability Commission Bill (NACB) of 2012 to transform NAB into the National Accountability Commission (NAC). The Bill is due to be tabled in the National Assembly to seek a simple majority vote before it becomes an Act.
In the proposed NACB 2012, there are a few areas where the would-be NAC can be considered an improvement over NAB. First, it lays down a broad consultation mechanism to seek the consent of the leader of the opposition to nominate the Chairman of the NAC and of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned to nominate a judge for the accountability court. Secondly, it makes the provision mandatory that the chairman should be a retired judge of the Supreme Court (SC) or a grade-22 federal government officer. Thirdly, both judges and army generals will also be held accountable for their misdeeds. Fourthly, a National Accountability Investigation Agency (NAIA) will be formed to investigate any alleged affair.
In the proposed NACB 2012, there are however several areas where the would-be NAC cannot be considered an improvement over NAB. First, once appointed the chairman of the NAC will be vulnerable to removal (in the absence of any justifiable reason) at any time before the completion of his four-year tenure. The question is, why will the disgrace earned by arbitrary (premature) removal of a chairman not deter many honourable judges from becoming the chairman of the NAC? Why is it necessary to curtail the liberty of the chairman to work independent of any external pressure? Why is a dependent, meek and cowed chairman required?
Second, the powers of the chairman to seek mutual legal assistance (where the jurisdiction is foreign) will be reduced. The question is, will Pakistan also offer the same reduced reciprocal legal assistance to other countries? Why does the incumbent government want the scope of mutual legal assistance reduced unilaterally? Why should those Pakistanis who siphoned off the wealth of this country and escaped abroad not be apprehended and the booty recovered?
Third, the powers of the chairman to procure banking information about an alleged person will be made subject to prior permission granted by a court. The question is, why should the chairman not be independent to procure any banking information without letting the accused know that an investigation is being carried out against him? Why is it important to put in place a mechanism to alert an accused person of any sort of investigation going on against him?
Fourth, the scope of the NAC will be limited only to public office holders (politicians or government servants) while the people falling under the definition of ‘other persons’ will be spared. One may argue that by shrinking this scope, the NAC will be more focused and less overburdened, but then the question is how many front men used by the corrupt public office holders are also pubic office holders? What is the mechanism for apprehending the front men to unearth the trail leading to the actual face indulging in corruption? Taken together, the points of reduction in the powers of the chairman to seek mutual foreign legal assistance and reduction in the scope of the NAC only to public office holders will lead to the front man of any corrupt public office holder being apprehended neither in this country nor abroad. Similarly, his bank accounts cannot be checked without alerting him. Does it portend good for the financial and moral health of society? Moreover, the culprits hoodwinking the public at large will also be exempted by the words ‘other persons’. In this regard, the question is, why should any wrongdoer or a company chiselling people out of their money on one pretext or another get off scot-free?
Fifth, the powers of the investigation agency (NAIA) will be short of arresting a public office holder if he is cooperating with the NAIA even if there is available solid evidence of corruption against him. The message is clear: indulge in corruption but cooperate with the NAIA to avoid arrest if the scam is exposed; in the meantime, flee from the country, save your skin and enjoy the fruits of the booty. The question is, why should the cooperation of a corrupt public office holder be a guarantee against his arrest? Why should not he fall from grace if he is corrupt? Why should the arrest not act as a deterrent against corruption? If such immunity is offered to a corrupt public office holder, what is the rationale of having any anti-corruption body at all?
Sixth, the accountability courts of the NAC will not punish a culprit for more than seven years imprisonment (instead of 14 years) in case corruption is proved against him and the looted money is not recovered. The question is, in such a scenario, should the duration of punishment be decreased or increased? For such a hardened criminal, why not the limit be extended to 20 years?
Seventh, the accountability courts of the NAC will not punish a culprit at all in case corruption is proved against him if he returns the looted money before the judgement of the court or his plea bargain is accepted by the NAC. The question is, why should there be a soft corner for a corrupt public office holder?
Eighth, there are several other questions to be asked. Why should any act of corruption be condoned under the subterfuge of an ‘act done in good faith’? Why does the ‘benami’ accounts and property of a culprit not fall in the ambit of the NAC? Why should career security not be provided to the NAC officials to make them work wholeheartedly?
The incumbent government should think again whether it intends to encourage or discourage corruption in society.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at
qaisarrashid@yahoo.com