US troops post-2014
January 7th, 2013
As Afghan President Hamid Karzai arrives in the US for talks this week, American officials have busy been shaping the debate on the post-2014 US military footprint in Afghanistan. First, it was reported that Gen Allen, the exiting commander of US forces in Afghanistan, had sent three options to the Pentagon: 6,000, 10,000 or 20,000 troops — the higher the number, the larger the mission presumably. Still, his high-end figure was short of the military hawks’ dreams: 34,000-60,000 troops to be left behind for a muscular counterterrorism force and to provide support to the Afghan security forces. Over the weekend, the White House has hit back, leaking to the media that it asked for and was provided lower troop estimates by the Pentagon, between 3,000 and 9,000 troops to be left behind after 2014. The public wrangling between the Obama White House and the US military over troop levels in Afghanistan has quite a history: pre-publication reviews of Gen McChrystal’s memoirs sheds some new light on how the military pushed for, and the White House tried to resist, a big surge of troops in Afghanistan in 2009.
This time, though, it seems likely the White House will largely get its way. A military footprint of less than 10,000 in Afghanistan may seem to be dictated by political considerations in the US, but then neither has the US military really been able to articulate an achievable mission and strategy in Afghanistan that would justify a massive troop presence. One of the benefits of the Petraeus resignation scandal has been that US military leadership has come under greater scrutiny, with questions being asked about whether the generals know what they are doing or have the ability to deliver lasting results in counter-insurgency situations. Even now, there is a push by the US military to at least maintain the present level of troops in Afghanistan — around 66,000 — as close as possible to the deadline for withdrawal at the end of 2014. It is a demand that may have some military logic but on the surface appears to be rooted in the theory that, for long as possible, more is better — hardly stirring.
Reaching a decision now on foreign troop levels post-2014 will have a significant impact on what happens in the next couple of years, particularly whether the Taliban will be tempted to come to the negotiating table, whether the Afghan government will absorb the implications of losing its safety net and scramble to perform better and if the Afghan security forces will be ready to lead. But before those tough questions can be answered, it remains to be seen if the mercurial Mr Karzai will cooperate with or resist US plans.
Boost for tax evaders
January 7th, 2013
The controversial bill seeking to change laws to provide an opportunity to tax dodgers to legalise their wealth has finally reached the National Assembly. Over the next few days, the tax amnesty bill could be passed into law. Those who think that opposition to the bill by the PML-Q, the MQM and the PML-N will block its passage are mistaken. After all, which political party does not have people in its fold waiting to take advantage of the tax concessions that the bill offers? And why are the government and the Federal Board of Revenue pushing the bill so earnestly when economists and tax bar associations have opposed the scheme? Both the finance minister and the FBR chairman insist that the amnesty will bring around 3.2 million untaxed rich people into the tax net, raising the number of taxpayers to four million from the existing 800,000 — which would still be a minuscule per cent of the population. The FBR contends that it is in possession of a “wealth” of data on the lavish expenditure of those who are being offered amnesty. If what the FBR is claiming is true, then the board has a very weak case for the amnesty scheme. It should have initiated ruthless action against those who do not pay their taxes instead of facilitating them in legalising their wealth.
The approval of the amnesty by the NA will not send a positive signal to honest taxpayers. It will only discourage them and provide an incentive for them to resort to illegal means in the hope of getting a similar deal a few years down the road. Nor will the exclusion of politicians and bureaucrats and their families from the scheme, as proposed by the FBR chief, help remove popular doubts about the hidden intentions of those who are pushing for it. The FBR must understand that the argument that it lacks enough powers to initiate legal action against tax dodgers and evaders doesn’t hold water. It has sufficient powers to punish cheaters. But FBR action against such people is not possible without political backing, and the government will not change its stance with polls round the corner.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed
January 7th, 2013
Those who had the opportunity of meeting Qazi Hussain Ahmed will remember him as a politician it was possible to have a conversation with, even if his ideas were in conflict with one’s own. With his accent, style and unhurried emphasis, he was representative of the Pakhtun politician. He did not intimidate in person though he headed a party whose cadres were known for their brash displays of emotionalism. He had to deal with the legacy of the Jamaat-i-Islami’s association with Gen Ziaul Haq’s martial law and his biggest challenge for space came from some other Zia protégés outside the party. As JI amir, he concentrated on establishing youth wings with a wider outreach than was available to the party’s student wing, the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba.Pasban and Shabab-i-Milli were the outcome. But by and large, the JI under him had to be content with trying to make a difference in partnership with other parties, such as the PML-N and later, the JUI. During his leadership, the JI’s city government in Karachi initiated major development projects that were often cited as examples of the party’s organisational skills. The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal’s stint in power in the former NWFP was another high point of Qazi Sahib’s term as JI amir.
He may not have been able to realise his dream of spearheading change, the famous ‘Qazi is coming’ cries in the 1990s being little more than a catchy memory about an unsuccessful campaign. But as a junior or equal member in a coalition, Qazi Sahib did play a role in shaping the country’s politics to the present. Apart from this, he maintained and expanded the JI’s overall presence to make sure the party had ‘likeminded’ people in important organisations, from groups committed to jihadi politics to the campuses, bureaucracy, etc.