Military operation costs
THE finance minister has disclosed that an incremental expenditure of at least Rs110bn will be required this fiscal year to meet the expenses arising from the military’s Operation Zarb-i-Azb under way in North Waziristan and its larger fallout.
Of this, he says, Rs75bn will be used for the operation and Rs35bn for IDPs, which presumably includes the cost of reconstruction in populated areas that have been destroyed by the bombing. This is an out-of-budget expense, meaning it was not programmed into the expenditure plan in June 2014. The fiscal deficit target, already under pressure from declining revenues, will probably need to be revised upwards, with commitments to the IMF and implications for the fiscal framework, and other areas of the budget from where resources will have to be freed up to pay for this incremental expenditure.
But the finance minister must try and obtain greater disclosures from the military about how this money is being spent, even if those numbers are not to be made public. The government can afford this expense given the nature of the threat, but since it has ramifications for other areas of the budget, and because it is an off-budget item, it is important that there be at least some oversight to ensure that it is being spent wisely. The figure appears to suggest that the military operation may be larger than what we have been led to believe, both in its present execution as well as its future scope. Reportedly, two divisions are involved in the operation, and if their expenses can add up to such a huge sum then it is essential for the government to raise the right questions regarding these expenditures. If the costs of mobilising a small number of divisions can escalate so rapidly, then one wonders what the expenses would be in the event of a larger conflict, and how far the fiscal framework can sustain them. It is hoped that our rulers will focus on these concerns as they proceed with their plans.
Kerry’s visit
CONTINUING the recent trend of workmanlike and somewhat productive meetings between Pakistani and US officials, US Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Islamabad has gone off smoothly. There were no histrionics, no surprises and, thankfully, no American demands for Pakistan to ‘do more’.
The two countries appear to have found a recipe for relatively stable relations: focus on security matters; keep American aid — military and civilian — flowing; and recognise the economic importance of the relationship in terms of Pakistani exports to the US and American influence over IFIs that Pakistan is indebted to. In Islamabad this week, that three-part recipe was again in evidence as America’s top diplomat met the senior political and military leadership here. While the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan may have worsened, at least both sides appear to be on the same page when it comes to keeping ties with the US stable and productive. Also continuing the trend established in recent interactions between senior Pakistani and American leaders was the focus on two countries in particular: Afghanistan and India.
On Afghanistan, with the US having a significantly different military mission there beginning this year, Washington appears keen to nudge the Pakistani and Afghan states closer and to ramp up the bilateral relationship. This makes sense for it is Pakistan and Afghanistan that must directly bear the consequences of each other’s security decisions and so routing substantive relations through a distant superpower is not necessarily the desirable formula. However, given the long-running divergences in the security interests of the two countries (as articulated by the Afghan and Pakistani security establishments) and the old suspicions that plague the bilateral relationship, an American role is necessary to try and make the most of the new beginning that the post-Karzai era in Afghanistan and the Pakistani military operation in North Waziristan may represent.
Surely, reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban and the bi-directional cross-border militancy problem should be at the top of the security agenda and it is there that a delicate three-way dance between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US will have to play out if results are to be achieved. While the US does appear interested in actively working on the Pak-Afghan relationship, it appears far cooler to the idea of intervening in the Pak-India relationship.
From army chief Gen Raheel Sharif’s visit to the US late last year to the Prime Minister’s Adviser on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz, Pakistani officials have tried to nudge the US into suggesting to India that now is not the time to stoke tensions on Pakistan’s eastern border, given the internal fight against militancy here. But thus far the US appears unwilling to do more than offer carefully worded phrases of support for stable Pak-India ties. That is not enough, as surely the American side must know.
Problematic security
THE latest announcements on the subject of school security display a breathtaking lack of sagacity. On Monday, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh governments disclosed further measures they intend to take in order to beef up security at educational institutions in the wake of last month’s devastating attack on Peshawar’s Army Public School. It seems that the KP government has decided to allow employees of all educational institutions to carry licensed arms on the premises.
According to the provincial information minister, Mushtaq Ahmad Ghani, the move will allow teachers and other staff members to engage the attackers for the “initial five to 10 minutes” before law-enforcement personnel reach the spot. On the other hand, in Sindh a high-level security review meeting resolved to ban the use of mobile phones in all educational institutions during teaching hours since the devices afford room for “unchecked communication”. The latter piece of absurdity can perhaps be dismissed not just because mobile phones are now ubiquitous and indispensable, but also because such a decision would be near impossible to implement. The question to be asked of the Sindh authorities is whether, by raising the issue of “unchecked communication”, they are implying that an attack on an educational institution may involve inside help. And if that is the case, where is the effort to identify and de-radicalise such individuals?
The move in KP, however, deserves outright castigation. Leave aside the folly of expecting the employees of educational institutions to act as the first line of defence in case of an attack. Leave aside even the fact that weapons and the violence that they lead to are anathema to places of learning. Consider simply the numerous scenarios in which such a move could go horribly wrong — weapons in the hands of untrained and apprehensive chowkidars; guns being misued or misappropriated; or, terrifying, a potential assailant having easy access to the weapons.
Consider just the fact that the answer to solving the conundrum of a heavily weaponised and violent society does not lie in adding more guns to the mix. No doubt, it is important to boost security at our schools, but this is a deeply irresponsible way to go about it. Taken together, these decisions run the gamut between idiocy and serious hazard. If this is the best that the two provinces can do in the face of an implacable enemy, there is much to worry about.
Published in Dawn January 14th, 2015.