US-India strategic alliance
HISTORY bears witness to the fact that the United States focused its efforts on building a close relationship with Pakistan only when it deemed it necessary to do so to achieve its limited aims in the region. It did not consider Pakistan important enough to develop long-time relations with.
In contrast, American policymakers have made sustained efforts to develop a cordial and durable relationship with India for the promotion of major US interests in South Asia. This illustrates the dichotomy in America’s attitude towards Pakistan and India.
However, being one of the principal exponents of the non-aligned movement, India preferred to remain politically neutral and in order to attain great power status in the international system it endeavoured to maintain a non-aligned posture. Yet, American policymakers continued to feverishly work to woo India which was seen by them to have strategic possibilities of interest to the United States.
The end of the Cold War, however, brought about a perceptible change in the strategic outlook of India. To all intent and purposes it abandoned its hoary commitments to non-alignment. President Bill Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 not only opened a new chapter in US-India relations, it was also heralded as a blueprint for future ties between the two countries. Based on the conviction that US interests required strong links with New Delhi, the Bush administration has been exploring ways of creating a strategic partnership with India since 2001.
Consequently, in 2004, the United Sates and India embarked upon a bilateral programme referred to as the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Under the aegis of this programme the United States and India agreed to work on a quartet of security issues that included civilian nuclear technology, civilian space technology, high technology trade, and missile defence.
On July 18, 2005, both, the United States and India formally established their strategic partnership in the furtherance of cooperation in a number of areas of mutual interests, including the nuclear field. Many considerations underlay this “new relationship” between the United States and India, which is, however, predicated on their common desire of containing China’s growing military might and its emergence as a political/economic power. China is perceived by both countries as a potential threat to their long-term interests in the region and beyond.
It is generally believed that President Bush, aiming to boost India as a counterbalance against China, has moved closer to accepting it as a nuclear weapon state notwithstanding his rhetoric of a vigorous non-proliferation policy.
It is important to note in this context that while welcoming Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to the White House on July 18 last year, President Bush described India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, and said that it should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states were entitled to. The president also said that he would ask Congress and US allies to revise American laws and international laws to allow nuclear trade with India.
One should not, however, be surprised at Washington’s nuclear cooperation with India which, in fact, dates back to the 1950s when, apart from building the Tarapur nuclear reactor and providing heavy water for its reactors, it also allowed Indian nuclear scientists to study at US nuclear laboratories. Declassified American papers also revealed that, in 1961, the United States had contemplated making India a nuclear power as a counterweight to China. That idea, however, had to be shelved at the time because of some problems in its implementation.
It is difficult to believe that while making a decision about a strategic partnership with India that would facilitate its emergence as a powerful entity with considerable political and military clout conferring upon it the status of a regional hegemon, US policymakers would not have taken into account Pakistan’s sensitivities.
Washington is well aware of Pakistan’s serious concerns about the threat to its security, particularly from its eastern neighbour, which leads one to believe that it deliberately ignored this important aspect.
However, it is equally intriguing that policymakers in Pakistan for many years did not know which way the wind was blowing in US corridors of power and, therefore, could not persuade Washington to adopt an even-handed policy towards Pakistan and India. There no point in making hollow noises against the US-India strategic alliance at this stage as it is now a fait accompli.
The US-India strategic partnership may be in consonance with America’s interests but will, however, create serious problems for all countries in the region as they have disputes with their bigger neighbour. It will particularly hurt Pakistan. Political analysts believe that the existing cordial Pakistan-US relationship might come under severe strain and place the present pro-US regime in Pakistan in a quandary if Pakistan’s legitimate concerns about its security are not addressed by the United States in a satisfactory manner.
Having been on the wrong side of history in Afghanistan and Iraq, the containment of China has now commanded President Bush’s attention. He has decided to use India as a conduit for this purpose. He has entered into a long-term strategic partnership with that country, ostensibly, to build closer ties between the two countries in different fields. The scepticism that this ominous development would upset the delicate balance of power between Pakistan and India and undermine the security of the former is well-founded.
A wide body of opinion in Pakistan is of the view that the United States cannot be relied upon as a dependable ally which underlines the need and urgency of evolving a new strategy that would particularly address the security concerns of their country. For obvious reasons, Pakistan cannot abdicate its responsibility for the preservation of its security and national integrity in the aftermath of the recent overtures the United States has made to India.
Unfortunately, however, Pakistan is also suffering from a number of serious political, economic and social problems. Ethnic and regional conflicts have particularly assumed critical proportions and might impinge upon its national security and territorial integrity.
It is, therefore, equally important to put our own house in order by creating national harmony and reconciliation. The need for pragmatism has never been so acutely felt as today.
By Ghayoor Ahmed 29 jan 06