''The Role of Iran and Syria in the Israel-Lebanon Crisis''

During the past few weeks, tensions in the Middle East have increased dramatically. In late June, Israel initiated a military operation on its southern borders against Hamas after the Palestinian organization kidnapped an Israeli soldier. As part of this operation, the Israeli army returned to the Gaza Strip, which Israel had evacuated in August 2005. Shortly after, on July 12, the Shi'a militant organization Hezbollah opened a second front against Israel on its northern border, kidnapping two Israeli soldiers. After Israel responded by launching air strikes on Lebanon, Hezbollah launched missiles into Israeli cities.

Hezbollah is one of Iran's and Syria's main regional allies, and both Tehran and Damascus play an important role in Hezbollah's current operations. Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution, Syria and Iran have shared a strategic alliance and have had overlapping interests in the Middle East. This alliance now faces new challenges.

The Iranian-Syrian Alliance

After the September 11 attacks on the United States, the strategic environment in the Middle East changed radically. The launch of the U.S.-led war on terrorism, based on the doctrine of preemption, represented a general shift from the old doctrine of containment and deterrence. This shift, which led to the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the removal of the Saddam Hussein government in Iraq, strongly changed the political balance in the Middle East. These changes had a deep impact on Syria and Iran.

The fall of Saddam and the presence of U.S. troops near the Syrian border posed an extraordinary challenge to the stability of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's regime. U.S. President George W. Bush accused Damascus of being a state sponsor of terrorism because it turned a blind eye to terrorist and jihadist infiltration of the Syrian-Iraqi border. American pressure became stronger after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005; after Hariri's death, the United States and other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council -- such as the United Kingdom, Russia and France -- asked Syria to leave Lebanon. Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon increased Damascus' weakness and reduced its strategic options in the area. Indeed, Syria had benefited economically and politically from its presence in Lebanon.

The rising international pressure on Syria in the wake of the Hariri assassination also strengthened the country's internal divisions. Recently, the growth of religious, tribal and generational divisions within Syria has been very strong and Bashar now faces new difficult challenges to his regime's stability. The new alliance formed by former Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is a clear example of this.

The new strategic context in the region has also posed important challenges for Iran. Although Iran has welcomed the fall of two of its historical enemies -- the Sunni Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Ba'athist government in Iraq -- the presence of U.S. troops in two of Iran's immediate neighbors is seen as a threat. Nevertheless, in contrast to the situation in Syria, Tehran has more options at its disposal since it wields greater geopolitical heft than Damascus. For example, Iran is one of the largest oil exporting countries in the world; it controls the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial shipping lane; it has an extensive nuclear research program; and, when compared to Syria, it plays a stronger role in the region. Moreover, due to Iran's geographic location, it is able to exercise its power in different regional theaters, such as in Central Asia, while Damascus does not have this option. Therefore, Iran's weakness is less marked than is Syria's.

In spite of this changing strategic environment, Syria and Iran still share a strategic alliance, one that began after Ayatollah Khomeini's victory in Iran in February 1979; after this revolution, Syria was the second country (after the Soviet Union) to welcome the toppling of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's government. At present, Syria and Iran share common goals: they cooperate against the U.S. intervention in Iraq; they offer financial, logistic and military support to Hezbollah for its operations against Israel; and they help armed Palestinian groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in their struggle against Israel. Moreover, they wish to minimize the regional role of Sunni powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, because a rising regional role for these countries could pose a serious threat to Iranian and Syrian interests. For Iran, increased power to Middle Eastern Sunni regimes could pose a challenge to its Shi'a-based regional role. For Syria, the growing power of the region's Sunnis could instigate Syria's Sunni majority to act against the Bashar-led Alawite regime. [See: "Syrian and Iranian Interests Converge in Lebanon"]

In the long-term, however, the strategic interests of both states could change. For example, Tehran sees agreement between Syria and Israel as a threat because such agreement would mean that Tehran could lose its main regional ally. The loss of Syria as an ally would increase Tehran's perception that it is being surrounded by hostile states, thus damaging its political role in the Middle East. For the same reason, Damascus does not want to see an agreement forged between the United States and Iran over the latter's controversial nuclear program; such agreement could result in a welcoming of Iran's more assertive role in the region. Damascus does not want a regional system that is characterized by the presence of a regional hegemon, such as Iran, because increased power to Iran could make it difficult for Syria to play a more effective political role.

Actors and Interests in the Israel-Lebanon Crisis

The ongoing Israel-Lebanon crisis can be explained by this aforementioned strategic partnership between Iran and Syria. There are various reasons why Hezbollah opened a second front against Israel (the first front being Hamas' attacks in June). First of all, Hezbollah is seeking to enhance its domestic and regional standing by hitching its wagon to the Palestinian cause. By helping Hamas' hard-line faction, Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah sent a message to the entire Islamic world. This message was that Hezbollah is a champion of the anti-Israel struggle, as opposed to the weak support provided to the Palestinians by the Sunni countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Additionally, Hezbollah wants to strengthen its position in the Lebanese political scene. In particular, it wants to deflect pressure away from demands to disarm, as required by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in September 2004. [See: "Tension Returns Between Jordan and Hamas"]

Since Israel pulled out of southern Lebanon in 2000, the Lebanese militia acquired, from Iran in particular but also from Syria, an arsenal of rockets, estimated to number between 10,000 and 13,000. Some of these rockets have a range of 100 kilometers, providing Hezbollah the capability to strike major Israeli cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv, thus increasing the strategic vulnerability of Israel.

Israel's harsh reaction to Hezbollah's attacks is linked to the regional character of the crisis: it is a message sent to Bashar and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Using the deterrence of its military strength, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has indicated to both Iran and Syria to stop supporting Hezbollah, in addition to ending its support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Yet Iran's and Syria's support for these militant groups are a result of their policy at preventing an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Both states want to hamper the search for an agreement because such an agreement would be against their current interests. Peace between Israel and the Palestinians means the end of the "Palestinian question," which is the sacred cow of Islamic grievances and Arab nationalism. As a result, the Islamic and Arabs regimes could lose a formidable propaganda instrument.

From a geopolitical point of view, such a peace could be a serious strategic challenge for Syria and Iran. For Syria, it means that its position toward Israel will be weaker than it is now. A weakened position would damage Syria's future negotiations with Israel on the return of the Golan Heights. For Iran, an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement could lead toward a pacification of relations between Israel and the Arab states. This pacification could increase Iran's geostrategic perception of being isolated in the region. Moreover, Iran wants to retain Hezbollah as a potential instrument against other Arab regimes. The Iranian leadership wants to continue to demonstrate Shi'a friendship with the Palestinians since this propaganda weapon assists Iran's search for a prominent role in the Middle East region.

Conclusion

Regional factors play a fundamental role in the Israel-Lebanon crisis. Lebanon and the Palestinians are pawns in a regional balance of power game. Iran and Syria are the external powers most involved in the crisis. Tehran strongly supports Hezbollah in order to increase its own role in the region. It does not want peace between the Arabs and Israel and wants to use the current crisis to avoid any sort of agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Using Hezbollah and Hamas' hard-line faction against Israel, Tehran sends a clear message to Washington on what its allies in the region are capable of. Tehran is also using the crisis to draw attention away from its nuclear program.

Damascus, through its support of militant groups fighting Israel, wants to deflect international pressure away from its regime. It is attempting to foment sectarian strife in Lebanon in order to reclaim its influence over that country. Bashar also wants to reduce Syrian internal divisions and unify the country against an external enemy. Also, like Tehran, Damascus does not want an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians because it will weaken Syrian diplomatic capabilities toward Israel on future negotiations over the Golan Heights.

Nevertheless, neither Syria nor Iran want a military conflict with Israel. Olmert understands this reality, and Israel's harsh response toward Lebanon is a clear message to Tehran and Damascus. By threatening to enlarge the conflict, Israel is attempting to obtain the cessation of logistical, financial and military support by Syria and Iran to radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and in the Palestinian Territories.

Syria, more than Iran, has an interest in avoiding military conflict with Israel because Damascus' geostrategic position is weaker than Tehran's. Unlike Iran, Syria has a direct frontier with Israel. Additionally, the Bashar government is in a weaker position domestically than is the current Tehran government. Tehran is concerned with Syria's weaknesses because it could affect its own regional position. Therefore, Iran will be compelled to pursue a softer approach toward the Lebanon crisis if Israel demonstrates the real intention to expand the conflict to Syria. In spite of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric of an Iranian military response against Israel if it attacks Syria, Tehran does not have the capabilities and the political will to engage in a serious conflict with Israel, which would invite involvement by the United States.

Therefore, the crisis between Israel and Lebanon is not merely a conflict between two states, but is a more complicated question involving state actors -- Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iran -- and non-state actors -- Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militant factions. It is in Iran's and Syria's interests to support these armed groups -- especially Hezbollah -- but if Israel threatens to expand the war into the larger region, this support could weaken.

Report Drafted By:
Dario Cristiani